Russia is probably well-prepared to defend against any Ukrainian offensives (apparently several defensive lines have been created), thus this situation with Kherson in Ukrainian hands is a stable state of affairs for both sides. — Tzeentch

Russia has been building massive fortifications all along the front.

The strategy since September seems to be to just defend at minimal cost to themselves and maximum cost to the Ukrainians, committing to the defence of a few places, and relying on the area under consideration simply so large that Ukraine simply cannot advance all that far in such conditions. For all the praise in Western media and social media, sometimes declaring the war already over, at the rate of Ukrainian advances it would not just several years but about a decade to push the front back to the pre-invasion lines. And that does not take into account that as Russian territory in Ukraine decreases it becomes easier to defend what remains (and obviously Crimea is an even bigger problem for an attacker).

The situation now is compatible with Russia organising new offensives or just calculating that setbacks like Kharkiv and Kherson are bad, but as long as they hold a large area on the map it's still a winning position, so they can just be in a defensive posture for years and years.

The United States pressured Ukraine to show willingness to negotiate a few weeks ago.

Then Russia gives up Kherson as a form of 'guarantee' that no offensives for Odessa or Transnistria will take place. — Tzeentch

I hope peace is reached.

However, the purely logistic and military reasons to withdraw from Kherson are sufficient to explain the move as well. Especially since Russian generals took a lot of effort to explain in detail the decision, and key political figures like Kadyrov immediately expressed their support of the decision. If this was a move in some sort of diplomatic game, we might expect it to be more surprising and unexplained.

The reality on the ground in Kherson was supplying the military and the civilians was a major hassle and the Ukrainians were shelling the damn that would if not drown plenty of Russian troops outright would cut them off entirely from resupply. Apparently Russia attempted to drain the reservoir but that didn't work.

If the damn is simply at risk of failing at any time, then withdrawing from Kherson is essentially necessary. For all the embarrassment of the withdrawal, thousands of troops drowning or being permanently cut off would be far worse and immediately people would be ridiculing the Russians for not knowing the risks and taking the necessary measures!

The dynamics of damn failure is also relevant to note. Any cracks lead to leaks, and leaks of high pressure water develop exponentially after a certain threshold of water movement. Once slow seepage turns into rapid water movement, high pressure leaks basically turn into abrasive water cutting machines and rapidly expand until structural failure. If Ukrainians are shelling the damn, it may also be difficult to bring in the large engineering project required to fix any problems.

So, although it could be also part of some diplomatic process, the purely practical reasons to withdraw also provide sufficient explanation.

Huh. So much for Dugin. (I think he is mixing up Frazer's The Golden Bough with Bellow's Henderson the Rain King - not that it matters in this context.)

Russian official media has been pretty tight-lipped about the "Kherson maneuver", as it is described by the MoD. In sharp contrast with Kharkiv retreat, most milbloggers and nationalists, as well as public figures like Kadyrov and Prigozhin stick to the party line this time around. Looks like they finally got the message.

There have been mixed messages coming in about the retreat. Many expected this to be a bloody rout, and there were early reports to that effect. Some experts asserted that it would be impossible for the Russians to pull out in anything less than a week. Others describe it as a well-organized retreat. We'll know more in the coming days, but on balance so far it looks more like the latter. Apparently, they had been preparing this for weeks before the official announcement, and managed to pull out most of their working equipment in the meanwhile. (Also, they looted everything they could from the city, from museum collections to toilets and sinks, and trashed what they couldn't take - but that's nothing new.) Their best fighting units withdrew as well, but there have also been reports about some units that were told to change into civvies and piss off any way they can.

This changing into civvies trick had been reported by locals many times, even before the retreat. I am not sure what's up with that. Perhaps the military were mixing with civilian evacuees in order to avoid becoming targets for Ukrainian strikes when they crossed the river?

Perhaps the military were mixing with civilian evacuees in order to avoid becoming targets for Ukrainian strikes when they crossed the river? — SophistiCat

You're always going to have the problem that some troops are needed to protect the retreat who, which is particularly more problematic across a water body.

In the evacuation of Dunkirk troops with this task were instructed to simply fight to the death. In the case of Kherson things aren't as desperate and it was planned in detail, so the last troops holding position and then trying to escape in clandestinely might be the only feasible plan for the very last troops.

Of course, could also be just rumours spread for some purpose by either side or then just spring up spontaneously.



I read this passage you cite several times, but I don't see where is he calling to execute Putin.

First he seems to say this is the last retreat that's acceptable to him, a line has been reached, but what goes with that is the current situation is still acceptable, just any further embarrassment and he'd be really angry, for realz.

Duggin also just mentions the autocrat is "fully responsible" which seems pretty far from literally meaning execution. I've been "fully responsible" for a lot of things in my corporate career, yet my fellow board members have never executed me.

You can't ban the opposition parties, ban dissenting media, ban people leaving the country, impose marshal law (i.e. no due process), and then call what you have "freedom". — boethius

The opposition paries are not banned.

Only one of the main opposition parties was banned (Opposition Platform). It was an openly pro-Russian party that maintained close ties with Russian officials and Russian ruling party before the invasion. (One of its leaders, Viktor Medvedchuk, has longstanding personal ties to Vladimir Putin. After he was arrested on treason charges, Putin had him exchanged for over 200 Ukrainian prisoners, including all of Azov commanders, as well as foreign prisoners who were sentenced to death in Donbass. That provoked a lot of anger among Russian war hawks.)

It should also be noted that although the parties themselves were banned, their elected representatives were not ejected from legislatures, and members of local governments from those parties continued in their capacities. (Unlike, for example, members of the banned British Fascist party, who were interned until the end of the war.) The Opposition Platform simply renamed its faction in Ukraine's parliament. — SophistiCat

Likewise, only pro-Russian media, were banned, not all independent media, and people can leave the country as much as they want if their aren't men of a certain age cohort.

As ↪Olivier5
pointed out, there isn't actually credible nuclear ransom. — ssu

The opposition paries are not banned.

... — SophistiCat — Olivier5

Love the way you guys are so buried in your own reality you've had to start quoting each other.

The opposition paries are not banned. — Olivier5

This was headline news ... are you sure you've been following the same conflict?

Zelenskiy says parties such as Viktor Medvedchuk’s Opposition Platform for Life are ‘aimed at division or collusion’ — Ukraine suspends 11 political parties with links to Russia

Likewise, only pro-Russian media, were banned, not all independent media, and people can leaving the country as much as they want if their aren't men of a certain age cohort — Olivier5

"You're free to do what the king says! And to fight in the king's army!! Can't you see it!!! Can't you see the freedom!!!"

The country’s national security and defence council took the decision to ban the parties from any political activity. Most of the parties affected were small, but one of them, the Opposition Platform for Life, has 44 seats in the 450-seat Ukrainian parliament. — Ukraine suspends 11 political parties with links to Russia

Now, if I remember one of the recent discussions, the idea proposed was Ukrainian state decision to wage uncompromising war was "democratish" due to mere presence of the elected representatives somewhere in the mix.

However, I'm pretty sure that concept of democratic legitimation of decisions requires elected political parties not being banned. Feel free to argue otherwise, if you would have us see you enjoy those freedoms of political expression that you are totally fine denying to others (as long as someone is alleging they are "linked" to Russia or "pro" Russia in some way, no matter how vague).

There has been a lot of discussion in the press about whether Ukraine can push forward in south Kherson to follow up the Russian retreat. This NYT piece gives an account of the different possibilities. The Ukrainians' proven ability to keep plans out of view adds to the opacity.

It doesn't seem the Russians are free to redeploy their forces further east because that would invite Ukraine to push directly toward Crimea.

You're free to do what the king says! — boethius

You know as well as I do that the Ukrainians are much freer than the Russians.

The Russians are actually digging fortifications in Crimea - something that would have been unthinkable even a year ago. Of course, such moves aren't always what they seem. Prigozhin's much-advertised "Wagner Lines" are pure theater, for example.

Yes, there does appear to be a lot of performative art in the preparations. On the other hand, the trenches being dug near Belgorod are less likely to be employed than the one's in Crimea that are in the path of Ukraine's stated goal to take the territory back.

Time for some more outrageous propaganda.

https://newleftreview.org/sidecar/posts/getting-closer?fbclid=IwAR1Wvtzz3bT3Ar_x8sSuPtpwSEQWxIF4KLIQhuylm64jgzJQTX0YrDJ3GdY

This part is particularly chewy:

In the Westernized mind, Putin and Xi, Trump and Truss, Bolsonaro and Meloni, Orbán and Kaczyński are all the same, all ‘fascists’. With historical meaning restored to the uprooted individualized life in late-capitalist anomie, there is once more a chance to fight and even die for, if nothing else, then for the common ‘values’ of humanity – an opportunity for heroism that seemed forever lost in the narrow horizons and the hedged parochialism enshrined in the complex institutions of postwar and postcolonial Western Europe. What makes such idealism even more attractive is that the fighting and dying can be delegated to proxies, people today, soon perhaps algorithms.

Pretty fancy language if you are simply objecting to your neighbor stealing all your stuff and people.

↪neomac
Huh. So much for Dugin. (I think he is mixing up Frazer's The Golden Bough with Bellow's Henderson the Rain King - not that it matters in this context.) — SophistiCat

On a hill at Bomma near the mouth of the Congo dwells Namvulu Vumu, King of the Rain and Storm. Of some of the tribes on the Upper Nile we are told that they have no kings in the common sense; the only persons whom they acknowledge as such are the Kings of the Rain, Mata Kodou, who are credited with the power of giving rain at the proper time, that is, the rainy season. Before the rains begin to fall at the end of March the country is a parched and arid desert; and the cattle, which form the people's chief wealth, perish for lack of grass. So, when the end of March draws on, each householder betakes himself to the King of the Rain and offers him a cow that he may make the blessed waters of heaven to drip on the brown and withered pastures. If no shower falls, the people assemble and demand that the king shall give them rain; and if the sky still continues cloudless, they rip up his belly, in which he is believed to keep the storms. Amongst the Bari tribe one of these Rain Kings made rain by sprinkling water on the ground out of a handbell. (The Golden Bough - J.G. Frazer)

I read this passage you cite several times, but I don't see where is he calling to execute Putin. — boethius

Agreed. But Dugin's complaint might sound now more ominous than ever to Putin.

Catch 22!

In liberated Kherson, residents between jubilation and disbelief

After eight and a half months of Russian occupation, the Ukrainian forces were greeted with emotion by the population of this city in the south of the country.

By Rémy Ourdan for Le Monde (Kherson)
Posted today at 06:57, updated at 09:12

The fog of dawn still envelops Kherson when the first inhabitants appear on Freedom Square, only about twenty at first. Few of them had the privilege to participate in the first celebrations of the city's liberation, the evening before, dancing around a brazier. Many, in Kherson cut off from the world, heard only a distant and uncertain echo of the historic event of November 11, through the stories of neighbors, or because they saw, in their street, a column of Russian soldiers leaving or Ukrainian fighters entering the city.

The first visual confirmation of the recapture of Kherson by the Kiev armed forces, for these people who had no access to television or social networks during the night, comes at dawn on Saturday 12 November: a Ukrainian flag is planted in Freedom Square, in front of the deserted building of the regional administration. It floats in the wind on what was a monument dedicated to the heroes of the Maidan revolution, destroyed by Russian forces in the first days of military occupation.

There are also these four police officers on duty around a van, who seem to be wondering what they are doing there, alone at this early hour, in a city which the Ukrainian general staff fears is still infested with plainclothes Russian agents, or soldiers from Moscow who missed the hour of departure before the bridges connecting it to the other bank of the Dnieper were cut.

A first military jeep appears in the fog. Three special forces commandos emerge, bearded, drawn features. Immediately grabbed by the inhabitants, entwined, congratulated, they quickly put on a smile that had perhaps disappeared from their face over the months of fierce fighting. The three fellows, in control of their emotions, seem almost surprised by the intensity of the welcome, by the gestures and the words of these Ukrainians who cling to them as one would cling, after a long time under water, to a lifeline.

"Surreal"

“Are you real? ! asks a woman . She wants to touch them, kiss them. Another woman brings yellow and blue ribbons – the colors of Ukraine – from her shop. People ask soldiers to write a word on them with a black marker, then wrap them around their wrists or pin them to their coats. On the other side of the square, men hoist a flag on the roof of the Ukraine cinema. "These Ukrainian flags everywhere, I can't believe my eyes" , a lady is moved.

The central square is gradually filling up. The soldiers of the 28th Mechanized  Brigade, at the forefront of the battle for the reconquest of the Kherson region, arrive at the city center. Then there are the police forces. After eight and a half months of occupation, suffering, silence, emotion overwhelms Freedom Square. The people of Kherson are in tears. Young girls hug the soldiers. Children wave flags. Everyone wants a hug, a shoulder to rest on for a second, a smile to share.

In a city without electricity, without water, without phone, everyone takes out a cell phone with a miraculously charged battery and takes pictures. Memories to look back on later. "As soon as the phone network is restored, I will send these pictures to my children abroad," says one woman. "You won't have to wait too long," smiles the special forces officer. He orders a soldier to deploy three Starlink antennas in the square. After a few minutes, the first phones begin to vibrate, releasing jams of waiting messages. The satellite network is so quickly taken over that it quickly becomes overwhelmed, impossible to make any call or send a picture. No matter. It's time for joy.

In the center of Freedom Square, one takes pictures in front of the destroyed monument, where residents lay flowers in tribute to those who fell in 2014 for the independence of Ukraine. In front of the Ukraine cinema, waiters at Topy, the only café open in a ghost town where all the curtains are down, take out five tables on the terrace and start serving hot tea and coffee. "It's surreal..." murmurs a young man. "It's almost as if this is peace, normal life."

A humiliating retreat for the Moscow army

Some inhabitants, seeing the presence of a journalist, start to spontaneously evoke the months of occupation, "the fear of the Russians", "the lack of everything", "the wait for the return of our guys". A woman is indignant: "Why is Putin doing all this? Why this war? Ask him this question in your newspaper!" Another tells us that "the Russians stole everything, the food in the stores, the books in the libraries, the carpets in the wedding hall, and even the little train in the kindergarten!"

Although it was less sudden than in the Kiev region and less chaotic than in the Kharkiv region, the retreat from Kherson was just as humiliating for the Moscow army. It marked the third bitter failure of the Russian war in Ukraine, while the city, conquered on 2 March, was the only Ukrainian regional capital to have passed under Russian control.

Zhanetta, a doctor whose apartment overlooks the square, saw "these checkpoints where Russian soldiers were stopping men, searching cars, searching phones." "The Russians said they were there 'forever'. We looked at them from our windows, without saying anything. We were waiting for our soldiers so impatiently," she says in a choked voice.

Anton, a young photographer who aspires to work for the press, was unable to document the occupation. "I was too scared. I only left my house twice in eight and a half months," he says. Once to see a friend downstairs. The other time, it was to try to flee Kherson, towards the territory under Ukrainian control. We went through about 30 checkpoints and at the last one, the Russian soldiers wouldn't let us through. It was a terrifying journey." Olga, a young psychologist who specializes in medical checkups for sailors in the port of Kherson, also didn't venture onto the streets of her city during the occupation. "The Russians came once to search my house. Then I stayed at home with my parents."

"This is the best day of my life!"

A man parks an old black Soviet-era Pobeda at the curb. Strollers gather to admire the antique. The car is equipped with six speakers, and it blasts I Have Nothing by Whitney Houston. "Don't walk away from me/I have nothing, nothing, nothing/If I don't have you," Whitney sings. "You, Ukraine," sing the young people surrounding the car.

Olga shares a bottle of "Ukrainian champagne" with another woman. They drink from the bottle, like so many others in Freedom Square. "This is liberation. This is the best day of my life," says one man. Some begin to improvise dances. The Ukrainian anthem aside, the most popular tune is Chervona Kalyna ("Red Berries"), an old song that rocker Andriy Khlyvnyuk "Boombox" covered in the days after the Russian invasion and which became a rallying song of the Ukrainian resistance. Soldiers' jeeps that continue to drive through Kherson also play it. The crowd is waving flags and singing at the top of their lungs.

Shortly before sunset, the three guys from the special forces leave. The back of their pick-up has become a kind of altar covered with offerings: flowers, chocolate bars, children's drawings... Those of the 28th Brigade also leave, followed by the policemen. They return to their bases, away from the city. Oleh, a police special forces fighter, is one of the last to sign flags and ribbons. "I have no words to express what I feel, my emotion," he says modestly. I am from Kherson. This is my hometown, I used to live here." Oleh does not want to talk about his departure in February, or his war. Another day, perhaps. "Please, write 'Glory to Ukraine' on this flag," a little girl asks him.

Night falls. In the distance, Ukrainian artillery fires a salvo of shells. The war is not over," says a soldier. Our comrades are on the front, advancing towards other territories to be liberated. We have received orders to spend a day or two in Kherson to see the population, but tomorrow we join them." In the darkened city, the girls stop dancing. "I am a little afraid that the Russians will punish Kherson for being so happy," says Natalya. Liberation is good, but it is not yet peace.

Ah, there you go, thanks. For some reason I thought the Rain King in Bellow was an interpolation from Frazer, not a literal reference. In hindsight, Dugin is much likelier to have read Frazer than Bellow.

Question:

How much should Putin + team be allowed to get away with scot-free?
_{(Similarly, is there a point at which enough is enough and hands-on international intervention is warranted?)}

Assimilating and re-culturating all of Ukraine? Grabbing Crimea and Donbas? Plain old-fashioned genocide? The child abductions? Nuclear deployment? The destruction? All or none of the above? (there are a few options/limits here, these are just examples)

Surely there are limits somewhere as to what can be tolerated, though I'm guessing it differs depending on who you ask including what the responses should be.

Surely there are limits somewhere as to what can be tolerated, though I'm guessing it differs depending on who you ask including what the responses should be. — jorndoe

Exactly. "Or what?" Is the only relevant question. Putin ought no get away with so much as throwing litter if the punishment is easily administered and without undesirable ramifications.

The whole point of this debate is the cost and method of preventing the humanitarian harms Putin's actions cause. It's no good preventing them, for example, if the humanitarian cost of prevention is higher than that which is being prevented.

It's a common propaganda trope to present only the negative which the campaign de jour is against, never the cost of the campaign itself.

"What ought we let Putin get away with?" is a pointless question without it's counterpart - the consequences.

Personally I'm not up for sitting in a nuclear wasteland with nothing but my schadenfreude at Putin's defeat. Somehow I think that as the next Putin-a-like takes up the reins of tyranny left behind, the value of that smugness might fade.

, so, while attempting to evaluate consequences, where would you set limits, and what to do about them? For example, what to do about the destruction, if you don't think they should get away with it?

_{(Involves future conjectures and isn't quite simple. For one, you can't ignore the Ukrainians themselves, had they said "Let's shut down the government and have Moscow take over", then surely that'd be fine with most. For another, I don't think the child abductions can be swept under the rug.)}

@Isaac@Isaac

Agreed. But Dugin's complaint might sound more ominous than ever to Putin. — neomac

I seriously doubt it. Putin has never met Dugin and never referenced him.

We were first told the sanctions would compel powerful oligarchs to overthrow Putin any day ... any day. Dugin is an ersatz replacement in that narrative.

Thinkers without power maybe dangerous to history, even civilisation as a whole, but rarely any specific individual has been murdered by thought.

↪Isaac, so, while attempting to evaluate consequences, where would you set limits, and what to do about them? — jorndoe

Why would there be limits in evaluating consequences?

Or do you mean to say "yeah, yeah, yeah, we should consider some consequences but we still must impose limits on Putin," as if to say Putin is a rambunctious school boy and we the school master, and sure, boys will be boys and invade a country or two on occasion, but there must be some limits placed on the young lad.

To repeat @Isaac's point, if we can't do anything about Putin's nuclear weapons, our means to discipline him by force maybe extremely limited.

So far, NATO has certainly accepted the limitations of only supplying arms and information to Ukraine, and extremely limited arms that are of no real danger to the Russian forces as a whole or significant damage on Russia itself. The consequence of this is that it takes millions of traumatised Ukrainians and tens' of thousands, if not already hundreds of thousands (we don't really know), of Ukrainian deaths and casualties to use Ukraine as the striking rod against Putin's arrogance.

If we know (i.e. NATO is firmly decided in their policy to not actually help Ukraine win, but just let Ukraine believe that) that Ukraine can't win and that a compromise would be better in nearly every metric of wellbeing for Ukrainians, on both sides of the front, then the first question that arises is if this is a moral manipulation of Ukrainians for our Western purposes (whether cynical geopolitics or some genuine moral stand against Putin to make sure he "doesn't get away with it" in line of how we held to account Bush and subsequent US regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan and didn't let the US get away with it along with torture and other law breaking ... oh sorry, never mind--but, even putting aside the hypocrisy, the moral question remains of punishing party A by manipulating party B to engage in the actual costly fighting and great harm against their self-interest).

Then, even worse, if the policy is not to allow Ukraine to "win" and every single day a compromise will net them more good than bad ... how do we know such an outcome is even adequate punishment to Putin? If he's not going to actually lose?

Historically, an army that wins a war is often far stronger at the end than at the beginning, even with a lot of casualties (US after the civil war and Russia after WWII are typical examples of extremely costly wars nevertheless "strengthening" the winning party).

Why would there be limits in evaluating consequences? — boethius

Hmm? I'm not sure you read my comments right.

The limits are between what to tolerate and not to tolerate, what they may get away with and not get away with, and this may be informed by perceived consequences of doing this-or-that or not doing anything. Gave some examples (not exhaustive).

I'm not sure if would run with doing nothing (at all?) due to a perceived threat of ☢ world war 3. If so, then that would be one example of a limit. I'm sure others would entertain other limits.

So, that's what limits was about. (You have any to recommend here?)

As an aside, James Longman from ABC News posted some maps (Nov 12, 2022)...

I seriously doubt it. Putin has never met Dugin and never referenced him. — boethius

Nevertheless Following the murder, Putin became “seriously interested” in Dugin. He sent him a telegram of condolences, and has since encouraged the administration’s contacts with the philosopher. It was one month after Daria Dugina’s murder, on September 30, that Putin first used one of Dugin’s favorite slurs: “the Anglo-Saxons” (in the sense of the presumed Anglo-American hegemony in the West). A Kremlin insider explains this as a direct result of Dugina’s death — and the way it was exploited to show Putin that “the enemies” are attacking “the upholders of traditional values,” those values being, of course, very dear to Putin. https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/11/03/hawkish-times-need-hawkish-people

We were first told the sanctions would compel powerful oligarchs to overthrow Putin any day ... any day. Dugin is an ersatz replacement in that narrative. — boethius

Sure, there is not even a single grain of truth in what they write. Putin's elite supporters are happy more than ever after the glorious retreat from Kherson. And "everything is going according to plan", right?
BTW you too stop spreading Western propaganda [1], the withdrawal is not an embarrassement at all: The Kremlin remained defiant Friday, insisting that battlefield developments in the Kherson region in no way represented an embarrassment for Putin.
https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-kyiv-europe-moscow-7dcca261a8af0641f9a3c11cc7f644b0


[1]

For all the embarrassment of the withdrawal, thousands of troops drowning or being permanently cut off would be far worse and immediately people would be ridiculing the Russians for not knowing the risks and taking the necessary measures! — boethius

Nevertheless Following the murder, Putin became “seriously interested” in Dugin. He sent him a telegram of condolences, and has since encouraged the administration’s contacts with the philosopher. — neomac

This would be true if any daughter of literally anyone in Russia was murdered by a Ukrainian operation.

And war policy hawks, even "philosophical" one's like Dugin, are rarely, if ever, some sort of threat. It would be like saying The Project of a New American Century and company, was a threat to Bush since he didn't invade Iran like many were insisting.

It's naive grasping at straws this whole narrative that Putin will be personally overthrown by someone for some reason. The oligarchs didn't overthrow Putin, the protesters in the streets didn't overthrow Putin, neither the rank and file or the generals, and Dugin is just now next on the list of people that have not overthrown Putin.

Sure, there is not even a single grain of truth in what they write. Putin's elite supporters are happy more than ever after the glorious retreat from Kherson. And "everything is going according to plan", right? — neomac

How does this even respond to my comment.

Live in extreme hyperbole with zero grip on reality if you want.

Not even the Kremlin's position is that everything is going "according to plan". Again, a delusional narrative born from the obvious fact that the Northern offensive by the Russians served to fix troops and attention there, and away from the south (which obviously worked in that respect), but somehow its necessary for Zelenskyites to get into all sorts of mental gymnastics to "prove" the Russian army is incompetent and does nothing right ... despite occupying nearly 20% of Ukraine and large gas fields.

Certainly plan A would be Kiev just capitulate, but clearly the plan B was to conquer strategically useful territory that could be plausibly held with a relatively small force; territory that is largely Russian speaking, links to Crimea and secures fresh water to Crimea and has been conquered held now since February, which is good evidence it is plausible to hold it.

Likewise, there's plenty of legitimate subjects of debate. Militarily, perhaps the Northern offensives "worked" in facilitating the conquest of the South, but was nevertheless too costly. Just because something achieves its objective does not mean it is cost-effective.

In the same vein, even if the South can be plausibly held, that's not a long term guarantee and enough
NATO arms and Ukrainian cannon fodder will retake it piece by piece. That Russia has held the territory until now and likely for at least a year, only demonstrates that the plan was plausible and executed well enough (to succeed in the plan for likely over a year).

Beyond military considerations, there are plenty of domestic political and economic and geopolitical subjects of debate as well. Useful subjects to debate. For example, will the anti-Wester coalition Russia is building going to last and going to succeed? That's far from clear, but what is clear is it is being build bric by bric.

Instead of constructive debate between positions that have merit, we (living in the real world) mostly must simply deal with endless rank hypocrisy from Zelenkyites.

For example, the "meme" of "everything is going to plan," which no Russian official has ever said (saying one thing was part of "a plan" is not the same as saying literally everything that has happened and all Ukrainian decisions and setbacks are "part of the plan"; Russian officials described this withdrawal from Kherson as a difficult decision, but the pros outweigh the cons, and not "the plan all along", so the critique is just dumb), is thrown at the Russians ... well, are things going according to plan for the Ukrainians?

When the offensives started we were made all sorts of promises about Russian lines collapsing, morale so bad the entire Russian army would essentially just disband into the fog, taking Kherson by force and encircling the Russians there (not just Russia withdrawing), and pushing deep into Russian territory all the way back to the Russian border!!

Has that plan happened?

The limits are between what to tolerate and not to tolerate, what they may get away with and not get away with, and this may be informed by perceived consequences of doing this-or-that or not doing anything. Gave some examples (not exhaustive). — jorndoe

Did you read my comment? I literally describe your thought process.

"Tolerate" and "get away with it" implies some power to do something about whatever is the annoyance.

Power that may simply not be there to impose our ideas.

Why people that go down this path of actually describing how the West will "hold Putin to account" invariably end their own analysis in Nuclear war, but Zelenskyites then make the insane conclusion that therefore Russia will be nuked if it continues and simply escalates to more force if Ukraine has some success against less force.

Whereas the correct conclusion is that since basically any method to really harm Putin may result in nuclear war, NATO won't go there as there's zero reason to take such risks on behalf of Ukraine, and the current situation is actually more described as a "freinemies" situation between NATO and Russia in order to completely screw Europe and make the world far more militaristic (good for US, UK and ... Russian! Arms industry) and far more profitable for fossil exporters (just like the US and Russia!).

For, remember my hypothesis in this conversation: NATO could defeat Russia in Ukraine, even just via arms, training and information supplies, but chooses not to, instead drip feeding weapons systems that are insufficient to actually defeat Russian forces and cause real and not merely perceived propaganda problems in the Western echo chamber (aka. pressuring the Russians to leave an area can be presented as some great victory in Western media, and just common sense tactical decisions in Russian media; which is far from an actual military problem of lines collapsing and thousands of troops being surrounded and sieged for months in a city with no way to resupply or relieve them, a situation that would actually create a real threat to Putin's grip on power).

And NATO chooses not to ... because of the nuclear weapons.

Sometimes US policy hawks simply admit this is indeed the policy, but better to bleed the Russians in Ukraine than "fight them here". Again, completely delusional argument, which, at least on the part of US policy hawks, is at least not a genuine belief but just propaganda rhetoric to justify a policy that benefits the US arms and fossil industries.

, OK, let me just pause you there for a moment (you're repeating).

In case of good old-fashioned :death: genocide in Ukraine at the hands of the invaders, would deployment of NATO/Polish/US/Romainian troops directly in Ukraine be warranted? Would doing so be unacceptable due to a perceived threat of ☢ world war 3?

In the current situation, are sanctions warranted, but Ukrainian support should be withdrawn towards forcing a peace deal where, say, Crimea and Donbas become parts of Russia, and that's then the accepted goal? Except, if the invaders were to (want to) absorb additional regions, would additional actions then be the way to go?

Are the child abductions acceptable collateral damage, and so there's nothing further to be done here? (To show an extreme limit, I'm guessing no one would nuke Moscow due to this.)

Those are examples you might say are warranted or acceptable, or where something else should be done (or not done). You'd (probably) want to add justification as you see them, but those are examples of limits. Where are they?

The UN has made a principled statement about what's un/acceptable by vote, but has limited mandate of action:

Resolution ES‑11/2 reaffirmed the UN's former commitments and obligations under its Charter, and reiterated its demand that Russia withdraw from Ukraine's recognized sovereign territory; it also deplored, expressed grave concern over and condemned attacks on civilian populations and infrastructure. Fourteen principles were agreed. — United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES-11/2

↪boethius, OK, let me just pause you there for a moment (you're repeating). — jorndoe

You clearly did not read what I wrote the first time, therefore I repeated it. What else do you expect?

In case of good old-fashioned :death: genocide in Ukraine at the hands of the invaders, would deployment of NATO/Polish/US/Romainian troops directly in Ukraine be warranted? Would doing so be unwarranted due to a perceived threat of ☢ world war 3? — jorndoe

First, let's correct your statement to say "perceived genocide in Ukraine" to remove the propaganda technique of presenting your emotional driver as certain but any basis of criticism of your plan of actions as less certain.

We would not know what the actual risk of WWIII, but likewise we would not know if there is an actual genocide or something simply staged by Ukrainian intelligence and purported to be a genocide.

Which is exactly the situation we currently have. Ukrainian intelligence continuously alleges various forms of genocide in Ukraine, West continuously cites nuclear weapons as the reasons for their caution and not directly intervening ... and throws some doubts on Ukrainian claims when necessary.

The result of this calculus that exists right now as the basis for NATO policy is not intervening directly in Ukraine. So, in terms of what NATO would do about such a scenario, the scenario is literally what we have right now, and NATO's non-direct-intervention is your answer.

Likewise, there is since years literally this exact same scenario in China where the West perceives a genocide ... but we don't do anything about it due to nuclear weapons and no way to conventionally invade China anyways.

Are the child abductions acceptable collateral damage, and so there's nothing further to be done here? — jorndoe

Again, propaganda. Collateral damage to what NATO actions?

Collateral damage is unintended consequences of your own actions, not someone else's.

There's lot's of actual dictatorships in the world, not mere "authoritarians" doing all sorts of horrible things. Why doesn't the West intervene in all of them to protect human rights? The nominal answer is the West simply does not have the power to do so and cannot be "world police" (ironically an expression used to ridicule the idea of intervening in situation there is no policy to do anything about, but also an expression used to justify US intervention as the "world's unipolar superpower" to intervene when it is the policy). The real answer is of course US policy always happens to align with US geopolitical interests and interventions, whether "humanitarian" or not, are always justified as humanitarian and (at least partly) for freedom or whatever, but mention the same logic in some other situation and even worse propping up a worse regime (like not only failing to invade but supporting and selling arms to places like Saudi Arabia -- how much "freedom" exists there?) and one is immediately brandied as the most naive of geopolitical connoisseurs.

Those are examples you might say are warranted, or where something else should be done (or not done). You'd (probably) want to add justification as you see them, but those are examples of limits. Where are they? — jorndoe

If you actually do intend to stop just re-posting lists of feel-good propaganda without making any point, and want to actually engage in debate, the fallacy in your reasoning is confusing moral limits with "power to do something about it" limits.

Morally, we should not (by definition) place any limits on the goodness of our intentions and intended outcomes of our actions. We should strive to bring about as good a world as possible for all life and humanity.

If you ask "should we do better if we could do better?" the answer is essentially by definition that better is better than not-better, so we should definitely prioritise that.

However, our power to actually bring about our intention is severely limited.

Terrible things happen in China, North Korea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Egypt, the United States, such as torture. We don't invade China or the United States to correct problems because we have no practical means of doing so.

If the reasons for our inaction are geopolitically clear (we need Chinese totalitarianism to keep communist workers from unionising and making our stuff more expensive, along with total disregard for dumping toxins in the environment and creating "cancer villages", again, so our stuff isn't too expensive), then there isn't even a debate. The idea of trying to cut China off from the global trading system and collapse their economy and government doesn't even come up as an option to achieve our moral goals, much less pour arms into any groups willing to fight with the The People's Liberation Army.

We are only debating Ukraine in the first place because the US sees some geopolitical benefits for fuelling the war. Those benefits are arguable, but clearly the US administration perceives them as practically achievable or then just distraction from the cowardly withdrawal of Afghanistan and domestic inflation woes. Whatever the case maybe, the fact that you naively ask such questions without mentioning all the "bad" situations we do nothing about, don't even consider doing anything about, is what is wrong with your world view.

The correct formulation of your question is first whether the situation in Ukraine has any practical way of being ameliorated through violence and the support of violence, or it is in a category such as China or North Korea or Iran or Egypt of Uzbekistan or the US, that we can't do anything about with external violence and the support of violence, whatever is happening there anyways?

Second question would be is violence and the support of violence to achieve our noble ends even the best tool available, or negotiation and compromise?

For example, the nominal justification of sanctions is to apply pressure as leverage to compel the other party to do what we want, not simply punish their civilian populations (that would just be cynical and counter productive to our humanitarian aims). Now, has a position even been formulated that the sanctions would be dropped if Russia does A, B, and C.

If the answer is "withdraw from all Ukraine including Crimea" well obviously the Russians won't accept that. So, the final question is what level of compromise with Russia is preferable to more bloodshed.

If your answer is "no compromise!" then you are simply a violent fanatic and do not actually have any humanitarian or freedom or political rights objectives, but your mentioning of such values is "limited", as you might say, to unsound and fallacious arguments to serve your propaganda.

If your policy is to fight to the last Ukrainian in uncompromising and childish diplomatic positions (like "I won't talk to Putin! I won't come out of my room until Putin is gone!!!" ), then Ukrainian welfare, much less anyone else's, is not your objective, just living vicariously a violent delusion through the deaths of Ukrainians.

For example, what to do about the destruction, if you don't think they should get away with it? — jorndoe

I think I've made my preferred solution quite clear - end the war, cede territory if need be, then support those Russians (and newly 'Russian' Ukrainians) who are fighting for regime change in Russia. And while we're at it, do the same in America so we're less likely to get into this mess again. Reduce nuclear weapon stocks to near zero. Reduce our reliance on oil (truly at the heart of all this). Oh, and end global capitalism.

As @boethius points out, you seem to be implying that we're holding back some sanction we have available to use for if Putin does something really bad. He's already done something really bad. He's invaded another country and taken little to no care over the civilian casualties caused in doing so. Did you think we were in some way OK with that? There's literally nothing we can do that wouldn't make matters worse. We're already making matters worse just by profiteering, but that has tolerable consequences (tolerable to them, that is).

What is this punishment you think we've been holding in reserve for child abduction that we we decided would have been 'too much' in response to Bucha?

We allowed a kleptocrat to inherit a stockpile of world-ending scale weapons and did nothing about it. Not only did we do nothing about it, but we encouraged him to make more, and then poked him with a big stick to see if he'd bite. The Ukrainians are now lying in the bed we made.