Are all Gettier problems fallacious: do the conclusions go beyond what the evidence actually supports? — TheMadFool

So you see a cow shaped object and believe its a cow but it's actually a cloth.

If you "suspect" the familiar silhouette is a cow then your "suspicion" is justified for further investigation.

If you "believe" it's a cow you jump to the conclusion (all cow shaped silhouettes are actual cows - which is unjustified)

This unjustified belief is proven unjustified when investigated and seen to be a cloth not a cow.

Your belief there is a cow in your field currently pertains to an object (the cloth) that isn't a cow. This belief is false and unjustified.

But if you believe there is a cow in your field "somewhere" but not necessarily the object you're looking at (the cloth) - for example because you hear a distant "moo" (additional information) then your belief is correct and justified when, and only when, you find both the cloth and the actual cow.

I don't see any contradiction in the situation other then the meaning of the term "belief" "justification" and "true knowledge" as with respect to the observer (subjects) observations and consequent conclusions (beliefs)

The devil is in the detail. In exactly how we use each word in the object-observer relationship during time (the time it takes to go around the field and establish the truth of the situation).

If you don't factor in time and space. How can you establish whether the silhouette of a cow is the cloth or the cow, or where the other cow is? In a single moment in time the true identity of the silhouette and the location of the cow cannot be known simultaneously.

The belief that they can is where the fallacy comes from.

A persuasive argument. However,

You are right that what is at stake is the meanings of "belief", "justification" and "knowledge". But that just means that you need to engage with Gettier's definition of justification which specifies that a justification may be a justification even when the belief is false. One problem is that if no belief can be justified unless it is true, all claims to knowledge must be based on an infinite regress and it is hard to see how new knowledge could ever be acquired by anyone and your use of the words would be very different from ordinary use.

You are right that the devil is in the detail here. But the Gettier problems are based on the fact (at least I think it is a fact) that truth and falsity do not wait for our actual and empirical process of learning what they are. We discover truths. I mean that if we articulate a possibility, either it is true or it is false, there and then. Suppose I believe, as I sit here, that there is a beer in the fridge. Either there is a beer in the fridge or there is not. I can only know which when I get to the fridge, but the beer is already there or not.

I think that the Gettier cases are generated in the gap between objective truth/falsity and awareness of truth/falsity. I mean it is set up by the situation that we know something that S does not; the problems disappear as soon as S is aware of the truth and abandons the false belief. They also depend on the exact formulation chosen for the justification and the knowledge, which I think is suspicious, though I don't think I can prove anything. Neither of these is a conclusive argument, but I think they at least defuse the issues; it is significant that most people do not want to abandon or even modify the JTB.

You are right that what is at stake is the meanings of "belief", "justification" and "knowledge". But that just means that you need to engage with Gettier's definition of justification which specifies that a justification may be a justification even when the belief is false — Ludwig V

I did engage with it. Considering his defintion I disagree. Is that not engaging and then choosing whether it makes reasonable sense to you or not. It is possible to disagree with a historical philosophers views. If it wasn't then how would we make any philosophical progress?

I am convinced by persuasive people. Until someone more persuasive convinces me otherwise by outlining the flaw with the previous persons basis for persuasion. That's just sensible.

which specifies that a justification may be a justification even when the belief is false — Ludwig V

Justification (that shadow over there looks like a cow) is justified even when the belief (that it therefore a cow) is false. Obviously not. The only justification is that (it may be a cow but I'm not sure it is yet). Because it allows for the possibility that the shadow is not that of a cow.

Another example: justification (to imprison someone) is still justification even when the belief (that they committed a crime) is false. Yikes. I think not.

One problem is that if no belief can be justified unless it is true, all claims to knowledge must be based on an infinite regress and it is hard to see how new knowledge could ever be acquired by anyone and your use of the words would be very different from ordinary use. — Ludwig V

Not an infinite regress. Just a regression to the truth. Where one's belief/ collection of beliefs about what is true matches what is actually the case. That is knowledge.

In essence using logic to remove the nonsense and get to the bottom of things - the actual knowledge that always exists. After all something definitively true doesn't change does it, otherwise it isn't true? Physics laws and principles are based on their constancy - their permanent unchanging nature. That's why they are considered true and useful in the pursuit of understanding how they determine the interactions between things.

Accurate assumptions (true beliefs) lead to accurate outcomes (predictions or results) when applied. False assumptions have no such power to predict or elucidate correct answers.

But the Gettier problems are based on the fact (at least I think it is a fact) that truth and falsity do not wait for our actual and empirical process of learning what they are. — Ludwig V

Of course they do. If the truth of nature isn't waiting for us to understand it then how could we ever approach it by as you said "discovering" truths, accepting them as our beliefs and then using them as assumptions for further investigations, in the taxing task of removing fiction from fact.

As Williamson notes, "Knowledge doesn’t require infallibility. What it requires is that, in the situation, you couldn't too easily have been mistaken."
— Andrew M

All right. But when you find you are mistaken, you need to withdraw the claim to know. — Ludwig V

Indeed. The claim can no longer be justifiably held at that point since knowledge does require truth and the claim in question is now known to be false.

Which is the Harman-Vogel paradox that Ludwig V referred to. Jennifer Nagel has a useful survey of some of the responses (contextualism, relativism, interest-relative invariantism, error theory) and her own solution (dual-process theory) in "The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox".
— Andrew M

I’m not sure whether to classify the classic Gettier cases as variants of that paradox or a completely different variety. But I am sure that this paradox is much more difficult and more important than the Gettier cases. I have looked at some of what Jennifer Nagel has written about this. I didn’t find any of the theories particularly appealing. I’m certain it deserves treatment separate from the Gettier cases. — Ludwig V

Yes, I agree they deserve separate treatments. In my view, contextualism is a satisfactory response to both.

Indeed. The claim can no longer be justifiably held at that point since knowledge does require truth and the claim in question is now known to be false. — Andrew M

Yes, I agree they deserve separate treatments. In my view, contextualism is a satisfactory response to both. — Andrew M

Agreement in philosophy is not easy to achieve, which makes it all the more satisfactory. Sadly, it means that I need to find a new thread, though, as you see, I'm still engaged with Benj96.

It frustrates me that Gettier problems have the fundamental characteristics of irony, but irony is only mentioned once in the wikipedia article in a sort of recursive way, and an internet search of "Gettier Problems" and "Irony" brings up an article about irony in Gettier problems in literature. Is it not ironic in the Gettier problem John thinks Jack will get the job and that he has ten coins in his pocket, so the person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, but in fact John gets the job but unknowingly also has ten coins in his pocket? This is ironic because it fulfills the definition that it is the opposite of what one expects in an interesting or humorous way. But that definition is not at the fundamental root of what irony is. An ironic analysis of Gettier Problems should identify them as a fundamental epistemological basis of irony. Take any irony, such as an "antitechnology website". The justified false belief that people should not use technology is falsified by the use of technology but is actually true due to the ridiculous kinds of things that technology allows such as "anti-technology websites". Or maybe the belief that antitechnology websites are ironic is a justified false belief because it is an actual absurdist argument against technology, but is actually ironic because it is a Gettier problem.

Let me try to phrase a couple more ironies as a Gettier problem: 1. Ronald Reagan's bulletproof limo deflected a bullet into his chest. Justified false belief: Bullet proof limo would protect president. Actuality: Limo resulted in president's injury. Truth: Limo did serve in President's protection during incident.

2. From wikipedia: Gettier created a tradition in the epistemology of JTB by destroying it. Justified False belief: "Gettier's formula creates a clear barrier in analyzing knowledge: Actuality: is a new area of epistemology for analyzing knowledge. Truth: the formula is a criticism of epistemology

On truth

I’m sorry. I didn’t put my point clearly enough. I certainly did mean what I said that truth is discovered.

On “justify”, “believe”, “know”

I hesitate to accept your way of using the words. You want us as observers to have a say in whether S suspects or believes that p. But deciding to suspect something is deciding to believe that p may be true or may be false and is up to S. If S decides (whether on the basis of more evidence or not) to believe something, which means committing to the view that p is true, that is also up to S. When I report that S believes that p, I am reporting S’s commitment without endorsing it myself. The difference between suspecting and believing is a fact about S and not up to us as observers. We can certainly use the words in a different way, but I’m reluctant to do so because most people don’t and I want to communicate with most people.

On the other hand, if I decide that S knows that p, I am endorsing S’s commitment to p and committing myself to p. So that is up to us observers. But that’s not relevant at this stage.

I would say that the same is true of "evidence". When I classify S's reasons as evidence, I am committing to the view that it does go to demonstrating that p - not necessarily all the way to certainty, but partly. You could put your point in something like the following way.

"The farmer has some evidence that the familiar silhouette is a cow, but the evidence is unreliable. The evidence does not justify his conclusion and further evidence is required. As it happens, further evidence will reveal that his belief is false. "

There are some complications, but I think that would stand up. What do you think?

The main objection that may be raised is that no process of deduction is involved in seeing, so the argument doesn’t apply. That’s why I prefer to object that one cannot see something that isn’t there, so the farmer hasn’t seen a cow – he just thinks he has seen a cow.

Another example: justification (to imprison someone) is still justification even when the belief (that they committed a crime) is false. Yikes. I think not. — Benj96

I was impressed by this. It certainly shows that where justification falls short of certainty, it may be inappropriate (depending on the circumstances, such as what is at stake and the probability of error) to rely on it. I’ll admit that “justification” is sometimes used to mean “show” or “prove” and so requires certainty. But I also think that sometimes it is used to mean “reasonable”, which doesn’t. For what it’s worth, I think you’ll find that dictionaries agree.

Not an infinite regress. Just a regression to the truth. Where one's belief/ collection of beliefs about what is true matches what is actually the case. That is knowledge. — Benj96

But doesn't that mean that all knowledge must start from knowledge? Where do we get the knowledge we start from? Surely that's clearly an infinite regress.

You want us as observers to have a say in whether S suspects or believes that p. But deciding to suspect something is deciding to believe that p may be true or may be false and is up to S. — Ludwig V

Yes. S observes P incompletely (it's silhouette in twilight) it only sees the outline not the full object in full light. You can believe P is one thing based on partial knowledge - the silhouette/vague outline (in others words jump to a conclusion with incomplete knowledge?) or you can investigate further, shine a torch, watch how it behaves, what it does, and then with a more full set of knowledge as to what it is you can believe its P (a cow for example).

But with no clear vision, no movement, no sounds, you are deprived of several modes of sensory information. How then can you believe it is definitely P without referencing it to your knowledge of what characteristics P has.
In that case it's better to "suspect" its P because the partial knowledge that you have doesn't exclude the possibility that thus potential P is indeed an actual P.

"The farmer has some evidence that the familiar silhouette is a cow, but the evidence is unreliable. The evidence does not justify his conclusion and further evidence is required. As it happens, further evidence will reveal that his belief is false. — Ludwig V

I don't think the evidence is so much "unreliable" but rather incomplete. As partial evidence it could be reliable if the remaining evidence confirms the suspicion of the farmer. The partial evidence is only determined as unreliable if it lead to a false conclusion.

"Partial information" about something which can be "known" simply means nothing is yet absolutely certain. It is only suggestive. As this partial information is one part of the set of all information one requires to confirm the known as indeed known. Partial information can lead to a logical suspicion but not to a complete justification - a blind belief, a gamble on the fact that P Is actually P

Is it not ironic in the Gettier problem John thinks Jack will get the job and that he has ten coins in his pocket, so the person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, but in fact John gets the job but unknowingly also has ten coins in his pocket? — introbert

In a sense, yes. (Though I seem to remember that Gettier bothers to tell us whether Smith has ten coins in his pocket.) But this irony is not fundamental to, or even characteristic of, Gettier problems.

The justified false belief that people should not use technology is falsified by the use of technology — introbert

There is an irony of a kind in this, but it is a not a very good argument, because the idea that people should not use any technology at all rules out clothes and simple tools like hammers and cooking. I'm certain that what these people mean is that people should not use certain technologies. So there can only be a falsification if you know what technologies you have in mind. I certainly don't see a Gettier problem in this.

Your other cases are certainly examples of irony. But I don't see them as Gettier problems.

I don't have any serious problem with your suggestions. Since I'm suggesting a way that you could better reformulate your point, I think it's up to you if you want to use it with some changes.

But we need to keep clear whether we are talking about the J clause or the T clause. What you say is certainly relevant to the T clause, but if you are talking about the J clause, you are saying that S's justification must be conclusive if it is to satisfy the definition. That's controversial and Gettier does not accept it. So you need to explain why you reject Gettier's definition. Sadly, he doesn't explain his reasons for adopting it, so it's hard. I do accept Gettier's definition because your strict definition would rule out many ordinary uses of "know" and transform "know" into a jargon concept useful only to philosophers.

In that case it's better to "suspect" its P because the partial knowledge that you have doesn't exclude the possibility that thus potential P is indeed an actual P. — Benj96

Yes, it probably is wiser to suspect rather than believe. But it is the farmer to suspect or not, not us, and if the farmer decides to believe, it's up to him.

Further to the question whether justification needs to be complete or not, we've already discussed it, and I said: -

where justification falls short of certainty, it may be inappropriate (depending on the circumstances, such as what is at stake and the probability of error) to rely on it. I’ll admit that “justification” is sometimes used to mean “show” or “prove” and so requires certainty. But I also think that sometimes it is used to mean “reasonable”, which doesn’t. For what it’s worth, I think you’ll find that dictionaries agree. — Ludwig V

But I don't see them as Gettier problem — Ludwig V

I'll have to do a little more work on this issue before I say too much more about it, but I see the Gettier problem as simply that JTB cannot be used as the basis of knowledge. Not every irony is a JTB but any JTB that is a GP is certainly ironic. This is simply due to the nature of the GP being a difference between idea or belief and actuality. Lets use yet another example: Jane heard John say "Dinner was wonderful". As such Jane has a JTB that dinner was wonderful. But John was actually being sarcastic (ironic) and meant that he didn't have any dinner. Nevertheless dinner was actually wonderful. In this case the irony which creates a discrepancy between idea and actuality becomes a natural mechanism for a GP.

Agreement in philosophy is not easy to achieve, which makes it all the more satisfactory. — Ludwig V

:smile:

I do accept Gettier's definition because your strict definition would rule out many ordinary uses of "know" and transform "know" into a jargon concept useful only to philosophers — Ludwig V

I understand exactly what you mean. What I would suggest to consider is that words do not have one discrete/ unchanging or fixed meaning. The meaning of a word is not binary (if A then not B). This can only be the case when the context is clearly and strictly confined.

Not only can a word mean one thing or another thing depending on context but it can mean two things simultaneously (ambiguous meaning) as in the case of innuendo, metaphor and puns, or in humour/comedy. And it can even be used in reference to itself to form a self contained paradox/ contradiction - a meaningless sentence.
Allow me to explain with four examples:

Meaning of the word "know".
Context 1: I know that I feel sad. (I believe/know pertaining to inherent internal knowledge of my state of mind).

Context 2: I know there is a phone in my hand. (I observe/I and others can know this as its an object - objectively observable.)

Context 3: I know he's larger than life, he practically draws in everyone in the room (ambiguous insult/compliment - could mean I'm calling him fat, could mean I'm saying he's so extroverted that people naturally gravitate towards him.

Context 4: I know that I know nothing. (socratic paradox).

In this way we see that the word "know" is not specifically defined but dynamic. If it wasn't language would be extremely rigid and unexpressive. It would be like mathematics - able to follow a singular line of logic but not able to be used for poetry, comedy, drama, artistic license etc

1. Ronald Reagan's bulletproof limo deflected a bullet into his chest.
2. From wikipedia: Gettier created a tradition in the epistemology of JTB by destroying it. Justified False belief: "Gettier's formula creates a clear barrier in analyzing knowledge: Actuality: is a new area of epistemology for analyzing knowledge. Truth: the formula is a criticism of epistemology — introbert

Is it not ironic in the Gettier problem John thinks Jack will get the job and that he has ten coins in his pocket, so the person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, but in fact John gets the job but unknowingly also has ten coins in his pocket? — introbert

I see the story about Ronald Reagan as ironical in the first sentence, but if you consider the whole story, it isn't. The second similarly - the first sentence is ironical, but overall it is not. The last quotation is a version of Gettier's first example, and I agree that it is ironic. But none of the other examples deployed in these arguments seem at all ironic to me. It takes more than a discrepancy between idea and actuality to create an irony. The first two stories report an attempt to do one thing but achieving the opposite, which is similar. The Gettier example is similar. But I see the core or paradigmatic meaning of irony as saying one thing and meaning the opposite. One of the peculiarities of irony is that it enables us to say things that would be socially inappropriate to say in the context but in such a way that the underlying meaning can be detected, so it isn't really concealing anything.

I don't have a problem with anything you say. One could argue that philosophy is a context that does require relatively fixed meanings to what we say (unless you are Kierkegaard or Socrates) However, one of my complaints about the Gettier business is precisely that it pushes us to give a binary answer where it is not appropriate.

The essence of irony is not linguistic. There is a common denominator across all irony categories (literary, socratic, cosmic, situational, dramatic, etc.) and it is not saying one thing and meaning the opposite, therefore at bottom irony is not reducible to linguistics. My contention is that irony is a fundamental disconnect between idea and reality or reality and actuality. As such I see it as an epistemological problem much like a Gettier Problem, so much so that I see GP's as ironic and some ironies as GPs. It bothers me that objectivity is the prevailing mode of thought when irony is the more realistic lens for subjectivity. You might think that is absurd, but objectivity deludes people into thinking they have apprehended truth, when the spectre of irony haunts all human perception. Happy Halloween!

Gettier's two cases are similar to the cottage industry that followed with the barn facade and the cloth examples because they are al claim to stipulate situations when S satisfies the JTB conditions but does not have knowledge.

The general issue at hand is the inherently inadequate notion of belief at work. You will not find much of that in the literature... yet. This applies to Gettier's two cases, the cottage industry that followed, Moore's paradox, and Russell's clock as well as all sorts of other philosophical topics in which meaningful human thought and belief are of major importance(the scope is daunting). However, the consequences of employing the emaciated conventional (mis)conception(s) of belief differ depending upon the particulars.

With regard to the topic at hand and the context of our discussion thus far...

Granting the cottage industry's claim that S believes that there is a sheep in the field after seeing a piece of cloth is granting far too much to begin with. It ignores the mistake altogether. S believes that a particular piece of cloth is a sheep. That belief is false.

"There is a sheep in the field" is not entailed by belief that a piece of cloth is a sheep. "There is a sheep in the field" does not follow from belief that a piece of cloth is a sheep.

The attribution of that belief to S by the author is unjustified. The same critique holds good in all cottage industry cases I've been fortunate enough to have read as well as Russell's clock.

Gettier's two cases are different. In the first, Gettier uses entailment to describe Smith as going from "I am going to get the job, and I have ten coins in my pocket" to "The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job". The man with ten coins in his pocket - you know the one Smith is thinking about - is Smith himself. Smith did not believe anyone else would get the job. Smith was not justified in believing anyone else would get the job. Someone else got the job, contrary to Smith's belief.

In the second case, Gettier uses the rules of disjunction to attempt to claim that Smith's belief that either Jones owned a Ford or Brown was in Barcelona was true as a result of Brown's being in Barcelona. Brown's being in Barcelona does indeed make the disjunction true, if we treat it as a naked proposition. However, it is not a naked proposition. Rather, it is supposed to be an account of Smith's belief. Now, Smith believed that the disjunction was true because Jones owned a Ford. The disjunction was not true because Jones owned a Ford.

In both cases, Smith's belief was justified false belief.

One may be justified in believing that p even if p is false. This opens the door to Gettier cases, no matter how stingy or generous the criteria are. The problems actually arise when S believes the right thing for the wrong, but justifiable, reasons.

How to respond? Well, my response to your farmer is 1) he thought he saw a cow, 2) he didn’t see a cow, 3) there was a cow. I observe that a) 1) and 3) are reasons for saying that he knew and that b) 2) is a reason for saying that he didn’t. I conclude that it is not proven that he knew, and that it is not proven that he didn’t, so I classify the case as unclassifiable. — Ludwig V

I'll tell you what I think is the obvious thing to say here: the problem with the farmer's belief that there's a cow in the field is that it was not caused by seeing any of the cows in the field. Or: there was no causal connection between the farmer and a cow that contributed to the farmer's belief.

This is more or less a typical Gettier case because the conclusion is an existential claim that is true in virtue of the existence of some particular: it is true that there is a cow in the field because this particular cow, let's call her Alice, is in the field. In a sense, we don't even have to talk about what's wrong with a cow-belief being caused by a bit of cloth, about whether the interpretation of blurry light spots is a reliable method of cow detection; all we have to say is that the farmer has what looks to be a belief about Alice despite that belief not being causally connected to Alice.

This was more or less Alvin Goldman's response to Gettier, and it does seem to get something right. (Only just started looking at Goldman, so don't ask me about his views.)

My way of putting this raises some issues though: in what sense is the farmer's belief about Alice? This doesn't look good at all. Since Alice played no role in the farmer's belief formation, it's pretty clear Alice is no part of the content of the farmer's belief. Alice does play a part in the existential claim; Alice is what makes that claim true.

We can get to Alice, as a matter of content, with the obvious counterfactual claim: had the farmer seen Alice instead of the bit of cloth, and seen that Alice is a cow, then in that case he would of course know that there was a cow in the field. But he might have seen Alice and mistaken Alice for a bit of cloth flapping in the breeze — so not seen that Alice is a cow — and formed the mistaken belief that there's a bit of cloth in the field, which might also be Gettierly true. That's a little uncomfortable for the causal account, as it stands so far, because it's just requiring the seeing itself to be a factive mental state. But at least now Alice, under some interpretation, is part of the content of the farmer's belief.

And that seems a reasonable starting point: Alice ought to play a causal role in beliefs about Alice. I don't think there is a remaining problem with the existential generalization after all because we can just enumerate it: if Alice, Bobbie, Clarabelle, and Dixie are the cows in the field, then the truth of such an existential claim as we're concerned with is a truth about at least one of those: one of those four ought to play a causal role in the farmer's belief, expressed as an existential generality.

Are we any better off though? Suppose the farmer thinks the cow he's seeing is Clarabelle, when it's Alice, even though Clarabelle is out there in the dark. There is some lingering oddness about the existential generalization; it feels a little unreal, like the content of his belief still involves Clarabelle, though expressed with reference to "a cow", and so his basis for believing that the generalization is warranted is suspect.

There are obvious cases in which the farmer would reach for the general, disjunctive claim because he sees a cow and doesn't know which one. What about in this case, where he believes he does know which cow makes the disjunction true? Now that's a funny thing, because it's very natural to have different degrees of confidence here: I for sure saw a cow, and I'm pretty sure it was Clarabelle — if it wasn't Clarabelle, I assume it was Alice or Bobbie or Dixie. That last clause can fail if a neighbor's cow has gotten into his field, but even that won't affect his high level of confidence that he saw a cow, some cow. We might even plump for him knowing it was a cow, while denying that he knows which one.

And that's a reminder that you absolutely can know a disjunction is true without knowing that one of the disjuncts is true. The law of the excluded middle is a clear enough example, but we might forget in these more mundane, probabilistic cases.

The farmer, then, could be in a state of disjunctive knowledge, connected causally to some truth-making cow, the actual content of which is a belief he holds only partially and could even be wrong about. (Something still weird about that formulation.)

In the original version of the story, it's a bit of cloth that is causally related to the farmer's implicitly disjunctive belief and another disjunct is true. What's different here from the case above where one cow is mistaken for another — and so there's acceptable disjunctive knowledge — is that you cannot see that a bit of cloth is a cow, because it isn't. We are relying on the seeing being factive, and that's already expressed as predication; what causation gives us is an explanation for the acceptability of the predication: you can see that something is a cow only if it is a cow. Which I hope is another way of saying that some cow ought to be causally involved in your formation of cow beliefs.

@creativesoul, I think some of your concerns are addressed above. @Andrew M, any thoughts?

However, one of my complaints about the Gettier business is precisely that it pushes us to give a binary answer where it is not appropriate. — Ludwig V

Indeed. This is why I'm not an advocate of Gettiers problem as he precisely defines it. It disregards obvious "work-arounds" and adaptations of meaning in the words he uses based on him not acknowledging rational external information that is sensibly known but presumed not to exist for the sake of his definitions. Like the ability to move through time and space (the field where the cow and cloth are) for example.

There are cases when forcing words to be discrete and exactly defined in relation to one another leads to illogical outcomes (problems).

In the same way that the liar paradox or grandfather paradox is created. They use two or more incompatible discrete definitions of words or grammar of words that's leads to logical conflict. If the interpretation/context/meaning of such words was less stringent and more fluid then the paradoxes can be resolved.

Many paradoxes, conflicts of interest or contradictions stand based only on previous assumption - what we mean when we use the words we do to describe them. Change the meaning (assumptions) and you change the outcome (whether something is rational or irrational) based on those assumptions.

It's logical to conclude that if all humans are animals (assumption 1) and some animals have wings (assumption 2) that some humans have wings. But that is a rigid discrete acceptance of the meaning of the assumption. Not influenced by external modulation (by other assumptions such as "humans are animals without wings" (assumption 3) which would further deductive reasoning to the conclusion that "all humans are animals, some animals have wings but they are other animals than human ones". Which is correct.

It is in this way that we must include as much information as possible to get an accurate logical conclusion. Something that the liar paradox does not do, nor the grandfather paradox.

It's logical to conclude that if all humans are animals (assumption 1) and some animals have wings (assumption 2) that some humans have wings. — Benj96

it's not. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallacy_of_the_undistributed_middle.

Yes it's clearly not (based on the fact that we have external knowledge pertaining to the set of assumptions (the knowledge that "not all animals are humans".).

I believe I already outlined that distinction. But I'll clarify once again.

If the assumptions given are strictly the "only information" available to make deductions (leaving our common sense to the contrary based on experience aside).. Then the logic follows as such.

This is the difference between mechanical/robotic or purely reason based thought and human thought based on experience and sense (observation).
We input into a computer that "some animals have wings." We also input that "humans are animals". The output from that sole computational function is that "some humans have wings".

The computer only has the information put into it as a basis to apply reasoning. Where is it going to extract the external knowledge that there are animals that are not human and therfore that humans don't necessarily have wings?

Yes it's clearly not (based on the fact that we have external knowledge pertaining to the set of assumptions (the knowledge that "not all animals are humans".). — Benj96

The fallacy of the undistributed middle is a formal fallacy, so it doesn't depend on the semantics of its terms (and related external knowledge).

Your syllogism
P1: all humans are animals
P2: some animals have wings
C: some humans have wings

corresponds to the following form (e.g. W = wing-equipped):
P1: All H are A
P2: some A are W
C: some H are W

This form is fallacious.

Correction what I said was.
P1 H = A
P2 XA =W (where X is an an unspecified fraction above 0 (none) but less than 1 (all) )
P3 XH =W (the same unspecified fraction pertains to some humans (H) being wing equipped (W).

In this case "human" = "animals". As in "all" humans are "all" animals. They are equivalent

Your form. P1 All H are A pertains to "All humans are animals." (but not all of them/as in not all animals are human. It is not equivalent because it is not reversible). In your case your following logic is correct. But seeing as I'm not referring to your meaning but the one I have outlined clearly above my logic stands.

It's not fallacious the fallacy is born through misinterpretation.

Your form. P1 All H are A pertains to "All humans are animals." (but not all of them). — Benj96

Because you wrote "all humans are animals" as a premise one and you claimed it was logic to deduce from that premise and a second one a certain conclusion. This is wrong from a standard logic point of view.
"All X is P" in standard logic is never understood as "All X is P and all P is X" as you seem to claim now (indeed "all humans are all animals" sounds pretty weird as a sentence). Formal logic is about propositional forms not about the semantics of the terms occurring insides propositions.

"All X is P" in standard logic is never understood as "All X is P and all P is X" as you seem to claim now (indeed "all humans are all animals" sounds pretty weird as a sentence). Formal logic is about propositional forms not about the semantics of the terms occurring insides propositions. — neomac

So if I say "-1 and +1 =0" I can't say "0 =-1.+1"?
They are not reversible and equivalent?
And if so how can your equivalence suddenly not satisfy reversibility unless it presupposes external information?
Physics equations work in reverse. Because they deal in actual equivalence not pseudo equivalence.

My point is that if one wants to deduce conclusions from premises based on formal logic, then the meaning of the terms is irrelevant. Indeed if your deduction is something like:
P1: All H are A and all A are H
P2: some A are W
C: some H are W
It looks valid but that doesn't depend on what we know about the terms H, A, W, anyways.
In short, I find your example twice misleading because, it's equivocally formulated ("all humans are animals" in logic is understood as in "all H are A" and not as in "All H are A and all A are H", indeed that's the syllogistic rule of distribution in universal affirmative premises) and even after removing the equivocation the logic of a deduction should be assessed by its form not by the semantics of its terms so it doesn't look appropriate to use it to make a semantic point, if that's your goal.

In the original version of the story, it's a bit of cloth that is causally related to the farmer's implicitly disjunctive belief and another disjunct is true. What's different here from the case above where one cow is mistaken for another — and so there's acceptable disjunctive knowledge — is that you cannot see that a bit of cloth is a cow, because it isn't. We are relying on the seeing being factive, and that's already expressed as predication; what causation gives us is an explanation for the acceptability of the predication: you can see that something is a cow only if it is a cow. Which I hope is another way of saying that some cow ought to be causally involved in your formation of cow beliefs. — Srap Tasmaner

:up:

I would just add, though, that the causal connection may not always be sufficient for knowledge. Consider the fake barn scenario. In that case, the traveler in fake barn country does see an actual barn, so the appropriate causal connection is present. But he doesn't know it because he was lucky. The false lemma in this case is that he implicitly assumes that this region is like any other where fake barns are a rarity.