I think it’s pretty much spot on. Less complex version than mine on pg 2.

I think it’s pretty much spot on. Less complex version than mine on pg 2. — Mww

Ok.

Real is that which is the object of human inquiry. — Daniel

So what is not the object of human enquiry?

Or do we conclude that everything is real?

Again, applying Austin's strategy of looking for the compliment of a posited definition of "real" clarifies the issue, in this case showing the definition to be inadequate.

So what is not the object of human enquiry? — Banno

Something that does not affect us in any possible way (directly or indirectly) so that it cannot be wondered about (directly or indirectly) because there is absolutely no information about it we can use to formulate questions about its nature - there is simply nothing that could be known about it due to its lack of interaction with us. So, for example, suppose we lack complete awareness about the existence of gravity, and we are studying the movement of a pendulum; wondering about the pendulum's movement indirectly asks about gravity even if we are not aware of it, and this "unknown" gravity should be considered as real as the pendulum's movement according to the definition of "real" being discussed. Something that does not interact with us at all may exist, but it would not be real to us since it could never be conceptualized or at least wondered about indirectly as with the "unknown" gravity in the example above. So, what is not real to human beings is that which does not interact with human beings at all, and therefore it can never be the object of (direct or indirect) human inquiry. Now, something like that may or may not exist; if it does, not everything is real (according to the human mind); if it doesn't then everything is real. In my view, all things that exist (must) have at least one thing in common, and as such they all interact with each other via this similarity, and therefore they all are real according to the definition being discussed, for humans are one of these things that exist.

You seem to be saying that we can "formulate questions" about "Something that does not affect us in any possible way", but that's not right. Gravity is inferred exactly because it affects the pendulum. Hence gravity does affect us.

You seem to be saying that we can "formulate questions" about "Something that does not affect us in any possible way" — Banno

I meant the opposite - we cannot formulate questions about something that does not affect us in any possible way. The pendulum example was intended to describe something we may indirectly ask about (gravity), as you said. Its purpose was to differentiate this type of "indirect relations," which should be considered "real" regardless of our awareness of them, from no relation at all.

Cool.

But it remains that there is nothing about which we can talk that is not real, by

Real is that which is the object of human inquiry. — Daniel

So it amounts to the claim that everything is real.

And hence, since we cannot claim of anything that it is not real, saying something is real is not saying anything about it.

So we remain as follows:

We can use "real" to differentiate in particular explicit cases - a real painting, a real foot, by understanding what the contrary is - a counterfeit painting, an artificial foot.

But some folk wish to contend that there is a way of using "real" that somehow goes beyond that, having no contrary.

The ball remains in their court. It is up to them to give an account that explicates such a use.

?

The ball remains in their court. It is up to them to give an account that explicates such a use. — Banno

I've had my say. Nothing to add.

We can use "real" to differentiate in particular explicit cases - a real painting, a real foot, by understanding what the contrary is - a counterfeit painting, an artificial foot.

But some folk wish to contend that there is a way of using "real" that somehow goes beyond that, having no contrary. — Banno

Why 'having no contrary'? Or do you only mean in the 'pants' sense, deriving it's meaning from the contrary?

I mean, it's true that we're never going to predicate of some object 'imaginary', not in earnest, but only as a manner of speaking. The logical form of such a claim is just going to be '~∃xFx' which doesn't commit us to anything. We can comfortably say something like 'Unicorns aren't real but imaginary'; no one's attributing a property to something that also has the property of being a unicorn.

I think we would like to be able to say something like, "If something is a unicorn, then it doesn't exist," or maybe if you have a name, like from a story, "If Sheldon is a unicorn, then he doesn't exist." I guess we can stuff that directly into classical logic, but I don't think it's a very comfortable fit. It is, however, pretty straightforward to say that if something (or Sheldon) is a unicorn, then it (or he) is a member of class known to be empty, so that's a contradiction — and the conclusion is just that (say) "Sheldon is a unicorn" is false; we'll only need to go for "Sheldon is not a unicorn" if "Sheldon" is known to refer — if, say, Sheldon is a horse with a horn affixed to his forehead.

The class of unicorns can be as real as you (whoever you are) generally take classes to be; it just happens to be empty, but that doesn't mean there's any particular problem talking about it. And if we define 'imaginary' as 'member of an empty class', it ought to serve pretty well as an opposite for 'real' in that most general sense, and show up in arguments about where we'd want it to.

Oh yeah, and then 'real' in this general sense is 'member of a non-empty class'. Which is fine.

Bonus anecdote:

Story Robert Creeley tells — didn't happen to him but another poet, I forget who — that after a reading someone from the audience came up to ask our poet about something he read, "Was that a real poem, or did you make it up yourself?"

Story Robert Creeley tells — didn't happen to him but another poet, I forget who — that after a reading someone from the audience came up to ask our poet about something he read, "Was that a real poem, or did you make it up yourself?" — Srap Tasmaner

I like that image. It's both. It lies in the overlap of 2 intersecting Venn circles, the real and the imaginary.

do you only mean in the 'pants' sense, deriving it's meaning from the contrary? — Srap Tasmaner

Yep.

The label on the pack says "What does "real" mean?"

Existential quantification is not about what is real and what isn't. It's more about what can be talked about and what can't. If Sheldon is a unicorn, then there are unicorns. p(a)⊃∃(x)p(x).

Oh, yeah, if 'real' is 'member of a non-empty class', then Sheldon proves that unicorns are real. That doesn't look right.

Existential quantification is not about what is real and what isn't. — Banno

Sure it is. Says so right on the tin.

if 'real' is 'member of a non-empty class', then Sheldon proves that unicorns are real. That doesn't look right — Banno

You mean like my example in which Sheldon is a horse? Sheldon's being a member of the class <horse> means Sheldon is real; doesn't make the class <unicorn> non-empty.

You mean like my example in which Sheldon is a horse? Sheldon's being a member of the class <horse> means Sheldon is real; doesn't make the class <unicorn> non-empty. — Srap Tasmaner

Confusing. Is Sheldon a horse or a unicorn?

If Sheldon is a unicorn, the by p(a)⊃∃(x)p(x) Sheldon exists. Are you happy to say that?

It seems that if one supposes that to be 'real' is to be a 'member of a non-empty class' then Frodo, being a member of the class "Hobbit", is real. And Sheldon shows that unicorns are real.

After all, there is the class of things that are not real. We don't want to treat that as empty, while still saying it has members. A better approach might be to suppose that being member of a class is not the same as being real.

Perhaps @TonesInDeepFreeze can help.

Frodo, being a member of the class "Hobbit", is real. — Banno

Nope. We pretend there is such a person and that he is a hobbit. There isn't, and he isn't.

Is Sheldon a horse or a unicorn? — Banno

I was offering an example of a real horse named Sheldon disguised as a unicorn. His not being a unicorn doesn't make him not real. He's a real horse.

there is the class of things that are not real. We don't want to treat that as empty, while still saying it has members. — Banno

It exists, it is empty, and it has no members.

If Sheldon is a unicorn, the by p(a)⊃∃(x)p(x) Sheldon exists. Are you happy to say that? — Banno

If Sheldon is a unicorn, the class of unicorns is non-empty, yeah. (And I have no issue with existential generalization.) If your argument concludes that an empty class has a member, that's a contradiction, so one of your premises is false, for instance, "Sheldon is a unicorn." That can be false even when Sheldon is quite real, because a horse.

A better approach might be to suppose that being member of a class is not the same as being real. — Banno

I'm saying that's exactly what it is.

We can use "real" to differentiate in particular explicit cases - a real painting, a real foot, by understanding what the contrary is - a counterfeit painting, an artificial foot.

But some folk wish to contend that there is a way of using "real" that somehow goes beyond that, having no contrary. — Banno

Jack thinks the bartender is real, but he's not.

What's the contrary in this case?

Jack thinks the bartender is real, but he's not.

What's the contrary in this case? — frank

Supernatural subtext of King's novel aside (are ghosts real?), is the contrary not Jack's recovered sanity (possibly via antipsychotic medication)?

I've worked with many people with psychotic illnesses who mark a demarcation between unreal experiences (psychosis) and real life (recovery).

Supernatural subtext of King's novel aside (are ghosts real?), is the contrary not Jack's recovered sanity (possibly via antipsychotic medication)? — Tom Storm

I was aiming for the Kubrick version which is more ambiguous. Is Jack delusional? Does he have the shining?

We can identify the bartender as unreal without knowing for sure what the explanation is. The contrary here is just "unreal."

I've worked with many people with psychotic illnesses who mark a demarcation between unreal experiences (psychosis) and real life (recovery). — Tom Storm

There are drugs which can take the ability to distinguish reality from imagination off line.

I was aiming for the Kubrick version which is more ambiguous. — frank

Sure, which for me makes it a problematic example for any hypothetical testing of 'the real'.

There are drugs which can take the ability to distinguish reality from imagination off line. — frank

Sure, there are dugs for any old thing. But is it not the case that someone who is 'mad' or 'high' is not experiencing the real? Merely the real for them. In some happy cases they may rediscover the real through recovery. There is a therefore a 'contrary' - to address your original point. Tell me where I am off.

In the case of The Shining we are potentially talking about a speculative metaphysics (ghosts, demons, spirits) combined with storytelling which painstakingly cultivates the logic of dreams. What can this illuminate for us outside of film criticism and interpretation of the director's intention?

was aiming for the Kubrick version which is more ambiguous.
— frank

Sure, which makes it a problematic example for any hypothetical testing of 'the real'. — Tom Storm

Why? We're just looking at instances of use.

What can this illuminate for us outside of film criticism and interpretation of the director's intention? — Tom Storm

I assert that in some cases, "real" is meaningful when it's only known negation is "unreal.". Kubrick's Shining is an example.

We aren't trying to identify some meaning for "real" that transcends use. And there's deeper significance to the real/unreal opposition. It won't be shuffled under a rug.

I assert that in some cases, "real" is meaningful when it's only known negation is "unreal.". Kubrick's Shining is an example. — frank

I agree with this.

Why? We're just looking at instances of use. — frank

I just have an issue with unnecessarily labyrinthine and contrived 'case studies' drawn from fiction. Just as I dislike the ridiculous scenarios spun for most thought experiments. I prefer the real. :wink:

And there's deeper significance to the real/unreal opposition. — frank

Tell me more about what you're thinking here.

And there's deeper significance to the real/unreal opposition.
— frank

Tell me more about what you're thinking here. — Tom Storm

Meaning tends to depend on negation. As Hegel said, a thing and its negation make up one concept.

For example, far/near is one concept where "far" ultimately means "not near."

Same with reality. Real/unreal are components of one concept. The reason a thing isn't real is semi-secondary to the prime concept.

Got you. I thought you might have been suggesting something more exotic, like idealism and the problem of ‘real’.

To me anything real is something that is not simulated. That definition extends to real leather to the real world. The way I see it the world we experience as indirect reality is not real, but is a simulation of something real. However that is not to deny mental contents, as I think experiences like delusions or hallucinations are real unless 1) they are not true delusions such as being deluded by mis/disinformation 2) they are not true hallucinations such as optical illusions or that p word on the tip of my tongue where you see things in a form such as clouds. So in sum real to me is grounded in opposition to fake, not unreal which is an absurd relation.

like idealism and the problem of ‘real’. — Tom Storm

I'm not sure what that is.

I'm not certain defining any object of human inquiry is about 'everything' or is saying nothing about it. Cells were not objects of human inquiry before 18th?century and as such they were not real in the sense he uses it. It's a viable definition to define only what is known as real, as in practice referring to what is not known will be doubted as unreal. It is also debatable whether only objects of human inquiry are included in 'everything' as certainly any speaker of the word doubtfully has all objects of human inquiry in mind, so if they are not thinking of all things they also allude to things they are not thinking about including what they don't know about.

Having difficulty seeing how that works. So if Sheldon is a unicorn, then Sheldon exists. But you say that being member of a class is the same as being real. If Sheldon is a unicorn, then he is a member of the class "Unicorns", and hence real.

So I gather you are saying that Sheldon cannot be a unicorn - that the class "Unicorn" is empty?

That seems to me to be an unneeded step to far.

If I can change the exemplar to fictional rather than imaginary, a few clear examples present themselves. I think we want to be able to make logical inferences about imaginary and fictional characters. I don't see anything worrisome about an inference such as "All hobbits have hairy feet; Frodo is a hobbit; therefore Frodo has hairy feet".

But Frodo, of course, is fictional, and not real. If being member of a class is the same as being real, then Frodo cannot be a member of a class, and so not a member of the class "hobbits". If we followed that rout, we would not be in a position to talk rationally about fictional or imaginative characters. That's the step too far.

Now that seems pretty straight forward, so perhaps there is something a bit more sophisticated we might do, along the lines of "well, we can keep fiction and imaginative discourse in a box over there, and proper discourse about the actual world over here, a seperate interpretation, the proper one for talking about real things. And if we do that we can define being real as being a member of a class..."

That is, one might set up a domain by ejecting imaginary and fictional stuff. Soof course the discourse in that domain will be about stuff that is not fictional or imaginative. In effect one would have defined one's domain of discourse as the contrary to fictional or imaginative... or whatever else you would like to exclude from being real. You will have done exactly as I have proposed.

Jack thinks the bartender is real, but he's not. — frank

If the bartender is not real, what is he? A ghost? Then he's a real ghost. I'll go with and say if Lloyd is not real he is a symptom of Jack's psychosis; that is the source of the dramatic tension. From Austin, the key is to ask "if it is not real, then what is it?" Is Lloyd a ghost or a delusion? So your example seems to me to work in favour of Austin's account.

But contra , I don't think Lloyd was a simulation. What I argued, Introbert, in my reply to @Daniel, is that it is a consequence of his view, "Real is that which is the object of human inquiry", that everything becomes real. Not sure you realised that. If I'm right then by Daniel's definition there is nothing that is not real. Seems to me that the only alternative would be some form of idealism, which I'm not going to debate here.

I'm not sure what that is. — frank

Consider yourself lucky.

When you wrote this -

And there's deeper significance to the real/unreal opposition. — frank

I thought you were heading down a Kantian noumena/phenomena model of reality that's all.

From Austin, the key is to ask "if it is not real, then what is it?" Is Lloyd a ghost or a delusion? So your example seems to me to work in favour of Austin's account. — Banno

Good. I thought this is where I was heading as well.

So I gather you are saying that Sheldon cannot be a unicorn - that the class "Unicorn" is empty?

That seems to me to be an unneeded step to far. — Banno

I have absolutely no idea why you think so. Of course the class of unicorns is empty. For all x, x is not a unicorn.

But Frodo, of course, is fictional, and not real. If being member of a class is the same as being real, then Frodo cannot be a member of a class, and so not a member of the class "hobbits". If we followed that rout, we would not be in a position to talk rationally about fictional or imaginative characters. That's the step too far. — Banno

There are no hobbits. The class of critters that are hobbits is empty. It's pretty clear to me.

What you need is an account of how talking about fiction works. Not only would I be disinclined to monkey with logic just for that, I'd assume you'll need logic to keep working in the usual way to carry out such an analysis.

That is, one might set up a domain by ejecting imaginary and fictional stuff. — Banno

Really? I would have thought imaginary entities don't exist and so don't need to be 'ejected' from the domain of discourse. There are no unicorns or hobbits for me to eject, are there?

So it amounts to the claim that everything is real. — Banno

I gotta be a bit nit-picky here and say the statement in question would better amount to the claim that everything perceivable by humans (directly or indirectly) is real.
I think everything would include things which we are completely unaware of (due to their lack of interaction) if those things existed - again, if they did, they would not be real from a human perspective (according to the statement in question), but they would exist.

And hence, since we cannot claim of anything that it is not real, saying something is real is not saying anything about it. — Banno

I see your point, and I would like to completely agree with it because it is true that the word "real" has more meaning when used to make comparisons between certain things (an original and a forgery, for instance, as you have pointed out previously); nevertheless, I think statements such as "real is that which is the object of human inquiry" or "everything perceivable is real" serve not a descriptive role, per se, but a foundational one in the sense that they prevent the formation of statements such as "ideas are not real" or "the mind is not real" or "unicorns are not real (unicorns are ideas of the mind)" when analyzing the world around us; in this way assuming all is real prevents one from looking for unnecessary tools to explain strange phenomena and instead provides a framework in which one looks to explain the nature of reality using tools that have been proven to function in past investigation, and the knowledge gathered with them. I say this because I have seen many times people try to give to the mind, for example, some kind of special status somehow separate from the physical world we have been studying for millennia, and I have also seen them create all kinds of scenarios that would explain its behaviour no matter how improbable they are. So, I agree that stating that something is real when everything is considered to be real has no real meaning at all (see what I did there?); but the assumption that everything is real provides a guiding track, lets say, that constrict us to look for the cause of whatever is the object of our inquiry using proven knowledge instead of wondering to other worlds that will only exist in the form of ideas or in paper.

Cells were not objects of human inquiry before 18th?century and as such they were not real in the sense he uses it. — introbert

But again, cells would have been indirectly the object of human inquiry when asking about anatomy, for example, the same way gravity was indirectly the object of human inquiry in the pendulum example.