Perhaps someone might object that in order for this principle - Either ensure that the sensible world is such that it will not visit horrendous evils on any innocents that you plan on making live in it, or do not make innocent persons live in it - to apply to a person, the person in question must have the ability to fulfil either of the disjuncts. That is, it only applies to you if you have the ability to alter the world in the required manner, and the ability to invest it with life.

But that seems false. At most one only needs the ability to fulfil one of the disjuncts. For instance, that is all that 'ought implies can' requires. So long as one can fulfil one of the disjuncts, one is able to comply with the directive.

And imagine a god who is unable to prevent herself from introducing new life into the world, but who does the ability to ensure that the world will not visit any horrendous evils on that new life. Well, clearly she ought to exercise that ability. That is, her inability to fulfil one of the disjuncts does not mean the principle does not apply to her. Likewise then, the fact we can't fulfil one of the disjuncts does not mean the principle does not apply to us.

HILARIOUS :rofl:. You are one of the smuggiest passive aggressiviest posters on here. — schopenhauer1

But he is not the "number one". :lol:

That's irrelevant. All that is relevant here is whether this principle is true:

1. Either ensure that the sensible world is such that it will not visit horrendous evils on any innocents that you plan on making live in it, or do not make innocent persons live in it. (P or Q)

Which it is. Or at least, proponents of the problem of evil must accept it is. — Bartricks

Hilariously illogical.

These kind of brainf thought constructs tell something about when actually the "me-myself-and-I" attitude is mixed with over protected lives we live now. The idea of our world now being so cruel... as if it wasn't more cruel before.

Well, it looks like we're stuck here :angry: :grimace: For clarity's sake I am re-posting your OP:

Imagine there is an omnipotent, omniscient person.

Imagine as well that there is a sensible world, exactly like this one.

And imagine that this omnipotent omniscient person really likes the sensible world, and likes how it operates and does not want to interfere with its operations, with one exception: they want to introduce life into it.

So, they have two desires: a desire to leave the sensible world to operate in its own manner, but also a desire to introduce sentient life into the sensible world.

Morally what ought they to do? Should they frustrate their desire to introduce sentient life into the sensible world? Or should they frustrate their desire to leave the sensible world alone and instead alter it so that it does not pose the risks to the welfare of the innocent life they plan on introducing into it? Or should they satisfy both desires?

I take it to be obvious that they should not satisfy both desires. So, that means that they should either adjust the world so as to make it a safer place, or they should refrain from introducing sentient life into it.

Now turn your attention to yourself. You are not omnipotent, but you do have the power to introduce new sentient life into this sensible world. And you are not omniscient, but you know that this sensible world is an incredibly dangerous place, full of all manner of dangers and just about every conceivable harm.

If the omnipotent, omniscient person wants to keep the world as it is, then they ought to frustrate their desire it invest it with sentient life.

If you are unable to change the world, then you ought to frustrate your desire to introduce new sentient life into it. Yes?

I mean, if the omnipotent, omniscient person ought not to introduce sentient life into the sensible world if they are not going to change the sensible world, then your inability to change the sensible world should also mean that you ought not to introduce sentient life into it. Agree?
- - - - - - - -

Now you say this (I boldfaced the most pertinent part):

For I am not trying to shed light on what an omnipotent person is capable of doing. Rather, I am trying to shed light on the morality of procreation. I am simply using the example of God and the problem of evil to do that, — Bartricks

And here is the point I am trying to convey: If you are using your omnipotent, omniscient person (OO-P) as an example/template to possibly emulate - as the OP clearly states - then your discussion of the properties & behavior of the OO-P is subject to debate - since that is the foundation on which you construct your Ps & Qs. And it is this foundation that doesn't make any sense to me. Just for example (and again from the OP):

So, that means that they [God] should either adjust the world so as to make it a safer place, or they should refrain from introducing sentient life into it.

But as you have clearly stated, the sensible world is neither of these things. So clearly, since the OO-P has done neither of these things, then clearly the OO-P is fine with introducing sentient beings into a sensible world filled with pain & evil. And since the OO-P is fine with this, then (following your reasoning) so should we frail human beings be.

And this is begging the whole LNC thing I mentioned a while back.

So again, your OP has set the basis for this discussion, and I'm sticking with it.

But there is one other alternative. Perhaps the OO-P is not essential to your P & Qs (as you seem to be saying). Then perhaps (ironically at this point) you might open up a new discussion and leave out the OO-P - so the discussion can be focused on your Ps & Qs.

Well, it looks like we're stuck here :angry: :grimace: For clarity's sake I am re-posting your OP — EricH

Yes, another fantastically prejudicial judgement by Mickie/Xtrix. This argument:

1. Either ensure that the sensible world does not visit horrendous evils on any innocents you plan on making live in it, or do not make any innocents live in it (P or Q)
2.We are not going to ensure that the sensible world is such that it will not visit horrendous evils on any innocents that we plan on making live in it. (Not P)
3.Therefore, we ought not to make any innocents live in it. (Therefore Q)

Is a 'life sucks' argument, apparently. Which means all discussion of the problem of evil should also be moved to this thread too.

If you are using your omnipotent, omniscient person (OO-P) as an example/template to possibly emulate - as the OP clearly states - then your discussion of the properties & behavior of the OO-P is subject to debate - since that is the foundation on which you construct your Ps & Qs. — EricH

What I was trying to do is show how a proponent of the problem of evil is committed to affirming the truth of a disjunctive moral principle.

1. Either ensure that the sensible world does not visit horrendous evils on any innocents you plan on making live in it, or do not make any innocents live in it (P or Q)

The omnipotent, omniscient person is dispensable insofar as it is the truth of that principle - if true it be - that gets one to the antinatalist conclusion. But as I was trying to show how those who run the problem of evil are, on pain of inconsistency, committed to affirming it - or seem to be, anyway - that was why I mentioned such a creature.

One could argue the other way - that is, one could take the moral permissibility of procreation as one's starting point and argue that it implies that there is no problem of evil.

To go back to my dinner invite examples. Jane wants to invite James over for dinner, but she only has ingredients for spaghetti bolognaise in her cupboard. But that's fine - there's nothing impermissible about inviting someone over for dinner if you're going to serve them spaghetti bolognaise (provided there's enough of it). For James does not dislike it and it's a meal of the kind a guest is entitled to expect.

But then surely it is fine for Marjorie - who is capable of cooking all manner of things for James, but just wants to cook spaghetti bolognaise - to invite James over and serve him spaghetti bolognaise too? SHe will not be doing James an injustice if she does that. She could serve him something better. But he's not entitled to anything better and so he is being done no wrong by Marjorie if she serves him spaghetti bolognaise.

That applies now to God. If it is morally permissible for us to procreate, despite the fact we'll thereby be subjecting an innocent to the risk of suffering horrendous evils - so, if we do no wrong to that person - then it is also morally permissible for God to subject innocents to life in this world despite the risk of them suffering horrendous evils. God is like Marjorie and creating life is like serving spaghetti bolognaise to a guest.

As is now obvious, this is clearly a life-sucks argument through and through and definitely belongs here.

Behind the resignation lies an approbation. The only pertinent point is whether it is always good for all individuals at all points of existence. I am not convinced that it is. For some, Shiva pervades the universe (or is synonymous with it!), which is, as wise people would know, true (satya) and beautiful (in its highest form). Many perspectives are out there—a hint that a broader approach is necessary when it comes to judging the value of existence.

@Baden

I appreciate you starting a new thread with a more respectful name.

I appreciate you starting a new thread with a more respectful name. — T Clark

@Baden

:up: :sparkle:

I am agree with Clark. Thanks for taking the unbiased solution. I think all the sides win here.

No worries. And this is a mod team decision. Not just me. :up:

The other side of this: https://www.chabad.org/4411808

The other side of this: https://www.chabad.org/4411808 — Hanover

As a philosophy - humane and inspiring. In this context - a grotesque and self-serving justification for prejudice and censorship.

In this context - a grotesque and self-serving justification for prejudice and censorship. — T Clark

I really have no idea what you're talking about.

I really have no idea what you're talking about. — Hanover

[deleted]

Just for the record, I (T Clark) did not delete this post.

What I was trying to do is show how a proponent of the problem of evil is committed to affirming the truth of a disjunctive moral principle. — Bartricks

I'm not following you here. By "proponent" do you mean a believer in God - and how they attempt to resolve the discrepancy between an omnibenevolent god and the existence of evil? Or are you referring to a non-believer and how they use the discrepancy to dispute/refute the existence of God?

BTW - I acknowledge that this is a dramatically simplified description of a highly complex set of philosophical/religious beliefs/opinions.

I'm guessing that you're referring to believers - but perhaps I'm missing something?

By a proponent of the problem of evil I mean someone who thinks that the evils of the world imply God's non-existence. So, they are those who argue that God does not exist on the basis of the evils of the world.

I am not one of those. I think God exists. I think there is no problem of evil.

But most philosophers think there is a problem of evil. They think the evils of the world provide us with good evidence (most would say decisive) that God does not exist.

Those philosophers ought to be antinatalists. That is what I am arguing.

That's not why I am an antinatalist. I am an antinatalist for a whole host of reasons.

My point, though, is that an argument - the problem of evil - that the vast majority of philosophers think is a very powerful one against God, implies the truth of antinatalism.

So, 'if' the problem of evil provides good evidence that God does not exist, then there is good evidence that it is wrong for us to procreate.

If P, then Q.

However, it does not follow that if Q then P.

So, although I am an antinatalist, this does not commit me to thinking that the problem of evil provides good evidence that God does not exist.

I think the problem of evil fails. But most think it succeeds. They are inconsistent if they are not also antinatalists.

It is entirely consistent to be an antinatalist and to believe the problem of evil fails to show God's non existence. For there is nothing inconsistent in being a theist antinatalist.

It is entirely consistent to think procreation is morally permissible and that there is no problem of evil. False. But consistent.

It is inconsistent, however, to think that there is a problem of evil and that it is morally ok for us to procreate.

The absurdity of the procreator proponent of the problem of evil's position is becoming increasingly apparent to me.

Jane wants to invite James over for dinner. She doesn't have to. She just wants to. But all she has in her cupboard is some spaghetti and a smashed jar of ragu. So all she is capable of serving James is spaghetti with sauce that has bits of glass in it. And she has no pudding to offer.

Well, I'd have thought it was obvious that she ought to refrain from inviting James over, given all she can serve him is a meal of glassy ragu and spaghetti. A guest deserves better - much better - than that.

But let's imagine that you think - bizarrely - that no, it is absolutely fine for Jane to invite James over and serve him glassy spaghetti and sauce.

Well, Marjorie wants to invite James over for dinner too. She doesn't have to either. SHe just wants to. But she has lots of things in her cupboard, including a smashed glass of ragu and some spaghetti. And she wants to serve James that. However, she is going to give him a great pudding.

Now, aren't you mega-bizarre if you think that it would be wrong for Marjorie needlessly to subject James to an evening of glassy spaghetti and sauce followed by a nice pudding, but not at all wrong for Jane needlessly to subject James to an evening of glassy spaghetti and sauce?

I think so. Yet that is analogous to the view of the person who thinks it would have been wrong for God needlessly to make innocent persons live in this world with all its evils, yet not wrong for them to do so.

God could have gotten rid of the evils - just as Marjorie could have served James something other than spaghetti and glassy ragu. But he is, it is supposed, going to provide a great pudding (an afterlife in heaven).

You, however, could only have served spaghetti and glassy ragu, for that is all you had. You didn't have to invite James to dinner, of course. And you can offer no pudding. If God did wrong, you did worse! I mean, whose invite would James prefer to receive?

The bigger issue that looms on James' mind is not what's for dinner, but are they going to make babies after? Few people will let the problems of the world make an argument against getting laid.

My position on antinatalism is that I agree with it as being the epitome of a philosophical idea: where thought becomes greater than the life that gives it existence. People are unlike other creatures in that we can appreciate our suffering. Animals in nature accept their lot. Our nature to think, or to like thinking, can lead us to favor heady ideals over material existence. However, most people are not philosophical. Thoughts can occur to any of us, but only in an insignificant number will thinking interfere with basic functions like eating (animals), procreating, and working. Nevertheless, as I said, I agree with philosophy at its apex. This is where thought becomes greater than the material world. Mind there is not at a subservient level to matter as in science, but transcends actuality to create nothing. This is the spirit that I favor in antinatalism.

Mind there is not at a subservient level to matter as in science, but transcends actuality to create nothing. This is the spirit that I favor in antinatalism. — introbert

Existence before essence is the case for humans in many ways that human pretend isn’t. Bad faith. :up:.

Thoughts can occur to any of us, but only in an insignificant number will thinking interfere with basic functions like eating (animals), procreating, and working. — introbert

The desire for sexual pleasure doesn’t seem the same as procreation, as we have divorced the two. Therefore, I consider procreation not a basic instinct. It is simply a culturally reinforced preference to want to reproduce. It could be out of any number of things including ones as banal as boredom, fear of missing out and a host of other complex socially derived, non instinctual reasons that have no discernible basis in an instinctual drive to “procreate”.

Before continuing I just wanted to say that I'm glad that we have had an invective free conversation. I believe very strongly (that whenever possible) it is ideas that should be criticized, not people. I hope that we can continue in that vein.

That said . . .

By a proponent of the problem of evil [PPE] I mean someone who thinks that the evils of the world imply God's non-existence. — Bartricks

Yet that is analogous to the view of the person who thinks it would have been wrong for God needlessly to make innocent persons live in this world with all its evils, yet not wrong for them to do so. — Bartricks

I think I finally understand what you're getting at - and here is where we disagree. I am not seeing any connection between being a PPE and your Ps & Qs. Being a PPE does not imply that one should have any opinion on how God should act, let alone that it is wrong of God.

To illustrate, let's take a specific hypothetical example. Let's say there's a person - call him Mr. X - who is an atheist and Mr. X thinks that the problem of evil is proof that She does not exist and that "God" is an imaginary character in various religious books. So what is Mr. X's opinion of AN? Is there any connection between Mr. Xs atheism and AN?

Not that I'm seeing.

Mr. X could be an AN - maybe he feels that there are too many people on the planet and we need to reduce the human population to keep a sustainable civilization.

Or maybe Mr. X is anti-AN. Mr. X loves children (he has 2 kids) and he is confident that humanity will eventually solve these problems.

Or maybe Mr. X has no opinion at all. He's a nihilist and thinks humanity is doomed no matter what happens.

Etc, etc.

- - - - - - - - - - -

As far as Jane inviting James over? Why does she have to serve the glassy sauce? She could serve the spaghetti plain - maybe with a bit of olive oil, a dash of salt, and some parmigiana cheese. Yum. Oh, her cupboard is empty? She can go out to the store and buy some. Oh, she's broke? She could call James and say "Hey James, I'm so sorry, all I have is plain spaghetti but I'd still like you to come over". Or she could call up James and say "Hey lover boy, would mind picking up a jar of ragu on your way over?"

As far as Jane inviting James over? Why does she have to serve the glassy sauce? She could serve the spaghetti plain - maybe with a bit of olive oil, a dash of salt, and some parmigiana cheese. Yum. Oh, her cupboard is empty? She can go out to the store and buy some. Oh, she's broke? She could call James and say "Hey James, I'm so sorry, all I have is plain spaghetti but I'd still like you to come over". Or she could call up James and say "Hey lover boy, would mind picking up a jar of ragu on your way over?" — EricH

Please don't give him any more ideas about how to adapted his theories, they are weird enough already.

Before continuing I just wanted to say that I'm glad that we have had an invective free conversation. I believe very strongly (that whenever possible) it is ideas that should be criticized, not people. I hope that we can continue in that vein — EricH

Oh, I very much doubt it, vicar. For you just criticized me there, didn't you? Tut tut.

I think I finally understand what you're getting at - and here is where we disagree. I am not seeing any connection between being a PPE and your Ps & Qs. Being a PPE does not imply that one should have any opinion on how God should act, let alone that it is wrong of God. — EricH

Yes it does. How doesn't it? A proponent of the problem of evil believes that it would be wrong for God to invest a world such as this one with innocent life. They point to the evils of the world and conclude that God would have prevented those. That's the basis upon which they believe God does not exist. They believe that God would either have altered how the sensible world operates so that it doesn't visit any horrendous evils on the innocents he puts in it, or he would not have put innocent persons into it.

So what is Mr. X's opinion of AN? Is there any connection between Mr. Xs atheism and AN? — EricH

Yes, clearly. Mr X believes this principle is true:

1. Either alter how the sensible world operates so that it does not visit horrendous evils on any innocents you plan on introducing into it, or do not introduce innocents into it. (Either p or q)

And this premise is clearly true:

2. We cannot alter how the sensible world operates so that it does not visit horrendous evils on any innocents we plan on introducing into it (not P)

3. Therefore, do not introduce innocents into it (antinatalism) (therefore, q)

As far as Jane inviting James over? Why does she have to serve the glassy sauce? She could serve the spaghetti plain - maybe with a bit of olive oil, a dash of salt, and some parmigiana cheese. Yum. Oh, her cupboard is empty? She can go out to the store and buy some. Oh, she's broke? She could call James and say "Hey James, I'm so sorry, all I have is plain spaghetti but I'd still like you to come over". Or she could call up James and say "Hey lover boy, would mind picking up a jar of ragu on your way over?" — EricH

You don't seem to understand the example.

We cannot alter how the sensible world operates so that it does not visit horrendous evils on any innocents we plan on introducing into it (not P) — Bartricks

Does it have to be even as far as horrendous evil? I’d think any non-individualized version of a person’s utopia would do. If it’s a god, you’d think this could at least be in consideration of one of the avenues he could have chosen for his creation.

Another thing to consider is, the parent is only thinking about their child, not all children , like a god presumably would. The parents think their child will live a “good enough” life and find something like 95% of it just peachy and fine. This is why some of my recent AN arguments revolve around the notion of aggressive paternalism. You shouldn’t assume for another that this life’s set of limited choices is what another would want. You shouldn’t assume others would want to deal with this life’s known, foreseeable harms (foreseeable from the parents experiences and predictions), and you shouldn’t assume to expose others to harms that are extreme that you may not even have expected but are known that it could happen. All these assumptions on behalf of others amounts to an aggressively paternalistic mindset and actions.

As my argument here is directed at proponents of the problem of evil, it would depend on whether milder evils are considered by them to be incompatible with God.

It is generally thought that the quality and quantity of the harms that befall people here are such that God, if he existed, would surely prevent.

Antinatalists, such as myself, are persuaded by a variety of arguments.

The argument I am making here is not directed at antinatalists, for we are already persuaded by other arguments. This argument is directed at those who think the problem of evil provides good evidence that God does not exist. That's most philosophers. But most philosophers are not antinatalists. This argument shows them that they should be.

Fair enough. I simply liken it to a game players are forced to play lest they kill themselves. Seems like such a bargain is prime facie unfair.

Your argument is that if problem of evil is unfair, then so are the billions of instances of procreations humans enact everyday bringing humans into what can be an evil world (and in my view always is).

You don't seem to understand the example. — Bartricks

I understand your example. I was trying to use some gentle humor to illustrate that your analogy lacks a certain rigor. But your example is irrelevant to the larger point I'm trying to get across.

Let me try once more to recap what I think you're saying (and what I'm trying to communicate). I'll do this in a conversation between you & Mr. X:

1. [Bartricks]: Imagine there's an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient entity.
2. [Mr. X]: That doesn't make any sense. An omnibenevolent entity would not allow evil & suffering to exist. Until you can resolve this inconsistency I have no reason to believe in such an entity. I might have other good reasons as well, but this is a sufficient reason in of itself.
3. [Bartricks]: Clearly your pointing out this inconsistency in my imaginary entity logically requires that you must have a certain moral position.
4. [Mr. X]: Huh? You're not making any sense. All I'm doing is simply pointing out that you are contradicting yourself back in #1. Why should your errors in basic logic have anything to do with how I live my life? I live by my own morality that has nothing to do with your imaginary entity.

They believe that God would either have altered how the sensible world operates so that it doesn't visit any horrendous evils on the innocents he puts in it, or he would not have put innocent persons into it. — Bartricks

Mr. X does not believe this - he is simply pointing out the inconsistency in the definition of God.. Mr. X is an atheist and he does not incorporate any definition of any imaginary entity or entities into his beliefs.

Mr. X does not believe this principal. Mr. X is an atheist and he does not incorporate any definition of any imaginary entity or entities into his beliefs. — EricH

I don’t get Bartricks using god as some thought experiment. I think a good analogy is rather a game that I think is good enough that I force other people to play it. I gaslight them and say, well now that I forced you into this game, if you don’t like ir, you can’t escape to a better game with different setup and initial conditions you can only play in the confines of this game. You can only imagine a different game but you can’t play it. However, if you are ungrateful for being exposed to this game, you can always kill yourself! If this sounds outrageously unfair as a game analogy, it really is not much different than procreation.

The problem is people will defend by appeals to majority practice and tradition which justifies only itself and not morality which in almost every other situation outside of procreation we’d consider unethical. This becomes special pleading due to long held cultural pressures and preferences.

No, you don't seem to understand at all.

And you don't seem to understand what a proponent of the problem of evil believes either.

My argument is addressed to those who believe that the evils of the world constitute evidence that God does not exist.

It is not addressed to those fools who think the concept of God does not make sense.

So, step one: try and focus on the relevant parties. I am addressing procreator (or natalist - by which I mean those who believe procreation is typically permissible) proponents of the problem of evil

If you think God can't exist, then you're not someone I am addressing.

I am addressing procreator proponents of the problem of evil.

Now, in order to help those who find it difficulty to follow a line of argument focus on the relevant issue - totally and utterly pointless in a context like this, I know - in my original example I asked you to imagine an omnipotent, omniscient person. Not God. Just an omnipotent omniscient person., Now, I know a little voice is saying 'ooo, but that ain't makking no sense'. Shut that voice up and focus.

And what did I then do? I then asked you to notice that a proponent of the problem of evil thinks a person like that morally ought not to invest a world like this with sentient life unless he was going to alter how it operates.

So, a 'good' omnipotent, omniscient person would either alter how the world operates so as to eliminate the risk of horrendous evils, or they would not invest the world with innocent life.

Forget whether you agree. This is to do with what a proponent of the problem of evil will agree to. And they'll have to agree to what I just said otherwise there is no problem of evil.

And that principle - either ensure the world will not visit horrendous evils on any innocents you make live in it, or do not make innocents live in it - has this form 'Either p or q'

And we are not able to ensure that the world will not visit horrendous evils on any innocents we make live in it.

That means 'not p' is true for us.

From which it follows. as a matter of basic logic, that q. That is, that we ought not to invest the world with innocent life.

1. Either p or q
2. Not p
3. Therefore q

is a deductively valid argument

Jesus!

Now, because that argument is deductively valid, anyone who wishes to deny its conclusion must deny a premise.

The second is clearly undeniable.

So it all hangs on the first.

And note, the question here is not whether you agree with 1, but whether a proponent of the problem of evil agrees with it.

if you think they do not have to agree with it, then explain how such a person could argue that the evils of the world imply God's non existence without appeal to that principle.

When it came to my dinner invite examples, I wouldn't be surprised if you thought that the thing to focus on is how nice pasta and ragu is.

Shall we go through it again?

No one has to invite James to dinner. No wrong is done if James is not invited to dinner (don't question that. Don't say 'but what if James is really hungry' or something tediously stupid like that. That'd be thicker than a thick thing on thick day. So don't.)

Jane wants to invite James to dinner. But she only has ingredients for meal X. Pssst, it doesn't matter what the meal is. Don't ask about the meal. Don't ask why she only has those ingredients and didn't work harder and acquire more ingredients. That's irrelevant.

Now, given that Jane can only serve James meal x if she invites him for dinner, is it morally ok for her to invite James to dinner?

Depends what x is. A dinner guest is entitled to a meal of a certain quantity and quality.

Let's imagine it is morally ok for her to invite James to dinner.

Well, if it is ok for her to invite James to dinner given she can only serve him x, then it is surely also ok for Marjorie to invite James to dinner and serve him x, even though she is capable of serving him something better.

Now, inviting James to dinner is playing the role of procreation in the above analogy. The meal x is life here in the sensible world as it is.

Jane is us. Marjorie is God. If it is morally ok for us to subject a person to life here in the sensible world as it is, then it is morally ok for God too as well. That is, if it is morally permissible for us to procreate, then there is no problem of evil.


But a proponent of the problem of evil thinks Marjorie did wrong in serving James X. If that was what she was going to serve, she should not have invited him.

So, a proponent of the problem of evil thinks it wrong for Marjorie to invite James over for dinner if all she is going to serve him is meal X.

But that now means that Jane would also be doing wrong if she invites James over for dinner given she can only serve him meal X.

In other words, if God would have been doing wrong if he introduced innocent life into this world as it is, then we too are doing wrong if we introduce innocent llfe into this world as it is.

See?

If it is wrong for Marjorie to serve James X, then it is wrong for Jane to invite James over given she can only serve him x.

If it is ok for Jane to invite James over given she can only serve him x, then it is ok for Marjorie to serve James x (even though she has the ability to serve him something better).

Thus, if it would be wrong for an omnipotent omniscient person to subject innocent persons to life in a world such as this, then it would be wrong for us to as well, given all we can offer is life in a world such as this.

And if it would be morally permissible for a person who can only offer life in world such as this to subject an innocent person to a lifetime in it, then it is morally ok for an omnipotent, omniscient person to do so as well, even though he has the ability to alter how the world operates.

So, if there is a problem of evil for God - and virtually everyone thinks there is (mistakenly, as it happens), then procreation is immoral.

If procreation is not immoral, then there is no problem of evil for God.

They are fair questions. Is God not unjust in allowing millions to suffer? Were my parents not wrong to bring me into this vale of tears? Even if I can get my parents off the hook it may not absolve God. And even if God can get in the clear my parents may still be culpable. They seem to be separate cases. At any rate it distracts attention from any blame that I might carry for making the world a worse place or distressing my parents.