So Russian attempts at invading Ukraine will likely push Ukraine into Western sphere of influence. — neomac
The red line was the actual nuclear threat, and the solution was focused on finding an agreement about the nuclear threat. Russia could have proposed the same to the US. But it didn't. — neomac
Russian military incompetence ... — boethius
The US didn't annex parts of Cuba nor obtained Cuban neutrality/Cuban demilitarization/regime change. And US reaction was against an actual nuclear threat. — neomac
Stop changing the subject. — Olivier5
It is not incompatible with imperialism. — Olivier5
The annexion of Crimea, Dombass and Kherson are evidence of imperialist ambitions. We are not talking of just beating Ukraine into Belarusian-type submission here, but of land and people grab. — Olivier5
1. NATO goes to war with Russia to implement by force the West's moral judgements, which maximises the risk of nuclear war, or
2. Ukraine imposes its will on Russia by force
3. Russia imposes its will on Ukraine by force
4. The war goes on forever — boethius
Right. The aid to the Ukrainians makes the providers proxied elements. Though, I don't think the instigator meant to (ultimately) attack them instead (in this war anyway). Or maybe someone disagrees with this? — jorndoe
Picture if China was taking the same actions in Canada or Mexico, despite US warnings. Would we say they were taking those warnings seriously? After all, it could be argued, China didn’t annex Canada or incorporate it into a defensive alliance — it was only talking about it.
How would that scenario play out? Would we therefore EXCUSE the US for invading Canada? Of course not. But it shouldn’t come as a shock. Nor should we invent stories about how the US President’s “real” motive is to conquer all of the Western Hemisphere.
— Mikie
Note that in this scenario, the US would annex large parts of Canada, just as Putin is doing in Ukraine. Therefore, it would be a land grab, a manifestation of imperialism — Olivier5
William Burns, who is now the head of the CIA, but was the US ambassador to Moscow at the time of the Bucharest summit, wrote a memo to then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that succinctly describes Russian thinking about this matter. In his words: “Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all red lines for the Russian elite (not just Putin). In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players, from knuckle-draggers in the dark recesses of the Kremlin to Putin’s sharpest liberal critics, I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in NATO as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests.” NATO, he said, “would be seen … as throwing down the strategic gauntlet. Today’s Russia will respond. Russian-Ukrainian relations will go into a deep freeze…It will create fertile soil for Russian meddling in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.”
“if Ukraine joins NATO, it will do so without Crimea and the eastern regions. It will simply fall apart.”
Your endless NATO caca arguments fail to account for the annexion of Crimea, Dombass and Kherson. This is the proof of imperial ambitions, which you have conveniently decided to ignore because it undermines your narrative... — Olivier5
In direct contrast to Russia’s frightful trajectory, the world is witnessing the full-throated and inspiring political birth of a Ukrainian nation-state, its founding myth strengthened by the shared trauma of conflict and common hardships — Gioe and Styles
Ukraine is clearly now a nation with an inarguably separate identity to Russia
Putin’s latest invasion has hardened and consolidated Ukraine’s national resolve—arguably creating the very thing he sought to strangle at birth, a politically confident and culturally separate nation, through his own reckless actions
That he’s an imperialist bent on expanding Russia. That’s wrong. It’s wrong because there’s no evidence supporting it, no matter how often it’s repeated in the media or on this thread. If you think there is evidence, happy to discuss that.
— Mikie
I’m responding only for my arguments. If you want to talk about “imperialism”, you better clarify what you mean by it in a way that is clear what you would take as an evidence for the concept to apply, because otherwise we are just quibbling over a terminological issue. See here: “Imperialism is the state policy, practice, or advocacy of extending power and dominion, especially by direct territorial acquisition or by gaining political and economic control of other areas,[2][3] often through employing hard power (economic and military power), but also soft power (cultural and diplomatic power).” — neomac
“Only”? I blame Putin for the war. NATO was a reason given for invasion — one that was given for years, clearly and consistently. The conclusion? That he’s an imperialist bent on expanding Russia. That’s wrong. It’s wrong because there’s no evidence supporting it, no matter how often it’s repeated in the media or on this thread. If you think there is evidence, happy to discuss that.
The Conventional Wisdom
It is widely and firmly believed in the West that Putin is solely responsible for causing the Ukraine crisis and certainly the ongoing war. He is said to have imperial ambitions, which is to say he is bent on conquering Ukraine and other countries as well—all for the purpose of creating a greater Russia that bears some resemblance to the former Soviet Union. In other words, Ukraine is Putin’s first target, but not his last. As one scholar put it, he is “acting on a sinister, long-held goal: to erase Ukraine from the map of the world.” Given Putin’s purported goals, it makes perfect sense for Finland and Sweden to join NATO and for the alliance to increase its force levels in eastern Europe. Imperial Russia, after all, must be contained.
While this narrative is repeated over and over in the mainstream media and by virtually every Western leader, there is no evidence to support it. To the extent that purveyors of the conventional wisdom provide evidence, it has little if any bearing on Putin’s motives for invading Ukraine. For example, some emphasize that he said that Ukraine is an “artificial state“ or not a “real state.” Such opaque comments, however, say nothing about his reason for going to war. The same is true of Putin’s statement that he views Russians and Ukrainians as “one people“ with a common history. Others point out that he called the collapse of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” Of course, Putin also said, “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart. Whoever wants it back has no brain.” Still, others point to a speech in which he declared that “Modern Ukraine was entirely created by Russia or, to be more precise, by Bolshevik, Communist Russia.” But as he went on to say in that very same speech, in reference to Ukraine’s independence today: “Of course, we cannot change past events, but we must at least admit them openly and honestly.”
To make the case that Putin was bent on conquering all of Ukraine and incorporating it into Russia, it is necessary to provide evidence that first, he thought it was a desirable goal, that second, he thought it was a feasible goal, and third, he intended to pursue that goal. There is no evidence in the public record that Putin was contemplating, much less intending to put an end to Ukraine as an independent state and make it part of greater Russia when he sent his troops into Ukraine on February 24th.
In fact, there is significant evidence that Putin recognized Ukraine as an independent country. In his July 12, 2021, article about Russian-Ukrainian relations, which proponents of the conventional wisdom often point to as evidence of his imperial ambitions, he tells the Ukrainian people, “You want to establish a state of your own: you are welcome!” Regarding how Russia should treat Ukraine, he writes, “There is only one answer: with respect.” He concludes that lengthy article with the following words: “And what Ukraine will be—it is up to its citizens to decide.” It is hard to reconcile these statements with the claim that he wants to incorporate Ukraine within a greater Russia.
In that same July 12, 2021, article and again in an important speech he gave on February 21st of this year, Putin emphasized that Russia accepts “the new geopolitical reality that took shape after the dissolution of the USSR.” He reiterated that same point for a third time on February 24th, when he announced that Russia would invade Ukraine. In particular, he declared that “It is not our plan to occupy Ukrainian territory” and made it clear that he respected Ukrainian sovereignty, but only up to a point: “Russia cannot feel safe, develop, and exist while facing a permanent threat from the territory of today’s Ukraine.” In essence, Putin was not interested in making Ukraine a part of Russia; he was interested in making sure it did not become a “springboard“ for Western aggression against Russia, a subject I will say more about shortly.
One might argue that Putin was lying about his motives, that he was attempting to disguise his imperial ambitions. As it turns out, I have written a book about lying in international politics—Why Leaders Lie: The Truth about Lying in International Politics—and it is clear to me that Putin was not lying. For starters, one of my principal findings is that leaders do not lie much to each other; they lie more often to their own publics. Regarding Putin, whatever one thinks of him, he does not have a history of lying to other leaders. Although some assert that he frequently lies and cannot be trusted, there is little evidence of him lying to foreign audiences. Moreover, he has publicly spelled out his thinking about Ukraine on numerous occasions over the past two years and he has consistently emphasized that his principal concern is Ukraine’s relations with the West, especially NATO. He has never once hinted that he wants to make Ukraine part of Russia. If this behavior is all part of a giant deception campaign, it would be without precedent in recorded history.
Perhaps the best indicator that Putin is not bent on conquering and absorbing Ukraine is the military strategy Moscow has employed from the start of the campaign. The Russian military did not attempt to conquer all of Ukraine. That would have required a classic blitzkrieg strategy that aimed at quickly overrunning all of Ukraine with armored forces supported by tactical airpower. That strategy was not feasible, however, because there were only 190,000 soldiers in Russia’s invading army, which is far too small a force to vanquish and occupy Ukraine, which is not only the largest country between the Atlantic Ocean and Russia, but also has a population over 40 million. Unsurprisingly, the Russians pursued a limited aims strategy, which focused on either capturing or threatening Kiev and conquering a large swath of territory in eastern and southern Ukraine. In short, Russia did not have the capability to subdue all of Ukraine, much less conquer other countries in eastern Europe.
As Ramzy Mardini observed, another telling indicator of Putin’s limited aims is that there is no evidence Russia was preparing a puppet government for Ukraine, cultivating pro-Russian leaders in Kyiv, or pursuing any political measures that would make it possible to occupy the entire country and eventually integrate it into Russia.
To take this argument a step further, Putin and other Russian leaders surely understand from the Cold War that occupying counties in the age of nationalism is invariably a prescription for never-ending trouble. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan is a glaring example of this phenomenon, but more relevant for the issue at hand is Moscow’s relations with its allies in eastern Europe. The Soviet Union maintained a huge military presence in that region and was involved in the politics of almost every country located there. Those allies, however, were a frequent thorn in Moscow’s side. The Soviet Union put down a major insurrection in East Germany in 1953, and then invaded Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 to keep them in line. There was serious trouble in Poland in 1956, 1970, and again in 1980-1981. Although Polish authorities dealt with these events, they served as a reminder that intervention might be necessary. Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia routinely caused Moscow trouble, but Soviet leaders tended to tolerate their misbehavior, because their location made them less important for deterring NATO.
The nuke rattling can also backfire. Russia's Western neighbors don't host nukes (as best we know), surely that would have included Ukraine, had they become a NATO member. On the other hand, Russia's nuke placements are on neighbors' doorsteps. And Russia bulging seems likely to carry such weaponry along, or threaten to, which might elicit a reaction; after all, not everyone airs nuclear threats. — jorndoe
According to Putin, NATO was planning to destroy Russia. He saw NATO as an existential threat. — frank
- Ukraine remains neutral. — Elon Musk (Oct 3, 2022)
The point stands: the US and NATO did not take Russian concerns seriously — as was demonstrated above[/].
— Mikie
That’s why you are blaming also US/NATO for this war, right? — neomac
Either way, if pushing for NATO membership, supplying weapons and military training, etc., is “taking Russian concerns seriously,” as you asserted, then the assertion is indeed baseless and wrong. If their concerns were taken seriously, these actions wouldn’t have been taken.
— Mikie
Taking a threat seriously means that one should not ignore the threat — neomac
I prefer living in the US over living in Iraq. The US invasion of Iraq was still wrong.
Even if Russia were a democracy, the war is wrong. The US ignoring the Russian concerns and contributing to escalating the crisis is also wrong.
— Mikie
So what? I’m more interested in testing the rationality of our expectations not in what we find desirable or moral. If all you have to offer is a list of scores based on your moral compass or desiderata, you are not intellectually challenging to me. — neomac
[Emphasis mine]If state A threatens state B in its proximity or state A invades state B, I could react differently depending on which state is democratic or authoritarian, because I prefer democracy over authoritarian regimes. — neomac
What was the Russian threat in 2008, exactly? — Mikie
By the end of 2008 Putin was already on the path of centralising power (e.g. by fighting oligarchs since hist first presidency term) while signalling his geopolitical ambitions in his war against Chechnya and Georgia. This was already enough to alarm the West and the ex-soviet union countries (including Ukrainians who have a long history of nationalist tensions with Russia). That’s why NATO enlargement was welcomed by ex-Soviet republics and not the result of military occupation and annexation by NATO, you know. — neomac
Additionally your myopic demands for evidence fails to take into account the initial assumption of my geopolitical reasoning: “You candidly admit that Putin’s perception of the threat was honestly felt (even if, ex hypothesis, it’s not justified) , but that’s pointless to the extent that all geopolitical agents (not only Russia) as geopolitical agent reason strategically. And strategic reasoning comprises threat perception, signalling and management , so if one must acknowledge that Putin/Russia felt threatened by US/NATO (even if, ex hypothesis, it’s unjustified), then one must acknowledge that also US/NATO/Ukraine can feel threatened by Putin/Russia (even if, ex hypothesis, it’s unjustified).”. So US/NATO felt Putin and the rising of Russian revanchism honestly threatening, even if, ex hypothesis, it wasn’t justified. Period. — neomac
NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations. We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and Georgia and look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in Georgia in May. MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. Today we make clear that we support these countries’ applications for MAP. Therefore we will now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications. We have asked Foreign Ministers to make a first assessment of progress at their December 2008 meeting. Foreign Ministers have the authority to decide on the MAP applications of Ukraine and Georgia.
"Real intentions"? Again, let's stop simply declaring the "real intentions" of the US or Putin, and look at the facts. From the summit communiqué in June 2021 to the Joint Statement in September 2021 to the statements by Blinken in December (after Russia made clear demands about NATO) -- the words were consistent. What about the actions? Well, not only weapons were provided, but extensive military training, including with NATO forces. — Mikie
You are missing the fact that Biden froze the procurement of lethal weapons by the end of 2021 (https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/appeals-ukraine-biden-admin-holds-back-additional-military-aid-kyiv-di-rcna8421) which were a more serious threat for Putin’s war machine than military training, defensive weapons and NATO promises. — neomac
And again: NATO/US military support to Ukraine was meant as a deterrent (however weak) — neomac
10 thousand trained troops a year (Obama), Trump supplying "defensive weapons," and Biden's long-held and continued hawkishness toward Russia (including what I've already gone over) -- hardly what you describe.
— Mikie
Again you are forgetting the issue of the lethal weapons. Not training, not NATO expansion, not defensive weapons, not the hawkish claims were the serious threat, otherwise Putin would have started his special operation much earlier. The serious military threat was the offensive weapon system provided to the Ukrainians against Putin’s expansionist ambitions. — neomac
Also in December, Putin said: “what they are doing, or trying or planning to do in Ukraine, is not happening thousands of kilometers away from our national border. It is on the doorstep of our house. They must understand that we simply have nowhere further to retreat to. Do they really think we do not see these threats? Or do they think that we will just stand idly watching threats to Russia emerge?”
— Mikie
Retreat from what? — neomac
Did Putin have evidence that Ukraine or NATO wanted to invade Russia? Or are we always talking about perceived strategic threats? — neomac
You keep presenting facts according to the Russian perspective but you didn’t explain yet why the West should act according to Putin’s way of framing the issue and related demands (NATO membership, no military training, no weapons for Ukraine) while letting Ukraine fall prey to Russia. How is that right? — neomac
If Russia did something wrong in invading Ukraine according to your moral compass, what do you think it’s sensible to do about it? — neomac
So here we stand:
You are blaming also US/NATO for this war in Ukraine
You do not ground your judgement based on geopolitical strategic concerns, only on your cute moral compass (honesty, impartiality, peace&lovefulness) — neomac
• Putin's Russia is a present existential threat to Ukraine, to which the Ukrainians are responding
• until Putin's Russia has taken over all of Ukraine, the (supposed (or, say, future-hypothetical)) threat of NATO membership remains
• if Putin’s Russia was to take over all of Ukraine, then Russia becomes an increased substantial threat to others (like Putinian autocracy, nuclear rattling doesn't help)
See where this is going?
- Ukraine remains neutral.
— Elon Musk (Oct 3, 2022) — jorndoe
For certain the EU has enormous leverage in the situation and can easily use it to broker a peace deal.
A recipe for a resolution could go something like this:
- Ukraine enters the EU on some fast track process.
- Russia gets sanctions dropped and Nord Stream 2.
- Russia pays for rebuilding of Ukraine (which is obviously just recycling some of the massive profits of dropping sanctions).
- The territorial question is of course the tricky part, but that could be resolved by agreeing to have another vote after peace is restored, people return to these regions; something that the world community would accept as legitimate, outside observers etc. If holding onto the territories is an obstacle to a peace deal that Russia actually wants, "giving the territory back" is problematic after annexation, however, the various regions having another vote in x time could be a reasonable compromise for everyone. "Will of the people" At least in principle Ukraine is "fighting" for the right of self determination, and Russia is claiming these regions can leave Ukraine and join Russia based on a vote, and presumably the EU is democratic and maybe even the US, so there's at least no issue in principle. Of course, you'd want to come to this deal before these regions are officially annexed, as Russia wouldn't want the precedent of one of its territories being able to vote to leave. — boethius
And I suppose this reaction to China's involvement -- as inexcusable as it would be -- would somehow prove that the US had "imperial ambitions" there all along, despite there being no evidence of it prior to China's actions? Nonsense.
There's no evidence of US "imperialist ambitions" in Canada today. I don't think that's controversial. — Mikie
Seems? It actually was threatening. The US wanted to destroy Russia, like wipe it off the map. Putin had no choice. — frank
Which is precisely why Canada has nothing to fear from the US, and is not seeking protection elsewhere.... — Olivier5
If, hypothetically, starting in 2025, China were on the doorstep, supplying weapons, training thousands of troops, and continually pushing for Canadian membership in a "defensive alliance," despite years of US warnings about this being a "red line," and then a reaction occurred in 2031 where the US annexed parts of Canada -- I suppose this would somehow make the claims true today? Of course not.
Likewise, there were no claims of Russian "imperial ambitions" prior to 2014. After that, it of course became the official reason. With no mention of the prior six years' warnings from Russia, which were recognized even within the US — Mikie
Oh really? What were the reasons for Ukraine and Georgia and all the others to seek NATO membership, oh wise one?They wanted to visit Brussels? — Olivier5
• Putin's Russia is a present existential threat to Ukraine, to which the Ukrainians are responding
• until Putin's Russia has taken over all of Ukraine, the (supposed (or, say, future-hypothetical)) threat of NATO membership remains
• if Putin’s Russia was to take over all of Ukraine, then Russia becomes an increased substantial threat to others (like Putinian autocracy, nuclear rattling doesn't help)
See where this is going? — jorndoe
This is alarming. It really is like preparing the narrative groundwork for using nukes.If Putin is actually going down the nuclear path, then Moscow will get all eyes-on, attention. I don't imagine they think that'd be a good move for Russia, or anyone at all. Anyone know specs of the Russian dirty / tactical nuclear bombs? (radius, time until area is safe, materials, yield, emp, delivery systems) — jorndoe
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