That's a pretty good explanation. Put simply "the book is in my room" implies that I know where the book is. "The book is possibly in my room" implies that I do not know where the book is. That's why the two are inconsistent with each other.

"The book is possibly in my room" implies that I do not know where the book is. — Metaphysician Undercover

You just have to be careful about this. Given

(1) The book is possibly in my room.
(2) I do not know where the book is.

It is not the case that (1) entails (2). It just doesn't. But conversationally, we take an utterance of (1) to implicate a commitment to (2). And that commitment is purely conversational; you do not contradict yourself if you say, "Well, it might be in my room — as a matter of fact I know that it is."

There's no more a contradiction here than there is in Mitch Hedberg's joke, "I used to do drugs. I still do, but I used to too." Implicature is not entailment; that's the whole point. (To belabor the point: "used to" suggests that you've stopped, but it doesn't mean that or entail that; it's just an inference we tend to make when someone says it, and an inference we're expected to make. If any of this were different, Mitch would not have a joke here.)

And that's another reason that approaching all philosophical problems in terms of what people say or can't say is so misleading; there are other rules than logic at work in what people say to each other and what it will be taken to mean.

However, if I recall correctly, you made the absurd claim earlier that "possible" is not the opposite of "impossible".
— Luke

That's right, imposible ought not be considered as opposite to possible, because it leads to the ambiguity of "necessary" which I described and you don't seem to understand. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Possible" is the opposite of "impossible". It is absurd to deny it. Whatever ambiguous meaning of "necessary" you think results from this makes no difference to the fact. You do not get to personally decide the meanings of these words.

Then you have likewise rendered "possible" as extremely ambiguous and misleading.
— Luke

Yes, "possible" is extremely ambiguous and misleading. But it has been this way for a long time, so it is not I who has rendered it thus. — Metaphysician Undercover

So if I consider "possible" as the opposite of "impossible", then I have gone awry in my thinking because it leads to ambiguous consequences for the meaning of the word "necessary", but the word "possible" was always ambiguous and not because you've gone awry in your thinking? This is just nonsense.

If you think that what is actual is not also what is possible, then what is actual must also be what is necessary. Consequently, free will is an illusion.

Seems to me that we're perfectly capable of understanding what sorts of thoughts are exclusive to humans and what sorts are not.

It would make no sense to say that a parrot danced as a way of showing its appreciation for the aesthetic beauty of a particular song unless it had personal taste regarding music. It would make no sense to say that my cat is jealous of the way my other cat looks unless she had a beauty standard for her to even be bitter about because it is one that she feels she has failed to meet whereas she feels her roommate has succeeded.

The gecko on my outdoor table was not thankful to me for leaving bits of butter mochi and juice for it - and could not possibly be - without having a meaningful sense of gratitude. The pheasants in my yard cannot respect the individuality of each other simply for the sake of doing so unless they have some socially derived moral/ethical sense of respecting the individuality of others simply for the sake of doing so. The male peacock does not have all his hopes and dreams wrapped up in successfully 'courting' females unless he has thought and belief(hopes and dreams) about what has yet to have happened(the future).

In principle, thoughts exclusive to humans would be(consist of) correlations including written language use. In practice, we do not attribute such thought to non human creatures.

Seems to me that we're perfectly capable of understanding what sorts of thoughts are exclusive to humans and what sorts are not. — creativesoul

You seem to think I have disagreed with this. The only thing I have any issue with is the "humans". I think it should be "language capable beings". Yes, of course we can say that only language capable beings can have linguistically mediated thoughts. It's analytically and trivially (insofar as it doesn't really tell us anything) true.

What you don't seem to understand MIchael, is that whether or not the book is actually in your room is completely irrelevant here. — Metaphysician Undercover

No it isn't. It's the only thing that's relevant. We're concenred with truth, not belief.

Whether or not the book is actually in my room has nothing to do with what I believe. I don't know where the book is so I say "the book is possibly in my room", but as a matter of fact, distinct from my belief, the book is actually in my room.

The book doesn't just cease to exist, or fail to have a location, simply because I don't know where it is.

It wouldn't hurt to distinguish the epistemic and alethic modalities now and then. — Srap Tasmaner

Not sure if it matters in this instance. Whether we're considering epistemic or alethic modality, if something is true then it is possible.

there are other rules than logic at work in what people say to each other and what it will be taken to mean. — Srap Tasmaner

Interesting. What other rules might those be?

It is not the case that (1) entails (2). It just doesn't. But conversationally, we take an utterance of (1) to implicate a commitment to (2). And that commitment is purely conversational; you do not contradict yourself if you say, "Well, it might be in my room — as a matter of fact I know that it is." — Srap Tasmaner

Exactly, and this exemplifies how commonly accepted principles of logic fail us, and can easily be used to deceive. Honestly, (1) does entail (2), as I've explained. If I honestly say the book is possibly in my room, this implies that I do not know where the book is. And if I use that statement when I know where the book is, I would be most likely engaged in deception (or possibly a guessing game).

So, if we define truth with honesty, then we can see that logic strays from truth in this example. Commonly accepted principles of logic allow that "the book is actually in my room", and "the book is possibly in my room", might both be true at the same time, when in reality this represents a sort of dishonesty.

There's no more a contradiction here than there is in Mitch Hedberg's joke, "I used to do drugs. I still do, but I used to too." Implicature is not entailment; that's the whole point. — Srap Tasmaner

But I didn't say the problem is contradiction. That's the point it's not contradiction, which involves opposition, I said it was an inconsistency because opposition is not involved, incompatibility is involved. Contradiction is to affirm is and is not of the same predicate. In this case, the issue is that "possibility" as what may or may not be, naturally violates the law of excluded middle, that's how it is defined. Then, in MIchael's examples, a relationship between what actually is (what is consistent with the law of excluded middle), and what possibly is (what is not consistent with the law of excluded middle) is proposed. This proposal creates the inconsistency which is evident from the dishonesty exemplified.

And that's another reason that approaching all philosophical problems in terms of what people say or can't say is so misleading; there are other rules than logic at work in what people say to each other and what it will be taken to mean. — Srap Tasmaner

Again, this is exactly the issue here. General rules for communication are based in honesty. Honesty is a requirement for communion. However, logic is not based in communion, being more like strategy, so it does not have this requirement. As evident from forms like mathematics, logic is fundamentally imaginary and the rules which become conventional are the ones which prove to be useful. Usefulness and honesty are sometimes inconsistent with each other, as demonstrated by the reality of deception, and so the rules of logic may become inconsistent with the rules of communication.

The inconsistency we've exposed demonstrates two very distinct ways of conceiving the relationship between possible and actual. One way is based in the rules of honest communication, what I call truth, the other way is based in the logical rules of usefulness.

"Possible" is the opposite of "impossible". It is absurd to deny it. — Luke

You obviously have not given any thought to what you are saying here. You just take it for granted that possible opposes impossible, as you claimed, "may or may not be" opposes "must or must not be", and you keep asserting this. I suggest you go back and read the post I made in reply to this proposition, exposing the problem with this assumption, and if you have any specific issue with what I said, you can bring it up with me. To reiterate what I said very succinctly, what is "possible" (as what may or may not be), must be outside the category of what is "necessary" (as what must or must not be) rather than opposed to it because if "possible" is opposed with "necessary" this places them in the same category. Placing "possible" in the same category as "necessary", or "impossible" (as a special form of necessary), leaves the true nature of "possible" as impossible to understand. In other words, it is a misrepresentation of "possible" which is not consistent with the truth about "possible".

You do not get to personally decide the meanings of these words. — Luke

Why not? This is how we proceed with logic, define the terms (personally decide the meanings of the words) then proceed with our propositions. The question is rhetorical though. I know we disagree on what constitutes meaning, so there's no point in you replying to that.

Whether or not the book is actually in my room has nothing to do with what I believe. — Michael

Exactly! And, we are not talking about whether or not the book is actually in your room. We are talking about the proposition "the book is actually in my room", along with the proposition "the book is possibly in my room", and what these two propositions mean. Since the meaning concerns what you believe, rather than what is actually the case, then whether or not the book is actually in your room is completely irrelevant.

No it isn't. It's the only thing that's relevant. We're concerned with truth, not belief. Your mistake is to continue to treat the word "true" as meaning "honest", which it doesn't. — Michael

"True" is a predicate of "belief", in the sense of knowledge, "justified true belief". When we talk about propositions like "the book is actually in my room", and "the book is possibly in my room", what is being represented here is beliefs, not real world situations. If you think that real world situations are being represented by these propositions, explain to me what real world situation could possibly be represented by "the book is possibly in my room".

Since "the book is possibly in my room" cannot possibly represent any actual real world situation, we must conclude the obvious, that it represents a belief. And, since this proposition represents a belief, then to maintain consistency we must also affirm that "the book is actually in my room" represents a belief as well, or else we are comparing apples and oranges and your assertions just are a big category mistake.

The book doesn't just cease to exist, or fail to have a location, simply because I don't know where it is. — Michael

Right, and this is why the proposition "the book is possibly in my room" must refer to what you believe, not some real world situation. And so, to correctly establish a relation between this proposition and "the book is actually in my room", without a category mistake, we must assume that the latter refers to a belief as well. Then we see that the two beliefs are inconsistent with each other.

Interesting. What other rules might those be? — Mww

I addressed this above. The rules of communion are based in moral principles, which are quite distinct from the rules of logic.

Since the meaning concerns what you believe... — Metaphysician Undercover

Given that "I believe that the book is in my room, therefore the book is in my room" is invalid, "I believe that the book is in my room" doesn't mean "the book is in my room".

The meaning of "the book is in my room" doesn't concern what I believe.

The meaning of "the book is in my room" doesn't concern what I believe. — Michael

I'm very distressed to hear that. Since it is very obvious that you could state "the book is in my room" when the book is not in your room, then it is also very obvious that "the book is in my room" means something other than that the book is in your room. Do you not agree with this?

Since it is very obvious that you could state "the book is in my room" when the book is not in your room, then it is also very obvious that "the book is in my room" means something other than that the book is in your room. Do you not agree with this? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I don't. It's a nonsensical inference.

I could state "I believe that the book is in my room" even when I don't believe that the book is in my room. Therefore, according to your reasoning, "I believe that the book is in my room" means something other than that I believe that the book is in my room. Do you not see how ridiculous this is?

That I can assert a falsehood isn't that it doesn't mean precisely what it says.

The fact that you understand the notion of dishonety proves that you understand the difference between the meaning of an assertion and the beliefs of the person making the assertion.

No, I don't. It's a nonsensical inference. — Michael

Look at the T-schema discussed earlier by Banno. "The book is in my room" is true iff the book is in my room. In this example, "the book is in my room" only means that the book is in my room, if the statement is true. In other instances "the book is in my room" means something else.

Why do you believe that this is nonsensical?

That I can assert a falsehood isn't that it doesn't mean precisely what it says. — Michael

That a statement could "mean precisely what it says" is what is nonsensical. The statement consists of words, symbols. What it means is an interpretation of the symbols. The interpretation is not a restatement of the same symbols. The meaning of the statement cannot be "precisely what it says". That makes no sense at all.

"The book is in my room" is true iff the book is in my room. In this example, "the book is in my room" only means that the book is in my room, if the statement is true. In other instances "the book is in my room" means something else. — Metaphysician Undercover

You appear to be equivocating on the meaning of "means". We're using it in the sense of a definition, not in the sense of entailment.

The T-schema doesn't say that asserting the proposition "the book is in my room" entails that the book is in my room. It only says that the book being in my room is the truth-condition of the proposition "the book is in my room", and according to Davidson the definition of a proposition is given by its truth-conditions.

Look at the T-schema discussed earlier by Banno. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK.

"The book is in my room" is true iff the book is in my room.

Notice that it isn't:

"The book is in my room" is true iff I believe that the book is in my room.

Therefore, your claims that the meaning of "the book is in my room" has something to do with what I believe, or that truth is honesty, are false.

I can honestly claim "the book is in my room" if I believe that the book is in my room, but if the book isn't in my room then my claim is false.

This is how almost everyone understands truth. It's the common use. Your use is uncommon. You have presented no adequate evidence or reasoning to support your use.

Suppose "possible world" means that if we identify all the possible worlds, one of the possible worlds must be the actual world. That is, we assume such a thing as the actual world, and we assume we've identified all the possible worlds, so necessarily one of the possible worlds is the actual world. Then we proceed to identify one of the possibilities as the actual world, the real world. As soon as we do this, we negate the defined status of "possible" from all the other worlds. They can no longer be the actual world, because we've identified the actual world and it's something else. Since we've named one as "actual", the others can no longer be classed as "possible", without changing the original definition of "possible". — Metaphysician Undercover

What you mean by "possible" is that the future holds more than one possibility; that there are several possible worlds and one of those becomes the actual world. I don't disagree with this. What opposes this view of "possible", and what I mean by "necessary", is that the future holds only one possibility; that there is only one possible world and only that world can become the actual world. What also opposes this view of "possible", and what I mean by "impossible", are those worlds that could never become the actual world because, e.g., they are physically impossible.

If there is more than one possible world at t0 and one of those becomes the actual world at t1, then the actual world at t1 is still one of those possible worlds that was at t0; one of the possibilities that could have been. Otherwise, for you to say that what is actual is what is necessary means that there were no other possibilities at t0; that no other world at t1 was possible at t0. This eliminates free will.

I think this is the common misconception of free will, which leads to all sorts of problems. After you have marked the box, engaged in the free will act, we cannot, from that temporal perspective, say that you might have marked a different box. From that temporal perspective, after the fact, it is impossible that you might have done otherwise. You did what you did, and at this time it is impossible that it might be otherwise. And this misconception (straw man), that if you had free will, you might have done otherwise, when you really can't because what's done is done. gives fodder to the determinist argument, . However, this does not change the fact that prior to the act you have many choices, and there are many possibilities for boxes which you might mark. So free will is very real from this perspective, despite the fact that you cannot have dome other than what you did. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you had many possibilities prior to the act, then the one that became actual remains one of those possibilities. It is only if you had no other possibilities prior to the act that what is actual would be necessary. Describing a situation as "necessary" because we have no other possibilities during the act (at the present time, in the actual world) leads to bizarre consequences and makes no sense of free will, or of freely choosing to make actual one of several possibilities. You are then describing as "necessary" something that you freely chose to make actual. What does "necessary" mean in that case? The word loses its familiar meaning.

Whether we're considering epistemic or alethic modality, if something is true then it is possible. — Michael

I mean, there's the Church-Fitch argument; if there's no way around that, then there must be truths that cannot be known.

Therefore, your claims that the meaning of "the book is in my room" has something to do with what I believe, or that truth is honesty, are false. — Michael

Here's the problem, as I see it:

(1) If you want to convey your honest belief that the book is in Michael's room, the words you choose to express that belief are "The book is in Michael's room."
(2) You choose those words because the literal (or conventional) meaning of that sentence represents your belief accurately.
(3) But that sentence represents your belief accurately precisely because it's what anyone who held the same belief as you would say if they wished honestly to express that belief.

The claim is that there is no more to a word's being appropriate for the purpose of expressing what you want to express than it being the word people use honestly to express that belief.

But your using that sentence honestly to express that belief is itself an element of the common practice that underwrites the use of that sentence to express that belief. That's not a paradox; it means that the words you are using are a solution (a stable equilibrium) to a problem in (cooperative) game theory, in which what you do is dependent on what others do, and what they do is dependent on what you do. This is the substance of the idea of the arbitrariness of the sign: any solution to such a problem is as good as any other.

But that's all about meaning.

You can take a further step and claim that there is nothing more to the book being in Michael's room than people who hold the belief that it is honestly expressing that belief by saying, or being disposed to say, "The book is in Michael's room."

Now what does this mean, that there is "nothing more to it"? That suggests there is a biconditional that looks like this:

P ↔ People who believe that P and wish honestly to express that belief assert, or are disposed to assert, that P.

Maybe here we give an account of belief, maybe we posit a language of thought and all of this is a way of saying that P is the canonical translation into our language from the LoT, maybe a lot of things, but some people are also going to be tempted to say (by a parallel argument) that there is nothing more to belief than what we assert or are disposed to assert, in which case the biconditional becomes

P ↔ People believe that P ↔ People assert, or are disposed to assert, that P.

That's the "nothing more" account, I believe. There are stops along the way where you might opt out, but this is its final destination.

The question of this thread has always been whether there is something more, whether there is, for instance, something more to the book being in Michael's room than the appropriateness of the sentence "The book is in Michael's room" for honestly conveying your belief that it is.

I think most people's pre-theoretical intuition is that of course there is, but the apparent difficulty of specifying what the something more is convinces some to give it up, or to give up in a slightly different way, something like this: if there is something more, it's not the sort of thing we can say, since all we can say is stuff like "The book is Michael's room," and that's already within the scope of the "nothing more" analysis.

So there's a summary of the what this thread is about. I'm not convinced the nothing more account is right, but the challenge is to offer an alternative as comprehensive, to say exactly where it goes wrong, or to show that it isn't actually what it seems to be.

Ok. What is communion as you’re using the word?

A poster was quoted, "Possibility is defined as "not necessary", and something is necessary if it is true in all possible worlds."

It should not be overlooked that he reformulated that to this (I'm using 'P' for 'possibly' and 'N' for necessarily'):

""possible" is defined as "not necessarily not": Pq <-> ~N~q". Therefore if something is true then it is possibly true: q -> Pq."

The definition there is correct. And "q -> Pq" is correct, but not merely from the definition but from axioms.

/

Another poster claimed that defining "possibly P" as "not necessarily not P" is circular because "necessarily" is defined in terms of possible worlds. No, "necessarily" is not defined at all; it is primitive. Moreover, "possible worlds" is semantic and is not involved in syntactical definitions. Moreover, while words such as "possible worlds" suggest intuitive motivations, mention of "possible worlds" is not needed for the semantics, as the semantics can be given in full formality without nicknames such as "possible worlds".

/

I don't know any person who would say this:

"Possibly the book is in the room. So the book is not in the room."

If someone told me that, then I would consider them incapable of coherent conversation and incapable of shedding any light on where the book is or might be.

/

Semantically (a simplified chart):

q is true or not true (but not both) in any given model ("world")

q is necessary iff q is true in every model

q is possible iff q is true in at least one model

q is contingent iff (q is true in at least one model and false in at least one model)

q is actually true iff (there is a certain model designated as the "actual model" and q is true in that model)

("the actual model" may refer to the world of observable facts or whatever explanation one would like to give for a notion of the "real world", "actual world", etc. When context is clear, we just say 'q is true'.)

Seems to me that we're perfectly capable of understanding what sorts of thoughts are exclusive to humans and what sorts are not.
— creativesoul

You seem to think I have disagreed with this — Janus

That's how to avoid anthropomorphism.

The notions of 'linguistically mediated thought' and 'language capable beings' don't - ahem - can't.

You are talking with a poster not capable of making sense.

You can take a further step and claim that there is nothing more to the book being in Michael's room than people who hold the belief that it is honestly expressing that belief by saying, or being disposed to say, "The book is in Michael's room."

Now what does this mean, that there is "nothing more to it"? That suggests there is a biconditional that looks like this: — Srap Tasmaner

That just seems way too convoluted and theory laden...

Seems to me like there's nothing more to the book being in Michael's room than the book, the room, and the spatial relation between the two.

Yes, of course we can say that only language capable beings can have linguistically mediated thoughts. It's analytically and trivially (insofar as it doesn't really tell us anything) true. — Janus

Which ought tell you something. That's not something I would or have said, nor does it follow from anything I would or have said.

(1) If you want to convey your honest belief that the book is in Michael's room, the words you choose to express that belief are "The book is in Michael's room."
(2) You choose those words because the literal (or conventional) meaning of that sentence represents your belief accurately. — Srap Tasmaner

I think this is ambiguous. The meaning of the sentence is what you believe, but it isn't that you believe it. The sentence that expresses that you believe it is "I believe that the book is in my room".

And, of course, it can be true that I believe something even if what I believe is false. @Metaphysician Undercover appears to conflate these.

The sentence that expresses that you believe it is "I believe that the book is in my room". — Michael

Or an assertoric utterance of "The book is in Michael's room."

At any rate, the content is where the action is.

it can be true that I believe something even if what I believe is false. — Michael

But you have no way of saying this as a report of your beliefs. And if someone else says it, of you, then it can be taken as report of their beliefs.

I think the trouble comes earlier and runs deeper.

That's how to avoid anthropomorphism.

The notions of 'linguistically mediated thought' and 'language capable beings' don't - ahem - can't. — creativesoul

Which ought tell you something. That's not something I would or have said, nor does it follow from anything I would or have said. — creativesoul

I have no idea what you are trying to say.

Or an assertoric utterance of "The book is in Michael's room." — Srap Tasmaner

Again, I think this is ambiguous. I think you're conflating two different senses of "meaning". I'm concerned with meaning in the sense of definition. "I believe that the book is in my room" and "the book is in my room" do not share a definition.

Otherwise how do you make sense of the "the book is in my room" part of "I believe that the book is in my room"? The latter isn't to be interpreted as "I believe that I believe that the book is in my room".

I think you're just taking meaning-as-use to an irrational extreme.

But you have no way of saying this as a report of your beliefs. — Srap Tasmaner

I thought I just did? "It can be true that I believe something even if what I believe is false" is something I believe. Or, more succinctly, "I am fallible".

Yep.

The sad thing is that your clear explanation will not correct the confusion here. That confusion is wilful.

Sometimes, as a discussion unfolds, the only thing to do is to laugh and walk away.