The explanations I have received, and have given, have been narratives, not mere references. The narrative (which as I have said, has the formal structure of a deduction that starts from premises that the explainee understands and believes, and proceeds by steps that the explainee understands and believes) will usually refer to many different phenomena along the way, with none of them distinguished from the others and having the special label 'cause' affixed to it. — andrewk

I'm nearly convinced but this part throws me a little, so I could use an example.

For the "why is the sky blue" example, you would do something like this?

1. Our atmosphere contains such-and-such gases, water vapor and dust.
2. If light strikes such-and-such objects, it behaves in such-and-such a way.
3. Thus when light from the sun enters our atmosphere, such-and-such happens and we see blue.

Is that the idea?

I haven't seen it put the way you put it before. It sounds like you are saying that Aristotle's aim was to distinguish the different ways in which people used (the ancient Greek equivalent of) the word 'cause'. If so, then maybe I have been too hard on him. I don't know how Ancient Greeks used words. He's likely to know much more about that than me. Also, even though there will be big differences between how they used a word and how we use its modern equivalent, I think I see some similarities between the uses he describes and the modern uses. — andrewk

Yes, if you read that passage in his "Physics", that is what he says, that he is distinguishing the different ways that "cause" is used. As I said before, you don't see "cause" being used now, in the sense of material cause or formal cause, these ways seem to have been phased out. And Aristotle at that time ruled out "chance" and "fortune", as accidentals, though he said that they were sometimes referred to as causes.

I don't see people around me using 'cause' in the sense of his 'final cause' though. Maybe it's just the society in which I live, but people I know just don't use the word 'cause' that way. I have no reason to suspect that Ancient Greeks didn't though. The closest I have observed is that people will use the word 'because' to explain why they did something. But I find the similarity between 'because' and 'cause' purely textual, not semantic. — andrewk

I think you will find that people do use "cause" in the sense of final cause, quite commonly. This is "cause" in the sense of an intentional act, and is what you described as coming into play in cases of liability and such things. In order to assign blame, we seek the individuals whose intentions played a role in causing the situation.

"Because" is related, because when we ask why of an act, we answer with "because". So "because" speaks of the reason for the act, but the actual cause of the act is the will of the individual. If the individual is not considered to be a freely acting "cause" of a situation, one cannot be held responsible for that situation.

I see what you mean, but my point would still stand in a somewhat different way insofar as the explanation would not merely be "gravity" or "refraction", but a narrative about how gravity causes apples to fall, or how refraction causes the sky to be blue, and so on.

Fair enough.

I can't make sense of this; I can't see how necessity can be understood to obtain in particular interactions unless determinism is assumed to be the case.

Do you really think that or do you think you are just humoring me?

Darn, I was hoping nobody would ask about the 'why is the sky blue?' one. The embarrassing fact of the matter is that, although it has been explained to me in various ways at various times in my life, none of those explanations has ever stuck. I remember that scattering and maybe also refraction play some role in there, and there's something about those having more impact on shorter wavelength light (which is the blue end of the visible spectrum), but that's about as far as it goes.

What you have outlined is the sort of shape I would expect a satisfying explanation to take, but with all the 'such-and-such'es filled in. So, yes, that's the idea.

Oh my, no, not humoring you. I've enjoyed and learned from both sides in this argument. I only pointed out the misreading to give you a chance to reshape your response to Andrew, which I looked forward to reading.

I googled it -- I had forgotten about "Rayleigh scattering," that the small gas molecules will radiate the same wavelength they absorbed, so that's why the more-often-absorbed blue gets spread all around. (I used to get that backwards--thought it was blue because blue was the least absorbed.)

Anyway, "deductive form" something like what I did?

Anyway, "deductive form" something like what I did? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes.

And thanks for the explanation. I know about Rayleigh scattering courtesy of a project I did on Monte Carlo simulation of photon diffusion through water bodies. But it never occurred to me that it was the same phenomenon going on in the atmosphere that made the sky blue. The water work was focused only on the amount of light that gets down to different depths, not on its wavelength.

There's a reasonable chance that I'll even remember that explanation now.

The sky is filled with glowing blue dots.

I had always been a little uncomfortable using conditionals talking about cause and effect. Where the conditional shows up in this "deductive form," is it regular, old material implication?

I can't see how necessity can be understood to obtain in particular interactions unless determinism is assumed to be the case. — John

Exactly, that's why the concept of efficient cause quite easily leads one into determinism. We only escape determinism by assuming that there are things which are uncaused in the sense of efficient causation. We still allow that these things are "caused" though, in the sense of final cause. But this means there is a radical difference between efficient cause and final cause.

"Because" is related, because when we ask why of an act, we answer with "because". So "because" speaks of the reason for the act, but the actual cause of the act is the will of the individual. If the individual is not considered to be a freely acting "cause" of a situation, one cannot be held responsible for that situation. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not really about holding one responsible for their actions. Punishment is meant as a deterrent for that person, and others, from thinking about performing that action in the future.

We like to say that we are punishing someone for their actions because that implies the notion of free will, where we don't actually have it. What we are doing in punishing someone is simply inserting a cause to change their behavior, and others, in the future.

The point is that a person is considered to be the cause of one's actions. If one were not the cause of one's actions we could not hold the person responsible for those actions. Punishment is irrelevant.

Uhh.... How else do you hold someone responsible for their actions? What does "holding one responsible for their actions" mean, or entail?

Holding one responsible means to recognize the individual as a cause. It may entail many things, blame, praise, judgement of guilt, trust, distrust, etc.. Whether or not punishment is due is not necessitated, and this requires another judgement.

Exactly, that's why the concept of efficient cause quite easily leads one into determinism. We only escape determinism by assuming that there are things which are uncaused in the sense of efficient causation. We still allow that these things are "caused" though, in the sense of final cause. But this means there is a radical difference between efficient cause and final cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do agree that the concept of efficient causation can quite easily lead to the idea of determinism; I just don't agree that the idea of determinism is entailed by it.

If indeterminism, the position that some things are not efficiently caused at all, is understood to be the case, then those undetermined events must be seen as either purely random, absolutely arbitrary, or purposely caused by 'something' outside of the system of efficient causation. Any truly final cause must, logically, be a cause which is not itself caused.

If indeterminism, the position that some things are not efficiently caused at all, is understood to be the case, then those undetermined events must be seen as either purely random, absolutely arbitrary, or purposely caused by 'something' outside of the system of efficient causation. Any truly final cause must, logically, be a cause which is not itself caused. — John

I wouldn't say that a final cause is necessarily not itself caused, because it could be caused by another final cause. One thing may be done for the sake of another, which is done for the sake of another, etc., so that we have a chain of final causes just like we describe chains of efficient causes.

So for instance, the apprehended means to the end are brought into existence to create that end, by acts of willing, and are therefore final causes themselves. But these acts of willing, being the means to the end, can be said to be caused by the end itself. And if we look further, this end may really be the means to a further end, so the chain of causation we can follow until we designate an ultimate end, just like Aristotle did in the N. Ethics, designating happiness as the ultimate end.

I would say the ultimate 'for the sake of which' (if there is one) would count as the final cause. All the others would be, in any case, merely formal causes.

Holding one responsible means to recognize the individual as a cause. It may entail many things, blame, praise, judgement of guilt, trust, distrust, etc.. Whether or not punishment is due is not necessitated, and this requires another judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Blaming, praising and judgement of guilt are the same as holding someone responsible. So that would be circular. Trust and distrust would be the same as providing a positive or negative consequences to the person who performed the action. Distrusting someone is a punishment. Would you like it if others distrusted you and wouldn't that change the way you behave in the future?

What use is blaming someone without punishing them (creating a negative consequence as a result of their action in order to prevent those actions in the future)? In my experience, simply blaming people isn't useful. You have to supply a negative consequence in order to prevent future acts, or they just end up doing it again.

Blaming, praising and judgement of guilt are the same as holding someone responsible. So that would be circular. — Harry Hindu

Not for me they are not the same. These named things are the result, or consequence of holding one responsible. Responsible means that one is accountable. Blaming and such only occur posterior to an act which one is held accountable for. I other words, being accountable, (responsible), is necessarily prior to blame, judgement, etc..

Distrusting someone is a punishment. — Harry Hindu

That's not true. In fact, I think it's nonsense. Distrust is held for the protection of oneself, not to punish another. The fact that the one being distrusted may not like being distrusted does not necessitate the conclusion that the distrust is being held for the sake of punishment. I can't imagine distrust being held for the sake of punishment, that seems like a misunderstanding of "distrust" to me.

What use is blaming someone without punishing them (creating a negative consequence as a result of their action in order to prevent those actions in the future)? In my experience, simply blaming people isn't useful. You have to supply a negative consequence in order to prevent future acts, or they just end up doing it again. — Harry Hindu

This is complete nonsense. First, punishing someone, unless it's a youngster just learning habits, rarely prevents the person from carrying out a similar act in the future. In most cases, the adult who misbehaves will continue to do so regardless of punishment. Does getting a speeding ticket prevent you from speeding again? If that were the case, we could get rid of all the speeders by handing out tickets. Second, blaming someone without punishing that person is extremely useful, because it allows you to remember something about that person's character. This information will be very useful in your future decision making concerning dealings with that person.

Not for me they are not the same. These named things are the result, or consequence of holding one responsible. Responsible means that one is accountable. Blaming and such only occur posterior to an act which one is held accountable for. I other words, being accountable, (responsible), is necessarily prior to blame, judgement, etc.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sheesh, MU. Can you use the dictionary, please?

Merriam-Webster definition of "blame":
1 : to find fault with

2
a : to hold responsible
b : to place responsibility for

That's not true. In fact, I think it's nonsense. Distrust is held for the protection of oneself, not to punish another. The fact that the one being distrusted may not like being distrusted does not necessitate the conclusion that the distrust is being held for the sake of punishment. I can't imagine distrust being held for the sake of punishment, that seems like a misunderstanding of "distrust" to me. — Metaphysician Undercover

How is it nonsense? Answer the question I posed. Would you like others to distrust you, yes or no? If not, then wouldn't it be a punishment if someone distrusted you after something you did that you are being blamed for? Yes, or no?

This is complete nonsense. First, punishing someone, unless it's a youngster just learning habits, rarely prevents the person from carrying out a similar act in the future. In most cases, the adult who misbehaves will continue to do so regardless of punishment. Does getting a speeding ticket prevent you from speeding again? If that were the case, we could get rid of all the speeders by handing out tickets. Second, blaming someone without punishing that person is extremely useful, because it allows you to remember something about that person's character. This information will be very useful in your future decision making concerning dealings with that person. — Metaphysician Undercover

If what I said is nonsense, then I have to question your existence as a social human being. It has been in my experience throughout my over 40 years of life that, if you give people a taste of their own medicine, then they stop doing what it is that they are doing that you don't like. They may continue to do it to others, but they won't do it to you any more.

Adults are like children in that they need consequences to adjust their behavior. Adults can be rehabilitated, or change their behavior as a result of the consequences of their prior actions. The problem with consequences comes when they aren't applied consistently. I guarantee you that if every speedster received a ticket every time they sped, then yes, they would stop speeding. If they were rich, then they might be able to afford the tickets and it wouldn't be much of a consequence because it doesn't place enough of a negative impact on them. Rich people would have to be fined more for it to begin to affect their behavior.

This is the problem with some adults today - that they weren't raised by parents that were consistent in their application of consequences when they were young. As adults, they think they can do what they want without any consequences.

Would you like others to distrust you, yes or no? — Harry Hindu

Some people I would not like them to distrust me, others I don't care if they distrust me.

If not, then wouldn't it be a punishment if someone distrusted you after something you did that you are being blamed for? Yes, or no? — Harry Hindu

No, I explained this. The fact that one dislikes what another person does, does not imply that the act of the other was carried out as punishment. I do not like a lot of things which a lot of people do, but it does not follow that these things are punishment to me. "Punishment" implies intent to punish, on the part of the punisher. As I explained, distrust is not intended as punishment, it is intended as protection for oneself from the other.

The logic of praise and blame entails that the person to be praised or blamed for some act or achievement is the unconstrained agent and origin of the act or achievement. If every act of a person is determined wholly by factors beyond their control; whether that be genes, social conditioning, neuronal activity or whatever, then there can be no rational justification for praising or blaming them.

Trust or distrust, approbation or disapprobation, may be emotionally emotionally driven, in which case it cannot be rationally justified.

If every act of a person is determined wholly by factors beyond their control; whether that be genes, social conditioning, neuronal activity or whatever, then there can be no rational justification for praising or blaming them. — John

Arguably, there could be rational justification if said praise or blame elicited a change in the agent's future behavior in line with the desires of the praiser or blamer. Even if we believe that our child was determined by forces beyond his control to take the cookie from the cookie jar, leveling blame (in the form of verbal admonishment) upon him may thereby decrease future incidents of his taking a cookie from the cookie jar, which suits our desire of our kid not sneaking so many cookies.

In other words, the praise or blame can itself become part of the causal chain which ineluctably leads to another agent performing or refraining from performing some particular act.

If not, then wouldn't it be a punishment if someone distrusted you after something you did that you are being blamed for? Yes, or no? — Harry Hindu

No, I explained this. The fact that one dislikes what another person does, does not imply that the act of the other was carried out as punishment. I do not like a lot of things which a lot of people do, but it does not follow that these things are punishment to me. "Punishment" implies intent to punish, on the part of the punisher. As I explained, distrust is not intended as punishment, it is intended as protection for oneself from the other. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fine. We can substitute the word, "punishment" with "consequences". Punishment is a kind of consequence. I did use the word, "consequences" in my previous post to make the same argument, so your argument doesn't do anything to take away from my assertion that knowledge of the consequences causes changes in behavior and decision-making.

Some people I would not like them to distrust me, others I don't care if they distrust me. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly. You value certain people's trust more than others. Losing their trust would be a dire consequence that causes you to think twice before doing something that would jeopardize losing that trust.

The logic of praise and blame entails that the person to be praised or blamed for some act or achievement is the unconstrained agent and origin of the act or achievement. If every act of a person is determined wholly by factors beyond their control; whether that be genes, social conditioning, neuronal activity or whatever, then there can be no rational justification for praising or blaming them.

Trust or distrust, approbation or disapprobation, may be emotionally emotionally driven, in which case it cannot be rationally justified. — John

Of course there can be rational justification for praising or blaming someone in a deterministic world. Praising and blaming causes changes in behavior in the future. It's the logic of praising or blaming someone after the fact, that I don't get. Why praise or blame a "free agent" (and what does "free agent" mean, anyway?)? Isn't it future decision-making and behaviors that we are trying to change? Isn't that why we try to make the consequences of other's actions known to them - so that the one's making a decision will consider the consequences as part of making the decision?

Hadn't really looked at this thread previously, and there's a ton to digest.

At any rate:

I want a lens or perspective that lets me look at things from "one billiard ball hits another" to "the economy does this" in way that makes those things show up as causal, without necessarily finding some unique single property that they all have.

The best swipe I have at it right now is to say that causation is a tension between those properties of a thing that (more or less) depend on its present context, and those properties of a thing that are (more or less) independent of its present context. — Pneumenon

Doesn't the second paragraph posit a "single unique property" for causation? Namely, the "tension" in question (whatever the heck that would amount to--I have no idea what you're saying there)?

Also, why are you looking for a way to characterize a bunch of things as causality while wanting to avoid looking at what causality is (a la "What does it mean for one thing to cause another")?

I think I'd modify this a bit to recognize that there is never not a context to begin with, so that it's no longer a question of 'independence', but of what variety of context is in play. — StreetlightX

It's as if you didn't at all realize that he said in and independent of something's present context. He in no way implied anything could be independent of context period.

This was one of the catalysts for the OP. I'm thinking of the tension between "eternal" laws (e.g. math, physics) and events embedded in time. Becoming, on this view, isn't a "falling away" from Being. It's rather the tension between the ontic and the ontological, to use Heidegger's terminology. Particular vs. universal, general vs. specific. I think of causality as one way that this tension unfolds, the constant working-through and tug back and forth between individual and context. Causality is not a creature of becoming opposed to being, but is the tension between them - or, to shy away from a strict definition, is one way in which that tension "shows up" for us. — Pneumenon

Becoming isn't at all distinct from being. Everything is in process, and process (change) is what time is.