You say that the truth of "the kettle is black " depends on both that the kettle is black and that some hidden value is in such and such a state — Isaac

I've not said anything about some hidden value. The truth of "the kettle is black" depends on both the meaning of the sentence "the kettle is black" and on the kettle being black, the latter being a non-linguistic, material feature of the world (assuming materialism for the sake of argument). Assuming reductionism and naïve realism (again for the sake of argument), the kettle being black is the existence of particular particles at particular locations in space. This has nothing to do with language (even if language is required to talk about it).

Or if materialism is unwarranted, then perhaps phenomenalism is the case, and the kettle being black is the occurrence of a particular sensory experience, which again has nothing to do with language (even if language is required to talk about it).

The world isn't just a conversation we have with each other. There is more to the world than language, and the existence and behaviour of these non-linguistic parts of the world are often the things that make a sentence true. I get wet when I stand out in the rain, not because of the sentence "it is raining", but because of the water falling from the sky.

Therefore, there are no boiling kettles outside of language, either? — Luke

No. Language is what delineates 'kettle' as an object. Without it, there's just 'the stuff that kettles are drawn from'.

The kettle itself — Luke

So, outside of our talk, is the screw in the drawer part of the kettle or not?

I don't believe there's much controversy about what a kettle is. — Luke

So is the screw in the drawer part of the kettle or not?

Boiling point — Luke

... is the scientific definition. It take a colloquial definition (one where I need to see a good volume of bubbles before I'll say the kettle is boiling). what fact of the world-outside-of-language, tells you I'm wrong?

Redundancy without realism leads to relativism and a disconnection of language from the facts of the world. If you accept realism, then you also accept some form of facts, correspondence and truthmaking. — Luke

Not at all. I laid this out (you don't seem to be actually reading the things I'm writing - if I'm not being clear, perhaps you might say so). What is real might well constrain our language. That is is not specific enough to act as truth-maker, doesn't mean it doesn't exist.

what is the point of testing a theory in science? — Luke

To get a better theory?

kettle being black depends on the existence of particular particles at particular locations in space. This has nothing to do with language (even if language is required to talk about it). — Michael

What particular particles? Do they include the screw in the drawer or not?

the kettle being black depends on the occurrence of a particular sensory experience — Michael

What sensory experience? The one I say is that of a kettle, or the one you say is that of a kettle?

get wet when I stand out in the rain — Michael

Do you? Or do you get damp when you stand out in drizzle? If you're wearing a coat are you still getting wet? Does the sentence "I didn't really get wet, just a bit damp" make no sense to you?

What particular particles? Do they include the screw in the drawer or not? — Isaac

Possibly, it's ambiguous. But if there are no particles, just the sentence "the kettle is black", then is it true?

What sensory experience? The one I say is that of a kettle, or the one you say is that of a kettle? — Isaac

Either. But if there were neither, just the sentence "the kettle is black", then is it true?

Do you? Or do you get damp when you stand out in drizzle? If you're wearing a coat are you still getting wet? Does the sentence "I didn't really get wet, just a bit damp" make no sense to you? — Isaac

Yes, yes, a little, and no.

But if there is no water falling from the sky, just the sentence "it is raining", then is it true?

Your arguments for the ambiguity of language do not refute my point. It still requires that there is something in addition to the sentences "it is raining" and "the kettle is black" for these sentences to be true. Truth depends on more than just language.

still requires that there is something in addition to the sentences "it is raining" and "the kettle is black" for these sentences to be true. Truth depends on more than just language. — Michael

Absolutely. And we're agreed there. But if what it relies on can't be specified (does it include the screw or not?), then it can't act as truth-maker. Worse, if what it relies on merely need be something, but not any specific thing, then it drops out of conversation. Which is all redundancy is saying.

The kettle itself; not merely talk about a kettle. — Luke

The truth of "the kettle is black" depends on both the meaning of the sentence "the kettle is black" and on the kettle being black, the latter being a non-linguistic, material feature of the world (assuming materialism for the sake of argument). — Michael

I don't think the disagreement between @Luke and @Michael, on the one hand, and @Banno and @Isaac, on the other, is primarily about truth or facts, but about reference.

Michael and Luke take "the kettle" as a referring expression, which means there is something that it refers to, and that something is not itself, but a concrete object. Then Isaac and Banno point out that what "the kettle" (here, an expression is being mentioned) refers to is simply the kettle (and here it is being used).

There are further arguments, but first it would be nice to see the four of you agree

(1) "the kettle" is a a referring expression; and
(2) what "the kettle" refers to, or can be used to refer to, is the kettle; and
(3) "the kettle" is an expression, and is not the same as the concrete object the kettle; and
(4) the kettle is a concrete object, and is not the same as the expression "the kettle".

If there's not agreement on this much, we need a different conversation.

I agree with that. My recent comments are a response to @Tate saying that "truth is a matter of comparing a statement to another statement". A sentence like "the kettle is black" isn't made true by another sentence but by the existence of a particular material object (if materialism is true), or by the occurrence of a particular sensory experience (if idealism is true), etc.

I agree with that. My recent comments are a response to @Tate saying that "truth is a matter of comparing a statement to another statement". — Michael

One down, three to go.

Or shall we make it four? What about it, @Tate? Does "the kettle" refer to the kettle, or, if you prefer, can it be used in a sentence to refer to the kettle?

It's 4 I'd quibble over. I'm not sure in what sense we can say the kettle is a concrete object if we can't agree on what that concrete object constitutes (and yet still unproblematically use the expression 'the kettle'). If we can use "the kettle" without issue, and yet can't even say whether the thing includes the screw in the drawer or not, it is hard to see how the kettle could be a concrete object.

But it depends how you're using 'concrete' here. I think the world consists of those objects we, collectively, identify with our forms of life (our language, for modern humans). So the kettle is definitely an object in the world, in that sense. But that's not this world-outside-language that @Luke and @Michael seem to be reaching for.

That world seems closer to what I would call 'hidden states'. But hidden states are a hypothetical notion in a scientific model. There is (according to the model) a relationship between hidden states and our shared objects, but it's a constraining one, not a determining one.

A sentence like "the kettle is black" isn't made true by another sentence, but by the existence of a particular material object — Michael

You just agreed the contrary. You said "yes" when I asked if the material particular matter was any particular matter. So it isn't made true by the existence of a particular material object, since any material particular matter will do, it's always true.

You said "yes" when I asked if the material particular matter was any particular matter. — Isaac

Did I? Where? If I did then it was a mistake.

Did I? Where? — Michael

I asked...

Any nonlinguistic feature? — Isaac

...and you answered...

Sure — Michael

But if it...

was a mistake. — Michael

...then my original question stands unanswered. Does this particular matter the truth about the colour of the kettle depends on, include the screw in the drawer or not?

The "sure" was actually a response to the rest of your comment. Sorry for not being clear.

Does this particular matter the kettle depends on include the screw in the drawer or not? — Isaac

That's for us to decide.

I really don't understand the point you are trying to make. That words and phrases can be ambiguous isn't that the truth of a sentence like "the kettle is black" doesn't depend on the existence of a material object (or the occurrence of a sensory experience).

That's for us to decide. — Michael

Yep. Using language.

The truth of "the kettle is black" cannot be determined by hidden states because nothing in those hidden states determines that they should be a kettle, nor exhibit the property 'black'. We determine that by language use.

We determine that by language use. — Isaac

But it's still the case that whichever matter we decide 'counts' as being the kettle must exist for the sentence "the kettle exists" to be true.

I think the world consists of those objects we, collectively, identify with our forms of life (our language, for modern humans). So the kettle is definitely an object in the world, in that sense. But that's not this world-outside-language that Luke and @Michael seem to be reaching for. — Isaac

Getting ahead of ourselves here, but I'll say this much: the kettle is literally "outside language" in just the sense that it is not itself the expression "the kettle" or any other expression; but it is also not, shall we say, 'untouched' by language, if you are correct that it is only an object insofar as it is collectively identified by use of the expression "the kettle". But if it is so identified, identified by the use of language, and by our forms of life more broadly, as the man said, then it is the thing in that sense identified by our use of the expression "the kettle". If it's not, then there has been no collective identifying of something by use of the expression "the kettle".

But it's still the case that whichever matter we decide 'counts' as being the kettle must exist for the sentence "the kettle exists" to be true. — Michael

Yes. But since it could be literally any matter at all, to claim that the truth of any sentence involving kettles depends on this fact would render all statements about kettles always true, since there's always some matter.

Yes. But since it could be literally any matter at all, to claim that the truth of any sentence involving kettles depends on this fact would render all statements about kettles always true, since there's always some matter. — Isaac

The sentence "the kettle is black" is true at T₁. I paint the kettle red at T₂. The sentence "the kettle is black" is false at T₂.

The meaning of the sentence "the kettle is black" did not change at T₂. So why did the truth value of the sentence "the kettle is black" change at T₂? Because the material object changed.

If the truth value of a sentence can change without the meaning of that sentence changing then the truth value of that sentence depends on more than just its meaning.

And I honestly don't know how you make the inference you do in the above quote.

if it is so identified, identified by the use of language, and by our forms of life more broadly, as the man said, then it is the thing in that sense identified by our use of the expression "the kettle". — Srap Tasmaner

Absolutely. You've hit the nail on the head.

It cannot be be the thing in that sense identified by our use of the expression "the kettle" because no single, agreed on thing (matter, particles, hidden states) fits that bill.

What the expression "the kettle" does, changes from use to use.

If it's not, then there has been no collective identifying of something by use of the expression "the kettle". — Srap Tasmaner

Sufficient to get a job done though. If I say "put the kettle on" I don't need you to know if that includes the screw in the drawer. I assume you gather my intent. I could probably have just said "tea time!"

If we want an ephemeral, relativist 'truth', then sure we could compare the 'kettle' of any given conversation to the 'black' in that same conversation.

But if we want a 'truth' that gets outside of these conversations... Which use are we going to pick?

The sentence "the kettle is black" is true at T1. I paint the kettle red at T2. The sentence "the kettle is black" is false at T1. — Michael

Is it? Does "the kettle" include the screw in the drawer or not? Does it include it at T1, but not at T2, or vice versa perhaps? Did you paint the screw. Was it a really dark red that I'd call black?

Is it. — Isaac

Yes. For the sake of argument we have fixed the referent of the phrase "the kettle" (and "black", and "red") such that the truth value of "the kettle is black" is unambiguously true at T₁ and false at T₂.

The meaning of the sentence didn't change at T₂ but its truth value did. Therefore, the truth value of the sentence depends on more than just its meaning. It also depends on the material object referred to by the phrase "the kettle".

If the truth value of a sentence can change without the meaning of that sentence changing then the truth value of that sentence depends on more than just its meaning. — Michael

I wonder if this is inconsistent with the redundancy theory.

For the sake of argument we have fixed the referent of the phrase "the kettle" (and "black", and "red") such that the truth value of "the kettle is black" is unambiguously true at T1 — Michael

Doesn't that just beg the question a little? Ramsey's concern about propositions is exactly that we just can't do that.

The meaning of the sentence didn't change at T2 but its truth value did. Therefore, the truth value of the sentence depends on more than just its meaning. — Michael

But the meaning only didn't change because you said it didn't. Again, this misses the main objections (Ramsey's propositions and Wittgenstein's private rules). If you declare that the meaning of an expression is just exactly what you say it is, then I think you might possibly be able to make the move you want to make. But then you'd have a private rule concerning the meaning.

Yes, but naming it doesn't affect what it is. 200,000 years ago, snow wasn't named "snow", and the color white wasn't named "white", yet snow was still white. At least, so the scientists tell us. — Andrew M

This is a mistaken supposition, explained well by Kant. The name "snow" does not refer to some sort of object which preexisted the appearance within the mind, as you seem to think scientists claim. The name refers directly to what appears within the mind, the phenomenon, as does the description of it, etc.. That is what is named, the phenomenon, not the assumed noumenon, which we assume as necessary for the existence of the phenomenon. We do not have the premises required to conclude that the phenomenon (what appears within the mind) is an accurate representation of the noumenon (the supposed thing itself).

What I think Michael is insisting, is that the truth of one's description of the phenomenon requires that the phenomenon accurately represents the noumenon.

Redundancy doesn't reject realism, nor need it be relativistic. You might say, as I do, that some hidden state constrains our neural models of it. You might also say, as I would, that we have an interest in those neural models being at least similar in function so that we can cooperate over manipulating those hidden states. You might also say that language is used (among other things) as a tool to this end. But since all of this goes on subconsciously, most of the time, and, most importantly, those putative 'hidden states' are simply hypothetical matters used in a scientific model of how brains work, there's simply not a mechanism by which they can act as truth-makers for sentence in English, without being entirely subsumed by simply 'the kettle is black'. — Isaac

This is a problem, your attempt to reduce mental activity, to "states". As I explained earlier in the thread, Aristotle demonstrated long ago, that there is an unresolvable incompatibility between a state of "being", and the activity which constitutes change, known as "becoming".

The issue seems to be that we need a source for the stability which constitutes a "belief", used as a noun. So you posit a stable neural network, or some such thing, as a stable "thing", which would support repetition of the same, or similar mental activity, constituting the thing which others might call a "belief".

Doesn't that just beg the question a little — Isaac

You agreed above that we can decide what words mean. So, for the sake of this example, we decide that the screw in the drawer is not part of the kettle, and to use a spectrophotometer to measure the kettle's colour, agreeing which range of results indicates the kettle being black or not-black.

Otherwise I don't understand the point that you are trying to make. That the sentence "the kettle is black" is neither true nor false? Or both true and false? Or true for some and false for others?

you posit a stable neural network, or some such thing, as a stable "thing", which would support repetition of the same, or similar mental activity, constituting the thing which others might call a "belief". — Metaphysician Undercover

Not at all. Just like a 'race' is any kind of activity which has a start, a finish, and some competitive element, a 'belief that the pub is at the end of the road' is any mental arrangement which results in a tendency to go to the end of the road when wanting to get to the pub.

You agreed above that we can decide what words mean. So, for the sake of this example, we decide that the screw in the draw is not part of the kettle, and to use a spectrophotometer to measure the kettle's colour, agreeing which range of results indicates the kettle being black and not-black. — Michael

Yep. Look at the bolded bits. The activities described are those of a living language.

Which doesn't refute my point.

We agree to fix the meaning of the sentence "the kettle is red" such that it is unambiguously false at T₁. I paint the kettle red at T₂. The sentence "the kettle is red" is unambiguously true at T₂. The meaning of the sentence "the kettle is red" didn't change at T₂ but its truth value did. Therefore, its truth value depends on more than just its meaning. It also depends on the kettle and its properties.

We agree to fix the meaning of the sentence "the kettle is black" such that it is unambiguously true at T1 and unambiguously false at T2 — Michael

Well, I didn't agree to that. I counted the screw at T1 and T2 -- I wouldn't want you saying false things, after all.

The meaning of the sentence "the kettle is black" didn't change at T2 — Michael

...because we stipulated it wouldn't.

So...

its truth value depends on — Michael

...us stipulating the meanings of the expressions under consideration.

The expression at T2 could be either true or false depending entirely on our stipulation. So you can't conclude that it (as a fact about what is the case) depends on you painting the kettle red. It's immaterial whether you paint the kettle red.

After T1, there are two possible scenarios.

Scenario 1 - you paint the kettle red (in this world-outside-language) and we stipulate the meaning of "the kettle is black" such that it's false.

Scenario 2 - you paint the kettle red (in this world-outside-language) and we stipulate the meaning of "the kettle is black" such that it's true.

Either scenario is possible. So painting the kettle red (in this world-outside-language) has no determining relevance.

If you artificially constrain the situation to only allow scenario 1, then all you're doing is determining the truth value of the statement at T2 by eliminating the other option. You've made it true because truth is binomial and you've excluded one option.

Are you saying that me painting the kettle red changes the meaning of the sentence "the kettle is black"? That's an absurd claim.