One sign of mystery is a collection of arguments known as the slingshot. It's the reason we say the extension of any sentence is it's truth value. All truths designate the same Great Fact. — Tate

And why do statements have the truth value they do? Why is it “the kettle is black” which is true and not “the kettle is red”? Some non-linguistic feature of the world has to be a certain way. The object referred to by the phrase “the kettle” has to have the colour property referred to by the word “black”.

And why do statements have the truth value they do? Why is it “the kettle is black” which is true and not “the kettle is red”? Some non-linguistic feature of the world has to be a certain way. The object referred to by the phrase “the kettle” has to have the colour property referred to by the word “black”. — Michael

You didn't look at the slingshot argument, did you?

Sure. Correspondence theory is the correct definition of truth. If you want to explain to a toddler what truth is, just tell them it's when a statement corresponds to reality. :up:

Some non-linguistic feature of the world has to be a certain way. — Michael

Yes, a certain linguistic way.

The object referred to by the phrase “the kettle” has to have the colour property [be] referred to by the word “black”. — Michael

Or explain 'property'.

some non-linguistic feature of the world satisfies that definition. — Michael

Any nonlinguistic feature? Does that include the screw in the drawer or not? Because without determining that, we can't say if the expression is true or not (using this method). We can't check if 'the kettle' is black if we don't know what, of all we see, is 'the kettle'.

We can't check if what we see is 'black' if we don't know how dark a shade constitutes 'black'.

Thanks, Luke.

I have attempted to argue that deflationism-without-correspondence leads to truth relativism. — Luke

My argument against it is that it collapses the distinction between sentence and world. It follows that there either is no world and propositions are true, or else there are no propositions and the world is true. — Luke

If the proposition "water boils at 100 degrees celsius" has no correspondence to the world, then it is true only because we (or most of us, or most experts) say that it's true, not because that's how the world is, or how water is. — Luke

What is the point of investigating the truth of the statement "three moons of our solar system contain water" if it's all just talk or opinion unmoored from the facts? — Luke

I've pulled these quotes in order to try to get a handle on something that bothers me about how deflation should be understood. It's as if you are of the opinion that a deflationary account does not permit sentences to be about how things are. Hence you think it leads to truth relativism, that sentences are true regardless of how things are, that water doesn't boil at 100℃, and that deflationist amounts to talk unmoored from the facts.

Deflation does not seek to make kettles and boiling water disappear, or to unmoor the words "kettle" and "boiling" from their use.

It's just about the way the word "true" works. it's the observation that "It is true that the kettle is boiling" is the same, in certain specifiable ways, as "the kettle is boiling". That specification is still that both sentences are true exactly if the kettle is boiling.

Rather than unmooring sentences from the world, deflation sets that sentences are about the world.

There's more to say, but I think I will stop there and wait for your response. If what I have said here is an accurate diagnoses of your account, then that's were we should focus our attention.

Sure, as I said, the truth of a sentence depends on both the meaning of the sentence and on non-linguistic features of the world. If the meaning is ambiguous then the truth-value is ambiguous. But, except in certain cases, it is still the case that a sentence’s truth value also depends on something which isn’t that, or another, sentence. We need something in addition to language for the sentence “it is raining” to be true.

Maybe a way to think on this is to say that there isn't always some material component to facts. — Moliere

Yes! And moreover, we tend to consider far too few examples of T-sentences and correspondence to get a good grasp or their variety.

it's probably better for some folk to think of deflation as widening correspondence rather than denying it. It's reasonably clear what kettles and snow correspond to, but the notion becomes fraught is we talk of numbers or colours or institutional facts or virtues. To be sure, correspondence theorists have answers for all these, but they involve ad hoc hypothesising that stretches credibility.

So we might consider "snow is red" is true if snow is red, which is a true T-sentence.

As is "seven is twice nine" is true IFF seven is twice nine, where we have a clear idea of what seven and nine and doubling are, until someone asks what it is to which they correspond.

And it's true that mercy is a virtue IFF "mercy is a virtue" is true; yet there are volumes on what it is to be a virtue.

What I’m arguing against is the deflationary view that there is never any material component to facts; that facts are no more than language use. — Luke

That is not what deflation is claiming.

It is pointing out that (P ≡ "P" is true). It then adds that one way or another, t at is all there is to the truth of sentences.

It is not denying that sentence are about stuff.

P ≡ "P" is true — Banno

P ↔ "P is true"

You've got your quotes in the wrong place. P is already a name.

P ↔ True(P)

I'm just here to help.

I don't disagree with any of this.

I might add the obvious point that 'the Earth moves" is both a belief about the Earth and a methodological maxim. It is a belief that will determine the experiments one does.

Beliefs just are "ways of conceptualising and intervening in particular situations". Meaning as use.

I'm not familiar with Joseph Rouse, but you and he seem to have in common the desire to juxtapose two things where there is only one.

Oh, Srap. The order makes no difference in an equivalence. P≡Q is the same as Q≡P

I wondered if someone would jump at that. I'm surprised it was you.

P ↔ "P is true" — Srap Tasmaner

is illformed. It'd be like saying

The kettle is boiling ≡ Fred

Fred does not take on a truth value.

Are there examples of certain forms of life being completely invisible to me? — Joshs

While I was doing some stretches outside there was a female fairy wren in the hanging baskets, Skittling quickly in search of breakfast. It has a family and at this time of year probably a nest nearby, perhaps with eggs or chicks.

I could follow it and make the invisible visible.

It's not as if a form of life cannot be subject to change.

It seems the truth of "the kettle is black" is entirely dependent on the meaning of 'kettle' and 'black'. All about language. — Isaac

Yep.

It's as if @Michael would have us say, that the kettle is boiling is not a fact, but corresponds to a fact that is outside of language; and when asked what that fact outside of language is, he says it is the boiling kettle.

SO he has it that:

The truth of “the kettle is black” is determined by both the meaning of “the kettle is black” and by whether or not some non-linguistic feature of the world satisfies that definition. — Michael

I would agree, and you might too, if he instead said "some feature of the world satisfies that definition", dropping the confusion of "non-linguistic". It's the boiling kettle.

One must drop the pretence of being able to get outside of language while still using language. Language is already about the way things are.

is illformed. — Banno

Oh you're right! Reached for quotes to group, so that it's

P ↔ (P is true)

instead of

(P ↔ P) is true.

But that's not what quotes are for.

Wasn't making a point about the order, duh, but, as I said, about your quotes around P in

P ≡ "P" is true — Banno

That's not what you mean. Here ' "P" ' is a name for ' P ', which is a name for a proposition.

That part you obviously agree with, since you passed over it in silence.

It's as if Michael would have us say, that the kettle is boiling is not a fact — Banno

I didn't say that.

One must drop the pretence of being able to get outside of language while still using language. — Banno

I get "outside of language" most of the day. When I wake up and eat breakfast I don't narrate my life.

Ok. (P ≡ "P"is true) is true is a pretty standard presentation, just writ in an unexpected direction. Substitute any sentence you like for P.

It's an illicit substitution, as @Michael and @Andrew M like to point out, but there are ways of dealing with this.

It's as if Michael would have us say, that the kettle is boiling is not a fact
— Banno

I didn't say that. — Michael

Yep. Hence the "as if".

One must drop the pretence of being able to get outside of language while still using language.
— Banno

I get "outside language" most of the day. When I wake up and eat breakfast I don't narrate my life. — Michael

Yep. It's a form of life, if you will. Language is embedded in breakfast and waking and...

You might not narrate your life, but you might.

And in any case, that is a subtle shifting of the goalpost.

Language is embedded in breakfast and waking and...

You might not narrate your life, but you might. — Banno

I also might paint my life, but it doesn't follow from this that painting is "embedded" in breakfast and waking. You really need to be more explicit with what you're saying because it seems vacuous as-is.

You really need to be more explicit with what you're saying because it seems vacuous as-is. — Michael

Perhaps if you read more widely...

The point at hand is the kettle boiling. That's a fact. But you want there to be another thing, that shall not be named, that is nevertheless the fact of the kettle boiling.

I ain't buying it.

Always, already, interpreted.

The point at hand is the kettle boiling. That's a fact. But you want there to be another thing, that shall not be named, that is nevertheless the fact of the kettle boiling. — Banno

Why would you think I want that?

I don't know why you want that. I'm not your shrink.

I don't know why you want that. I'm not your shrink. — Banno

Huh?

I don't want that. So I'm asking you why you (wrongly) think that I do.

Here we go again.

Perhaps, if I am wrong, you might explain what it is you do want. Rather than asking me to guess.

I think I made my point quite clear here.

We need something in addition to language for the sentence “it is raining” to be true. — Michael

Indeed, you need it to be raining. Which is already to interpret the world, to use language.

That is, for "it is raining" to be true, it needs to be raining.

Which is the exact point made by the T-sentence.

SO what, if anything, is our disagreement?

Always, already, interpreted. — Banno

So you're agreeing that we never make it outside language. Talk if truthmakers is language on holiday.

So you're agreeing that we never make it outside language. Talk if truthmakers is language on holiday. — Tate

There is no outside, nor inside. That terminology is fraught.

SO what, if anything, is our disagreement? — Banno

You tell me. You were the one who decided to mention me when you said "it's as if @Michael would have us say, that the kettle is boiling is not a fact" even though I wouldn't have us say that, and then later "you want there to be another thing, that shall not be named" even though I don't want that.

There is no outside, nor inside. That terminology is fraught. — Banno

So you don't understand the question?

You want to name non-linguistic things, as if that very act were not linguistic. Looks like much the same error as @Tate. You want the kettle's boiling to be true yet uninterpreted.