Cheers. My apologies for not being clear.

It seems to me to be like supposing that a form of life could be private.

It seems to me to be like supposing that a form of life could be private. — Banno

I agree. If forms of life could be private, then so could language. To say that language can't be private, is to say that forms of life can't be private.

It's informative, I think, to apply Davidson's strategy to form of life.

If one supposes that there are various, discreet forms of life, then one might be tempted to suppose them to be incommensurate. Something like that seems to sit with the lion comment.

But if forms of life were incommensurate, would we recognise them to be forms of life? It seems that in order to recognise certain behaviours as a form of life, we have to recognise the parallels with our own form of life. The language, practices and values of a form of life must be recognised as such in order for us to recognise a form of life.

So it seems that forms of life cannot the totally incommensurate, one to the other.

The interesting question then arrises as to the extent to which forms of life might differ, yet remain recognisable as forms of life.

This of course raises the question of relativism in Wittgenstein. Some suppose that the truth of any proposition is dependent on the form of life against which the proposition is set. But if, as argued above, in order to recognise some other form of life as such we must recognise some aspects of that form of life, then it follows that there are propositions that are true for both the other form of life and our own. To say that forms of life are recognisable as such is to say that they are commensurable, that they share common truths.

Hence, truth cannot be entirely relative to form of life.

If one supposes that there are various, discreet forms of life, then one might be tempted to suppose them to be incommensurate. Something like that seems to sit with the lion comment. — Banno

I don't see our "forms of life" as being incommensurate, but as having a family resemblance. Although, with the lion example, I do see it as being incommensurate. We don't share much in common with a lion's form of life, which is why we wouldn't understand a lion if it could talk.

But if forms of life were incommensurate, would we recognise them to be forms of life? It seems that in order to recognise certain behaviours as a form of life, we have to recognise the parallels with our own form of life. The language, practices and values of a form of life must be recognised as such in order for us to recognise a form of life. — Banno

I'm not sure if we would have to recognize our own form of life in order to understand an account of forms of life in general. Wouldn't that be the same as saying, in order to understand a concept, I'd have to understand my own account of concept? We seem to understand what a form of life is, only after understanding forms of life in general, as is what happens with concepts.

So it seems that forms of life cannot [be] totally incommensurate, one to the other. — Banno

I agree. There are some aspects of our forms of life that may not be commensurate, just as there are some aspects of games that aren't commensurate. However, there must be something in common, like the commensurability of the concept game. They share incommensurability and commensurability, both can be true at the same time, but not in the same way.

I don't know, is that as clear as mud?

I'm not sure if we would have to recognize our own form of life in order to understand an account of forms of life in general. Wouldn't that be the same as saying, in order to understand a concept, I'd have to understand my own account of concept? We seem to understand what a form of life is, only after understanding forms of life in general, as is what happens with concepts. — Sam26

That's not quite the argument. Rather, one could only recognise another form of life from within ones own, and by seeing that some aspects of the other form of life matched one's own.

IF we are to recognise another form of life then we must recognise some shared aspects.

That's not quite the argument. Rather, one could only recognise another form of life from within ones own, and by seeing that some aspects of the other form of life matched one's own. — Banno

When you say, "...one could only recognize another form of life from within one's own," are you using the phrase "from within one's own," as a private matter, or something broader, to include our forms of life generally as persons?

If you prefer, "...one could only recognize another form of life by making use of one's own". A form if life is not private.

You seemed to be making it private, that's why I responded the way I did a couple of posts back. Okay, now I think I see what you're getting at.

If one supposes that there are various, discreet forms of life, then one might be tempted to suppose them to be incommensurate. Something like that seems to sit with the lion comment.

But if forms of life were incommensurate, would we recognise them to be forms of life? It seems that in order to recognise certain behaviours as a form of life, we have to recognise the parallels with our own form of life. The language, practices and values of a form of life must be recognised as such in order for us to recognise a form of life.

So it seems that forms of life cannot the totally incommensurate, one to the other.

The interesting question then arrises as to the extent to which forms of life might differ, yet remain recognisable as forms of life. — Banno

With the clarification, I believe I agree with this. It seems that we would recognize the forms of life of animals, right? There has to be something in common?

It seems that we would recognize the forms of life of animals, right? There has to be something in common? — Sam26

It seems so. The difference between animals and ourselves is that they do not have access to institutional structures such as language. In this regard our form of life is much richer.

So do we agree that at least some truths are not relative to a from of life?

This of course raises the question of relativism in Wittgenstein. Some suppose that the truth of any proposition is dependent on the form of life against which the proposition is set. But if, as argued above, in order to recognise a form of life as such we mist recognise some aspects of that form of life, then it follows that there are propositions that are true for both forms of life. To say that forms of life are recognisable as such is to say that they are commensurable, that they share common truths.

Hence, truth cannot be entirely relative to form of life. — Banno

There is a difference between truth being relative to you personally, as opposed to truth being relative to a language. Truth can be relative to a form of life, for e.g. bishops move diagonally, but it can also be dependent on facts separate from our forms of life. Some forms of life (other than our own) exclude the use of concepts, so there would be no common truths, but probably common beliefs.

So do we agree that at least some truths are not relative to a from of life? — Banno

I think we agree, but I'm not entirely sure.

I'm not sure what is being said here.

Can you give an example of a "truth being relative to you personally"? Do you have in mind a preference for vanilla?

I'm also bothered by "facts separate from our forms of life". I'm not sure wha they might be.

And "Some forms of life (other than our own) exclude the use of concepts" - is this the observation that some forms of life exclude concepts found in others, or something else?

Can you give an example of a "truth being relative to you personally"? Do you have in mind a preference for vanilla? — Banno

Yes, my preference for vanilla is a truth relative to me.

I'm also bothered by "facts separate from our forms of life". I'm not sure wha they might be. — Banno

Well, the concept fact is relative to our forms of life, but what the facts sometimes refer to are things separate from our forms of life. For example, the Earth having one moon is not dependent on our forms of life.

And "Some forms of life (other than our own) exclude the use of concepts" - is this the observation that some forms of life exclude concepts found in others, or something else? — Banno

It includes the forms of life that exclude certain concepts, but it also includes forms of life that exclude language, at least language that is as complex as our own.

Broad agreement, then.

:up:

I don't see our "forms of life" as being incommensurate, but as having a family resemblance. Although, with the lion example, I do see it as being incommensurate. We don't share much in common with a lion's form of life, which is why we wouldn't understand a lion if it could talk. — Sam26

The lion is an eater of flesh as many of us are. The lion is active sometimes and rests at others. The lion sleeps and perhaps even dreams. The lion seems to enjoy playing sometimes and cares for the young. The lion copulates. In all its vital features of life the lion does not seem so different to us.

I never understood that saying of Wittgenstein's, that we would not understand the lion if it could speak, to make any sense. If it did not speak English or a language we are familiar enough with, then of course we would not understand it, just as we don't understand anything spoken in an unfamiliar language. If the lion spoke in a familiar language, then why would we not understand it?

The lion is an eater of flesh as many of us are. The lion is active sometimes and rests at others. The lion sleeps and perhaps even dreams. The lion seems to enjoy playing sometimes and cares for the young. The lion copulates. In all its vital features of life the lion does not seem so different to us. — Janus

Ya, I could have worded that better. There are things that are incommensurate, but things that are also commensurate. So, both of these concepts apply.

I never understood that saying of Wittgenstein's, that we would not understand the lion if it could speak, to make any sense. If it did not speak English or a language we are familiar enough with, then of course we would not understand it, just as we don't understand anything spoken in an unfamiliar language. If the lion spoke in a familiar language, then why would we not understand it? — Janus

The assumption is that the world of a lion is different enough, i.e., it's ability to think and use concepts would be so different from our own, that understanding the lion would be a great challenge, if we could understand at all. That's my take.

Yes, my preference for vanilla is a truth relative to me. — Sam26

A powerful philosophical statement.

But Kuhn’s paradigms aren’t specific to individuals, and they aren’t dependent on theoretical models either. — Joshs

Kuhn's paradigms are certainly theoretical models, if theory is taken to be the propositions held to be true by the paradigm. As if the Copernican paradigm did not theorise that the Earth moves.

Further, Davidson points not just to Kuhn, including Whorf, Quine, Bergson. Feyerabend, Lakatos, Musgrave... all quite theoretical.

...Davidson’s assumption ( I may have this wrong) that two people receiving the same stimulus must have the same sensation, which justifies his belief that a translator is always able to describe the world to which the language being translated applies. — Joshs

Interesting. Davidson would presumably hold that two folk would overwhelmingly agree as to their beliefs, following the Principle of Charity. That's not at all the same as supposing that they have the same sensations. The commonality of belief is what justifies translation.

Kuhn believes instead that our perceptions are thoughgoingly interpretively mediated — Joshs

...as does Davidson.

The assumption is that the world of a lion is different enough, i.e., it's ability to think and use concepts would be so different from our own, that understanding the lion would be a great challenge, if we could understand at all. That's my take. — Sam26

Right, but then that raises two questions; firstly do thinking and using concepts require language? If the answer is yes, then presumably if the lion were able to speak English then she would be able to think and use concepts in the ways that English enables her to.

The other question is as to whether animals are able to think and use concepts at all, If the answer is 'yes' then perhaps it would follow that the ability to acquire language relies on the ability to think and use concepts, in which case the lion would never, if her thinking and concepts are so different, be able to acquire the ability to speak English. Personally, I don't believe a lion's thoughts would be so different to our own. I think human exceptionalism is way overblown.

If you mean, why do I think knowledge is, at least relatively, persistent --- I'm not quite sure what to say. I could say (a) it's part of our concept of knowledge for it to be persistent (not my favorite argument) or (b) there's an embarrassment of evidence that knowledge persists, for varying durations, certainly, but it's not ephemeral like perception; and maybe (a) derives from (b). — Srap Tasmaner

I think both are right: that is, we do think of knowledge as relatively persistent, and also that it is not as ephemeral as perception. But then the salient qualification is "relatively".

Generally, if we know how to do something, we don't forget it so quickly. I used to know how to play the 'Moonlight Sonata', but I haven't kept up practicing it, so now I can remember only the first ten bars or so (strange that I generally seem to remember the early, and not the later, parts of pieces I have forgotten how to play the whole of).

Are you a citizen only when you're showing your passport? Do you know how to ride a bike only while you're actually on a bike? Do you know your mother's name only when you're using it in a sentence? — Srap Tasmaner

I don't see the "citizen" example as being relevant given it is not about knowledge, but about how one might be classified. As for the others: I know how to ride a bike if I can get on one and ride it, and I know my mother's name if I can use it in a sentence.

I would say that if I had forgotten my mother's name temporarily, then for that temporal period, I did not know her name, even if I could be said to have the potential to know it, since it would likely come to me soon enough. But as I said before, I think this is a matter of definition more than anything else.

One reason I'm not so fond of the idea of meaning as use, is that use is vast and possibly diverse, and we each may have our own different ideas or impressions of what "standard" usage is. That said I'm OK with the idea that meaning is shown by use because that can be perfectly consistent with there being different meanings of terms, and disagreements about those meanings, since there may be different usages.

Except, remember that by stipulation I don't know what he said, so what am I remembering? If I recreate his words from something, what is that something? I don't mean that as question for neuroscientists; it can obviously be that too, but for us, it needs to be something that's capable of engendering knowledge. That's the whole point of this, to say that there are these separate instances of knowledge and I create a new one when I need it. How do I do that? — Srap Tasmaner

What you are driving at here is not so clear to me. Could you add some flesh to the bones, or give an example to make it clearer?

.

Really? Not the belief that bikes are for riding? The belief that one sits on the saddle and pushes the pedals? That the brakes are for stopping? ... We've no idea at all what beliefs people might have? — Isaac

I know how to ride a bike, and I don't think I've ever held the belief that bikes are for riding, or the belief that one sits on the saddle and pushes the peddles. Nor was I ever taught these beliefs when I learned to ride a bike. It was demonstrated to me how to do it, and I was given guidance and assistance. Now, I just jump on the bike and go. Sorry to disappoint you, but I've never accepted these beliefs, and I am being very honest. You might ask me now, if I believe in those things, and I could consider them, and give you an honest answer. But that would be after the fact. I haven't considered those particular questions before now, so I've never made those judgements nor developed those beliefs.

Those trivial, mundane things are not the type of thing that I believe in. When I want to go, I just jump on the bike and it goes. and when I want to slow down I grip the brakes. without actually believing in things like chains, sprockets, and gears, handle bars and seats, etc.. Just like when I want to walk, I don't rely on beliefs about the capacity of my legs to hold me, or their ability to move me.

And when I get in my car, I do this without believing in the roles of driveshafts and transmissions, flywheels, crankshafts, cam shafts, connecting rods, pistons, and numerous parts which I can't even name. I can't even honestly assert that I hold the belief that turning the key will start the engine. I just turn the key, with the expectation that the engine will start, anticipating. Sometimes it doesn't start and I'm left disappointed. Then, when I have trouble with the car, I might develop the belief that turning the key will not start it. That's very odd because I never developed the belief that turning the key would start the car, it's just something I learned how to do. But when it doesn't work, I'm quick to develop the belief that it doesn't work. And that belief is what reminds me not to do what I was previously in the habit of doing (turning the key for the purpose of starting the car). So the belief is used as a reminder for me, when activities which I normally engage in habitually, without associated beliefs, are not working properly. I need to use the belief to deter me from trying to do something which my intuition says ought to work, but I've found out, actually will not work. I use the belief to counteract my intuition.

Why? Not all Oak trees are the same, that doesn't suddenly raise problems with us deciding that some trees are more similar to each other and calling that group 'Oaks'. But knowing you I expect you've got some problem with that too. — Isaac

I said that different people observed to be acting in a similar way does not produce the conclusion that they have a similar belief. Now you come up with something about naming similar trees. That is not relevant. I wasn't talking about naming the similar acts, like we name similar trees, I was talking about the assumption that there is a similar belief associated with those similar acts.

For example, many things will fall if dropped from a height, due to the force of gravity. We would never conclude that since these things act in a similar way, they must hold a similar belief. Nor would we conclude that plants which grow in a similar way hold similar beliefs. So why would we conclude that if different people act in similar ways they must hold similar beliefs?

just turn the key, with the expectation that the engine will start, anticipating. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is an expectation not a kind of believing? Is there a salient difference?

Yes of course, there is a big difference. To expect is to think of a future event, that it is likely. A belief is a strong conviction concerning what is.

Yes of course, there is a big difference. To expect is to think of a future event, that it is likely. A belief is a strong conviction concerning what is. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's your definition of those terms. Mine is different: I'd say to expect something will happen is to believe it will happen. Of course, if in the moment you consciously thought about it you would realize there is a chance that when you turn the key the engine will not start. In that case you might not be said to believe it will happen, but that it is likely, or more likely than not, to happen.

I would say the same about your expectation: after such conscious consideration of the possibilities you would not expect that it will happen, but expect that it is more likely to happen than not. So, I'm not seeing much, if any difference between the meanings and implications of the two terms 'belief' and 'expectation'.

This is the value of introspection. It allows us to make these distinctions such as the difference between an expectation and a belief. Sure, we can simply define then as having the same meaning, but then we need to come up with different terms to describe the differences which are very real within us.

Look at the difference I described, instead of trying to make the difference go away. To expect is an attitude toward the future. A belief is an attitude toward what is, and that implies at the present. If you do not like the terms used, "expect" and "belief", perhaps they bring unnecessary baggage, then we can just talk about the different attitudes without laying any names on them. The distinct attitudes are one toward what will happen in the future, and the other toward what is the case, now. We could add another distinct attitude toward what happened in the past.

The point is, that in learning how to ride a bike, or knowing how to ride a bike, we do not rely on the attitude directed toward what is the case, now. We rely on an attitude concerning what will happen, in the future, if we perform a specific act, and proceed in that way. Do you agree that there is a distinction to be made between the attitude toward what is the case , now, and the attitude toward what will happen, in the future.

and concepts are so different, be able to acquire the ability to speak English. Personally, I don't believe a lion's thoughts would be so different to our own. I think human exceptionalism is way overblown. — Janus

I guess it depends how you define human exceptionalism. It seems to me that all you have to do is look at what we accomplish, in areas of science, or in other areas of study, as compared to what other animals accomplish. The way we interact with the world is generally far more complex. This isn't to say that animals aren't more advanced in some areas, but if you look at the overall picture, humans generally will outperform an animal in terms of what we can accomplish.

I would say that if I had forgotten my mother's name temporarily, then for that temporal period, I did not know her name, even if I could be said to have the potential to know it, since it would likely come to me soon enough. — Janus

I would call the passage from ignorance to knowledge learning. You learned your mother's name from her or from someone else who knew it. On your usage, by remembering you would learn your mother's name (again) from someone (yourself) who doesn't know it.

I think what you call a "potential to know" is what the rest of us call trying to remember something you do know. The idea that you might be able to remember something you do not know, is puzzling.

Did you come up with this usage of "know" yourself?

Theories of truth

1. Correspondence (science)
2. Coherence (math)
3. Pragmatic (religion)