Then it's the trivial error. You are simply adopting an eccentric use for the word "fact", and in doing so separating yourself from the discussion.

IS there anyone you can cite who thinks that an individual is a fact? Is there any mention of this theory in the SEP article? Does anyone else agree with you?

Otherwise, we might do well to stick to distinguishing between facts and individuals. Facts are about individuals.

I’m giving the view of the Correspondence theory, as the IEP article demonstrates. Many posters here have expressed their advocacy of the Correspondence theory. Furthermore, the SEP article states that the views it expresses on representation and truthmaking are not “what most people have in mind”, and not the “usual notion “ or “usual concept”. I would hardly call mine the eccentric view.

I’m giving the view of the Correspondence theory, as the IEP article demonstrates. — Luke

No, you are not. The correspondence theory is not the theory that facts are individuals, nor that facts can be individuals, or anything of the sort.

Thanks. I think we are done here.

No, you are not. The correspondence theory is not the theory that facts are individuals, nor that facts can be individuals, or anything of the sort. — Banno

Once again, the correspondence view is that facts are what account for the truth of propositions. Do you deny that the factual existence of snow accounts for the truth of the proposition “snow is white” according to this view?

And you still haven’t told me what you mean by an “individual”.

Not so odd. I miss a lot. Can you fill it in a little for me?

Were are you, Pie?

Is truth a property of sentences , or is truth a property of propositions — Pie

...or not a property? The merits, or lack thereof, of the prosentential view remain undiscussed.

We do seem to treat truth as a property, at least in that we predicate it to propositions.

Has anyone worked through these ideas?

the prosentential view remain undiscussed — Banno

FWIW, I liked what I saw of the prosentential theory, maybe a few years ago on IEP. It has a linguistic feel to it, and provides reasonable motivation for the existence and usefulness of what sometimes appears to be a superfluous word. (The model-theoretic approach more or less shows it to be unnecessary, so much so that Dummett commented that if you didn't already know what truth was, you'd have no idea what you were defining with all those T-schemas and what the point of it could possibly be.) I keep it in the back of my mind when constructing examples.

Blocks the Liar, as I recall, and if that matters.

R = It is raining

R v ~ R is true. Does R v ~R correspond to anything? Tautologies like R v ~R are true by force of logic alone, it matters not whether it's actually raining or not. :chin:

As you like. R v ~R happily corresponds to the fact of it raining, just as R v X, for any X does. Likewise for corresponding to it not raining.

On the other hand, a tautology is uninformative. It says nothing, and saying it commits one to nothing. It's not entirely unnatural to defend correspondence but restrict it to informative claims.

R v ~ R is true. Does R v ~R correspond to anything? — Agent Smith

It corresponds to the fact that it is never, at the same place and time, both raining and not raining.

Ok. I stand corrected. However there's got to be a statement that's true without corresponding to anything, either partially or wholly, oui? I can't think of one though.

A true proposition that does not appear to correspond to anything.

it is never, at the same place and time, both raining and not raining. — Janus

That'd be ~(R & ~R). Not the same. Unless you are Meta.

I'm sorry, I don't follow.

Well, according to the correspondence theory for every true propositions there corresponds a fact.

If you are right and (R v ~ R) is true but does not correspond to a fact, then it puts paid to correspondence.

Yeah, but I was wrong - there's going to be, at a bare minimum, a partial correspondence (it's raining rain OR it's not).

And what is that correspondence? Not truth.

R v ~R happily corresponds to the fact of it raining, just as R v X, for any X does. — Srap Tasmaner

R has the same truth value as (R v X), by OR introduction.

But (~R v R) does not have the same truth value as (R v X), which would be false if it were not raining and X were false.

Not so much because that's not an exclusive or. You're talking about something else.



Here's something for you. Was thinking about 'modal' adjectives after my exchange with @Sam26, and it's curious how it's not at all tempting to treat them as properties of sentences (or propositions, whatever).

(1) Sheila says you sent that email. Is that true?

Maybe true is "true of" or "applies to" the sentence Sheila said.

(2) Is it at least possible that you sent that email?

No one wonders if the sentence Sheila said is possible. She's already said it.

Obvious candidates are (a) that "possible" is short for "possibly true" and (b) that we're not talking about the sentence but the state of affairs the sentence describes. (2) and (b) seem to get along fine, but we could have a better match for (a) with something like

(2') Is it at least possible that what Sheila said is true?

which you could continue to interpret as Sheila's sentence maybe possessing this property.

There are ways in which constructions involving "true" and the modal adjectives diverge, but also quite a few where they are very close.

(3) Is what Sheila said true?
(4) Is what Sheila said possible?
(5) No, it's not true because it's impossible.

That last one is a doozy because if you want to take to take "it" as what Sheila said, you can't take both "true" and "impossible" as properties a sentence might have -- that would be nonsense. It doesn't rule out truth as a property but you need a nuanced expansion of (5) into logical form to allow it. (Maybe the second "it" is impersonal, etc. etc.) Not a huge hurdle, maybe, but you have to wonder why ordinary usage would lean toward sometimes treating these so similarly if they're so different.

(6) It's not only possible, it's true.

And if we decide to cut through all this by taking, say, "possible" as meaning "possibly true", there's the peculiarity that these modal adverbs (now) contrast with <null>. Not impossible, but slightly odd.

(6') It's not only possibly true, it's <null> true.

Of course we, knowers of systems modal, will be tempted to say this is also

(6'') It's not only possibly true, it's actually true.

To a normal person, "actually true" will sound a bit like "really pregnant" or "completely off".

Anyhow, once we've added "true" everywhere, what's it doing? It's no longer part of the contrast with "possible". But we can't move on to saying that "true" is short for "actually true" because that would completely undermine our treatment of "possible", "impossible" and the others.

I don't mind resorting to Philenglish ("It is the case that ..." "It is possibly the case that ...") and the formal systems are what they are. I was just wondering if we might learn something from how ordinary usage handles things, and I think I've learned that there is some kind of relationship between truth and the various alethic modes, but the picture is far from clear.

But (~R v R) does not have the same truth value as (R v X), which would be false if it were not raining and X were false. — Banno

Agreed, which is why I mentioned that R v ~R will also correspond with it not raining.

there's going to be, at a bare minimum, a partial correspondence (it'll rain OR it'll not) — Agent Smith

Yeah that's it, except partial is full for a disjunction. "Or" means "or", for realsies.

What about the coherence theory of truth?

1. If p then q
2. p
3. q [1, 2 MP]
4. If p then ~r
5. ~r [2, 4 MP]
6. q & ~r [3, 5 Conj]

q and ~r cohere (they're consistent) and so are true w.r.t each other. Lies among which number the white lies (gennaion pseudos) depend not on correspondence (impossible) but on coherence (consistency in re other lies - web of deceit, lies beget lies). Clearly correspondence theory of truth is not the only game in town; plus what about maya (the world as an illusion) and the Cartesian deus deceptor? Consistency aka coherence (theory of truth) is all we can hope for (at the moment).

Ooooh nice. There's a thesis topic for someone.

Obvious candidates are (a) that "possible" is short for "possibly true" — Srap Tasmaner

Isn't it?

One analysis (I think it's Davidson, again) of "Sheila says you sent that email" is
i) You sent that email.
and
ii) Shiela said that (i) is true

And no one wonders if "Is that true?" is asking about (ii).

"Is it at least possible that you sent that email?"
might be
2") Is it true that in some possible worlds, (i) is true?

And here you have an opaque context:

(3) Is what Sheila said true?
(4) Is what Sheila said possible? — Srap Tasmaner

We might reinstall the extensional transparency with
3') Is (i) true?
4') Is (i) possible?
which at least superficially predicate to (i).

It is worthy of notice that the sentence “I smell the scent of violets” has the same content as the sentence “It is true that I smell the scent of violets.” So it seems, then, that nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing to it the property of truth. (Frege, 1918) — link

Dangerous ideas like this should come with a warning label!

Not so much because that's not an exclusive or. You're talking about something else. — Srap Tasmaner

That'd be ~(R & ~R). Not the same. Unless you are Meta. — Banno

That's right, my hasty bad; it corresponds to the fact that at any place and time it is always either raining or not raining, which amounts to much the same thing.

Davidson, On saying that, uses this strategy to deal with indirect discourse.

Now that article is about propositional attitudes, yet I hadn't given it much attention. But propositional attitudes feed in to the discussion between @Sam26 and @creativesoul. SO might need to reread it.


Article Source.

it corresponds to the fact that at any place and time it is always either raining or not raining, which amounts to much the same thing. — Janus

This seems to have the odd result that the sentence "it is raining or it is not raining" is true because it corresponds to anywhere.

And here I am again at a loss to say what that correspondence amounts to. "it is raining or it is not raining" does not seem to mean "anywhere".

This seems to have the odd result that the sentence "it is raining or it is not raining" is true because it corresponds to anywhere.

And here I am again at a loss to say what that correspondence amounts to. "it is raining or it is not raining" does not seem to mean "anywhere". — Banno

It corresponds to the fact that it is always either raining or not raining at any place and time; shortening that to just "anywhere" which says nothing about time or raining is misleading.

shortening that to just "anyway" which says nothing about time or raining is misleading. — Janus

But "Its raining, or it isn't" says nothing about time or place. It still seems odd to insist that it does, clandestinely.

But "Its raining, or it isn't" says nothing about time or place. It still seems odd to insist that it does, clandestinely. — Banno

If it is to be true "it's raining, or it isn't" implicitly references time and place, since it can be raining at one place and/ or time and not raining at another place and/or time at either the same place or time (but not both, obviously). The same applies to "it's not (raining and not-raining)".

A long stretch.

No, not a long stretch at all, because both formulas are untrue without implicit reference to time and place. Unless you have a counter-argument good enough to convince that it really is a long stretch.

...because both formulas are untrue without implicit reference to time and place. — Janus

But that's not right. (R v ~ R) is never untrue. time and place are irrelevant.