How does he draw the conclusion that the noumenal world (reality as it is in itself) is pure will? — Albero

It’s a good question.

Later on in the World as Will and Representation, I think volume 2, he’ll say that because we cannot know anything whatsoever beyond time, we cannot truly know the “thing in itself” — but the will is the closest we can come— and so he makes that leap. A pretty important point that’s buried in the text. He mentions that the veil has been lifted as much as possible, or something like that.

I don’t have it available to cite the page, but if you’re interested I’ll make a note to do so in the future.

So ultimately, you’re right— our experience of will is still experience.

yeah I’d definitely appreciate it! I guess it’s just hard because Schopenhauer is adamant that the thing-in-itself does not “cause” our representations like Kant thought since that would be a contradiction; and instead the noumena and phenomenal worlds are more like two sides of the same coin. But does that then mean if they’re two sides then we’re still not *really* getting the “gnosis” of the will?

Schop says that the narrow door to the truth is that our bodies appears to us as both external physical objects (as representation) and as something we can experience such as touch hunger and desire I.e as will. And because our bodies appears to us as both will and as representation-the noumenal world is entirely constituted out of will. — Albero

To frame all that we experience "interiorly" or "somatically", that is whatever perceptual access we have to the body/mind, as "will", as Schopenhauer does or as 'will to power' as Nietzsche does, is, in my view very one-sided.

The noumenal, as Kant thought it, is what we can only think of as what lies beyond experience altogether; the logical counterpart to 'things-as experienced' is 'things in themselves". So, I think Schopenhauer was both a very poor interpreter, and a very poor critic, of Kant's philosophy.

My own interpretation of how Schopenhauer comes to see the will as the 'thing in itself' is through the idea of it being an imminent reality in mind/body consciousness. This is different from seeing as it as being transcendent and separate and, possibly unknowable.

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So I've been trying to read Schopenhauer as a prelude to Nietzsche — Albero

I'd stop at Schop and respectfully advise to ditch the Nietzsche :smile:. Mainlander was a more interesting post-Schopenhauerian.

How does he draw the conclusion that the noumenal world (reality as it is in itself) is pure will? Schop says that the narrow door to the truth is that our bodies appears to us as both external physical objects (as representation) and as something we can experience such as touch hunger and desire I.e as will. And because our bodies appears to us as both will and as representation-the noumenal world is entirely constituted out of will.

Maybe I'm misunderstanding him, but this to me seems like a kind of invalid inference? To me it seems that both representation and the will that we experience are both just phenomenal experiences we perceive. I still don't get how Schopenhauer comes to this conclusion, can anyone explain his thought process for me more clearly? — Albero

Things to take away from Schopenhauer:

1) Space, time, causality are not "out there" independent of a subject. There is no object without a subject. If you take away the subject, the material world vanishes.

2) How can we ever to make metaphysical claims about the world if we cannot get beyond a subject-relation-to-object (that is conditioned by various principles of sufficient reason like causal necessity, logical necessity, spatial reasoning, and motives)?

3) Our own bodies are conditioned by time/space/causality. They are objects like other objects. However, unlike other objects, our own bodies have feelings like hunger, pain, desires, etc. (will). He sees this inner sense of self as revealing a force that underlies all being.

4) Schopenhauer is not a solipsist. He makes the jump that the entire world has this same internal "willing" nature. He simply takes it as a kind of self-evident truth that it isn't just yourself experiencing this inner nature.

5) The jump here is that he sees this willing nature as some suggesting a more fundamental aspect of reality. That is to say, this willing nature that we experience ourselves, is behind all phenomenal activities we observe (everything from gravity, sub-atomic particles, to animal behavior).

So here I think is the part where we have to parse out his idea of will/Will.

Think of Will as an iceberg.

Most of the Will is "below the water".. It is a sort of unknown (not even an unknown..it's literally the thing-in-itself...An all encompassing nothingness/everythingness.. can't be described without being contradicting.. it can only be spoken about in the negative)....

However Will has the unfortunate aspect of having representation. Thus there is a form of Will that is subject-for-object. Pure subject-for-object is apprehended through aesthetic genius (the artist/musician and the experience of art and music). It is disinterested insight into the the object. However, most of life is not this, but rather the suffering version whereby subject-for-object is conditioned by space/time/causality imposed by the subject which is to say desiring, lacking, wanting, appropriating. It is the pendulum swing of pursuing a goal and boredom and being caught up in the negatives of conflict with environment, others, for survival, comfort, and such.

Of course, his suggestion will be to deny the will to negate the subject-for-object relationship all together. This would be akin to perhaps Nirvana/Enlightenment. This would be closest perhaps to a sort of pure gnosis of the Will "below the water" and not just will as it manifests in representation.

Most of the Will is "below the water".. It is a sort of unknown (not even an unknown..it's literally the thing-in-itself...An all encompassing nothingness/everythingness.. can't be described without being contradicting.. it can only be spoken about in the negative)....

Right.

Of course, his suggestion will be to deny the will to negate the subject-for-object relationship all together. This would be akin to perhaps Nirvana/Enlightenment. This would be closest perhaps to a sort of pure gnosis of the Will "below the water" and not just will as it manifests in representation.

But heres my confusion: do we just not know this Gnosis we get in that ascetic self-denial is “true” knowledge of the thing in itself? Per Kant, we could never truly know, right? Or is @Xtrix correct in assuming that what Schopenhauer means is that the gnosis is the “closest we can possibly get” because anything else couldn’t exit the principle of sufficient reason?

Per Kant, we could never truly know, right? — Albero

Schopenhauer disagreed with Kant on a number of points, especially about being able to decipher the "thing-in-itself" so it probably wouldn't be a consideration whether Kant thought one can "truly know" or not.

Or is Xtrix correct in assuming that what Schopenhauer means is that the gnosis is the “closest we can possibly get” because anything else couldn’t exit the principle of sufficient reason? — Albero

In a sense yeah. We are all Will full-stop. So there is no need for any further understanding of this other than to recognize it. However, denying our natures as subjects-for-objects manifested in us as the animal's "will-to-live" would bring us as close as we get to understanding Will in and of itself not mediated as subject-for-object. At least, that's my interpretation.

Another interpretation might be that it is complete denial of Will to nothingness. But then "what" nothingness in this Nirvana-like state is, would have to be explained.. That's why I make the iceberg analogy.

this just about clears it up, thanks! I suppose things get even trickier when Schopenhauer throws platonic forms into the mix as well

Schopenhauer throws platonic forms into the mix as well — Albero

Yes, an unnecessary connection. However, if you think of it this way...The artist "knows" the object in its "purest form". This purer vision of the object is closer to directly communicating the world as the object is. He makes a parallel to Plato's forms.

I also think that you can see Schopenhauer somewhat in Neo-Platonic tradition.. Will is a unity that is broken into subject-object... This is similar to Jewish mysticism (ironically, since he didn't seem to look into the mystical parts of Judaism as much).. The Ein Sof is the unknowable nothingness/everythingness/infinite/unlimited/unified (you can only get at it from the negative of what it's not) aspect of God (Will below the iceberg).. The sephirot is like Ein Sof manifested into Platonic forms.. The bottom sephirot is the material world that is most concealed.. There are even more parallels in Lurianic Kabbalah whereby the perfect "vessels" of the sephirot are broken and are concealed. Gnosticism also has many parallels.. The One God of Light gets divided and many gods and worlds emanate down to the Demiurge who is an evil god that creates this world..

Schopenhauer had an admiration for some of these concepts which more for the kernel of truths about this world being a source of suffering and denying this world. He obviously didn't like the way it was believed literally.

So I've been trying to read Schopenhauer as a prelude to Nietzsche — Albero

Contrary to some of the advice offered here I would suggest that if you are interested in reading Nietzsche then start with Nietzsche. If you read Schopenhauer as a prelude to Nietzsche then there are others to be read as a prelude to Schopenhauer. An endless downward spiral.

The first Schopenhauer, our own @schopenhauer1, illustrates the problem, although his intent may lie elsewhere.

The first Schopenhauer, our own schopenhauer1, illustrates the problem, although his intent may lie elsewhere. — Fooloso4

Sorry, I am confused.. Are you saying I am stating the problem or am the problem? And what problem would that be?

Neither.

You point to some of the influences on Schopenhauer (Plato, Platonism, mystic Judaism, and much more that you did not mention). If the advice is to first read Schopenhauer in order to read Nietzsche, which is clearly not your advice since you recommend stopping with Schopenhauer, then since, as you point out, there are other things to read that shed light on Schopenhauer, the same advice, again not yours, to read Schopenhauer as a prelude to Nietzsche, could be extended to reading other thng as a prelude to reading Schopenhauer.

If the advice is to first read Schopenhauer in order to read Nietzsche, which is clearly not your advice since you recommend stopping with Schopenhauer, then since, as you point out, there are other things to read that shed light on Schopenhauer, the same advice, again not yours, to read Schopenhauer as a prelude to Nietzsche, could be extended to reading other thng as a prelude to reading Schopenhauer. — Fooloso4

Though this is throwing some shade on me... I do agree that philosophical traditions can have a sort of infinite regress of influence down to the earliest philosophers. But I do see the logic in specifically studying Schopenhauer before Nietzsche if only to understand what Nietzsche would invert. Denying the Will-to Live becomes embracing the Will-to-Power etc. etc. But, as you mention, it's not necessary. Nietzsche is a philosopher who can very much be read on his own terms.

Schopenhauer himself recommends reading mainly Kant, and some Plato; he would be right because those directly influenced him..

He himself draws parallels with Gnosticism and such, but Neoplatonism itself has parallels and interplay with ideas in Gnosticism and Jewish mysticism. I can also see ideas of Spinoza which he wrote about in regards to his brand of pantheism.

But yeah, I don't recommend Nietzsche other than to maybe understand what he said.. As far as the ideas (what can be distilled and organized from much of the aphorisms and disparate thoughts). Nah.

The problem is always being in the "prelude" state.

What I recommend, and I think most of us actually do, is to start somewhere and then move back and forth, expanding the picture, filling in gaps, and correcting the picture.

yeah I’d definitely appreciate it! — Albero

So I found it -- from my bookshelf, in the end. Very old-school of me.

Meanwhile it should be carefully observed, and I have always kept it in mind, that even the inward experience which we have of our own will by no means affords us an exhaustive and adequate knowledge of the thing in itself.

[...]

Yet inner knowledge is free from two forms which belong to outer knowledge, the form of space and the form of causality, which is the means of effecting all sense-perception. On the other hand, there still remains the form of time, and that of being known and knowing in general.

Accordingly in this inner knowledge the thing in itself has indeed in great measure thrown off its veil, but still does not yet appear quite naked. In consequence of the form of time which still adheres to it, every one knows his will only in its successive acts, and not as a whole, in and for itself: therefore no one knows his character a priori, but only learns it through experience and always incompletely. But yet the apprehension, in which we know the affections and acts of our own will, is far more immediate than any other. It is the point at which the thing in itself most directly enters the phenomenon and is most closely examined by the knowing subject; therefore the event thus intimately known is alone fitted to become the interpreter of all others.

[...]

Accordingly the act of will is indeed only the closest and most distinct manifestation of the thing in itself; yet it follows from this that if all other manifestations or phenomena could be known by us as directly and inwardly, we would be obliged to assert them to be that which the will is in us. Thus in this sense I teach that the inner nature of everything is will, and I call will the thing in itself. Kant's doctrine of the unknowableness of the thing in itself is hereby modified to this extent, that the thing in itself is only not absolutely and from the very foundation knowable, that yet by far the most immediate of its phenomena, which by this immediateness is toto genere distinguished from all the rest, represents it for us; and accordingly we have to refer the whole world of phenomena to that one in which the thing in itself appears in the very thinnest of veils, and only still remains phenomenon in so far as my intellect, which alone is capable of knowledge, remains ever distinguished from me as the willing subject, and moreover does not even in inner perfection put off the form of knowledge of time.

[Emphasis is mine.]

(Pages 196 to 198 of the E.F.J Payne version. I copied the above from the Internet once I found it in my book.)

I think this is extremely important to keep in mind when reading Schopenhauer. It's one of those things that simply gets overlooked -- probably because most people don't really read these books, or if they do, don't do so carefully enough. It took me a while before I even really noticed it or let it truly sink in: he's not saying he's discovered the thing-in-itself after all. He's not contradicting Kant in really any way, other than to say that, since he claims the will is the most immediately known thing to us, this should be what's used to describe the entire world and the thing-in-itself. A kind of "force" which permeates all beings.

Hope that helps a little. I would continue reading on as well, because he next says:

the question may still be raised, what that will, which exhibits itself in the world and as the world, ultimately and absolutely is in itself? i.e., what it is, regarded altogether apart from the fact that it exhibits itself as will, or in general appears, i.e., in general is known.

Which I think is getting at your question, too. I won't spoil it by posting the answer... :wink:

this is excellent, thanks :smile:

What I recommend, and I think most of us actually do, is to start somewhere and then move back and forth, expanding the picture, filling in gaps, and correcting the picture. — Fooloso4

Fair enough. Makes sense. Read what you want to and supplement when needed unless you want to make a point to read chronologically.

the question may still be raised, what that will, which exhibits itself in the world and as the world, ultimately and absolutely is in itself? i.e., what it is, regarded altogether apart from the fact that it exhibits itself as will, or in general appears, i.e., in general is known.

Yep. This very much goes with my analogy earlier.

Think of Will as an iceberg.

Most of the Will is "below the water".. It is a sort of unknown (not even an unknown..it's literally the thing-in-itself...An all encompassing nothingness/everythingness.. can't be described without being contradicting.. it can only be spoken about in the negative)....

However Will has the unfortunate aspect of having representation. Thus there is a form of Will that is subject-for-object. Pure subject-for-object is apprehended through aesthetic genius (the artist/musician and the experience of art and music). It is disinterested insight into the the object. However, most of life is not this, but rather the suffering version whereby subject-for-object is conditioned by space/time/causality imposed by the subject which is to say desiring, lacking, wanting, appropriating. It is the pendulum swing of pursuing a goal and boredom and being caught up in the negatives of conflict with environment, others, for survival, comfort, and such.

Of course, his suggestion will be to deny the will to negate the subject-for-object relationship all together. This would be akin to perhaps Nirvana/Enlightenment. This would be closest perhaps to a sort of pure gnosis of the Will "below the water" and not just will as it manifests in representation. — schopenhauer1

The Ein Sof is the unknowable nothingness/everythingness/infinite/unlimited/unified (you can only get at it from the negative of what it's not) aspect of God (Will below the iceberg).. — schopenhauer1

The "Ein Sof" in Jewish mystical thought has nothing whatever to do with "Will". And the creator God is not merely blind will either. Why do you seek to interpret everything through the lens of a second-rate philosopher?

unless you want to make a point to read chronologically. — schopenhauer1

Not by choice, but as an undergrad we had to take a sequence of courses that lasted all four years, beginning with the pre-Socratics through toAlthoug the 20th century using mostly primary texts.

Although the program director had written a book on the pre-Socratics, which of course we had to use, his bias was in favor of historical development - later philosophers correcting earlier mistakes. I never bought into that, but I do think there is a benefit in reading the history using primary texts. Even though such an approach, within the time constraints just touched the surface and skipped over a lot, it was a good start, but not the only or even for everyone the best approach.

In my opinion much better than Copleston's or Russell's histories of philosophy, which I have a very low opinion of. Or the approach that focuses on "problems in philosophy", that is, ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, and so on.

:up:

Why do you seek to interpret everything through the lens of a second-rate philosopher? — Janus

I think that’s a bit harsh. I think there’s plenty to learn from Schopenhauer, and he’s an excellent writer — very clear. I also think his interpretation of Kant is a good one. Although he does take some liberties…

I think that’s a bit harsh. I think there’s plenty to learn from Schopenhauer, and he’s an excellent writer — very clear. I also think his interpretation of Kant is a good one. Although he does take some liberties… — Xtrix

I agree he's a very good writer; I just don't think that highly of his ideas, or his interpretation and critique of Kant. A second rate philosopher as compared to first rates such as Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard and Heidegger is still pretty good compared to a tenth rate. Anyway, it's just my opinion...

A second rate philosopher as compared to first rates such as Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard and Heidegger is still pretty good compared to a tenth rate. — Janus

Can’t argue with that list. I’ve been meaning to read Hegel. Seems daunting but probably isn’t once one starts.

Can’t argue with that list. I’ve been meaning to read Hegel. Seems daunting but probably isn’t once one starts. — Xtrix

Hegel's prose is dense; and he's not the most elegant writer. I've only read the Phenomenology (and I cannot claim to have thoroughly and closely read that), and secondary works and lecture series, mostly that deal with the Phenomenology. I have this, which looks like it would be a comprehensive introduction, on my shelves but I haven't read it yet. (Too many books and other pursuits and not enough time)

Accordingly in this inner knowledge the thing in itself has indeed in great measure thrown off its veil, but still does not yet appear quite naked.

My criticism of Schopenhauer's understanding of the "thing in itself", and of his critique of Kant's idea of "things in themselves" (that there cannot be things in themselves because there can be no space or time, which make possible differentiation, in the noumenal, and that since there also can be no causation in the noumenal, that Kant's idea that things in themselves cause the things we perceive is incoherent) is that it overlooks the implications of Kant's idea, implications that Kant himself may not have addressed (I say "may not" because I have not studied Kant's works exhaustively, a lifetime's study, and so cannot say for sure whether he did address these implication explicitly).

So, Kant's idea is that if there are representations, then there must be "something" which is represented, and which is not the representation itself. Things-for-us are representations, according to Kant, and so there must be things-in-themselves that are not those representations, but which give rise to them.

To repeat Schopenhauer's criticism, there cannot be things in themselves, for the reasons given above, so there must be only the thing in itself, absolute, non-spatiotemporal and undifferentiated. But this reifies what for Kant was unknowable things into a transcendent absolute, the very kind of reification which Kant sought to show was not justifiable by pure reason.

So, to get to the "implications" mentioned above, if everything we experience is a for-us, things-for-us, which leads logically to the idea of things-in themselves, then why would it not follow that space-for-us, time-for-us, causation-for-us lead logically to the ideas of space-in-itself, time-in-itself and causation-in-itself, thus defusing Schopenhauer's whole critique and transcendent reification of the thing-in-itself?

My own interpretation of how Schopenhauer comes to see the will as the 'thing in itself' is through the idea of it being an imminent reality in mind/body consciousness. This is different from seeing as it as being transcendent and separate and, possibly unknowable. — Jack Cummins

I was thinking along similar lines but it turns out Schopenhauer's will has a very specific, technical definition in his philosophy much like arguments in logic. We would be barking up the wrong tree if we were to understand Schopenhauer's will as having something to do with its conventional definitions.

That said, it can't be ruled out that Schopenhauer settled on the word "will" because its conventional meaning has just the right psychological force to appeal to his readers.

Good day.

The "Ein Sof" in Jewish mystical thought has nothing whatever to do with "Will". And the creator God is not merely blind will either. — Janus

Well yeah, that's obvious. You've heard of analogies right? It doesn't have to be exact fits. Of course I know that Schopenhauer is explicitly atheistic. His Will is a striving force that just "is" and has no purpose. It has no telos and certainly no plan or scheme. However, the part that is analogous is that the Ein Sof is Kabbalah is the part of the godhead that is inaccessible. If you read what I said earlier about Will and its analogy to the iceberg, it nicely parallels Schop's idea about Will. I said:

Think of Will as an iceberg.

Most of the Will is "below the water".. It is a sort of unknown (not even an unknown..it's literally the thing-in-itself...An all encompassing nothingness/everythingness.. can't be described without being contradicting.. it can only be spoken about in the negative)....

However Will has the unfortunate aspect of having representation. Thus there is a form of Will that is subject-for-object. Pure subject-for-object is apprehended through aesthetic genius (the artist/musician and the experience of art and music). It is disinterested insight into the the object. However, most of life is not this, but rather the suffering version whereby subject-for-object is conditioned by space/time/causality imposed by the subject which is to say desiring, lacking, wanting, appropriating. It is the pendulum swing of pursuing a goal and boredom and being caught up in the negatives of conflict with environment, others, for survival, comfort, and such. — schopenhauer1

Now, it is not perfectly analogous of course. Obvious, the godhead in traditional Judaism is a metaphysical entity that directs, creates, and has a goal, etc. But that's not the part I was making a parallel to.

I also saw the 10 Sephirot idea as a sort of Platonic one (Neoplatonic to be more precise). There are "forms" that the godhead had cleared his own "being" to form for which other parts of the heavens/physical realm were created. Sort of templates that when combined, are like the blueprint of known existence. Anyways.. Way into the weeds here, but that can be analogous simply to Schop's use of Plato's Ideas/Forms.. Some sort of template forms that are not conditioned time/space/causality but are somehow part of the system of Will.

So anyways, it is an interesting debate in Schopenhauerian studies as to whether one can "deny the Will" if Will is all there is. I think, the system Schop was thinking was that "denying the will-to-live" (the will as it manifests in the subject-to-object) is what he meant, and that the rare state of Nirvana.. a kind of ego suicide through starvation and quietism, is really just having some sort of gnosis of Will proper, whilst diminishing the will via subject-to-object.

Why do you seek to interpret everything through the lens of a second-rate philosopher? — Janus

I don't interpret everything through the lens of Schopenhauer (who is not a second-rate philosopher). Why do you think he is second-rate? He did have some essays that were off-the-mark (on Women for example), but his philosophy proper was much more clearly written than much of the other philosophers of the time preceding, during, and after him. His ideas were indeed unique with much analytical force amongst his ideas. Second-rate to me is focusing on symbolic logic, for example, and using it to say very little. The fact is, he is the kind of philosopher that knew logic and kept up-to-date with the science (though it was obviously outdated within a generation). Luckily post-Kantian philosophy wasn't based on empirical findings in science so much as it was trying to understand how the mind is related to the world, and what the world is, in-itself. You may disagree with this approach, but it is indeed one way of approaching the problem. Science always rides upon the assumptions and a priori habits/forms that the human brain provides.. And that is what many post-Kantian philosophers tried to explore.

So, to get to the "implications" mentioned above, if everything we experience is a for-us, things-for-us, which leads logically to the idea of things-in themselves, then why would it not follow that space-for-us, time-for-us, causation-for-us lead logically to the ideas of space-in-itself, time-in-itself and causation-in-itself, thus defusing Schopenhauer's whole critique and transcendent reification of the thing-in-itself? — Janus

Because space, time, and causation are not just space-for-us, time-for-us, causation-for-us. It is rather space/time/causality are but conditions of the mind imposed on the thing(s)-in-it(them)self. Thus the thing-in-itself is not conditioned by space/time/causality. What can be a critique perhaps, is his step that the Will is somehow a "unity".. There are ways around this.. and it can be simply how language is used in our everyday usage (pace Wittgenstein), but one can make the critique that a "unified" Will is also a condition.. Schop himself I believe addressed this and really meant to say that Will is really only talked about in the negative (what it can't be).. And even such description as "unified" really is a category error. I don't think this creates any huge blow to the general idea though.

Because space, time, and causation are not just space-for-us, time-for-us, causation-for-us. It is rather space/time/causality are but conditions of the mind imposed on the thing(s)-in-it(them)self. Thus the thing-in-itself is not conditioned by space/time/causality. — schopenhauer1

I don't agree. Just as things are things-for-us, meaning things as experienced and conceived of by us, so are space, time and causation such as they are experienced and conceived of by us.

I am quite familiar with Schopenhauer's philosophy, have read WWR, and secondary works by McGee and others, and I think his philosophy is pretty superficial and uninteresting compared to the likes of Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Husserl and others.

Schop himself I believe addressed this and really meant to say that Will is really only talked about in the negative (what it can't be).. — schopenhauer1

Calling it "Will" is already talking about it in the most positive way. And I think he pinched the idea from Spinoza's "conatus" in any case. The difference is that Spinoza did not reify conatus as "substance". The idea of "will" or volition is the idea of just one aspect of mind or awareness.