Tarski's work doesn't really apply to ordinary language use. Whatever we chose to do with the T-schema, as it relates to ordinary language use, will have to be stipulated. — Tate

To what extent I understand that paper, I agree with you. I'm just ripping the schema from Tarski more than applying what Tarski said, and putting together something like a simple logic that I thought might bridge some understandings. I have tried that Tarski paper more than once, and I wouldn't dare tell someone here what it means. :D

The distinction between logic and metaphysics seemed pertinent. So I thought I could "step things down" from abstract-description to something like a logic, a simple set of symbols and their accepted formulae -- away from facts and general pictures of the world (seeing as I, at least, find that inadequate anymore... truth is so much more than correspondence)

I have tried that Tarski paper more than once, and I wouldn't dare tell someone here what it means. :D — Moliere

Point taken. I'm going from secondary sources rather than the horse's mouth. My understanding is that Tarski's truth predicate is entirely formal. It's not truth as it appears in the wild.

So the T-schema could just as easily be a B-schema:

"P" is blob IFF P.

What's blob? It's just a gear in a logic machine. It's a mistake to read folk notions into that.

truth is so much more than correspondence — Moliere

Exactly.

The original use of "true" was set out earlier by me, and it meant consistent with what occurred. I personally do not employ the notion of "fact" because of - as you like to say - all of its philosophical baggage. I tend to stick to the long form. But, given that not all true statements are so as a result of being consistent with what happened and/or is happening, it seems reasonable to extend its application to being consistent with the way things were and/or are as well as the case at hand. I say this, if for no other reason than to account for things like claims about personal preferences, as well as social conventions and other parts of reality that emerge via language use.

It's interesting to me, as well, how the original use did not involve being taken account of. I mean, we began using the term "true" long before ever considering that and/or how we were. The same goes for "truth". It was only later that skepticism over the use emerged.

Yeah, it's be good to have a thread on that, so we could go into the detail... — Banno

Maybe just start another thread. Name it something kind of obscure so the moderators will leave it be.

If I'm surreptitious the mods will never learn. No, I'll probably start it again soon.

But it's sunny, so not yet.

Point taken. I'm going from secondary sources rather than the horse's mouth. My understanding is that Tarski's truth predicate is entirely formal. It's not truth as it appears in the wild.

So the T-schema could just as easily be a B-schema:

"P" is blob IFF P.

What's blob? It's just a gear in a logic machine. It's a mistake to read folk notions into that. — Tate

I agree with that understanding as you've spelt it out here.

So stipulating English statements.

So stipulating English statements. — Moliere

What do you mean by "statement"? A proposition?

But it's sunny, so not yet. — Banno

:up:

truth is so much more than correspondence
— Moliere

Exactly. — Tate

I'm not sure I'm satisfied with that, especially in part because I don't like the directional metaphor -- more, or less than? Up or down?

I suppose it's better to say that correspondence seems to work-for, but it's not something you'd consider a universal theory of truth, or something. Or, you could, but you could also, with that, build ontologies of tables and not-tables and such. And that's just a bit too much for me.

So stipulating English statements.
— Moliere

What do you mean by "statement"? A proposition? — Tate

I'd settle for any used English sentence, including sentences on this thread.

Clumsy there -- in text I should be more precise. I continue to mean statements. So of the form of propositions, sure. But that, itself, is just a stipulation if we need to make it -- if "statements" as in "used English statements" is precise enough for us, then that's good enough for me. I'm not writing the tractatus :D

I'd settle for any used English sentence, including sentences on this thread. — Moliere

Used? So truth only applies to the content of human interaction?

Used? So truth only applies to the content of human interaction? — Tate

Not truth, but the meta-predicate "-B", let's say -- to mark its queerness.

Mostly to say, this is a "good enough for us" predicate.

If we care about the liars paradox, say, then these things can be introduced through the power of the semantics of English (which are probably absurdly powerful, even limited to just statements?)

But if it's balking at the limitation of truth to human interaction -- yeah, that's pretty much what this would limit it to. No propositions. The focus is on statements used, so utterances -- unless you mean by "utterance" only the "phonic substance" of Saussure.

But if it's balking at the limitation of truth to human interaction -- yeah, that's pretty much what this would limit it to. No propositions. The focus is on statements used — Moliere

That's fine. It just has to be clarified. We should also note that in limiting truth to the content of human interaction, we're making a judgment about a portion of truth predication in ordinary language use.

We're saying that when people speak of truths which have not yet been discovered, they're mistaken, or speaking metaphorically, or are confused.

How should we address that?

We should also note that in limiting truth to the content of human interaction, we're making a judgment about a portion of truth predication in ordinary language use.

We're saying that when people speak of truths which have not yet been discovered, they're mistaken, or speaking metaphorically, or are confused.

How should we address that? — Tate

Kneel before the error theory! embrace the error theory! :D

That's the elegant solution.

That's the elegant solution. — Moliere

I don't know. There's usually blood and guts everywhere when we try to do surgery on natural language use.

I don't know. There's usually blood and guts everywhere when we try to do surgery on natural language use. — Tate

Heh. Well, that's why it's a "for us" predicate. Sort of like a rule to a game, you could say. If an incision matters to a community of users, well -- then the incision matters, and the predicate -B obtains meaning among those who use said predicate.

Well, that's why it's a "for us" predicate. — Moliere

You mean just for the two of us?

Well, yes -- and also everyone who might still be interested of course. Where else would we get a pool of example statements from?

Universality could be a concern of ours, though, right? That's usually part of the game. But it's anyone here still participating and interested to define said predicate. And part of the game, as it is, is that it's totally breakable. But then that's how you start to introduce rules.

Of course, the queerness is just meant to mark how we are just playing a game between us, but obviously we're still interested in truth. That's how this all started after all. But the game is queer enough that I thought I'd stipulate.

truth is so much more than correspondence — Moliere

truth is so much more than correspondence
— Moliere

Exactly. — Tate

In a sous rature (under erasure) kinda way or in some other way?

I suppose it's better to say that correspondence seems to work-for, but it's not something you'd consider a universal theory of truth, or something. — Moliere

No theory of truth is going to cover every use of the concept truth. It seems that most uses of the concept, though, do point to a relationship between propositional beliefs, and states-of-affairs. In this sense there is a kind of correspondence or association between the propositional belief, and those states-of-affairs that make the proposition true, as opposed to false. As with the word game, we have a set of family resemblances that guide us when using the concept. There are no hard and fast definitions that work in every social context.

That snow is white does not represent a fact; it is a fact. — Luke

I'll mention it again as it bears repeating.

a) "snow is white" is true iff snow is white
b) "snow is green" is true iff snow is green

However we make sense of the consequent of the T-schema I think it should apply to both (a) and (b). It is not a fact that snow is green. Although there may be times, like with (a), where the consequent is a fact, there are times, like with (b), where it isn't. A rigorous account of the T-schema should cover both cases.

So, "p" is true iff p. What sort of thing is p? It is not always a fact. Maybe an answer to that will tell us what sort of thing a fact is.

And if the truth is what you say it is, does it follow that what you say is true, is true? Can you cast spells? — Banno

The truth is what I say it is
I perceive the world and observe something white. In a performative utterance, I name this something "black". Henceforth, for me, "something is black" is true iff something is white, and the truth for me is that "black" is white.

Unfortunately, those in authority within society had previously in a performative utterance named this something "white", such that society as a whole accepts that "something is white" is true iff something is white, and the truth for society as a whole is that "white" is white.

Truth is relative. There is no absolute truth. My truth is no more valid nor less valid than anyone else's. It may be true that I will have difficulty fitting in with society, but that is no judge as to what I know to be true. After all, in 1633, the Inquisition of the Roman Catholic Church forced Galileo Galilei, one of the founders of modern science, to recant his theory that the Earth moves around the Sun, and under threat of torture, Galileo so recanted.

Is what I say true, true
I make the performative utterance "I name this ship Queen Elizabeth".
I can then say that it is true that this ship is named Queen Elizabeth.
Is what I say is true, true ?
(What I say is true) is (this ship is named Queen Elizabeth)
So yes, (this ship is named Queen Elizabeth) is true

So yes, what I say is true is true.

Spells
A spell has magic power. Magic produces supernatural effects. The supernatural exists outside the natural world. The natural world is matter, energy, time and space. My belief is that there is nothing outside the natural world, though I don't know.

Therefore, I believe that I cannot cast spells, but I cannot say that I know that I cannot cast spells.

Is what I say true, true
I make the performative utterance "I name this ship Queen Elizabeth".
I can then say that it is true that this ship is named Queen Elizabeth.
Is what I say is true, true ?
(What I say is true) is (this ship is named Queen Elizabeth)
So yes, (this ship is named Queen Elizabeth) is true

So yes, what I say is true is true. — RussellA

Sometimes something is true because you say it. You cannot apply the above reasoning to everything.

Beauty is truth, truth beauty, - that is all Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know. — John Keats (Ode to a Grecian urn)

There you go, from the great Keats himself!

No theory of truth is going to cover every use of the concept truth. It seems that most uses of the concept point to a relationship between propositional beliefs, and states-of-affairs. — Sam26

I don't think so. Most uses of "truth" point to honesty, as in "are you telling the truth?". It's just a certain type of philosopher, practising a defective form of epistemology, who wants to reduce "telling the truth" to a "relationship between propositional beliefs, and states-of-affairs".

This proposed reduction ignores the fact that 'telling the truth" refers to making a statement about what one honestly believes, and there is no necessary connection between what one honestly believes, and any real "states of affairs". So, this proposal, made by some epistemologists, that "truth" is mostly used to "point to a relationship between propositional beliefs, and states-of-affairs" is fundamentally flawed. It is flawed because there is no necessary relationship between one's honest belief, which "truth" is normally used to refer to, and any real "states-of-affairs".

Consequently, these epistemologists will endlessly discuss how it is possible that "truth" could actually refer to a relationship between propositional beliefs and states-of-affairs, because there will always be a problem which makes it impossible that this is actually the case. And of course, that is because there is no necessary relationship between one's honest belief, what "truth" actually refers to, and any real states-of-affairs.

I think that'd be part of our conclusion more than a starting point. That'd be exactly what's controversial, right? So for your use of Keats, at least accepting that these are of the form of a statement:

"Beauty is truth" is -B iff Beauty is truth

Some might object and say "beauty" is the sort of thing which has to be not-included, because -- but the because is where a new rule is introduced between us. Or perhaps we're fine with accepting this as an example statement that comes to define -B for us -- we're realists of beauty, and such uses don't bother us, in fact we encourage such uses because the logical form gets along with our metaphysical belief in beauty as a real thing unto itself that can be successfully predicated.

The formal predicate, being formal, can be anything we want. But since we're talking about truth we'd probably use example sentences which try to break or test that. But it's true that we could focus on another meta-lingual predicate (say "...is persuasive") and the set of statements we agree to, along with the rules for why we agreed to them, would inform our meaning of the meta-lingual predicate.

Ok but aren't you rainin' on my parade and on others' parades too? Is there no other way than to just poop at someone's party?

Beauty, to me, is the very cosmos itself!

I'll mention it again as it bears repeating.

a) "snow is white" is true iff snow is white
b) "snow is green" is true iff snow is green

However we make sense of the consequent of the T-schema I think it should apply to both (a) and (b). It is not a fact that snow is green. Although there may be times, like with (a), where the consequent is a fact, there are times, like with (b), where it isn't. A rigorous account of the T-schema should cover both cases. — Michael

The T schema does cover both of these cases. If snow is not green, then the antecedent is not true. You could ask: why is it not a fact that snow is green? And: what would make it a fact?

So, "p" is true iff p. What sort of thing is p? It is not always a fact. Maybe an answer to that will tell us what sort of thing a fact is. — Michael

For almost every case I can imagine, p is always a fact of our world, our conventions and/or our myths and stories. These might all amount to the same thing.

Per Wittgenstein:

241. “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” — What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life. — Philosophical Investigations

108. "But is there then no objective truth? Isn't it true, or false, that someone has been on the moon?" If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the moon... — On Certainty (my emphasis)