I think it is important when some people appear to be arguing against a distinction between facts and statements that represent facts. — Luke

Who, me?

You mean that "snow is white" is not a fact, because facts are things in the world, like that snow is white, and so while "snow is white" represents a fact, it is not a fact?

Isn't that what I have been arguing?

I'm also pointing out that it would be problematic if someone were to say other wise. Consider these two sentences:

I.

"Snow is white" is not a fact, because facts are things in the world, and so while "snow is white" represents a fact, it is not a fact.

II.

That snow is white is not a fact, because facts are things in the world, and so while that snow is white represents a fact, it is not a fact.

A subtle difference. Which is preferable? I say (I), but you and @bongo fury appear to be advocating (II).

I must have that wrong.

There are only variables that can be substituted for English sentences... — Moliere

Yeah, I think that that is a key consideration here. Logic is an accounting practice of that which already existed in its entirety prior to being taken into account.

If being true means being consistent with fact, then a true statement is consistent with fact, where "fact" is what has occurred. True statements are not facts. To quite the contrary, true statements are so, only if, only when, and only because they are consistent with fact. — creativesoul

Sure. — Banno

And then...

I'd say they are both facts because they are both true statements, and facts are true statements. — Moliere

Yep. — Banno

:brow:

You're welcome.

:wink:

This is interesting because the other theories don't seem to present a logic, so much, as a description of truth (hence, substantive) -- but they certainly presume a logic at least. I don't think I would describe the correspondence theory of truth as a logic. I'd say it's a metaphysical description of truth. — Moliere

This touches on the fundamental error in of many in this thread. The topic is truth, and not belief or justification. The substantive theories work (more or less) as theories of belief or justification, but not as theories of truth. They tell us when we might appropriately hold something to be true, but not what truth is.

So, as an example, disquotation is discounted by some here, not because it is inadequate as a theory of truth, but because it is inadequate as a theory of belief or justification.

See https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/13349/the-logic-of-truth/p1, where I began to set out the strategy Tarski adopted in developing his theory of truth. This strategy informs the logic of truth.

And then... — creativesoul

Oh, my bad. The reassurance was directed at the etymology.

If being true means being consistent with fact, then a true statement is consistent with fact, where "fact" is what has occurred. True statements are not facts. To quite the contrary, true statements are so, only if, only when, and only because they are consistent with fact. — creativesoul

Statements are not facts. "Snow is white" is a true statement, but not a fact. That snow is white is a fact. '"Snow is white" is true' is a fact. And '"Snow is white" is a true statement' is a fact.

The difference is in what is being done with each. See my reply to Luke, above.

The reassurance was directed at the etymology. — Banno

The etymology is interesting, because the term "true" was first used in the sense of being consistent with what has/had occurred, long prior to the term "fact" being coined and/or being used in a manner inconsistent with what had occurred. The first use was that sense, what has/had ocurred. I cannot be too certain off the top of my head, but it seems like a couple of centuries went by...

"Fact" in the sense of the case at hand is notably different than "fact" as what has/had occurred. Those are both distinct from "fact" as a true statement.

You mean that "snow is white" is not a fact, because facts are things in the world, like that snow is white, and so while "snow is white" represents a fact, it is not a fact? — Banno

That would be basic correspondence theory, yes. My picture 1. Something I thought that neither of us agreed with but only one of us was capable of discussing coherently.

Isn't that what I have been arguing? — Banno

Cough, splutter...

"The cat is on the mat" is true ≡ The cat is on the mat
The thing on the right is a fact.
[...]
Now, where in any of this does a sentence correspond to a fact?
What might that correspondence be? — Banno

Perhaps (in the light of your new reflections) you meant "the thing represented by the sentence on the right is a fact"? (Similar to the clarification offered here.)

But then that would be exactly where a sentence does correspond to a fact. (According to the theory being discussed though not espoused.) And the correspondence might be whatever you just called representation.

A fine effort. Some problems, though - I like spinach. Fry it with a bit of lemon juice and pepper and serve it next to some red meat. Nothing better.

And if the truth is what you say it is, does it follow that what you say is true, is true?

Can you cast spells?

but only one of us was capable of discussing coherently. — bongo fury

Don't be too concerned, you'll catch on.

See this argument. It tries to capture were we differ.

See this reply.

Seems to me to be a refinement of language over time. Very much in the way of Austin.

I'd like to hear what you have to say about this:

I.
"Snow is white" is not a fact, because facts are things in the world, and so while "snow is white" represents a fact, it is not a fact.

II.
That snow is white is not a fact, because facts are things in the world, and so while that snow is white represents a fact, it is not a fact. — Banno

Again, it seems to me that you are suggesting that (II) is the better account. Am I wrong?

This by way of looking for a middle position.

Well, P is not the way the world is. "The way the world is" is part of the metaphysical picture of truth that I posited. In the metaphysical picture you have representation on the left-hand-side, and represented on the right-hand side. — Moliere

Are there any truth conditions, or is it simply an algebraic biconditional?

But in the logic you have the mention-operator, variables, the copula, T, and the domain for P (I said sentences, but I should say statements) — Moliere

Isn't that just substituting "domain" for "the world"?

Note that in the logic there is no way the world is or isn't or anything. There are only variables that can be substituted for English sentences. (I would accept other natural languages as well, just using English since we're using English) -- that is, this is stripped of the metaphysical baggage. Instead we have a logic with a formula and defined operators and domains, and then we fill in what the predicate T means based on the meanings of English (that you and I already know). — Moliere

This still does not explain (or I still don't understand) the use-mention metaphor. Is it supposed to be the same as the use-mention distinction?

I believe the way most of us have been using the word "fact" here is to mean a thing that exists in the world, a state of affairs in the world, or a way a part of the world is at some time.
— Luke

This is not quite the same as saying a fact is a true statement. "Most of us" would do well to look at a broader range of examples. — Banno

No, it's the same as saying that a river is a fact.

Tarski's work doesn't really apply to ordinary language use. Whatever we chose to do with the T-schema, as it relates to ordinary language use, will have to be stipulated.

Seems to me to be a refinement of language over time. — Banno

Don't refinements usually imply improvement?

Well, I'd say "yes".

And I think, contra , that Tarski's analysis informs our use of "true" in natural languages.

I think it is important when some people appear to be arguing against a distinction between facts and statements that represent facts.
— Luke

Who, me? — Banno

I wasn't sure. @Pie certainly appeared to be arguing against the distinction. I didn't know whether this was a common view among deflationists.

You mean that "snow is white" is not a fact, because facts are things in the world, like that snow is white, and so while "snow is white" represents a fact, it is not a fact?

Isn't that what I have been arguing? — Banno

Not according to @bongo fury's recent quote of yours, it seems:

"The cat is on the mat" is true ≡ The cat is on the mat
The thing on the right is a fact.
[...]
Now, where in any of this does a sentence correspond to a fact? — Banno

Are you saying "The cat is on the mat" is not a sentence?

Are you saying "The cat is on the mat" is not a sentence? — Luke

No.

I'm having the greatest difficulty in seeing what your objection is. Please take a look at

I.
"Snow is white" is not a fact, because facts are things in the world, and so while "snow is white" represents a fact, it is not a fact.

II.
That snow is white is not a fact, because facts are things in the world, and so while that snow is white represents a fact, it is not a fact. — Banno

Which is better? Because, again, you seem to be advocating (II).

Am I wrong? — Banno

Yes. (I) is fine, as I say:

That would be basic correspondence theory, yes. My picture 1. — bongo fury

Now read on...

Which is better? Because, again, you seem to be advocating (II). — Banno

No, I'm not advocating II. That snow is white does not represent a fact; it is a fact.

Yes. (I) is fine, as I say: — bongo fury

And what of (II)?

that Tarski's analysis informs our use of "true" in natural languages. — Banno

You can't really call Tarski's work an "analysis." He wasn't analyzing anything.

If you use the T-schema to say something regarding ordinary, natural language use, you'll have to stipulate how you want to approach that. Tarski doesn't do that for you.

That snow is white does not represent a fact; it is a fact. — Luke

...and now you seem to be agreeing with me.

Yeah, it's be good to have a thread on that, so we could go into the detail...

:groan:

And, as @bongo fury has just pointed out, you seem to be agreeing with the correspondence theory.

So have we reached Aporia?

And what of (II)? — Banno

Am I wrong?
— Banno

Yes. — bongo fury

(II) is nonsense.

Address the other.

(II) is nonsense. — bongo fury

I agree. And yet it seems to be what you are saying.

Address the other. — bongo fury

This is addressing the other.