No, the intellect surpasses the will in saints, where the will completely denies itself. In artistic geniuses this happens only momentarily, via glimpses obtained through Platonic Ideas.To be a genius is the only the intellect can surpass the will, when for most it merely serves it. — TimeLine
But I still don't see what this has to do with what we were talking about. We weren't discussing Platonic Ideas.As in Kant's aesthetics, genuine art on Schopenhauer's view is the product of a genius or someone who has been “momentarily inspired to the point of genius” (WWR I, 261). But he construes the creative process of the genius rather differently from Kant. For all of the fine arts save for music—which constitutes an important exception treated below—the genius produces art first by contemplating an Idea in nature or from human affairs. Sometimes the genius is aided by her imagination which allows her to perceive Ideas in possible as well as in actual experience. Then, with technical skill she embodies the Ideas she has perceived into a form (be it in marble, paint or words on the printed page) that enables the Ideas to be perceived by others. In this way, the genius lends her superlative ability to perceive Ideas in actual or imagined things to the ordinary person, who can less readily perceive Ideas from the phenomenal world.
Schopenhauer sees a relationship between genius and madness. He believes that “every increase in intellect beyond the ordinary measure is an abnormality that disposes one to madness” (WWR I, 215); since the genius is distinctive for her superfluity of intellect (WWR I, 211), which allows her to withdraw from mundane concerns more often and more sustainedly in order to perceive the Ideas in things and in the patterns of human life, she is thus disposed to madness. Also, geniuses resemble madmen insofar as they are often so engrossed in perceiving the essential in life that they pay little attention to particulars, and are generally terrible in practical affairs. But the real distinguishing factor between the “madman” and the genius has to do with memory. From his “frequent visits to madhouses” and his reflections on the symptoms of these real inmates as well as on those of characters in literature who have gone insane (e.g., Ophelia, King Lear, Ajax), Schopenhauer hypothesizes that the mad lack reliable interconnections between past and present events, and in many cases this is due to some traumatic event they have suffered in their past. By contrast, the genius has a memory that functions normally.
But I still don't see what this has to do with what we were talking about. We weren't discussing Platonic Ideas — Agustino
The freedom we assume - the 'choice' - is actually illusory. — TimeLine
Schopenhauer's conception of genius seems different:Let's go back to the problem I had initially, the notion that there is no free-will but there is free-choice and the latter purports an intellect or capacity to distinguish between the subject and an object, a person who can experience space and time superior to the independence of this will. As you say Intellect is what gives eyes to the will and makes it see - stops it from being blind, and hence makes it able to choose based on the material the intellect furnishes, but to reach that level of transcendence, to actually be capable of giving 'eyes to the will' manifests itself in what Schop. refers as 'genius' or in his aesthetic argument and corresponds to Platonic Ideas as being the instigator of this capacity to become independent of the principle of sufficient reason. — TimeLine
Mere men of talent always come at the right time; for, as they are roused by the spirit of their age and are called into being by its needs, they are only just capable of satisfying them. They therefore go hand in hand with the advancing culture of their contemporaries, or with the gradual advancement of a special science; for this they reap reward and approbation. But to the next generation their works are no longer enjoyable; they must be replaced by others; and these do not fail to appear.
The genius, on the other hand, lights on his age like a comet into the paths of the planets, to whose well-regulated and comprehensible arrangement its wholly eccentric course is foreign. Accordingly, he cannot go hand in hand with the regular course of the culture of the times as found; on the contrary, he casts his works far out on to the path in front (just as the emperor, giving himself up to death, flings his spear among the enemy), on which time has first to overtake them… Talent is able to achieve what is beyond other people’s capacity to achieve, yet not what is beyond their capacity of apprehension; therefore it at once finds its appreciators. The achievement of genius, on the other hand, transcends not only others’ capacity of achievement, but also their capacity of apprehension; therefore they do not become immediately aware of it. Talent is like the marksman who hits a target which others cannot reach; genius is like the marksman who hits a target … which others cannot even see. — WWR Vol II Chapter XXXI
No level of transcendence is required at all. Even a person with a weak intellect - his will is still guided by that intellect - only that the intellect isn't powerful enough to see all the choices that are available, to see the advantages/disadvantages they entail, etc. So the weak intellect is almost as if the will was blind.As you say Intellect is what gives eyes to the will and makes it see - stops it from being blind, and hence makes it able to choose based on the material the intellect furnishes, but to reach that level of transcendence, to actually be capable of giving 'eyes to the will' manifests itself in what Schop. refers as 'genius' or in his aesthetic argument and corresponds to Platonic Ideas as being the instigator of this capacity to become independent of the principle of sufficient reason. — TimeLine
No level of transcendence is required at all. Even a person with a weak intellect - his will is still guided by that intellect - only that the intellect isn't powerful enough to see all the choices that are available, to see the advantages/disadvantages they entail, etc. So the weak intellect is almost as if the will was blind. — Agustino
That the intellect guides the will presupposes that the intellect is subservient to the will already. The will wants X. The intellect tells the will how to get X. Will it take road A or B? That's the choice.I understand what you are trying to say, but when you say "his will is still guided by that intellect" only it lacks 'power' that this grading of the objectification of the will (and I assume lower phenomenon) lacks this so-called power because it is unable to perceive Ideas and is thus subsumed. It becomes irrelevant; you either are, or you are not and when the latter, the intellect is subject to the will. — TimeLine
That the intellect guides the will presupposes that the intellect is subservient to the will already. The will wants X. The intellect tells the will how to get X. Will it take road A or B? That's the choice.
That's why this has nothing to do with genius or sainthood, but with our natural way of functioning. — Agustino
No, intellect doesn't define direction, you're quite right about that. Intellect only tells the Will how to get to where it wants to get. I wouldn't say intellect is movement of the Will though. Intellect is separate from the activity of willing - at least in principle. It's similar to the distinction Hume made between reason and the passions.Intellect cannot guide the Will, that is define a direction of the Will, because intellect is already movement of the Will. — TheWillowOfDarkness
intellect only tells the will how to get to where it wants to get — Agustino
the intellect is subservient to the will — Agustino
But it doesn't have to be like that - hence Schopenhauer's denial of the will. — Agustino
Schopenhauer in the second Volume of WWR pulls back from the complete identification of thing-in-itself with Will. Therefore what is left after the complete abolition of the Will is nothing from the perspective of us - those still full of Will.He denies the illusory will, the representations that individuate. The will in-itself stands outside of this intellect or cognitive faculty and is the force behind everything. — TimeLine
To reiterate, how is your argument relatable to Schopenhauer with whom you have incorrectly associated it with? — TimeLine
And, please, I have no time to waste on a series of superfluous straw-mans; intentionally substituting the argument by pulling focus on something unreasonable and irrelevant undermines your own intelligence. — TimeLine
Schopenhauer in the second Volume of WWR pulls back from the complete identification of thing-in-itself with Will. Therefore what is left after the complete abolition of the Will is nothing from the perspective of us - those still full of Will. — Agustino
Have you read this post (and the one quoted from Thorongil, and then followed the discussion)?If the will is independent of cognition as the thing-in-itself, one cannot within the boundaries of the intellect confirm the existence of it, ergo it would be contradictory to state otherwise and hence why it is unknowable, an immanent metaphysic that defies an empirical answer just as much as one cannot claim freedom from the will. The result is that one is condemned to a paradox. There is a transcendence from this metaphysics, but that still remains an appearance that interprets the thing-in-itself. "I know my will not as a whole, not as a unity, not completely according to its nature, but only in its individual acts, and hence in time, which is the form of my body's appearing, as it is of every body. Therefore, the body is the condition of knowledge of my will." He is trying to strike down our cognitive limitations while at the same time acknowledge the essence of our nature, the key being conceptual knowledge hence Ideas. — TimeLine
So why don't you reformulate that objection as clearly and precisely as you can, and I will respond to it. — Thorongil
that implies freedom to be nothing but a compulsion — TimeLine
I am confused as to how you assume choice is not a compulsion — TimeLine
The intellect is always subservient to the will. — TimeLine
Yes, but in S's system this is non-sensical because it would imply that the thing-in-itself is the ground of the Will - this would suggest that the PSR applies to the thing-in-itself as well, which is totally contrary to the position S would hold. Since the thing-in-itself is beyond space, time, causality and the PSR, it cannot stand as ground for the Phenomenon (or for the Will) for that matter.Something like: without the thing-in-itself, there would be no Will, without Will, there would be no phenomena. As such, any instance of phenomena and the Will may be considered of the thing-in-itself, as the thing-in-itself is ground of both (in the sense of "with"; neither Will nor phenomena can be given without the thing-in-itself). — TheWillowOfDarkness
I'm not entirely sure what you mean by the last sentence. Could you please explain? — Chany
Coercion is the use of physical force, threat or intimidation without regard for a person's desires or volition in order to obtain compliance. Using this definition, I suspect that, absent oppressive living conditions, choice coercion is more exception rather than rule. — Galuchat
This is the wrong question to ask with regard to the relationship between choice and responsibility. It presupposes responsibility and asks for a definition of free choice which provides it. I agree with presupposing responsibility (as this satisfies a fundamental human need for justice), but a better question would be: given a scientifically derived notion of human choice, how can we formulate responsibility to meet the need for justice?What sort of free will is necessary for moral responsibility, and does ours satisfy the criterion (thus making us morally responsible)? — Sineview
Has any scientific research been conducted which supports libertarian free will (the ability to do otherwise)?Belief in free will as it is understood by libertarians (for example, Kant) consists in believing, inter alia, that whatever we have done in the past, we really could have done otherwise, even though all the conditions were just the same. — John
Yes, I can agree with this.I don't think so. The system seems to be treating the it-in-itself not as a ground in the sense of PSR, but rather as just as something, beyond representation, which is necessarily given with Will and phenomena. A sort of metaphysic of immanent presence, where the point is not how the thing-in-itself justified everything else (i.e.PSR), but that's mutually present with anything.
If the thing-in-itself is a necessary side of the reality coin (Will being the other), how does it make sense to speak of the thing-in-itself like a realm which has no significance in relation to Will or phenomena?
While we may not be able to say exactly what the thing-in-itself is, we do know it is a necessary presence given with Will and phenomena. Though not Will or phenomena, we know the thing-in-itself is given with any instance of Will and phenomena. — TheWillowOfDarkness
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