Why not? — Luke

The world is the totality of facts, not of things (Tractatus 1.1). Rivers are things. Things are not facts.

So the snow being white is a fact but the white snow isn't a fact. Or it is? I don't understand why it matters. Is the word "fact" important? This just seems to be an issue of grammar.

Wittgenstein does that to you! Oui? — Agent Smith

Absolutely not. Wittgenstein is scrupulous.

It's all the arrows. What are they doing? — Banno

Pointing.

And the splotch down the bottom - what's that? The thing-in-itself? — Banno

The (alleged) thing that's not also a string of words.

The thing in my hand is a knife or a piece of metal. We mark the difference by the context. — Banno

Sure. Two words for one thing. No problem. If we're ready to clarify.

The string [snow is white] is a fact or a sentence. We mark the difference by the context, but in addition we can use quote marks. — Banno

Fine, if you would stick to that. Two words ("fact" and "sentence") for one thing (string). But you keep doing one word ("fact") for two things (string and alleged thing that's not also a string). And refusing to clarify, and then basking in people's incomprehension.

Wittgenstein does that to you! Oui?
— Agent Smith

Absolutely not. Wittgenstein is scrupulous. — bongo fury

Oh! Banno is the resident Wittgenstein scholar. I thought that was the explanation for his cryptic posts.

No.

~~

But you keep doing one word ("fact") for two things (string and alleged thing that's not also a string). — bongo fury

Not quite right. I don't think I've said that the sentence is a fact. Again,
1. snow is white - fact
2. "snow is white" - sentence

No. — bongo fury

I agree. They are not cryptic.

No — bongo fury

:blush:

"The cat is on the mat" is true ≡ The cat is on the mat
The thing on the right is a fact. — Banno

1. snow is white - fact — Banno

No more questions, your honour.

1. snow is white - fact
2. "snow is white" - sentence
3. "snow is white" is true - fact
4. '"snow is white" is true' - sentence.

You seem to think that (1) and (2) are the same. They are not. But (1) and (3) are logically equivalent. Or if you prefer, (2) and (4) are equivalent.

Not at all. I criticised (1).

Specifically, here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/732016 — bongo fury

"The cat is on the mat" is true ≡ The cat is on the mat
The thing on the right is a fact. — Banno

No, the thing on the right of the T-schema is a string of words. — bongo fury

So yes, there are uses of "truth" that rely on the force of an utterance. There are uses of "truth" that rely on the breach of convention. There are Big Picture uses.

I propose that we might gain a better understanding of these Big Picture uses were we to have a clear grasp of the logic of truth. Tarski, Kripke, and such.

And for my money disquaotation presents that logic. At the least, understanding the logic of truth will underpin any other considerations.

But philosophy is hard, and is found in the detail rather than the trite and trivial. — Banno

This is interesting because the other theories don't seem to present a logic, so much, as a description of truth (hence, substantive) -- but they certainly presume a logic at least. I don't think I would describe the correspondence theory of truth as a logic. I'd say it's a metaphysical description of truth.

(Funny thing here too, given the notion of logic as truth-preservative. You'd have to, I think, come up with another way to think about logic than this common short-hand to talk of a logic of truth. Hence your invoking meaning as a beginning?)



**

I wonder if this is something that's getting lost in the conversation, at this point. So far I think we've been thinking about disquotationalism as a distinct theory from the standards. Might it be that disquotationalism is simply focused on the logic of truth, whereas the others are focused on the metaphysics of truth?

Ok, change the example to a coin. There's a categorical difference between a dollar and a piece of metal. Which do you have in your pocket? — Banno

The piece of metal in my pocket is not a dollar, properly speaking. It's a coin which represents a dollar. That's what makes the categorical difference, a dollar is a value, and a coin is not a value, it is a representation of a value. And that's how numerous different things, different coins, bills, makings on paper and in cyberspace, can represent the very same value. The representations are not actually the thing represented.

That is the issue with the sentence and the fact. The sentence is supposed to be a representation of the fact. and so there is a categorical difference between the two, the sentence and the fact, which makes it impossible that a sentence is a fact. However, in common vernacular we take shortcuts and simplify to facilitate expedience. So that I might say "the coin in my pocket is a dollar", just like one might say "snow is white is a fact". These shortcuts appear to be saying that the sentence "Snow is white.", is also a fact, just like it appears like I am saying that the coin in my pocket is a dollar. The representative aspect is just taken for granted.

Not quite right. I don't think I've said that the sentence is a fact. Again,
1. snow is white - fact
2. "snow is white" - sentence — Banno

What I think Bongo Fury is trying to point out to you, is that in #1, you are trying to utilize that invalid shortcut, to say that "snow is white" is a fact, when in reality it is a sentence which represents a fact.

To insist that "the sentence is a fact", when you clearly recognize the categorical difference in your reply to me, quoted above, indicates that you are being dishonest in your communion with Bongo Fury. I can conclude that you are employing a dishonest use of words, a type of sophistry, because you recognize the categorical difference between the sentence "snow is white", and the fact which it represents, yet you premise that the sentence is the fact in your logical procedure.

No, the thing on the right of the T-schema is a string of words. — bongo fury

That string of words refers to a fact.

When we say "Joe Biden is President" we're not saying that the string of words "Joe Biden" is President; we're saying that the man referred to by the string of words "Joe Biden" is President.

Something worth considering is that "snow is green" is true iff snow is green, but it is not a fact that snow is green. So what does "snow is green" refer to if not a fact? A fiction? Or does it make sense to talk about non-obtaining facts?

Perhaps it isn't quite right to say that the consequent of the T-schema is/refers to a fact.

That string of words refers to a fact. — Michael

(My emphasis.)

Exactly. According to correspondence theory in this kind of context.

For me, the words on the right of "iff" in '"Snow is white" is true iff snow is white' point to the grounding fact of snow being white (or not). — Janus

(My emphasis again.)

See, Pie and @Banno? It's not hard not to equivocate, if you don't want to: — bongo fury

Perhaps it isn't quite right to say that the right-hand side of the T-schema refers to a fact. — Michael

Of course perhaps it isn't at all right.

Hence my second picture, just as one plausible alternative. Following up the option that whole sentences don't refer at all.

So what does "snow is green" refer to if not a fact? A fiction? — Michael

Plausibly it is fictional literature.

Exactly. According to correspondence theory in this kind of context. — bongo fury

Not necessarily. “1 + 1 = 2” is true iff 1 + 1 = 2. 1 + 1 = 2 because this is what follows from the axioms of mathematics. The T-schema works with a coherence theory, too.

The T-schema works with a coherence theory, too. — Michael

Hence my quoting Goodman, earlier. And note that my second picture is consistent with the T-schema. Even though it doesn't have whole sentences referring (or corresponding).

This possibility doesn't excuse the equivocating, between strings of words, and alleged things or situations that aren't strings of words.

It doesn't excuse the equivocating between a string of words and alleged things or situations that aren't strings of words. — bongo fury

I think the issue is that facts aren’t always things, e.g material objects. It is a fact that unicorns don’t exist, but the non-existence of unicorns isn’t a thing that exists. Is there a distinction between the fact that unicorns don’t exist and the sentence “unicorns don’t exist” being true?

I think the issue is that facts aren’t always things, e.g material objects. — Michael

That's a related issue, sure. I'm less unsympathetic to the notion of corresponding facts that are physical events (objects in the larger sense of regions of space-time). But I'm unsympathetic to the notion of corresponding facts generally, and even less sympathetic to their being smuggled in by systematic equivocation.

It is a fact that unicorns don’t exist, — Michael

I think we agree here.

, but the non-existence of unicorns isn’t a thing that exists. — Michael

Neither is the existence of cats a thing that exists.

Is there a distinction between the fact that unicorns don’t exist and the sentence “unicorns don’t exist” being true? — Michael

What do you think?

But I'm unsympathetic to the notion of corresponding facts generally, and even less sympathetic to their being smuggled in by systematic equivocation. — bongo fury

I find it strange that you're not wanting disquotationalism, then. That seems to me to be what is accomplished by the logic -- no sussing out the meaning of correspondence. Simply true sentence on the left-hand side, and used sentence on the right-hand side. Truth is as a meta-lingual predicate of used language.

.

The world is the totality of facts, not of things (Tractatus 1.1). Rivers are things. Things are not facts. — Banno

According to PI, the meaning of a word often depends on how it is used and/or "is what an explanation of its meaning explains" (560). I believe the way most of us have been using the word "fact" here is to mean a thing that exists in the world, a state of affairs in the world, or a way a part of the world is at some time. Many dictionaries give one of the uses/meanings of "fact" as "something that really exists" or similar. I'm not sure how you are using the word.

Is the word "fact" important? — Michael

I think it is important when some people appear to be arguing against a distinction between facts and statements that represent facts.

Is there a distinction between the fact that unicorns don’t exist and the sentence “unicorns don’t exist” being true? — Michael

There is no distinction between the way the world is and what the sentence represents if true, but there is a distinction between the way the world is and the sentence that represents the way the world is. If there were no distinction, then the sentence could be neither true nor false. The sentence would be the world.

There is no distinction between the way the world is and what the sentence represents if true, — Luke

I'm pretty sure this is what disquotational theories are trying to get at.

So --

but there is a distinction between the way the world is and the sentence that represents the way the world is. If there were no distinction, then the sentence could be neither true nor false. The sentence would be the world.

The distinction between the way the world is and the sentences that represents is

(Sentence-that-represents) is T IFF the way the world is

Breaking out of metaphysical baggage, we'd say

"P" is T IFF P

And replace all instances of P with English sentences, while recognizing that the quotations are an operator on all sentences that these are being mentioned, not used.

Finally, coming to define T as true, but only by understanding the meaning of the previous bits, as well as the iff operator.

Funny thing there, still. We come to understand the predicate T in relation to the actual language introduced in this model I'm proposing. But truth is smuggled in by way of the "iff" connector, since we already understand these connectors to be truth-evaluative.

What is truth? — Pie

Consider the propositions "snow is white" and "the bird is blue". To know whether they are true or false, one must first know what they mean. We cannot decide whether a proposition is true or false until we know what it means.

There are two kinds of propositions
"Snow is white" is analytic necessary, as snow is white by definition. "The bird is blue" is synthetic contingent, as we need to observe the world.

The example of the Rosetta Stone
Ancient Egyptian was a coherent language that described the world in which the ancient Egyptians lived, yet couldn't be understood for thousands of years until the discovery of the Rosetta Stone. In Tarski's terms, ancient Egyptian is the object language. Something external to the object language was needed to give the object language meaning. In this case the Rosetta Stone was needed. In Tarski's terms, a metalanguage.

The meaning of "snow is white"
Go back to the beginning. I perceive in the world something that is cold, white and frozen. I name this something in a performative act "snow". I could equally well have named it "schnee". I record my performative act in a dictionary, where white is described as one of the properties of snow, in that white is a necessary property of snow. Austin discusses performative acts.

I utter the proposition "snow is white". In Tarski's terms, utterances are uttered in the object language. In Tarski's terms, performative acts are carried out in the metalanguage. Therefore, what does the utterance "snow is white" mean. It only has meaning if snow is white has been established during a performative act in the metalanguage. It has no meaning if snow is white has not yet been established by a performative act in a metalanguage.

Is "snow is white" true or false
The utterance in the object language "snow is white" is true if the predicate "is white" has been established as a property of the subject "snow" during a performative act in a metalanguage. The utterance in the object language "snow is white" is false if the predicate "is not white" has been established as a property of the subject "snow" during a performative act in a metalanguage.

Meaning of "the bird is blue"
For "the bird is blue" to have meaning as an utterance in the object language, the properties of the subject "bird" and properties of the predicate "is blue" must have been established during performative acts within a metalanguage. A bird, for example, having several colours, ability to fly and being an animal

Is "the bird is blue" true or false
The utterance in the object language "the bird is blue" is true if, first, the predicate "is blue" has been established as a possible property of the subject "bird" during a performative act in a metalanguage and second, if it is perceived in the world that the bird is blue. The utterance in the object language "the bird is blue" is false if, first the predicate "is blue" has been established as a possible property of the subject "bird" during a performative act in a metalanguage, and second, if it is perceived in the world that the bird is not blue

The analytic T-sentence "snow is white"
Under what conditions is the utterance "snow is white" true ? The T-sentence is "snow is white" is true iff snow is white. "Snow is white" is an utterance in the object language.

"Snow is white" is true if the predicate "is white" has been established as a property of the subject "snow" during a performative act in a metalanguage.

An analytic T-sentence may be generalised as "A is B" is true iff the predicate "is B" has been established as a property of the subject "A" during a performative act in a metalanguage.

The synthetic T-sentence "the bird is blue"
Under what conditions is the utterance "the bird is blue" true ? The T-sentence is "the bird is blue" is true iff the bird is blue. "The bird is blue" is an utterance in the object language. "The bird is blue" is true iff not only the predicate "is blue" has been established as a possible property of the subject "bird" during a performative act in a metalanguage but also if it is perceived in the world that the bird is blue

A synthetic T-sentence may be generalised as "A is B" is true iff not only the predicate "is B" has been established as a possible property of the subject "A" during a performative act in a metalanguage but also if it is perceived in the world that the A is B.

Quine and the analytic-synthetic divide
Quine wrote Two Dogmas of Empiricism 1950. He argued that analytic truths are problematic. He distinguished between logical truths, "no not-x is x" and truths based on synonyms, such as "a bachelor is an unmarried man". Synonyms are analytically problematic, in that although bachelor is a synonym for unmarried, they have a different senses, different meanings.

Consider the analytic proposition "snow is white", which is analytic because by definition snow is white. But note that the word "is" has different possible meanings. As a metaphor, "cheese is heavenly". As irony, "spinach is delicious". As identity, A is A. As description, "the Eiffel Tower is a wrought-iron structure erected in Paris for the World Exhibition of 1889 with a height of 300 metres". As definition, "a unicorn is a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead". As assumption, "drinking a lot of water is good for you".

The word "is" in "snow is white" is not used as an identity, but as a definition.

Where does meaning and truth exist
Consider the proposition in an object language "snow is white". To know whether it is true or not first requires knowing what it means. As with the example of Ancient Egyptian, meaning cannot be discovered within the language itself, no matter that the language is coherent, no matter that it describes the world within which it exists. Meaning is discovered external to the language itself, whether the Rosetta Stone, or a dictionary created in a performative act within a metalanguage.

The meaning of the object language exists within the metalanguage, not in the object language. Similarly, the truth of the analytic proposition "snow is white" exists not in the object language but in the metalanguage.

Consider the proposition in the object language "the bird is blue". The meaning of the object language exists within the metalanguage, not in the object language. The truth of the synthetic proposition "the bird is blue" requires not only its meaning which exists only in the metalanguage and not the object language but also a perception of the world that the bird is blue

Where is the world
I perceive something in the world. If I believed in Idealism, the world would exist in a mind. If I believed in Realism, the world would exist mind-independently.

My argument so far requires that I perceive a world, but whether this world exists in my mind or exists mind-independently makes no difference to either the meaning or truth of the analytic "snow is white" or synthetic "the bird is blue". As an aside, Wittgenstein's Tractatus may also be read independently of any belief in Idealism or Realism.

The creation of meaning and truth
I perceive in the world something that is cold, white and frozen. In a performative act I name this something "snow". Subsequent to this performative act, "snow" means something cold, white and frozen and it is true that "snow" is something cold, white and frozen.

Meaning and truth have been created in a performative act.

The problem of the nature of objects and properties
I perceive something in the world that is cold, white and frozen, and in a performative act name it "snow". Later I may discover that "snow" is not only cold, white and frozen but also H2O. How can the same object have different properties ? This raises the question of what "snow" is exactly. It raises the question of what any noun is, whether it be snow, table, the Moon, the Eiffel Tower, etc.

Bradley, for example, questioned the nature of objects and their properties. He starts with the example of a lump of sugar. He notes that there appears to be such a thing as a lump of sugar and this thing appears to have qualities such as whiteness, sweetness, and hardness. But, asks Bradley, what is this “thing” that bears properties? On the one hand, he thinks it is odd to assume that there is something to the lump of sugar beside its several qualities, thus implying that postulating a property-less bearer of properties is incoherent. On the other hand, he notes that the lump cannot merely be its qualities either, since the latter must somehow be united.

For Bradley, unity or “coexistence” of qualities presupposes relations, which is why he questioned our concept of relations, leading to questioning the ontological existence of relations.

IE, "snow" is not an object existing in the world. "Snow" is a name given to a set of properties that exist in the world.

A solution to the Liar Paradox
Consider the statement "this statement is false". Tarski diagnosed the paradox as arising only in languages that are "semantically closed", and to avoid self-contradiction, it is necessary to envisage levels of language, the object language and the metalanguage. The metalanguage is where truth and meaning are created in performative acts.

When I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth, the ship only has the name Queen Elizabeth at the conclusion of my performative act. At the conclusion of my utterance "I name this ship" it is not yet true that the words "I name this ship" refer to the proposition " I name this ship Queen Elizabeth".

Similarly, the statement "this statement is false" only has meaning at the conclusion of my performative act. At the conclusion of my utterance "this statement", it is not yet true that the words "this statement" refer to the proposition "this statement is false".

IE, within the performative act, "this statement" doesn't refer to the statement "this statement is false".

Summary
Truth is a creation of a performative act, in that, in naming this ship the Queen Elizabeth, it becomes true that this ship is named Queen Elizabeth.

My conclusion may be summed up by a line from that great film "The Shooter" - The Truth is what I say it is

And replace all instances of P with English sentences, while recognizing that the quotations are an operator on all sentences that these are being mentioned, not used. — Moliere

I don’t understand the use-mention comparison. If P is the way the world is when “P” is true, this implies that “P” already has a use/meaning. And P’s being a way the world is is not a use of “P” (or a use of language).

Truth conditions are on the right

I don’t understand the use-mention comparison. If P is the way the world is when “P” is true, this implies that “P” already has a use/meaning. And P’s being a way the world is is not a use of “P” (or a use of language). — Luke

Well, P is not the way the world is. "The way the world is" is part of the metaphysical picture of truth that I posited. In the metaphysical picture you have representation on the left-hand-side, and represented on the right-hand side.

But in the logic you have the mention-operator, variables, the copula, T, and the domain for P (I said sentences, but I should say statements)

Note that in the logic there is no way the world is or isn't or anything. There are only variables that can be substituted for English sentences. (I would accept other natural languages as well, just using English since we're using English) -- that is, this is stripped of the metaphysical baggage. Instead we have a logic with a formula and defined operators and domains, and then we fill in what the predicate T means based on the meanings of English (that you and I already know).

True statements are sentences. Facts are not. — creativesoul

Yep. — Banno

1. snow is white - fact
2. "snow is white" - sentence
3. "snow is white" is true - fact
4. '"snow is white" is true' - sentence.

You seem to think that (1) and (2) are the same. They are not. But (1) and (3) are logically equivalent. Or if you prefer, (2) and (4) are equivalent. — Banno

(3) is about the sentence "snow is white". (1) is not. How are they both facts? As a result of logical equivalence?

How are they both facts? As a result of logical equivalence? — creativesoul

I'd say they are both facts because they are both true statements, and facts are true statements.

At the very least, this is how we talk about them.

So in the case of 3, if we were to set out the T sentence:

" "Snow is white" is true" is T iff "Snow is white" is true.

You can tier this up as high as you like.

@ Yep.

This might be the problem:

I believe the way most of us have been using the word "fact" here is to mean a thing that exists in the world, a state of affairs in the world, or a way a part of the world is at some time. — Luke

This is not quite the same as saying a fact is a true statement. "Most of us" would do well to look at a broader range of examples.