snow is white - fact — Banno

Equivocal pointing of "fact".

between true sentence and more occult alleged entities. — bongo fury

Equivocal pointing of "fact". — bongo fury

What's that?

Are you saying that it is not a fact that snow is white?

But a wise fellow once said, concerning pointing, — Banno

Word and object have no inherent connection, but only a mystic confuses the two. — bongo fury

...and?

First cab off the rank is that statements don't have a fixed meaning. See Davidson's A nice derangement of epitaphs. There seems to be no way to construct a coherent account of meaning as a convention that will work in every case. No set of rules will be able to capture the whole of meaning, because as soon as such rules are stipulated, some wag will undermine them — Banno

So we agree on this?

What's that? — Banno

It's saying, are you pointing the word "fact" at the true sentence or at some alleged corresponding entity?

...and? — Banno

And stop doing it, please. The equivocation.

You don't have to accept the alleged corresponding entities. But stop having it both ways, and basking in people's incomprehension.

It's saying, are you pointing the word "fact" at the true sentence or at some alleged corresponding entity? — bongo fury

That is muddled. Are you pointing at the knife or the piece of metal?

But stop having it both ways, and basking in people's incomprehension. — bongo fury

I can have it both ways because it works both ways.

I'll take that point, but make anther. Trust - and honesty - stand in much the same relation to all our utterances, not just to statements. Even dishonesty only works against a background of honesty. So what we have here is not peculiar to truth per se. Indeed the very act of understanding someone is underpinned by a charitable expectation of honesty.

But our topic here is truth. — Banno

What you are saying here is that meaning, as well as other human relations, requires truth (in the sense of honesty). So we should take it that truth, in that sense, is prior to meaning, and therefore does not require meaning, "truth" being the more general concept and logically prior to the more specific concept, "meaning".

Are you pointing at the knife or the piece of metal? — Banno

If I say

A piece of metal is a knife. — Banno

then I'm pointing "piece of metal" and "knife" at a metal knife.

If I say

The string of words is a fact. — Banno

then I'm pointing "string of words" and "fact" at the true sentence.

1. snow is white - fact
2. "snow is white" - sentence
3. "snow is white" is true - fact
4. '"snow is white" is true' - sentence.

No equivocation.

You seem to think that (1) and (2) are the same. They are not. But (1) and (3) are logically equivalent.

No equivocation. — Banno

I can have it both ways because it works both ways. — Banno

And? Be explicit.

You seem to think that (1) and (2) are the same. — Banno

Not at all. I criticised (1).

Specifically, here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/732016

But you havn't been able to set out an equivocation.

I point to the that.

You say " Are you pointing at the knife or the piece of metal? Stop equivocating!"

I go and do something else.

I point to the that. — Banno

Mystical babble.

You say " Are you pointing at the knife or the piece of metal? " — Banno

No, you said that. I showed here that it was beside the point.

We've been here before, and this is as far as our discussions ever proceed.

If there is an equaviocation, you ought be able to set it out by making it explicit.

The thing in my hand is a knife or a piece of metal. We mark the difference by the context.

The string [snow is white] is a fact or a sentence. We mark the difference by the context, but in addition we can use quote marks.

So, where is the equivocation?

You seem to hold that it must be either a sentence or a fact, and never the twain shall meet. For you, it's either a knife or a piece of metal, but never both.

Unlike knife and piece of metal, there's a categorical difference between a sentence and a fact. It really can't be both.

It's all the arrows. What are they doing? Each of them seems be be doing something different.

And the splotch down the bottom - what's that? The thing-in-itself?

Unlike knife and piece of metal, there's a categorical difference between a sentence and a fact. It really can't be both. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, change the example to a coin. There's a categorical difference between a dollar and a piece of metal. Which do you have in your pocket?

I have a piece of paper with the word “coin” written on it. Is that a coin?

Does it count as a coin? (Searle)

I wouldn't think so; hence the categorical difference.

I want to run something by you and any others who may be reading this.

The most common Old English use had it that truth was the quality of being steadfast, loyal, faithful, trustworthy, honest, steady in adhering to promises and friends, etc. That is... "truth" originally meant the quality of being true, and when something was true it was steadfast, loyal, faithful, trustworthy, honest and steady in adhering to promises and friends, etc. Such use of "truth" seemed to be more applicable to people. Another Old English use, the sense of "something that is true", was first recorded mid-14c., whereas the sense meaning "accuracy, correctness" is from 1560s.

The term "true" was first used in the sense of being "consistent with fact" around c. 1200. Given that the English language began being written around c. 600, it comes as no surprise to me that English speakers would begin using it "true" to mean consistent with what occurred because they found themselves faced with conflicting stories about the very same events, especially when amidst much denser populations, many of which that had written record. They needed a means for distinguishing dependable and reliable stories from those that were not. Hence, true stories are consistent with what occurred. Stories that are not true, are not.

If being true means being consistent with fact, then a true statement is consistent with fact, where "fact" is what has occurred. True statements are not facts. To quite the contrary, true statements are so, only if, only when, and only because they are consistent with fact.

Mystical babble. — bongo fury

:chin: Wittgenstein does that to you! Oui?

Sure.

Truth became the translation for veritas. So the Latin word for truth, with the root *were-o-, came to be translated into English by the word for trustworthy, with the root *deru-.

And?

And I thought you were arguing against this:

Unlike knife and piece of metal, there's a categorical difference between a sentence and a fact. It really can't be both. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was going to post this earlier to try and highlight the categorical difference:

A sentence (as a string of letters) may be a fact of the world, but there are many facts of the world that are not sentences (e.g. some facts are rivers).

The content/meaning of a sentence can correspond with a fact of the world, but not all sentences correspond with facts of the world (e.g. some sentences are false).

True statements are sentences. Facts are not.

A river isn't a fact. It's a river.

That the river is flooding - might be a fact. "The river is flooding" would then be a true sentence.

Yep.

A river isn't a fact. — Banno

Why not?

creativesoul Yep. — Banno

Is that a sentence in your pocket or are you conceding there's a categorical difference between a sentence and a fact?