There's may not be an external, material world, but that there is a world is certain. — Banno

I think the spatial metaphor 'external' is not so bad. The world encompasses little ol' me.

As Kojève puts it, man is [historical] time is the concept[-system] existing empirically.

Pie, I doubt that you disagree with this; rather, it seems obvious, no? — Banno

Indeed. Transformation is patently constant, but changes in the norms are governed by those same changing norms.

Our practice of language-use is not merely the application of concepts but simultaneously the institution of the conceptual norms governing the correct use of our linguistic expressions; it is our actual use of language itself that settles the meanings of our expressions.
...
A characteristic distinguishing feature of linguistic practices is their protean character, their plasticity and malleability, the way in which language constantly overflows itself, so that any established pattern of usage is immediately built on, developed, and transformed. The very act of using linguistic expressions or applying concepts transforms the content of those expressions or concepts. The way in which discursive norms incorporate and are transformed by novel contingencies arising from their usage is not itself a contingent, but a necessary feature of the practices in which they are implicit. It is easy to see why one would see the whole enterprise of semantic theorizing as wrong–headed if one thinks that, insofar as language has an essence, that essence consists in its restless self–transformation (not coincidentally reminiscent of Nietzsche’s “self–overcoming”). Any theoretical postulation of common meanings associated with expression types that has the goal of systematically deriving all the various proprieties of the use of those expressions according to uniform principles will be seen as itself inevitably doomed to immediate obsolescence as the elusive target practices overflow and evolve beyond those captured by what can only be a still, dead snapshot of a living, growing, moving process. It is an appreciation of this distinctive feature of discursive practice that should be seen as standing behind Wittgenstein’s pessimism about the feasibility and advisability of philosophers engaging in semantic theorizing…

…
[T]he idea that the most basic linguistic know–how is not mastery of proprieties of use that can be expressed once and for all in a fixed set of rules, but the capacity to stay afloat and find and make one’s way on the surface of the raging white–water river of discursive communal practice that we always find ourselves having been thrown into (Wittgensteinian Geworfenheit) is itself a pragmatist insight. It is one that Dewey endorses and applauds. And it is a pragmatist thought that owes more to Hegel than it does to Kant. For Hegel builds his metaphysics and logic around the notion of determinate negation because he takes the normative obligation to do something to resolve the conflict that occurs when the result of our properly applying the concepts we have to new situations is that we (he thinks, inevitably) find ourselves with materially incompatible commitments to be the motor that drives the unceasing further determination and evolution of our concepts and their contents. The process of applying conceptual norms in judgment and intentional action is the very same process that institutes, determines, and transforms those conceptual norms. — Brandom

And, well known, I think...

We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but are never able to start afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is taken away a new one must at once be put there, and for this the rest of the ship is used as support. In this way, by using the old beams and driftwood the ship can be shaped entirely anew, but only by gradual reconstruction. — Neurath

But Google can translate the simple stuff very well, so it's hasty to exaggerate the velocity of change.

In my previous discussion with Joshs, the contention has been mostly determining what is in contention... — Banno

He's fun though.

As Kojève puts it — Pie

And how did the end of history work out? He's still trying to eff the ineffable.

Neurath's metaphor only goes so far. The ship meets another ship, sails into port, changes its crew. It's not alone. Language is in the world; it's not alone.

It's good to have an articulate, well-read opponent. — Pie

i just don't trust his book recommendations.

And how did the end of history work out? He's still trying to eff the ineffable. — Banno

Oh he's beautifully mad though. His Hegel is both cutting-edge and reactionary. It's like sci-fi. Yet I think much of it endures.

i just don't trust his book recommendations. — Banno

I may be more in the middle. There's great stuff in Heidegger and Derrida, two of his favorites, but I like dragging that stuff over toward a more analytic-friendly style.

...behaviour alone cannot always reliably inform us of anothers' thought and belief.
— creativesoul

I suggest inferentialism — Pie

I'm not following why you suggest a theory of language as a means to establish what language less belief consists of?

What would inferentialism tell you about the content of my cat's belief when she believes that a gecko is under the stove?

Above you suggest a box that cannot be looked into by others, an approach I consider to have been shown wanting. — Pie

You've misunderstood then. All I've done was point out the fact that outwardly observable behaviour - alone - is not always a reliable means to know what the candidate under consideration is thinking. Don't get me wrong, it's not always unreliable, and there are definitely situations and behaviours that are sufficient. Just not always. Some cases, sure. Not all. That has nothing at all to do with Witt's beetle.

I'm not following why you suggest a theory of language as a means to establish what language less belief consists of? — creativesoul

What I had in mind was your mention of behaviorism. To me, behaviorism is clearly on the right track, but too rigid, insufficiently sensitive to just how ridiculously verbal and inferential we are. So I offer a theory that is also wary of ye old ghost theory, while making plausible sense of the talky part of our doings.

Inferentialism makes a good case for building a theory on assertions. If irony is the trope of tropes, we get lots of mileage from a little spin on an assertion. We philosophers especially might want to consider how central inferences are in the lives of the 'rational' animal...and what are premises and conclusions ? How do we explain ourselves to one another ? To ourselves ? Inferences. — Pie

Key word "explain"...

A language less child can learn that touching fire causes pain. Do they infer?

All I've done was point out the fact that outwardly observable behaviour - alone - is not always a reliable means to know what the candidate under consideration is thinking. — creativesoul

What's your operational definition of this thinking ? If not a beetle in a box, then presumably there's something ? I don't think you mean dispositions. You seem to mean something 'inside.' Brainstates ?

I'm not following why you suggest a theory of language as a means to establish what language less belief consists of?
— creativesoul

What I had in mind was your mention of behaviorism. To me, behaviorism is clear on the right track, but too rigid, insufficiently sensitive to just how ridiculously verbal and inferential we are. So I offer a theory that is also wary of ye old ghost theory, while making plausible sense of the talky part of our doings. — Pie

Okay.

A language less child can learn that touching fire causes pain. Do they infer? — creativesoul

I'd say no, but we, who do infer, might explain them in inferential terms. We could also mathematically model the situation, I suppose. Why not ? But what else is there ? ESP ? A baby whisperer, if that made sense ? Perhaps I'm wrong, but I fear you are pointing at something ineffable.

All I've done was point out the fact that outwardly observable behaviour - alone - is not always a reliable means to know what the candidate under consideration is thinking.
— creativesoul

What's your operational definition of this thinking ? If not a beetle in a box, then presumably there's something ? I don't think you mean dispositions. You seem to mean something 'inside.' Brainstates ? — Pie

No. Human thought and belief is not the sort of thing that has a precise spatiotemporal location. It's not in the skull. It's not outside the skull. It consists of internal and external things, and thus it is neither one nor the other... it's both.

Not sure what "operational definition of this thinking" is asking for.

Correlations drawn between different things. <------that's what all human thought and belief amounts to.

Not sure what "operational definition of this thinking" is asking for. — creativesoul

For instance, how does one detect/define consciousness ? If one rejects the idea of a mysterious X that makes the difference between an arbitrarily convincing P-Zombie and a 'Real Boy,' then we must have some threshold of recognition. In ordinary life, it'd be something like responsiveness (we could talk the details endlessly, but we wouldn't be worried about P-Zombies.)

So how do you determine or grab a nonlinguistic belief ? Currently I can imagine attributing linguistic belief or a mathematical model.

If belief is internal and external, it'd be hard to grab it, I'd think. How can one report it objectively ? Or is it merely postulated ?

A language less child can learn that touching fire causes pain. Do they infer?
— creativesoul

I'd say no, but we, who do infer, might explain them in inferential terms. We could also mathematically model the situation, I suppose. Why not ? But what else is there ? ESP ? A baby whisperer, if that made sense ? Perhaps I'm wrong, but I fear you are pointing at something ineffable. — Pie

You're definitely wrong about that!

A child that has just been burned as a result of touching fire forms the belief that touching fire caused the pain solely by virtue of drawing a correlation between what they did(touch the fire) and the pain that ensued. We can know this much as a result of their absolute refusal to touch it again.

There's no language necessary for the child's belief. Our knowledge thereof, our accounting practices, well... those most certainly need language. But the child has none. The child cannot have an attitude or disposition towards a proposition such as "touching fire causes pain", but they can and do learn that touching fire causes pain.

I'm not rejecting the practices that I'm criticizing. Rather, I'm simply pointing out the scope of rightful application.

For instance, how does one detect/define consciousness ? — Pie

The notion is muddled, as you well know. How one 'detects' consciousness is a matter of what they're looking for to begin with, or at least, one goes about detecting consciousness by looking for whatever they think and/or believe it is, according to the language games they've played involving the term. I am of the well-considered opinion that consciousness amounts to meaningful experience and as such it is the sort of thing that existed long before we began talking about it. Which is to say that it is the sort of thing that we can be wrong about.

If one rejects the idea of a mysterious X that makes the difference between an arbitrarily convincing P-Zombie and a 'Real Boy,' then we must have some threshold of recognition. In ordinary life, it'd be something like responsiveness (we could talk the details endlessly, but we wouldn't be worried about P-Zombies.)

Biological machinery is not mysterious. I'm not worried about P-Zombies anyway.

So how do you determine or grab a nonlinguistic belief ? Currently I can imagine attributing linguistic belief or a mathematical model.

I prefer to use the term language less. I've found that the "non-linguistic" description fails to be able properly account for the content of a language less creature's belief in terms of elemental constituency and existential dependency.

Are you asking me how I've arrived at the bare minimum criterion(elemental outline) for what counts as a language less belief that I have?

If belief is internal and external, it'd be hard to grab it, I'd think...

It's postulated. Belief as propositional attitude was postulated as well. Turns out that language less belief falsifies it. Not all belief are equivalent to propositional attitudes. I go even farther and argue that some complex human belief is not! I've already touched upon that with Russell's clock and the sheet over the wire fencing.

What I'm setting out is very easy to understand.

It seems pointless to guess at what-it's-really-like-for-a-crow. — Pie

I take serious issue with the very notion of what-it's-like regardless of the candidate under consideration. It's not like anything at all to be me. What sense does it make to expect there to be something it is like to be a bat(or a crow)? It's a flawed approach with no clear target. Bottles and flies.

We can arrive at a scientifically and philosophically respectable position when it comes to what our own thought and belief consists of as well as what it is existentially dependent upon, and should that notion be amenable to evolutionary terms as well as being able to bridge language less belief with language use, then we ought have a much better idea of the thought, belief, and/or consciousness of other creatures.

Can we go into necessary details of the brain-in-a-vat gedanken experiment/Descartes' deus deceptor/the simulation hypothesis? The Devil is in the details they say. At some point it should be possible to find out whether idealism/materialism obtains, si?

Another approach: it's we who are making sense of the cat... — Pie

Indeed. There is no problem at all talking in terms of "the cat believes" as a means to make sense of the cat so long as we do not claim that the cat's beliefs are propositional in content. Our report is.

Does an ameoba have its reasons ? — Pie

Perfect example of anthropomorphism.

I take serious issue with the very notion of what-it's-like regardless of the candidate under consideration. It's not like anything at all to be me. What sense does it make to expect there to be something it is like to be a bat(or a crow)? It's a flawed approach with no clear target. — creativesoul

Taken literally it is a ridiculous question: how can it be like anything else to be me, or any individual, animal or human?

But in common parlance it just means "how is it" or "how does it feel". How does it feel to be you? Does it feel good? Sometimes? Mostly? Does it feel terrible or unpleasant sometimes? So what is it like to be a bat? How does it feel to be a bat? What kind of experience(s) does a bat have? We don't know, but we might be able to take a guess, a more or less educated guess, no? Don't we imagine a chiropterologist might have a better idea than we do?

Perfect example of anthropomorphism. — creativesoul

Which was the point, sir.

I'm looking for an alternative to a mathematical model or modeling via linguistic beliefs. So far I think you've only told us what the objects in question are not.

I take serious issue with the very notion of what-it's-like regardless of the candidate under consideration. — creativesoul

:up:

If it's ghost-like stuff, I agree. There's a boring version that's acceptable, such as a report of what it's like to be blind, to be a kindergartner, etc. But the 'hidden' thing is useless.

Perfect example of anthropomorphism.
— creativesoul

Which was the point, sir. — Pie

Given the medium of communication is bereft of all but word use and my tendency to believe I'm talking to an honest person who's seriously interested in the topic at hand, I'm sure you'll understand how the sarcasm went unnoticed.

I'm looking for an alternative to a mathematical model or modeling via linguistic beliefs. So far I think you've only told us what the objects in question are not.

Where are you looking? I suggest a very careful re-read of this conversation. What you claim to be looking for has long since been presented

So far I think you've only told us what the objects in question are not.

I've said nothing at all about objects.

What kind of experience(s) does a bat have? We don't know, but we might be able to take a guess, a more or less educated guess, no? Don't we imagine a chiropterologist might have a better idea than we do? — Janus

I would hope such a person would have knowledge about bats that we do not. Seems reasonable to say that that knowledge could be very useful for acquiring knowledge about a bat's experience in the same way that a neuroscientist would have knowledge that is useful to taking account of our own experience.

However, I see no reason to believe that bat experts have knowledge about how thought and belief emerged, simply because they are bat experts. Although they could be very knowledgable when it comes to what sorts of things a bat is capable of drawing correlations between, because that is largely determined by the biological machinery of bats.

Where are you looking? I suggest a very careful re-read of this conversation. What you claim to be looking for has long since been presented — creativesoul

To head off any confusion, let me be clear that I'm in earnest. I don't intend sarcasm or rudeness. Here's my view of the situation.

You say you are right where all philosophers up till now are wrong...on an important issue. That's a strong claim, for which a strong case ought to be made. Note that I think talk of models already saves those philosopher from being wrong. We don't have to know or claim to know the secret hearts of cats or amoeba to postulate entities useful for predicting them. [Indeed, I think we agree that such a secret 'inside' is useless.]

How ought we to think of belief in languageless creatures ? The way I'm tracking things, you've said not-this-way and not-that-way. But where's the positive, 'operational' definition, however tentative ?

I've said nothing at all about objects. — creativesoul

I don't mean pumpkins or bowling balls. I mean the beliefs in question.