Say what it means. I cannot read the notation.
For some x, Fx is true. Not sure what the a is.
It being a rule of first order logic doesn't tell me what it means that something (my context universe in particular) exists.

I guess we can agree that every thing that exists must satisfy the criterion of logical consistency: it must be what it is and not be what it is not. In other words, it must be identical to itself and different from what it is not. — litewave

This doesn't help if something is logically consistent but nonexistent. I questioned that above when I cannot come up with an example of a consistent thing that nevertheless is known not to exist.

About identical, the word is ambiguous. Twins share identical (indistinguishable) DNA but are not the same person. A lit candle seems to share numeric identity with the burnt out stub an hour later. It is the same candle (identical), but the two states are hardly indistinguishable.

I was just pestering @Owen for no particular reason.

So, you've been at this for over week, how's it going?

There are some things you could try if you get stuck:

• Linguistic ascent: instead of looking at the thing you're interested in, look at how we talk about it.
• Go transcendental: instead of asking, "Is such-and-such the case?" ask what would have to be the case for such-and-such to be the case?
• Theory-crafting: instead of trying to provide an account of something, ask what a theory that could provide such an account would be like, or would have to be like.

Sometimes it will turn out you can answer some question from this list, and you'll learn something important--maybe a new approach, maybe that your original problem cannot possibly be answered, etc.

I don't think FOL has anything to say about ontology. Not sure where that discussion is intended to go. ∃ means something other than an ontological assertion.

Not according to Quine.

There are some things you could try if you get stuck: — Srap Tasmaner

Linguistic ascent is the worst. Not looking for how existence is used in our language. Almost all the confusion in philosophy, especially in forum discussions, seems partially rooted in language use, which takes far too much for granted.
Transcendental: I'm not asking if anything is the case. Everybody thinks I'm looking for proof or evidence of something.
The theory crafting is perhaps a way of wording part of what I am doing.

As for going over this over a week, sure. Years actually, but it only recently got stuck on this point. I have a pretty good story that is self-consistent as any I've seen, and solves almost all the hard questions, at least to my satisfaction. Fermi paradox is one of the things that is yielded a coherent answer. But part of my supposedly consistent story is flippant use of the word 'exists', so I'm trying to pin that down.

I perhaps claim to have an answer, which I rate still very low on a probability of being THE answer. Everybody has a different opinion, and the odds of mine being the closest guess to the fact of the matter is still very low odds.

So in pondering the question "why is there something instead of nothing", I instead ask how the experience would be different if there were not anything, and found it to be the same. Instantiation is not required. But that answer leans heavily on what it means for something to just be.

noAxioms,

Sorry for the delay in replying. Getting back to where we left off:

How would you address this reasoning?: The background to the sum of all existents either exists or does not. If it exists in some way, it is contained within the sum of all existents. If it doesn’t exist in some way, then there is no background to the sum of all existents. Both conclusions result in there not being a background to the sum of all existents, aka to existence. — javra

Seems like pretty good reasoning at first glance, an argument for a lack of distinction.
But can we apply this logic to a horse? Against what background does the actual horse stand apart if the background doesn't exist? I pick horse because it might stand out against the nonexistent (in this world) unicorn. Does the unicorn need to be actual enough for the horse to stand apart from it, in which case the contradiction is unavoidable.
We need to find logic that works for the horse (an example we believe to understand a bit more clearly) before attempting to apply it elsewhere. — noAxioms

You’ll have to explain this better. The main crux that I don’t yet understand: how is a horse—which is one particular existent—in any way compare with the sum of all existent things? The argument I provided was for the latter; and I can’t yet make sense of how it could be meaningfully applied to the former (or to any particular existent for that matter).

Less pivotally, you’ve lost me with how a horse can be distinguished as such without it holding a background of not-horse; I’m thinking background in terms of shrubs, the sky, a tree or two, etc. But even an imagined or dreamed horse will have some background that is itself distinguishable as such … no? Then again, say you try your hardest to visually imagine a horse with no background; let me know if you can visually imagine this such that there is no color or shade of grey, white, or black to this not-horse realm. I know I can’t. Which isn’t to say that I can’t focus my attention on the imagined horse such that the non-horse background is not payed attention to; but this non-horse area will still be relatively dark, or light, or something. This not-horse realm is then a background to the visually imagined horse.

As regards the remainder of the exchange, I’ll try to better express my own outlook:

There’s being in and of itself and then there’s things that sand out in one way or another—or, to be more up to date with the thread, things that have a context. Both givens with being and things that have a context are existents, but while being encapsulates all things with a context—such that all things with a context are—not all forms of being are things with a context.

To hopefully better phrase a previously given example: A gravitational singularity from which the Big Bang resulted (this as is modeled by todays mainstream physics) is one such instance of a given with being that is not a thing with context. One way of putting it: if the Big Bang resulted from absolute nonbeing, then it was an ex nihilo effect. Allowing for such can result in metaphysical mayhem if one is to be consistent about what one upholds—which is one strong justification for the very old philosophical proposition that “nothing can come from nothing” (maybe a different issue though, this were there to be disagreements with this outlook on ex nihilo effects). On the other hand, as our models of spacetime break down the further we conceptually move back through the Big Bang, we are left with the alternative that there initially existed a state of being devoid of both space and time. This state of being is conventionally conceived to be a gravitational singularity … which, by its very nature, can only be devoid of context, though nevertheless holding being.

But, getting back to the reasoning first offered for the sum of all existents, let “the sum of all that exists” be here termed the cosmos. If one wants to uphold multiple universes, then the cosmos would encapsulate all these multiple universes. Thus defined, I still find it justifiable to uphold that the cosmos can only exists in terms of being per se but does not exist in terms of a thing with context. The existence of things with context is a product of pertaining to the cosmos as one of its many parts, imo.

In retrospect, though, I’m arguing from a point of view not very sympathetic to there actually being multiple physical universes. If you’re leading enquiry is into how our universe’s existence compares to those of other universes, this is something that I’m not qualified to comment on.

This doesn't help if something is logically consistent but nonexistent. I questioned that above when I cannot come up with an example of a consistent thing that nevertheless is known not to exist. — noAxioms

You cannot come up with an example of a consistent thing that is known not to exist? There is no such example. If existence is logical consistency then every logically consistent thing exists.

About identical, the word is ambiguous. Twins share identical (indistinguishable) DNA but are not the same person. A lit candle seems to share numeric identity with the burnt out stub an hour later. It is the same candle (identical), but the two states are hardly indistinguishable. — noAxioms

When I say that a thing is identical to itself I mean that it is identical in every way. The DNA strands of twins are not identical in every way - to say the least, they have different positions in spacetime, which makes them different things.

A gravitational singularity from which the Big Bang resulted (this as is modeled by todays mainstream physics) is one such instance of a given with being that is not a thing with context. — javra

If you take a more general definition of "context" you will find that the singularity of the Big Bang does have a context from which it is different. The context can be anything that is not the singularity of the Big Bang, for example my cat (which exists at a different point in spacetime) or number 7 (which transcends every spacetime).

Thus defined, I still find it justifiable to uphold that the cosmos can only exists in terms of being per se but does not exist in terms of a thing with context. — javra

A collection of things (such as a cosmos) is also different from its parts, so the parts provide a context for the collection/whole.

HI Srap Tasmaner.

1. Ga -> ∃x(Gx), is valid.
2. Ga -> ∃F(Fa), is valid.
3. Ga -> ∃x∃F(Fx) is valid.

1 is 1st order and 2 and 3 are 2nd order theorems.

1a. Ga -> G exists.
2a. Ga -> a exists.
3a. Ga -> ((G exists) & (a exists)).

If you take a more general definition of "context" you will find that the singularity of the Big Bang does have a context from which it is different. The context can be anything that is not the singularity of the Big Bang, for example my cat (which exists at a different point in spacetime) or number 7 (which transcends every spacetime). — litewave

These are adequate contexts in reference to our concept of a gravitational singularity, which stands out as one concept among many others. Were the gravitational singularity addressed to be ontically real, however, it of itself would have no context - no not-singularity to which it could be contrasted. Neither entities, such as cats, nor quantities, such as the number seven, would hold presence. Else, we are addressing two different things.

A collection of things (such as a cosmos) is also different from its parts, so the parts provide a context for the collection/whole. — litewave

The “cosmos” was for the purposes of the argument specifically defined as the “sum of all existents” - and not as merely a collection of things among many others. Then, to state that the context of the sum of all existents is the particular existents themselves is to equivocate both the meaning of “context” and the reasoning first quoted in my previous post. The context of a cat, for example, is not one of its ears.

When I say that a thing is identical to itself I mean that it is identical in every way. The DNA strands of twins are not identical in every way - to say the least, they have different positions in spacetime, which makes them different things. — litewave

I didn't say 'strand'. The DNA of twins is identical, consisting only of information, not particular details of a strand, which has properties like position.

OK, how about the candle? Are the two states not the same candle because of the differences in lit and burnt-out, or are they one thing, identical to itself, just extended in spacetime? Even the latter has a hard time with identity if you consider MW cloning. The statement "candle is lit at time T" has no truth value if all those states are part of one identity, and only some of those states are 'lit'.

Not sure why we're nailing down the usage of identical in this topic.

"to exist is to be spoken of."

Yes. As Lao Tzu may have written - "The unnamable is the eternally real. Naming is the origin of all particular things."

Naming is what brings things into existence.

Vulcan does not exist.
Pegasus does not exist.
Santa does not exist.
etc.

Sometimes naming does not bring things into existence.

Given a model of language where words are akin to culturally preformed boxed within which we can place concepts and then pass them along to others—this being only a very rough analogy—then naming a new concept can at times bring awareness of the concept into existence within the minds of others … as well as better anchor the concept within our own minds via a means by which it can be succinctly addressed.

But if I name a “five-legged, telepathic, ghost unicorn that’s been teleported to Earth by AI UFOs which have traveled back in time from a future multiverse in which planets are all shaped as four-sided triangles” as “dfjsl-ajf’l” my ontological suppositions are that this entity does not then suddenly pop into existence (in the narrow sense of existence, i.e. into the realms of objective reality). [Not to put words into other’s mouths but I presume that Banno would agree.] Yea, I try for humor but seldom succeed (seriously, good natured humor was intended in the given example). Still, the outlandish nature of “dfjsl-ajf’l”—thus defined—is all the same a good example precisely due to its outlandishness, imo.

p.s. just noticed Owen already replied to the same issue. I'll post my comments all the same.

Of course Vulcan, Pegasus, and Santa exist. Or are you saying that only things that have a physical representation exist? By that standard, mathematics, hunger, vision, and love don't.

And my response to you is the same as mine for Owen.

Were the gravitational singularity addressed to be ontically real, however, it of itself would have no context - no not-singularity to which it could be contrasted. Neither entities, such as cats, nor quantities, such as the number seven, would hold presence. — javra

The whole spacetime is present, with the Big Bang singularity presumably at the beginning of the time dimension. And abstract entities like numbers are present even without a spacetime.

The “cosmos” was for the purposes of the argument specifically defined as the “sum of all existents” - and not as merely a collection of things among many others. Then, to state that the context of the sum of all existents is the particular existents themselves is to equivocate both the meaning of “context” and the reasoning first quoted in my previous post. The context of a cat, for example, is not one of its ears. — javra

If by the "sum" you don't mean "collection" or "whole" but all existent things, then the "sum" is not a single thing but many things. And each of those things exists in the context of all the other things.

And if by the "sum" you mean the collection or whole of all existent things then this "sum" is different from each of its parts - because it is not identical to any of its parts, and so the sum is a thing that exists in relation to (or in the "context" of) its parts, which are other things. Anyway, there is no such greatest collection, just as there is no greatest number.

By that standard, mathematics, hunger, vision, and love don't. — T Clark

Ah, but these stated givens don’t exist because they were named. They were named, and conceptualized, because they exist. And no, one does not need to be a physicalist to uphold this. Note the following for instance:

[...] "The unnamable is the eternally real. [...] — T Clark

That which is eternally real is itself existent despite it being unnamable.

Besides, you have yet to address whether or not dfjsl-ajf'ls are existent or not - and if existent, if they exist in the same way you do.

"Ah, but these stated givens don’t exist because they were named. They were named, and conceptualized, because they exist."

And I say it is useful to say that they exist because they are named. It's not the only way to think about it, but it is one valid way. Hey, this is metaphysics. It's not true or false. It's enlightening or misleading. It's useful or not.

"[...] "The unnamable is the eternally real. [...]
— T Clark (Lao Tzu actually)

That which is eternally real is itself existent despite it being unnamable."

There's a formulation of that line from the Tao te Ching I like better - "The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao." That's Lao Tzu's joke. He's was a funny guy. He was aware of the irony and expects his readers to be also.

I didn't say 'strand'. The DNA of twins is identical, consisting only of information, not particular details of a strand, which has properties like position. — noAxioms

Then did you mean the DNA as an abstract thing? In that case, it is a single abstract thing, identical (in every way) to itself. And this abstract thing is instantiated in concrete things - in the concrete DNA strands of the twins. And each of those concrete DNA strands is identical to itself and different from the other, at least with respect to its position in spacetime. Also, each of those concrete DNA strands is different from the abstract DNA.

OK, how about the candle? Are the two states not the same candle because of the differences in lit and burnt-out, or are they one thing, identical to itself, just extended in spacetime? Even the latter has a hard time with identity if you consider MW cloning. The statement "candle is lit at time T" has no truth value if all those states are part of one identity, and only some of those states are 'lit'. — noAxioms

In the usual usage the candle is meant as a thing extended in spacetime (enduring in time). Then the statement "candle is lit at time T" means that the candle is in the lit state at time T.

Anyway, every thing is identical to itself in the sense it is defined. So "candle" as a thing extended in spacetime is identical to itself as a thing extended in spacetime. If by "candle" you mean something else, then this something else must be identical to itself too, in the sense in which it is defined. Otherwise it doesn't exist in that sense - there is no thing in that sense.

Not sure why we're nailing down the usage of identical in this topic. — noAxioms

Existence in the most general sense means being identical to oneself and different from others.

The whole spacetime is present, [...] — litewave

Not according the to model of spacetime which breaks down and thereby leads to the inference of a gravitational singularity.

If by the "sum" you don't mean "collection" or "whole" but all existent things, then the "sum" is not a single thing but many things. And each of those things exists in the context of all the other things.

And if by the "sum" you mean the collection or whole of all existent things then this "sum" is different from each of its parts - because it is not identical to any of its parts, and so the sum is a thing that exists in relation to (or in the "context" of) its parts, which are other things. — litewave

I agree that the whole stands in relation to its parts. But I'm addressing context in the what I take to be the typically utilized way: such as that within which a given resides.

Anyway, there is no such greatest collection, just as there is no greatest number. — litewave

Are you saying there is no universe?

Etymologically the word "existence" means "to stand out" as in, to be distinct from other things. I've liked this view for some time, simply because the implication is that anything that can be named, distinguished, or shown to be distinct from other things exists, whereas if something doesn't exist, then there never was anything there to not exist in the first place, as no true distinction could even be drawn.

Tell you what, I'll reply to your posts after you reply to mine. As a reminder:

you have yet to address whether or not dfjsl-ajf'ls are existent or not - and if existent, if they exist in the same way you do. — javra

Not according the to model of spacetime which breaks down and thereby leads to the inference of a gravitational singularity. — javra

If the model is inconsistent then it is not an accurate representation of reality, because reality cannot be inconsistent. I am talking about reality, not a model. Apparently there is spacetime in reality and there is a Big Bang at the beginning of our universe.

Are you saying there is no universe? — javra

If by universe you mean the collection of all existing things then there is no universe in this sense. Why? Suppose there is a collection of all existing things. Then this collection is a thing too, and another collection can be defined in which this thing is included as a part, so what you supposed to be a collection of all existing things is in fact not a collection of all existing things.

If by universe you mean all existing things then there is universe in this sense but it is not a single thing.

If it is true that unicorns have four legs then unicorns exist.
Truth is that which can be shown to be the case.
To show that 'Unicorns have four legs' is true, we need to verify it.
Verification requires the existence of unicorns and unicorn legs.

One truth about x proves x exists. ..where x is the subject of the truth. — Owen

Suppose I claim there is a smallest positive real number, call it k.

It's easily proven that k < 1, right?

Does that prove that there is a smallest positive real number?

Naming is what brings things into existence. — "T

Sometimes naming does not bring things into existence. — "Owen

This seems only a different context, and a different designation of which contexts are included in objective existence, a term with which I have yet to find any meaning. So naming a thing (doesn't need a name, but even any concept of it) does bring the thing into existence in the context of ideas. I see nobody being right or wrong here, but working from different contexts without stating them.

But if I name a “five-legged, telepathic, ghost unicorn that’s been teleported to Earth by AI UFOs which have traveled back in time from a future multiverse in which planets are all shaped as four-sided triangles” as “dfjsl-ajf’l” my ontological suppositions are that this entity does not then suddenly pop into existence (in the narrow sense of existence, i.e. into the realms of objective reality) — javra

Outlandish though it be, your description did seem to make it pop into existence in my thoughts, and you seem to realize that, prompting your parenthesized disclaimer that you're not including imagined ideas as existing things.

My only disagreement with your comment the is the " i.e. into the realms of objective reality". I am very much questioning that the reality you reference there is objectively real. Reality seems to be things that are present in our universe (our context). That being the definition of objective reality is to deny that there are other contexts (not just deeper but related contexts, such as a creating deity which would not be a real thing in the universe), but completely unrelated contexts.

You have a lot in your posts, but I'm just now getting to it all and trying to weigh in on some of the discussions.

"naming a new concept can at times bring awareness of the concept into existence within the minds of others …"

Let's see. Maybe I'm saying "awareness of the concept" is existence. Yes, I think I am. Something like that.

"But if I name a “five-legged, telepathic, ghost unicorn that’s been teleported to Earth by AI UFOs which have traveled back in time from a future multiverse in which planets are all shaped as four-sided triangles” as “dfjsl-ajf’l”

I'm a little confused by your formulation, but let's try this - Yes, this dfjsl-ajfl exists as much as Santa, love, math, or the moon.

"...in the narrow sense of existence, i.e. into the realms of objective reality..."

I think the idea of objective reality is hard to support in this context. I think its existence is worthy of examination. That is not a new idea. You have assumed the existence of the physical reality of objective reality independent of human conceptualization. I think you have begged the question.

As for your humor - I think it was more than just that. You were coming up with what you thought was an absurd example to test my idea. That is a reasonable rhetorical method.

"...objective existence, a term with which I have yet to find any meaning."

We sort of agree, but I think the terms "objective existence" and "objective reality" have plenty of meaning. I only object to their unexamined application in this context. I think depending on the physical existence of objective reality in this context is misleading.

"So naming a thing (doesn't need a name, but even any concept of it) does bring the thing into existence in the context of ideas. I see nobody being right or wrong here, but working from different contexts without stating them."

First of all, you're not paying attention. I specifically wrote that there is no right or wrong in this discussion. It's metaphysics. I think I have been very clear in stating the context of what I am writing.

Second - no. It doesn't bring something into existence "in the context of ideas." It brings it into existence in the only way things are brought into existence.

"I am very much questioning that the reality you reference there is objectively real. Reality seems to be things that are present in our universe (our context). That being the definition of objective reality is to deny that there are other contexts (not just deeper but related contexts, such as a creating deity which would not be a real thing in the universe), but completely unrelated contexts."

I think you've gone a bit off the tracks there. If you bring a "creating deity" into the discussion you miss the point. God is brought into existence in the same way lamb chops are. In one of my favorite verses from the Tao te Ching, Lao Tzu says "[The Tao] is hidden but always present. I don't know who gave birth to it. It is older than God."