That's demonstrably false, since there's tons of counterexamples where appearance didn't match reality. — Marchesk

When we demonstrate the truth or falsity of an empirical claim, this is made possible because the intelligibility of what is at issue is determined within a shared set of practices. Thus , the appearance matches or fails to match the criteria that have been intersubjectively constructed. This is not an ‘external’ reality in the sense of having features entirely disassociated from those practices , but neither is it walled off from
world inside a solipsist ideal realm. Rouse argues that our scientific theories and practices are biological niches that we construct through our interaction with our social and material environment, just as an organism creates a niche that it inhabits and that produces constraints on what is real for that organism ( what is ‘true’ or ‘false’ relative to its needs and goals). So whatever you show to be demonstratively true or false is always going to be relative to a space of reasons that responds to and is altered by changing circumstances, just as an organism’s niche adjust itself to an environment that changes in response to the organism’s interactions with it.

Nicely worded. Thanks.

Let me explain then. You have provided examples of complex thought which uses words. These examples are insufficient to produce the inductive conclusion "complex thought needs words". You have provided no evidence whatsoever, that complex thought requires words, only evidence that some complex thought uses words. Therefore you do not have the premise required to conclude that this proposition "a complex thought doesn’t need words any more than does a simple thought" is false. You have provided no indication that complex thought needs words. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Using words" and "needing words" are not always the same thing. I am responding to a claim about complex thought not needing words. I provided a few examples of thoughts that need words, and seem to be complex thoughts. Such examples falsify the claim I objected to as it was written. A simple qualification of "some" would fix the issue.

A criterion of simple and complex thought is on order as well. I mean, if we aim to determine which candidates belong in which category, we need to know what the differences are between the two. I've yet to have seen anyone aside from myself attempt to even perform that task. I drew a distinction between thought that does not include words as content(part of correlation) and thought that does to make the point that some complex thought needs words.

All the nuance, of course, is packed up in both the aforementioned criterion for what counts as thought(simple and complex), as well as what it takes for a thought to "need words".

For whatever it's worth, I'm not at all against claiming that some complex thoughts need words whereas some do not. "Need", on my view, means existentially dependent upon. Furthermore, depending upon the content of the thought in question, some languageless creatures can have thoughts that need words although they do not use words. It's nuanced, but no issue if we have an adequate linguistic framework.

All that matters is whether or not the world when not being seen resembles how it looks to us. Are the mind-independent features of the world present in the phenomenological character of experience? — Michael

How would a world resemble how it looks to us? I can't even make any coherent sense of such an expression.

I see a green apple on the table in front of me. You want to claim that there isn't 'really' a green apple there? On what grounds?

That we sometimes hallucinate, or are mistaken? That only demonstrates that sometimes there's no green apple, not that always there's no green apple.

That birds would see it as purple? That only shows that green apples look purple to birds, not that there is no green apple.

That someone else might claim it's blue? That just proves the cognitive scientists notion that we see by active inference, our inferences are not always right.

That Physics describes the apple as waveforms? Someone sitting on the other side of the table would describe the apple differently too, they have a different perspective. You've not yet given an account of why one thing must only have one property from all perspectives.

...

So whilst I can see how we could say that the mind-independent features of the world are not present in our phenomenological experience, I just can't see why we would.

one cannot see that colours are essentially seen. That is a self-evident truth of reason, not something we are aware of sensibly. — Bartricks

Ok, I understand now.

In my view.....
......it is preposterous, bordering on the catastrophically absurd, that the totality of that of which I am aware, re: the entirely of my cognitions, requires that I read, write and speak; — Mww

Agreed. Who would ever say such a thing, whether overtly or by virtue of inevitable logical consequence?

......if language developed as a means of simplex expression by a single thinking human subject, or as a means of multiplex communication between a plurality of thinking human subjects, then it is the case language presupposes that which is expressed or communicated by it; — Mww

Well sure. I've no issue at all with that aside from the inadequate qualification that stems from your having driven a definitional wedge between language and thought in such a way that you're incapable of even admitting that some thought is itself existentially dependent upon language use. On pains of coherency alone, you must deny all such talk! I mean, good on you for the consistency. However, we both know that coherency alone does not guarantee truth. A position can be perfectly valid, consistent, internally coherent, etc...

...and false.

How do we know whether or not such positions are false, despite being perfectly consistent? A plethora of counterexamples succeed in showing us that the framework in question contradicts everyday events. By acknowledging those contradictions we can also experience the added benefit of bringing our attention to the fact that our framework is inherently flawed somewhere along the line. In this case, it could be somewhat corrected by proper qualification(claiming "some" rather than necessarily implying that all thought is existentially independent of language).

With much agreement, I'm quite certain(for empirical as well as logical reasons) that some language presupposes that which is expressed and/or communicated by it. Not all. So, I would be fine with saying that prior to expressing and/or communicating some thought using language, there must first be a thought to express and/or communicate with language. I'm readily accepting the validity and/or internal consistency(coherence) of your position. I've foregone any criticism of that aspect of the position you're putting forth. However, it lacks much needed explanatory power(the aforementioned examples to the contrary).

The contentious matter at hand is whether or not all thought needs words, which I take to mean whether or not any thought needs language in order to be formed to begin with(in the first place; initially formed; emerge into the world for the very first time; etc.). Some thought clearly emerges solely as a result of prior language use. I mentioned a few already here and now as well as earlier and elsewhere. Odd(perhaps indicative of an inherently inadequate linguistic framework???) that you did not directly address those counterexamples. More generally speaking(being Kantian you hopefully appreciate that)...

There are thoughts about words.

Where words have never been, there could not have ever been thoughts about words. All thoughts about words are existentially dependent upon words. We need words to think about in order for us to even be able to think about words. All such thought needs words.

......if language is assemblage of words, and words are the representations of conceptions, and language is the means of report in the form of expression or communication, then language presupposes the conceptions they represent, and on which is reported; — Mww

This is part of the problem as well.

Language is far more than merely "assemblages of words". Meaning comes immediately to mind. Not all assemblages of words are meaningful. All language use is. So, language takes a bit more than just an assemblage of words. Words are not inherently meaningful. Meaning is attributed.

We also use language to do far more than communicate and/or express pre-existing thought(which is the only use you've focused upon as of yet). I'm claiming that there are far more uses of language, some of which produce entirely new thought. Language use has introduced so many different kinds of thought that I find it very very odd that anyone could possibly disagree with claiming that many thoughts need language(are existentially dependent upon language).

......thinking is cognition by means of conceptions. If language presupposes conceptions, and conceptions are the form of cognitions, and cognition is thinking, then words presuppose thinking. — Mww

Our frameworks are quite different, as you well know. I mean, this is not our first exchange. However, generally speaking, although I reject your framework for all the different reasons I'm putting forth, I would whole heartedly agree that words presuppose thinking, if by that I mean that thought emerges prior to language. Well, to be more precise and consistent, some does anyway. Whereas certain other kinds of thought cannot for they are a product thereof.

Thoughts about what time it is cannot possibly exist(be formed) prior to the existence of clocks(a means of time telling, if you prefer). Clocks are themselves existentially dependent upon language in that they owe their very existence to language use. Thus, it only follows that wondering what time it is, even if unspoken, is one kind of thought that needs words, for it is about stuff that is itself existentially dependent upon words. Where there has never been a means of time telling, there could not have ever been thoughts about what time it was/is.

Wondering about time is a kind of thought that needs words.

If language is so all-fired necessary for the formation of complex thoughts, why did we come equipped with the means for the one, but only for the means of developing the other? Why did we not come equally equipped for both simultaneously, if one absolutely requires the other? — Mww

I have no idea why. That's a psychological question.

Seems to me that we come equipped with the capability to form both thought that needs language as well as thought that does not. Interesting that I've recently watched Chomsky stuff as well as other linguistics and neuroscientists, and they've claimed that the human brain has not undergone much evolution at all over the past ten thousand or so years.

The robotics engineer manufactures a machine with pinpoint circuit board soldering accuracy; the toddler has somewhat less accuracy but still understands the distinction between thing-as-object and thing-as-receptor-of object, and the congruency of shape for both, to put a round object in a round hole. — Mww

Oh yeah...

It's fascinating to watch children at an age where their understanding of language use exceeds their mastery of speech. They invent totally "new" two word combinations like "more outside" while standing at a glass sliding door separating them from what they want; from being outdoors.

Acknowledging that some thought is existentially dependent upon language does not force us into saying that all thought is.

So I come upon a thing, some thing for which I have absolutely no experience whatsoever. Maybe something fell to Earth, maybe I discovered something previously unknown in the deep blue. The modern argument seems to be......I can form no complex thoughts about that new thing, can have no immediate cognition of it, unless or until I can assign words to it. But, being new, which words do I assign if I don’t cognize what the new thing appears to be? What prevents me from calling the new thing by a name already given to an old thing?

And, of course, everything is new at one time or another. — Mww

You misunderstand the modern argument. Mine anyway. Not all opinions are equal.

I find that the single problem with direct and indirect perception is shared in that both positions drive a terminological wedge into the practitioners' brains by virtue of divorcing perception from reality.

That's the fatal fundamental flaw of both.

Human perception is not existentially independent of reality. Rather, it is most certainly a part thereof. We are both, objects in the world and subjects taking account of it and/or ourselves. The division of us and the world, of our perception and the world, creates the very problems that those practitioners find important enough to talk about for hundreds if not thousands of years.

Flies and bottles come to mind.

How would a world resemble how it looks to us? I can't even make any coherent sense of such an expression. — Isaac

Neither can I, but it's the position of direct realism that it does. Hence the arguments I've put forward that show the problems with this view.

You want to claim that there isn't 'really' a green apple there? — Isaac

I don't make that claim because I don't claim that something is "really" there only if it is mind-independent. As I've said many times over the years, antirealism isn't unrealism.

That birds would see it as purple? That only shows that green apples look purple to birds, not that there is no green apple. — Isaac

If something looks purple but isn't purple then there's a difference between a purple-look and being purple, and so we're back to what I said before; there are two different senses of the word "purple" and you're just equivocating. There's the purple appearance, which I would say is the primary sense of our understanding, and then there's the mind-independent state of causing most humans to be presented with this purple appearance, which is an ad hoc naming.

That birds would see it as purple? That only shows that green apples look purple to birds, not that there is no green apple. — Isaac

It would show that the apple doesn't have the property of being green or purple. Rather, it's the perceiver in question that sees the apple as having that color. This is basic ancient skepticism. Honey tastes sweet to you and bitter to me, therefore sweetness isn't a property of honey, but rather our taste buds.

As I've said many times over the years, antirealism isn't unrealism. — Michael

So world-stuff exists. The green apple we see is part of that world-stuff, but not as we perceive it. You didn't seem to have any issues with the nominalism of Jody Azzouni. Apples don't exist as such. But features in the world-stuff that can be carved into apples by animals like us do exist. As you stated in that thread, antirealism concerning objects, relations and properties. But not the world itself.

Human perception is not existentially independent of reality. — creativesoul

Indeed.

The division of us and the world... — creativesoul

But division is not independence. To divide an army into units is not to say they're independent, nor is it to say they're not all still part of the army. One can still say "I don't think the army are reckless, but that unit is"

When we talk about internal and external, we're just dividing the world along lines useful to that model. Systems can be defined by their Markov boundaries. We're not obliged to divide the world that way, but it's a lot more convenient than referring only to "the world" every time one wants to describe some part of it.

it's the position of direct realism that it does. — Michael

Can you give an example from a direct realist?

I don't make that claim because I don't claim that something is "really" there only if it is mind-independent. — Michael

I should have highlighted 'there'. Your claim, unless I'm mistaken, is exactly that the green apple isn't there (where it seems to be in the external world), but rather is in our minds, with merely some causal something being 'there'.

If something looks purple but isn't purple then there's a difference between a purple-look and being purple — Michael

It looks purple to birds. Being purple is about the property of how it looks to humans. 'Purple' is a word in human language, not bird language.

There's the purple appearance — Michael

There isn't.

It would show that the apple doesn't have the property of being green or purple. — Marchesk

Why would it show that?

For whatever it's worth, I'm not at all against claiming that some complex thoughts need words whereas some do not. — creativesoul

So do you see then, that we can make the general claim "complex thought does not need words"? And in your examples, the words are "needed" not for the complex thought, as you seem to think, but for something else. We could for instance name a special type of complex thought, propositional thought, or something like that, and say that words are needed for this.

I would whole heartedly agree that words presuppose thinking.... — creativesoul

My major premise, the fundamental ground of my argument. I shall call that a win, and issue an exuberant....and wholeheartedly honest....thank you.

.....to be more precise and consistent, some does anyway. — creativesoul

I might agree some complex thought does not presuppose words, but rather, ensue from them, insofar as the words are given to me, from which my complex thoughts arise, in which case, I may treat of those words as any of my perceptions. Still, the dialectical continuity should limit the relation of word and thought to individual subjects.
————

Acknowledging that some thought is existentially dependent upon language does not force us into saying that all thought is. — creativesoul

But it does force a sufficient explanation as to the relation between the quality of thoughts wherein words are necessary and the quality thoughts wherein they are not. Parsimony...the elimination of self-contradiction...should suggest thought does not have a quality, such that it follows words perform no qualitative conditioning on them, or, the quality of thoughts resides in some other procedural constituent.
————

Wondering about time is a kind of thought that needs words. — creativesoul

Does it? The first thing that occurs to me, is an image of a device by which a change can be demonstrated. Never does the representation arise in the form of a word. I will agree, nonetheless, that wondering about time, as the subject of a series of propositions, might elicit a series of representations of words I’ve experienced concerning what others have said about it. But then, when I do that, in effect, all I’m doing is treating my own private cognition as if I am in the process of expressing myself.

Which leads inevitably to this: do you see where ego might explain the position that complex thoughts require words? Complex thoughts would require words, merely from the seeming that whatever is being thought, ought to be expressed? Or, perhaps, I am so desperate to be understood, I treat my thoughts as if they were words, in order to facilitate the congruency of the recipient’s understanding. Dos the sound of a thought carry the same weight as the thought?

Given those possibilities, it is clear words may adjust the quality of a complex thought, thus can be said to be necessary for such adjustment. But not necessary for the thought itself. Also given is possible sufficient reason for simple thoughts requiring no words at all, insofar as the quality of simple thoughts is determined by its simplicity. If one does not understand how I arrived at the word “BOOM!!!”, then he will have great difficulty with how I understand, e.g., religion, should I talk to him about it.
—————

Not all opinions are equal. — creativesoul

Oh, but they are. The correspondence between the truth of them, and that to which it is directed, may not be. Opinion is merely a relative judgement, after all.

The disagreement in our respective frameworks, is predicated on the differences in our definitions. Still, given that.....

the human brain has not undergone much evolution at all over the past ten thousand or so years. — creativesoul

...it remains that our brains work compatibly with each other, which implies our thinking must, if thinking is only a production of brain mechanics necessarily. How we think about things, on the other hand, is governed by the contingency of our experiences, and not the stationary condition of our physiology.
————-

this is not our first exchange. — creativesoul

And time well spent, I must say, even if this....

You misunderstand the modern argument. Mine anyway. — creativesoul

....is the case.

Why would it show that? — Isaac

You can't have something be both all green and all purple. It would show that color is perceptually relative to the perceiver.

You can't have something be both all green and all purple. — Marchesk

How do you know? I thought we had no direct knowledge of the external world. Now you're saying that it's objects are definitely such that they can't be both green and purple. How could you possibly know that?

People universally believe that objects look colored because they are colored, just as we experience them. The sky looks blue because it is blue, grass looks green because it is green, and blood looks red because it is red. As surprising as it may seem, these beliefs are fundamentally mistaken. Neither objects nor lights are actually “colored” in anything like the way we experience them. Rather, color is a psychological property of our visual experiences when we look at objects and lights, not a physical property of those objects or lights. The colors we see are based on physical properties of objects and lights that cause us to see them as colored, to be sure, but these physical properties are different in important ways from the colors we perceive. — Palmer, 1999

Vision science: Photons to phenomenology

People universally believe that objects look colored because they are colored, just as we experience them. The sky looks blue because it is blue, grass looks green because it is green, and blood looks red because it is red. As surprising as it may seem, these beliefs are fundamentally mistaken. Neither objects nor lights are actually “colored” in anything like the way we experience them. Rather, color is a psychological property of our visual experiences when we look at objects and lights, not a physical property of those objects or lights. The colors we see are based on physical properties of objects and lights that cause us to see them as colored, to be sure, but these physical properties are different in important ways from the colors we perceive. — Palmer, 1999

The physical properties we ascribe to the world are just as dependent on our accounts as are the colors we see. Neither is more ‘true’ to nature than the other. They are simply different sorts of interpretations for different purposes.

Logic.

Also, I didn’t make a claim about object existence. I referenced the nominalism of a philosopher Michael and I were debating in another thread.

Logic — Marchesk

How? Talk me through the logic.

I didn’t make a claim about object existence. — Marchesk

I know. You made a claim about its properties. Properties you also claim we do not experience. So I'm wondering how you know anything about its properties.

If colour is a property of our perception, then what is it that is constrained in external objects when you say they cannot be both green and purple?

It can't be the nature of colour since that's apparently a property of our perception, not constrained by any physical law pertaining to the object.

It can't be the nature of the object, since we don't know the nature of the object on account of all its apparent properties being actually those of our perception. And in any case, the nature of the object is unrelated to its colour (which is, rather, a property of our perception)

So what is which is constrained in an object such that it cannot be both green and purple?

So what is which is constrained in an object such that it cannot be both green and purple — Isaac

The wavelength of light the creature sees, which gets represented as a color sensation. I’m not sure what you’re disagreeing about, other than you don’t like calling the color experience qualia.

In the complete absence of light and leaves there cannot be any experience of seeing them. In the complete absence of the biological machinery, there cannot be any experience of seeing them. Thus, the experience consists of both internal and external things. It most certainly follows that the experience is neither internal nor external for it consists of elements that are both. — creativesoul

If the experience is considered to be an affect of the biological machinery insofar as it is the biological machinery that experiences red and not the leaves or the light, then it follows that we are thinking of the experience, by your own definitions, as internal. Of course it needs the stimulus of external elements (light and leaves) but it does not follow that the experience is both internal and external on that account, Of course if you define experience as the whole process, then of course it, tautologically, is both internal and external, so these are just different ways of speaking, different ways of conceptually dividing and/ or sorting things. — Janus

Following on from what I said, and to clarify why I said there was nothing in what you said to respond to; what you say above is just an expression of defining "experience as the whole process (of external and internal elements)" in which case "of course it, tautologically, is both internal and external", which is the same as to say it is neither in the sense that it cannot, on that interpretation, be rightly classified as either. So, to repeat myself, "these are just different ways of speaking, different ways of conceptually dividing and/ or sorting things".

Yet you speak as though there is some context-independent "fact of the matter" that I am somehow disagreeing with or missing, when I have already acknowledged that "experience" can be defined in those different ways, although the more common conception is the one which logically leads to it being thought of as internal in relation to the external world it is of.

The wavelength of light the creature sees — Marchesk

Why can't that wavelength be both green and purple?

Your argument is that colour is a property of experience becasue two people see different colours and an object cannot be two colours at once.

But if colour is a property of experience, then the statement "an object cannot be two colours at once" is incoherent. Colour is not a property of objects so there cannot be physical laws about how many such properties it can have at once.

The best you can say is that if colour were a property of objects, then it could not be two colours at once. But here you're creating a counterfactual world in which colours are the properties of objects and claiming you know what physical laws would exist in such a world. Which is an unsupported claim - we only know the physical laws of our own world, the one in which you claim colour is a property of experience, not objects.

What words do for "complex thought" is a type of compression. The complex thought, with multiple facets (being complex) is "compressed" and represented, or signified, by one simple word, or a simple proposition, a paragraph, a chapter, or even a simple book. So in a sense we can say that words render complex thought as simple. One entity represents a massive thought complex.

Why can't that wavelength be both green and purple? — Isaac

According to you, something is green if it causes most humans to see it as green and something is purple if it causes most humans to see it as purple. How can a single wavelength cause most people to see it as green and most people to see it as purple?

Your argument is that colour is a property of experience becasue two people see different colours and an object cannot be two colours at once.

But if colour is a property of experience, then the statement "an object cannot be two colours at once" is incoherent. Colour is not a property of objects so there cannot be physical laws about how many such properties it can have at once. — Isaac

When direct realists say that we see an object as red because it is red they are not saying that we see an object as red because it causes us to see it as red. That would be a truism.

There is something which is a red look (i.e. the seeing as red). It's what occurs when most people's eyes are stimulated by light with a wavelength of 650nm. Direct realists say that we see an object as red because that object has that exact red look and that light reveals the look rather than just causes that look. A red look and an orange look are conceptually different things, and if they were physical properties they would be physically different things. And the claim is that an object cannot have two different physical looks for the same reason that it cannot have two different physical masses or two different physical charges. Or, at the very least, that at least one object could have just one physical look.

And if at least one object could have just one physical look but two people could see it as two different colours then for at least one of them the colour they see isn't a property of the object.

But I suspect that your account of experience can't make sense of this, in which case it's irrelevant to the argument being made which is an attack on direct realism, not on whatever your account is.

According to you, something is green if it causes most humans to see it as green and something is purple if it causes most humans to see it as purple. How can a single wavelength cause most people to see it as green and most people to see it as purple? — Michael

Indeed. It's a reductio argument. I think it doesn't make sense that an object is (normally) two colours at once because I think colour is a property of the object and as such amenable to the physical laws we know about objects (such as their propensities to reflect light of particular wavelengths). If, on other confirmatory analysis, the object turns out to be green, then those who called it purple were wrong.

Of course, our models of physical laws could be wrong, and an object could be found which does emit wavelengths which are ambiguous, perhaps could be correctly modelled as both green and purple, but I don't know of any such objects.

The whole "why can't an object be both green and purple" argument is meant to draw out the fact that, we're all really talking as if colour is a property of external objects because we're all quite happily discussing the physical laws which constrain the colour an external object can actually be.

There is something which is a red look — Michael

And what is this thing? Is it physical (if so in what form?). If it's not physical then in some other realm? Dualism here?

It's what occurs when most people's eyes are stimulated by light with a wavelength of 650nm. — Michael

What occurs when most people's eye's are stimulated by light with a wavelength of 650nm is a series of fairly well documented and reasonably well understood neurological reactions. Which of them is the 'Red Look'?

Direct realists say that we see an object as red because that object has that exact red look. — Michael

This doesn't make sense as written. You said above the 'the red look' is "what occurs when most people's eyes are stimulated by light with a wavelength of 650nm". How can an object have it when objects don't generally have eyes?

A red look and an orange look are conceptually different things, and if they were physical properties they would be physically different things. the claim is that an object cannot have two different physical looks for the same reason that it cannot have two different physical masses or two different physical charges. — Michael

OK, so that answers my question above, the concept is physical. So where is it in our brains?

the claim is that an object cannot have two different physical looks for the same reason that it cannot have two different physical masses or two different physical charges. — Michael

But an object can be both narrow and sinuous, it can have two properties of outline. Objects can be both rough and sticky, two properties of texture. Objects can be both vertically striped and horizontally striped, two properties of patterning. And we're still in physical properties. Once we get into conceptual properties, it becomes even easier for an object to have two properties of the same category at once. An object can be both a hammer and a crowbar (tool type). An object can be both a weapon and paperweight (use). An object can be both awe inspiring and beautiful (emotional response)...

There's absolutely no reason to think an object cannot be both conceptually of an 'orange look' and a 'red look' - whatever such notions might mean.

I suspect that your account of experience can't make sense of this, in which case it's irrelevant to the argument being made which is an attack on direct realism, — Michael

Then I'm struggling to understand the account direct realism (or indirect realism, for that matter) is putting forward. If direct realism wants identicality with this undefined concept referred to as 'the experience of red', then it seems it can have it - the concept has no definition so who's to say an object doesn't project 'the experience of red', since we can neither measure such a thing nor do we know anything about any laws which constrain it, we've absolutely no idea whether an object can project it, nor how many such things it could project at once.

If all we're talking about is 'the experience of red' then literally all options are on the table. It could be a property of our mind, it could be a property of objects (which we detect with our 'experience detectors'), it could be a property of God which both the object and us merely reflect.

I can't see how any amount of thinking is going to pin down the nature of this 'experience of red' since it has no laws governing it.

Then I'm struggling to understand the account direct realism (or indirect realism, for that matter) is putting forward. — Isaac

The epistemological problem of perception asks: is the world as it appears to us? Direct realists answered in the affirmative. However they made sense of "directness", that things are as they appear follows from perception being whatever they meant by "direct". Therefore, if it can be shown that things aren't as they appear (i.e. that a thing's appearance depends in part on an organism's perceptual apparatus and any associated mental phenomena (e.g. if substance or property dualism are true)) then direct realism is false.

The argument I have been making is that, assuming scientific realism, the world isn't as it appears to us. That's not to say that how the world is and how it appears aren't causally covariant; we know that an object's colour-appearance is determined by the wavelength of the electromagnetic radiation it emits or reflects, as well as by an organism's sense receptors and any subsequent brain activity.

I agree with you, as you seemed to say above, that it doesn't even make sense for the world to "have an appearance" (when not being seen), and so direct realism seems to be false even in theory, irrespective of scientific realism. But there seems to be a sticking point in that at times you even seem to reject appearance tout court. Or at the very least reject the claim that any words we use (like "red") refer to features of this appearance; instead you say that they all refer to whatever hidden states are causally responsible for the appearance. I disagree with this view, although admittedly it's irrelevant as the argument isn't over what words mean or what they refer to but about whether or not the world is as it appears to us.

The epistemological problem of perception asks: is the world as it appears to us? Direct realists answered in the affirmative. — Michael

If they're really arguing that we're never wrong, however the world seems, that's how it is, then they should consider the earth flat, the sun in its orbit, dragons exist, and the weather caused by an angry God as these are all ways the world has appeared to us to be.

Since some direct realists are otherwise very intelligent people, I think a more plausible explanation is that you've misunderstood their position. But I'm not sufficiently expert in that area of philosophy to gainsay, so, assuming you're right, what an embarrassment to the field of philosophy that anyone thought such an obviously nonsensical thing.

If they're really arguing that we're never wrong, however the world seems, that's how it is, then they should consider the earth flat, the sun in its orbit, dragons exist, and the weather caused by an angry God as these are all ways the world has appeared to us to be. — Isaac

There's a difference between the phenomenology of experience and any subsequent intellectual interpretation. I think you're conflating two different senses of "how things appear".

For example, "the object appears to be glowing red" and "the object appears to be hot because it is glowing red."

But the phenomenological sense of 'appear' can't possibly apply to the world (without imparting consciousness to all objects) so the same problem arises. If the direct realist thinks the world is exactly as it phenomenologically appears, then their argument is still so embarrassingly ridiculous as to force us to consider our own misunderstanding as the more plausible explanation.