The nominalism of Jody Azzouni

Marchesk

Sean Carrol had the philosopher Jody Azzouni on his Mindscape podcast at the beginning of the year. You can listen to it here: https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/podcast/2022/01/03/178-jody-azzouni-on-what-is-and-isnt-real/

Azzouni's states that his current nominalism is there are no objects, relations or properties, but instead, the world is a "fabric with features". He admits the word "fabric" is metaphorical. Just call it varied world-stuff (my phrase). Carrol seemed pretty much on board with this brand of nominalism. He likened it to everything being a vector in Hilbert space. Azzouni's response is that's fine as long as you don't take the mathematical formalism literally. So varied world-stuff seems to capture the essence of what they were talking about.

The argument against objects is that there are no boundaries between things in reality. The world just varies. We carve this variance into objects, properties and relations, because of our biology and culture. When Carrol asked about physical laws, Azzouni stated that just because we can generalize some of the world in science doesn't mean there has to be an explanation for why the generalization works. It may be brute, and we have to live with the problem of induction.

Azzouni does admit that spacetime may exist, since curved space has a relation to energy in General Relativity. But in classical mechanics (Newtonian), spacetime would simply be an abstraction.

But his primary target for nominalism is mathematics. When Carrol brings up the unreasonable effectiveness of math in science, Azzouni points out that only some branches of math are useful in science. And when you get down to it, it's always very specific uses. His argument against the necessary consistency of arithmetic is that this is only necessary as syntax, and going beyond that is to import meaning into the formalism. There was some discussion of Peano numbers and unproven statements outside the axioms of a number system, which Azzouni didn't think supported realism.

I should specify that Jody Azzouni and Sean Carrol first discussed what is meant by "real" and "existing". Basically, the world as something mind-independent apart from us. Sherlock Holmes exists as literature, and you can say true statements about Holmes. But Holmes obviously does not exist as a real person. Making true statements and saying "there is blah", does not commit you to existence claims in Azzouni's view. What does exist is the world or nature, which we're part of. But the world doesn't depend on us. It just is and we try to make sense of it with our language and the kind of epistemic access to have, which is aided by technology. So while Azzouni is a hard-core nominalist, he rejects anti-realism and logical positivism. It is important to figure what's real.

So I guess this means science doesn't carve nature at its joints, since nature has no joints, just variance. But then, how does every electron have the same mass, charge and role in the Standard Model? Why do we have separate particles and forces? Why are there fundamental constants like Planck and the speed of light? How come there are phase transitions if there's no real boundaries? And why is Sean Carrol so on board with this kind of radical nominalism if he thinks the wave function is real and describes many worlds?

Doesn't special relativity depend on relations with it's observer-based frame of reference? How would you reformulate either special or general without relations?

Regarding evolution, why was it beneficial for us to evolve the cognitive and linguistic capabilities to carve the world into objects, relations and properties? Also, what makes abstraction so useful? And finally, what happened to the particulars if reality is just a "fabric with features"?

Brute seems like somewhat of a cop out. Your philosophy is challenged because it fails to explain important features of the world, and you get to say they're brute, no explanation needed. My major problem with Humean causality is that it gives no explanation for why A always follows B, which could change at any point in the future. The entire cosmos has a deep order to it, but for no reason? That's an awful lot of bruteness to take on.

Michael

Doesn't special relativity depend on relations with it's observer-based frame of reference? How would you reformulate either special or general without relations? — Marchesk

Quantum mechanics is incompatible with relativity and so assuming a quantum theory of gravity can be found then he need not worry about relativity.

We carve this variance into objects, properties and relations, because of our biology and culture.

…

So while Azzouni is a hard-core nominalist, he rejects anti-realism and logical positivism. — Marchesk

If he says that we carve this variance into objects then it seems that he’s being an anti-realist about these objects, even if he’s not being an anti-realist about the “fabric with features”.

My major problem with Humean causality is that it gives no explanation for why A always follows B, which could change at any point in the future. — Marchesk

What does it mean for A to cause B? Does it mean that B happens because A happens? And does this mean that if A didn’t happen then B would not have happened? And does this mean that there is no possible world where A does not happen and B happens? Even this account is explained in terms of a sequence of events. Or is there an account of causation that provides more “substance” to the relation between A and B?

jgill

. . . but instead, the world is a "fabric with features". — Marchesk

A little like quantum field theory. We are excitations in a reality field. Neat.

Marchesk

↪jgill

Yeah, I was thinking something like that.

Marchesk

Quantum mechanics is incompatible with relativity and so assuming a quantum theory of gravity can be found then he need not worry about relativity. — Michael

Assuming it doesn’t involve relations. String theory was briefly mentioned on the podcast.

f he says that we carve this variance into objects then it seems that he’s being an anti-realist about these objects, even if he’s not being an anti-realist about the “fabric with features”. — Michael

True. Also known as mereoligical nihilism.

What does it mean for A to cause B? — Michael

A necessitates B, as opposed to B just happens to follow A, but it might not do so in the future.

Michael

A necessitates B — Marchesk

How is this any different to saying “if A happens then B happens”?

Marchesk

How is this any different to saying “if A happens then B happens”? — Michael

You don't understand the notion of causality? If it could be shown that A causes B, then it will always be the case that B follows A. But if it's just A happens then B happens, it doesn't have to continue being that way, since nothing necessitates it. That's where the problem of induction comes from.

Michael

You don't understand the notion of causality? — Marchesk

Causation is a tricky thing to define. The definition I provided above is Lewis’ counterfactual theory of causation. I’m not quite sure how to make sense of “A necessitates B”. It’s definitely not “if A is true then B is necessarily true”.

Although part of the problem here is probably to do with the various paradoxes of material implication.

Marchesk

he definition I provided above is Lewis’ counterfactual theory of causation. — Michael

Which doesn't help with the problem of induction. If causality is based on a law of nature, then the law of nature will ensure that B always follows A. Counterfactuals don't help us with the future, since we don't know yet that the counterfactuals will continue being so.

Causality can be defined is that which makes B follow A (in our simple abstract example).

Michael

Causality can be defined is that which makes B follow A — Marchesk

Unfortunately we’re looking for something more formal to explain this relationship. Can we translate what you say here into symbolic logic?

Marchesk

Unfortunately we’re looking for something more formal to explain this relationship. Can we translate what you say here into symbolic logic? — Michael

What does symbolic logic have to do with causality or laws of nature? It's interesting you want to use a syntactic formalism in a discussion on nominalism.

But okay, if you want to try it, go ahead.

Edit: I should add that maybe there's a deep relationship between reality, logic and math. I'm not a nominalist. I'm not sure what we can properly say exists beyond the varied world-stuff, but it seems like we need some abstractions to make existence claims.

Michael

What does symbolic logic have to do with causality or laws of nature? It's interesting you want to use a syntactic formalism in a discussion on nominalism. — Marchesk

It helps us make sense of the terms. Symbolic logic is used in much of philosophy, not just as an exercise in syntax but to better address the substance of some philosophical position, e.g. with the recently discussed Fitch's paradox of knowability.

Admittedly we don't need to go that far, but it would be useful if we could translate the notion of causation into something more formal than "A causes B if some C makes B follow from A" because it's not clear what C is or what it means for this C to make B follow from A. My own account of causation is taken from Lewis: A causes B if it is not possible for A to be false and B to be true.

Tom Storm

My own account of causation is taken from Lewis: A causes B if it is not possible for A to be false and B to be true. — Michael

Nice.

jgill

My own account of causation is taken from Lewis: A causes B if it is not possible for A to be false and B to be true. — Michael

This assumes a linear causation chain. I.e., no other cause for B exists. If C also causes B, then A can be false and B true, and still A, like C, causes B. :chin:

Janus

A necessitates B — Marchesk

How is this any different to saying “if A happens then B happens”? — Michael

How is this any different to saying “if A happens then B happens”? — Michael

You don't understand the notion of causality? If it could be shown that A causes B, then it will always be the case that B follows A. But if it's just A happens then B happens, it doesn't have to continue being that way, since nothing necessitates it. That's where the problem of induction comes from. — Marchesk

I think to say that A necessitates B is exactly the same as to say "If A happens then B happens". And that is not affected by additions like "if C happens then B happens" because A is not specified as the sole cause of B. That latter could be formulated as "If B happens then A must have happened". And you can always add: " And C and or D and or E, and so on, must have happened". The idea of necessary and/or sufficient causes or conditions.

But these formal definitions seem to be lacking the essential element of our conception of causation; which is some kind of energetic forcing, not mere correlation.

Joshs

↪Janus

I think to say that A necessitates B is exactly the same as to say "If A happens then B happens". And that is not affected by additions like "if C happens then B happens" because A is not specified as the sole cause of B. That latter could be formulated as "If B happens then A must have happened". And you can always add: " And C and or D and or E, and so on, must have happened". The idea of necessary and/or sufficient causes or conditions.

But these formal definitions seem to be lacking the essential element of our conception of causation; which is some kind of energetic forcing, not mere correlation — Janus

Putnam had some interesting thoughts on material conceptions of causation

“I have argued that materialism, which conceives of
persons as automata, inherits Hume's problems. A neoassociationist theory of understanding (the probabilistic automaton model) renders it unintelligible that anything in the mind/brain can bear a unique
correspondence to anything outside the mind/brain. (Of course, everything corresponds in some way or other to everything else; the problem is how anyone correspondence can be singled out as "the" relation between signs and their referents.) In this sense, Hume's difficulties with objective reference to an external world are difficulties for the materialist too.

Moreover, if the physical universe itself is an automaton (something with "states" that succeed one another according to a fixed equation), then it is unintelligible how any particular structure can be singled out as "the" causal structure of the universe. Of course, the universe fulfills structural descriptions-in some way or other it fulfills every structural description that does not call for too high a cardinality on the part of the system being modeled; once again, the problem is how anyone structure can be singled out as "the" structure of the system.
If we say that the structure of the physical universe is singled out by the mind, then we either put the mind outside the universe (whichis to abandon materialism) or else we are thrown back to the first problem: the problem of how the signs employed by the mind can have a determinate "correspondence" to parts and aspects of the universe. If we say that the causal structure of the physical universe is "built into" the physical universe, then we abandon materialism without admitting that we are abandoning it; for all we do in this case is to project into physical systems properties (for example, being a "background condition," being a cause, being cotenable with the antecedent of a counterfactual) that cannot be properties of matter "in itself." In this sense, Hume's difficulties with objective necessitation are difficulties for the materialist too.”

Janus

↪Joshs

The problem with 'hard' materialism is nicely set out there. As to correspondence between signs and the things they refer to, I suppose the physicalist could say that neural pathways that encode associations between words and things or activities are "laid down" and activated when we hear or read words, leading us to understand the words as referring to the associated things, and conceiving this as reference. Can the eliminative physicalist also consistently say this? Not sure...more thought required.

Marchesk

But these formal definitions seem to be lacking the essential element of our conception of causation; which is some kind of energetic forcing, not mere correlation. — Janus

Yes, it has to be something making B follow A, which would avoid the problem of induction about the future. Because if B is just correlated with A, there's no guarantee it will always be correlated.

Marchesk

My own account of causation is taken from Lewis: A causes B if it is not possible for A to be false and B to be true. — Michael

The problem of induction says we don't know this to be true about the future. But if there is a C which makes it so that A can't be false and B be true, then we do know that B follows A in the future.

The C could be in A or B, it could be a law prescribing A & B, or it could be something else connecting B to A. I think it would be easier to discuss an example than just to talk about C in abstract terms.

Marchesk

This assumes a linear causation chain. I.e., no other cause for B exists. If C also causes B, then A can be false and B true, and still A, like C, causes B. :chin: — jgill

For sake of simplicity. In the everyday world, it will often get messy. The cue ball striking the 9 ball and hitting it into the corner pocket would be a simple example. Or an equation like E=MC^2, where we can say that energy is always equal to the mass times the speed of light squared and use that energy conversion as a starting point for making atomic bombs or reactors.

Marchesk

↪Michael

Here's a counter factual argument. Take something that could happen, but never does. Say the creation of a large river of Sprite flowing through some country. Nothing in nature prevents that from happening. It's not an impossibility. Now take a perpetual motion machine. It will never exist because it's impossible.

How does Humean causation distinguish between the two cases?

Marchesk

Moreover, if the physical universe itself is an automaton (something with "states" that succeed one another according to a fixed equation), then it is unintelligible how any particular structure can be singled out as "the" causal structure of the universe. — Joshs

So we could use Conway's Game of Life example. There are three simple rules governing the evolution of the state of each cell. And from that you can get all sorts of patterns, depending on the starting state and the number of cells.

What you can't say is that there aren't really rules, because the rules are what makes it a particular cellular automation. Something has to determine what state the cells will change to each generation. Similarly, one could argue that the rules described by physics determine the evolution of all the world states. And we can consider other universes with different rules, and how that would change what sort of universe you get, or how long it lasts.

Joshs

↪Marchesk

What you can't say is that there aren't really rules, because the rules are what makes it a particular cellular automation. Something has to determine what state the cells will change to each generation. Similarly, one could argue that the rules described by physics determine the evolution of all the world states. And we can consider other universes with different rules, and how that would change what sort of universe you get, or how long it lasts — Marchesk

I think the question for Putnam is whether any rules can be treated as non-relative to a conceptual scheme of understanding. Being a conceptual relativist he would say there aren’t really rules in the same sense that there aren’t really quarks or gravity. That is, none of these can be claimed to have an existence independent of any conceptual account of them.

Michael

The problem of induction says we don't know this to be true about the future. But if there is a C which makes it so that A can't be false and B be true, then we do know that B follows A in the future.

The C could be in A or B, it could be a law prescribing A & B, or it could be something else connecting B to A. I think it would be easier to discuss an example than just to talk about C in abstract terms. — Marchesk

So A causes B if some C makes B follow from A? But then what does it mean for C to make B follow from A? Does it mean that if C were false then B wouldn’t follow from A? We’re back to the counterfactual definition of causation I gave above, just replacing A with C.

Marchesk

↪Michael

The counterfactual definition still doesn’t solve the problem of induction, and it doesn’t distinguish between impossible and possible but never happens.

Michael

The counterfactual definition still doesn’t solve the problem of induction... — Marchesk

Is it supposed to? I just understood it as an attempt to explain what causation means.

... and it doesn’t distinguish between impossible and possible but never happens.

Is it supposed to? It just explains that "A causes B" means "If A didn't happen then B wouldn't have happened". Whether or not A or B is possible has nothing to do with causation.

Marchesk

↪Michael

Possible Universe X: B always follows A. Possible Universe Y: B follows A up until time T.

Compare that to All Possible Universes where: B always follows A.

How do we account for the difference between those two accounts? A causal account would explain that in the all possible universes account, B is necessitated by A.

Marchesk

↪Michael

whether or not something is possible has everything to do with causation, outside of contradictory statements.

Michael

Possible Universe X: B always follows A. Possible Universe Y: B follows A up until time T. — Marchesk

A causes B in universe X, A causes B up until time T in universe Y.

Compare that to All Possible Universes where: B always follows A.

A causes B in all possible universes.

Marchesk

↪Michael

You don’t see a difference in those accounts of causality? In the all possible universes, it’s impossible for A not to follow B. In the other account, it is possible.

Michael

You don’t see a difference in those accounts of causality? — Marchesk

It's the same account; that A causes B is that if A didn't happen then B wouldn't have happened. It's just that in one universe A doesn't always cause B. What's the issue?

The nominalism of Jody Azzouni

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