The harms to existing beings is also a good point worth thinking about. — DA671

It's the basis of my argument against anti-natalism. One only need a reasonable belief that one's child will not suffer greatly for any small suffering they might experience to be outweighed by the benefits it is reasonable to believe they will bring to one's community. Ethics should be about the welfare of the community as a whole, not of individuals, otherwise no sacrifice for the wider community could ever be ethically advocated.

Pronatalists are of the opinion that ... — Agent Smith

Just to clarify: I am an antinatalist (also, pro-euthanasia, pro-abortion, pro-vasectomy/tubal ligation) because the world and society I was born into and have lived in for almost 58 years is ravaged by gratuitious suffering force multiplied by endemic stupidity; so for the last 30+ years I've deliberately avoided chucking anymore fresh meat into the moral circus of these times. I'm not "pronatalist" at all. In fact, one doesn't have to be; there's no argument needed to procreate and perpetuate the species – that's what extant species do by biological default.

However, I am against poor arguments and sophistical exortations which is all that's ever proffered in defense of "antinatalism". In genuine Hegelian (or Žižekian) fashion, antinatalists should be hyper-natalists preaching "be fruitful and exponentialize" in order to as rapidly as possible bring about the negation of natality with an extinction-event scale Malthusian apocalypse: hyper-natality —> natality thesis negated by fatality antithesis —> antinatal aufhebung. Yeah, it's bullshit, but at least there's an internally consistent hook to hang that antinatal party-hat on (rather than a so-called "utilitarian / consequentialist argument" premised on a category mistake of conferring a moral status on inexistent, merely possible, persons as if they are existing, actual, persons).

:yawn:

Indeed. However, would you say that there is a risk that we can start thinking about the community or the collective as this distinct being of sorts whilst disregarding the needs of the individuals, which could be deleterious for the community itself (eventually)? I suppose it can be good to remember that both the ocean and the drops need each other, which you probably already know.

I've seen people go through years of misery due to their failure to have kids. Thankfully, many of them found happiness through adoption. Still, I think it does demonstrate that procreation can be a source of unfathomable value for many (and I haven't even mentioned the indirect value it could have due to the fact that it could lead to the creation of people who would help their communities and would contribute towards the common good).

would you say that there is a risk that we can start thinking about the community or the collective as this distinct being of sorts whilst disregarding the needs of the individuals, which could be deleterious for the community itself (eventually)? — DA671

Yes, I think one can reason badly about the courses of action which would most benefit the community and ignoring individual welfare would be one such bad reasoning practice.

procreation can be a source of unfathomable value for many (and I haven't even mentioned the indirect value it could have due to the fact that it could lead to the creation of people who would help their communities and would contribute towards the common good). — DA671

Yes. And also many projects which increase the welfare of a community take more than one generation to complete, so it's reasonable to have children to help progress such projects.

That's only if one is focusing more on the risks and is ignoring the opportunities that could also exist. — DA671

Not necessarily. I can ask the same question even if the odds were, say, 10:1. A gamble with good odds is still a gamble. The question is whether in the face of unknown consequences we can classify our choice as anything other than a gamble.

My preferred solution to the unknown consequences problem is to consider ethics about virtue, not consequence. Virtue only requires that we do our best. — Isaac

I think a just intention alone does not suffice, though it is a prerequisite for a moral action.

Similarly, a good outcome alone is not enough either.


One needs both.


The issue is that when one's intentions do not match up with the outcome, and instead one produces a negative outcome, one must have been ignorant. And ignorance is not virtuous, nor does it justify an action.

I think a just intention alone does not suffice, though it is a prerequisite for a moral action.

Similarly, a good outcome alone is not enough either.


One needs both. — Tzeentch

One cannot have both, so you've made moral action impossible. Thus the word 'moral' becomes pointless. I suggest, therefore we find it new use - perhaps to describe actions which are reasonably likely to bring about good outcomes?

ignorance is not virtuous — Tzeentch

Ignorance, of the sort you describe here, is neither virtuous non non-virtuous. It's as relevant to virtue as having a nose. We are all ignorant in the manner you describe and cannot be any other. As such the state is irrelevant to virtue. One cannot make into a virtue that which is unobtainable.

All we can reasonably say is a virtue is for one to have taken achievable steps to predict the outcome of one's actions.

It is (if creation has value/disvalue for the person). My point is that it isn't necessarily bad. We do know that most people do appear to appreciate their lives (and we lack evidence to the contrary) to not an absolute, but an adequate degree. Furthermore, the sort of environment one is in can also help one make a reasonable decision. It's unlikely, for instance, that procreating in North Korea would always lead to an amazing outcome. Obviously, wealth is only just one factor. The degree permeation of meaningfulness in a region/community is also a vital consideration. The question is whether or not the action is reasonably justifiable. Given the possibility of countless invaluable experiences, I think it can be. But because this is a "can", not a "will", universal pro-natalism or even extreme pro-natalism is ethically untenable.

One cannot have both, so you've made moral action impossible. — Isaac

Why not?

Ignorance, of the sort you describe here, is neither virtuous non non-virtuous. It's as relevant to virtue as having a nose. We are all ignorant in the manner you describe and cannot be any other. As such the state is irrelevant to virtue. One cannot make into a virtue that which is unobtainable. — Isaac

While I would argue ignorance is relevant to one's capacity to bring about intended outcomes, I would agree it is a "neutral" factor. However, virtue ethics would imply that ignorance is not an impediment to ethical behavior, whereas I would argue that it is.

If intentions were good but the outcome was bad, then there must have been ignorance at play. In my view that does not justify the action or make it moral as per virtue ethics.

One cannot have both, so you've made moral action impossible. — Isaac


Why not? — Tzeentch

Because that would involve omniscience and none of us are.

If intentions were good but the outcome was bad, then there must have been ignorance at play. In my view that does not justify the action or make it moral as per virtue ethics. — Tzeentch

Well then you're not using the word 'moral' correctly. The degree of prior certainty you're describing is not the kind of action we use the word 'moral' to describe (in fact it describes no class of actions at all, since that level of prior certainty in unobtainable but...). You're describing a different type of action. Let's call it a 'y-moral' action. Now, why ought we only act in ways which are y-moral?

Because that would involve omniscience and none of us are. — Isaac

Why would that require omniscience?

You're saying for one's intention to match the outcome it requires omniscience?

Well then you're not using the word 'moral' correctly. The degree of prior knowledge you're describing is not the kind of action we use the word 'moral' to describe. You're describing a different type of action. let's call it a 'y-moral' action. — Isaac

Perhaps.

It seems to me that talking about morality in terms of only intentions or only outcomes makes no sense, and these two should always be considered together.

If one intends to do great good but does only great harm, they clearly cannot be said to be moral, regardless of their intentions.

If one intends to do great harm but does only great good, they clearly cannot be said to be moral either, regardless of the outcomes.

You're saying for one's intention to match the outcome it requires omniscience? — Tzeentch

Yes, clearly. One does not otherwise know the outcome in advance and cannot match it to one's intention.

Morality is about what we ought to to. It is necessarily predictive about outcomes.

If one intends to do great good but does only great harm, they clearly cannot be said to be moral. — Tzeentch

Why not? If the harmful outcome was completely unforeseeable we'd commonly refer to such good intentions as virtuous.

But let's take this away from semantics. What ought we do? We cannot predict the future with great accuracy, our inaction could cause as much harm as our action, so what ought we do?

But let's take this away from semantics. What ought we do? We cannot predict the future with great accuracy, our inaction could cause as much harm as our action, so what ought we do? — Isaac

When it comes to the well-being of others, to take only those actions the outcomes of which we can predict with great accuracy.

When it comes to the well-being of others, to take only those actions the outcomes of which we can predict with great accuracy. — Tzeentch

Why?

:clap: :fire:

Gratuitious suffering! Endemic stupidity! Fresh meat! Moral circus! :up: :up:

As for your recommendation, let's go all out on (pro)natalism; (Hegelian) Dialecticism guarantees that, as you seem to be implying, that the thesis (natalism) contains the seed of its own antithesis (antinatalism) via overpopulation/population explosion and intriguingly this might be automated rather than willed. The same goes for antinatalism, but there's a real chance that the yin-yang pattern won't hold: ◇extinction!

Much obliged monsieur!

If one can say that it's wrong to procreate unless it's almost certain that the outcome would be positive, then one could create a similarly high standard and say that it's right to procreate unless a negative outcome is nigh impossible to avoid. The single-minded emphasis on harms and implicit contempt for the positive does not seem right to me.

Or something else—hopefully better.

I think that creation can be justifiable. There are many people who live have inestimably valuable without the media covering them all. However, we do need to do a lot more to create a create a better society that would be worthy of innocent sentient beings. Have an excellent day!

(B) find another (less incoherent) argument to "justify" their position or (C) concede that the idea is wholly subjective and be consistent enough to (i) refrain from procreating and/or (ii) kill themselves asap. — 180 Proof

:clap: :clap: :clap:

Or something else—hopefully better. — DA671

Yes, some of us, I guess the more liberal-minded ride on optimism, it's their superpower. Others tend to be conservative, extra cautious as it were, not willing to take (unnecessary) risks, these types like to play it safe.

The way out, like one person once told me, is to take a calculated risk.

No people, then no progress, no purpose, no new knowledge, no learning, no great new scientists/politicians/writers/Imagineers/entertainers/good decent people Nothing new and good. Even no vile antinatalists! (every cloud has a silver lining). Antinatalism is a cowardly solution to one of the best teachers we have, suffering.
The possibility of harm to others inspires all decent people to work hard to protect against such.
Every member on this website who has children that they love more than they value their own lives are being constantly insulted and accused of being immoral by misanthropic cowards who do not have the guts to make their statements face to face in public.
All the antinatalists here should organise into a public pressure group and show their faces on tv and the internet. Then their suggestions could be exposed to all and the public can react to them accordingly. Perhaps they will start a new global revolution and all procreation will stop. :rofl:

Dart Analogy for antinatalism.

Imagine you're asked to throw a dart blindfolded. The person whose game this is informs you that there's a dartboard, complete with a bullseyse in front of you but, just to add that extra spice to the game, there's also a child in the vicinity of the dartboard. You're told that whether you throw the dart or not is your choice and yours alone. Would you throw the dart or would you go "you sick bastard!"

Better to play pinata. Swinging a big club blindfolded can cause harm but the intelligent pinata player can prod with the bat quite softly until they identify where the item filled with goodies is.
Then they can swing with strength and release all the goodies for everyone to enjoy (all part of a balanced food plan of course). People don't have to play nasty games such as the one you suggest.

The possible outcome of one throw are (50/50 odds, a fair coin in a manner of speaking):

1. Dart lands anywhere but on the kid ( :smile: )

OR

2. Dart lands on the kid ( :sad: )

We're not certain which of the two (1/2) will happen! How would you or anyone else for that matter tackle this game?

The game mirrors the natalism vs antinatalism dilemma. Neither side can guarantee the joy/sorrow of children and hence can't clinch their respective arguments.

P.S. Those who can provide for the well-being of their kids are only a handful of well-off folks and so, for simplicity's sake, they can be ignored, like $\delta x$, from the calculus.

The single-minded emphasis on harms and implicit contempt for the positive does not seem right to me. — DA671

Yes, I agree. There's no point in reducing harm just for the sake of following some rule about reducing harm. We usually weigh predicted harms and benefits. I can't see any reason why procreation should be treated differently.

When it comes to the well-being of others, to take only those actions the outcomes of which we can predict with great accuracy. — Tzeentch

Why? — Isaac

Because if one chooses to interfere in the affairs of others, one should be certain their actions don't cause irreversible harm.

Calculated risks keeping in mind the opportunities! :ok:

The possibility of irreversible harms should not blind us to the possibility of imperishable goods. If one cannot guarantee that the future would not be completely miserable, then they should not simply ignore one side of the coin. There is this incessant demand for absolute perfection (total happiness, absolute certainty) when it comes to the positives, yet this is dropped when it comes to the negatives, which seems like an arbitrary and unjustifiable double standard.

Calculated risks keeping in mind the opportunities! — DA671

Not forgetting the threats! :lol:

That is why I used the word "risks"! Therein lies the balance. But the scales can tilt towards the light. Also, the joy derived from love and acquiring knowledge is far greater than the satisfaction that darts can provide.

That is why I used the word "risks"! Therein lies the balance. — DA671

A calculated risk is when the odds of winnin' are higher than the odds of losin'. The risk is in name only, or nominal/negligble whatever you wanna call it but, the catch is, ain't zero! Having children it seems is a gamble after all!