:fire:

Exactly what evidence was collected to suggest this conclusion? — noAxioms

Even though behaviorally it makes no difference, subjects might report a difference who have this structure temporarily knocked out. Perhaps there is a lapse of phenomenal memory. This is not really the point of the OP however.

I've never been able to figure out what people have that a machine cannot. — noAxioms

It's always weird to me when someone makes this claim. A digital camera sees red, and processes the data coming from it's red sensors. But it has no experience. A computer is no different.

Computers have memory, and they identify themselves, but they have no awareness. Think of a p zombie as a perfect computer simulation of how a human behaves, without any of the internal stuff. — hypericin

Yes. There are two possibilities if such a simulation becomes possible; either they are zombies, or they have awareness. It seems to me at the moment, that although it is easy enough to mimic human behaviour in many ways, it is not really possible to mimic awareness without awareness, and that awareness is not an epiphenomenon of information processing. There is a stillness and emptiness to awareness quite different from the business of thought, that I don't think anyone has much considered trying to simulate in a computer, because it seems to have no function. Perhaps that is the secret that it has no function, but is just an epiphenomenon, but I think it has a vital function, which is to impart freedom. Zombies have no freedom.

P-zombies, for obvious reasons, remind me of thespians! Laughing but not actually amused, crying but not actually sad, angry but not, reasoning but no, not, so and so forth! We, as we are, can be p-zombies i.e. p-zombies are actual/real to the extent such an inference is allowed by superb acting.

This is not really the point of the OP however. — hypericin

The point of the OP was apparently to play what-if games given a hypothetical empirical p-zombie test. But I'm addressing the opening assertion that such a test exists, which it cannot by Chalmers' definition.

Even though behaviorally it makes no difference, subjects might report a difference who have this structure temporarily knocked out.

This is self contradictory. Are you making this up or did the scientists in question actually say this? Did they actually say this structure is responsible for the kind of consciousness that the dualists are talking about?
If the subjects reported noticing a difference, then there's a behavioral difference. If it rendered them 'thoughtless' (your words from your 3rd post), they'd not be able to respond at all.
If it rendered them not sentient, they'd not be able to hear the question asked of them. Even a simple mechanical device is sentient since it can perceive its environment. But you're probably using a loaded definition of sentience.
If it disabled one's entire 'inner experience', you'd think the subject would notice the sudden total lack of experience.

All I see from your reply above (I didn't see any quotes from the article) is that the subject noticed the difference, which indicates that the structure is not entirely vestigial. That's all. Your description of having it disabled does not match that of a subject who suddenly is reft of experience and feelings.

Perhaps there is a lapse of phenomenal memory.

What is phenomenal memory? Memory of a phenomenon? All memory is phenomenal by that definition, except I suppose memory of conclusions reached by thought, such Fermat working out his last theorem.
Were the subjects asked about memory of past experiences? I still have zero quotes from them.

I've never been able to figure out what people have that a machine cannot.
— noAxioms
It's always weird to me when someone makes this claim.

You suggest that some people are zombies, but balk when I suggest I'm probably one of them since I don't see the problem that others do so clearly. Ah, but I'm behaving differently, and true zombies apparently must lie about this sort of thing. I don't do that, so somebody must be wrong.

A digital camera sees red

It does not, no more than does an eyeball. A human with an eye sees red. A device with a camera sees red if it in any way reacts to the data instead of just storing it like a camera does. OK, a smart camera with red-eye editing sees red. I'll buy that.

But it has no experience.

By what definition? It's not human, sure, and that's the usual definition. You have a better one that doesn't so much beg your conclusion?

A quick test is developed for the presence of this structure. You take it, and of course, you are positive. — hypericin

Of course? What if it isn't?
The Nazi's had similar tests, used to justify treating a segment of the population like cattle. The MAGA crowd would love this.

Interesting question.

As humans we want for our love to be returned. I imagine that it would completely ruin the relationship.

Are you making this up or did the scientists in question actually say this? Did they actually say this structure is responsible for the kind of consciousness that the dualists are talking about? — noAxioms

You completely misunderstood, this is all just background I made up for my hypothetical question. No scientists in question, no such structure has been discovered.

You suggest that some people are zombies, but balk when I suggest I'm probably one of them since I don't see the problem that others do so clearly. — noAxioms

In reality I would be very surprised if zombies existed. I think it is much more likely that there is a cognitive difference which makes this concept more difficult for some people.

A device with a camera sees red if it in any way reacts to the data instead of just storing it like a camera does. — noAxioms

A digital camera doesn't just store it, there are a multitude of processes which must occur before the light can be stored digitally. Correcting for red eye is just another transformation.

By what definition? It's not human, sure, and that's the usual definition. — noAxioms

That is not the usual definition. The usual is something more like "private internal perception". A camera or a computer can respond behaviorally to it's red sensors in essentially the same way you can to yours. But (we presume) only you have an accompanying subjective experience of red.

Try to describe what it is like to experience red to a blind person. You can use adjectives like "warm", "excitable", etc, but that is about as far as you can go. The internal experience is completely private, and completely incommunicable.

If indeed you lack this, this must sound like gibberish.

Ah, but I'm behaving differently, and true zombies apparently must lie about this sort of thing. — noAxioms

People cite this "no behavioral difference" as if it were some kind of iron law of p zombies, instead of a completely arbitrary stipulation in Chalmers's own thought experiment. In reality, if p zombies did exist, you would expect a behavioral difference of some sort, even if it were the kind of impairment that would only reveal itself in testing.

I love long walks, my cat and grand piano. I think I can manage loving a perfect facsimile of a person.

You completely misunderstood, this is all just background I made up for my hypothetical question. No scientists in question, no such structure has been discovered. — hypericin

OK, that wasn't clear. I retract my attack on the OP since it wasn't a claim, only a proposition.
I suppose you can thus make up any answer you like.
I've had people ask what would happen if the sun suddenly wasn't there, and how long it would take for the Earth's orbit to change. The question has no answer since the posited scenario isn't possible. In a different universe with different rules, sure, you can ask such a question.

In reality I would be very surprised if zombies existed.

I'd be very surprised if somebody wasn't one, so go figure.

The usual is something more like "private internal perception". A camera or a computer can respond behaviorally to it's red sensors in essentially the same way you can to yours. But (we presume) only you have an accompanying subjective experience of red.

I don't see the difference. Sorry, I just don't. I notice you didn't hazzard a line between what likely has it (a dog? frog? jellyfish? non-gloppy-interior alien?). How could such a thing evolve? At some point a non-dualistic parent needs to breed a dualistic offspring, totally discarding all the beneficial functionality of the parents, offloading the task to this presumably more capable external entity. It makes no sense outside of religious creationism, a total denial of science.

The self-contained AI robot has all of it. It's internal perception. Where else is it going to go on? It is first person. Again, nothing else is doing the perception for it.
On the other hand, the perception proposed by the woo folks is
1) external: a sort of remote control of an avatar by the external entity
2) second person, since the avatar is not doing its own perception, sort of like a go-pro on a remote-controlled drone transmitting the images to the controller, and
3) not free willed since unlike the AI robot, the avatar cannot make any of its own choices. That doesn't sound like something making the physical entity more fit.

Sorry for the rant.

Damn, I wish I added, "I would not care because I am a p zombie"

Source? From what I can tell there isn't a structure like that in the brain. So far they've isolated a bundle of nerves that turn it on and off but so far nothing like that has been found.

ALso how could you prove a lack of an internal life? You can't really measure that.

You completely misunderstood, this is all just background I made up for my hypothetical question. No scientists in question, no such structure has been discovered. — hypericin

I don't see the difference. Sorry, I just don't. — noAxioms

I am truly, genuinely curious as to what is going on here. Is there a conceptual difference, so that we are talking past each other? Some kind of difference in cognitive style? Do you enjoy an intuitive clarity about consciousness most of us lack? Are you a p zombie?

Let's proceed in the spirit of inquiry, rather than rancorous debate.

A few questions:

Are you able to visualize? Can you create a picture of something, say a beach, on command in your head? Some people lack this ability entirely. I can do it, but the quality is poor.

Can you imagine sounds? I can do this quite well, with great clarity.

Can you imagine touch and other body sensations? I can do this, but here the imagination is easily confused with the real thing, this had lead to very serious psychosomatic problems when I was younger.

What about taste and smell? I actually cannot imagine these, at all.

How do you think? I think primarily by talking to myself. I "hear" my voice in constant dialogue with myself. This dialogue is supplemented with flickery images of poor quality, which are nonetheless a huge help. I was surprised to learn that this is not at all universal. Some people think exclusively with speech or images, some with emotions, some apparently do not use sensory media at all, and think in pure concepts. I think there are more ways I cannot remember.

I understood it, you would need a way to quantify inner experience for the question to even make any sense.

Even then it doesn't matter either way.

Are you a p zombie? — hypericin

If your definition of one is that it operates the same way a computer would (a pure physical process, no help from an external acausal entity), then yes.
If your definition involves being distinct from somebody who has a fuller experience that I don't, then probably not. My only argument for it is that I don't see any hard problem, and others seem to see one so clearly. That's evidence of a distinction, not just a different opinion.

Mind you (pun intended), I don't take the intuitive view on almost anything. Our deepest instinctual beliefs are a load of lies, but lies that serve a purpose. I don't think time is something that flows despite all my everyday actions being based on such an assumption. My preferred quantum interpretation is utterly incompatible with a classical human identity. I know my physics well enough to use it to pick a consistent philosophy. I started with the physics and worked to a consistent conclusion, not start with a conclusion and dismiss any physics that gets in the way.

Are you able to visualize? Can you create a picture of something, say a beach, on command in your head? Some people lack this ability entirely. I can do it, but the quality is poor.
Can you imagine sounds? I can do this quite well, with great clarity.

You should pick something that a computer can't do. Can you think of one? These questions seem irrelevant.

None of my imaginings are particularly good enough to mistake from external input, but I occasionally take a while to realize some dream events did not occur. This is because they've already been filed in memory, not because my dreams are particularly real at the time. Most dreams are not thus filed since long term memory is for the most part disabled except in fairly shallow sleep.

How do you think? I think primarily by talking to myself.

I do best literally talking out loud to myself, which is why I work out hard problems while walking/biking away from others. As a kid I would shoot baskets for hours, talking about anything except the activity itself. I think best when I move.

The voices in my head are often of others, sometimes for a whole day. Craig Furguson is a fave.
I suspect my youngest son thinks sans language. Images mostly. I have a hard time recalling things before the age of three because those memories are stored in a different non-verbal language than the ones since.

I suspect the computer would be more consistent than an aging person, but perhaps it might think in new ways as it learns them just like we do.

Are you a p zombie? — hypericin

To honestly answer yes, it seems to me that one would have to examine one's interiority and experience and find nothing there. Not the nothing that one finds in one's empty pocket, but the nothing one finds in not having pockets at all. If the answer 'yes' comes to mind, it must, in all honesty, be rejected.

Behaviorally, its absence makes little difference, apart for a few subtle impairments. But internally, the consequences are profound: those who lack this structure have no internal lives at all. — hypericin

This description is not that far removed from how enactivist cognitive science understands consciousness.
That is, they dispense with the internal-external, subjective-objective divide and argue that awareness is embodied , which means that it is an interaction , either with other persons or other aspects of one’s environment, which can include one’s bodily( affective) environment.
In this view consciousness is not some mysterious inner substance or module, it is an elaboration of organizational and functional characteristics of all living systems.

People tend to treat others as if those others don't really exist, as if they are merely shells with no inner life, other than the one stipulated by other people.
— baker

I do not. Is this projection? — hypericin

Look at the way people usually talk. They typically use you-language.

That is, they dispense with the internal-external, subjective-objective divide and argue that awareness is embodied , which means that it is an interaction , either with other persons or other aspects of one’s environment, which can include one’s bodily( affective) environment. — Joshs

I don't see how dreams fit with this approach. Your body is normally paralyzed during dreams, and your dream content is usually imaginary. You're not typically perceiving the world. How is that not internal to the brain? There's quite a lot to consciousness which is more than just perceiving or interacting with the world. Like imagination, memory and inner dialog. Even perception carries some anticipation of what one is going to perceive. And when we interact with others, we do a sort of simulation or estimation of their internal states. We guess at what they're thinking and feeling.

The problem any sort of behaviorism has had is that it simply can't capture everything that goes on inside people's heads. That's why there's no accurate lie detector test, and no mind reading device. Someone's behavior and their language clues us in, but it doesn't tell the full story.

What is love?

What is a p-zombie?

Double trouble! Both are huge topics, with lotsa unexplored territory, and information on them is exasperatingly sketchy. What could go wrong, will in such circumstances! Bonam fortunam brave explorers, you'll need it!

it is an elaboration of organizational and functional characteristics of all living systems. — Joshs

This path ends in the absurdity of the conscious paramecium or Roomba, and furthermore cannot account for the fact that our own conscious awareness is just the tip of the iceberg of unconscious processes.

I don't see how dreams fit with this approach. Your body is normally paralyzed during dreams, and your dream content is usually imaginary. You're not typically perceiving the world. How is that not internal to the brain? There's quite a lot to consciousness which is more than just perceiving or interacting with the world. Like imagination, memory and inner dialog. Even perception carries some anticipation of what one is going to perceive. And when we interact with others, we do a sort of simulation or estimation of their internal states. We guess at what they're thinking and feeling. — Marchesk

The question is whether we should
look at such experiences as imagination
and dreaming as merely a re-arrangement of what was already there, the accessing of inert memories in place of contact with fresh, external novelty. Why not look at such experiences as forms of self-transformation? To do this would be to re-think the meaning of internal vs external.

As far as simulating others’ states of mind, simulation theory is o w of three competing f approaches in cognitive science, along with theory theory and interaction theory. Theory theory says that when we try to understand others we consult an internal script.

“Theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST), the standard and dominant approaches to social cognition, share the important supposition that when we attempt to understand the actions of others, we do so by making sense of them in terms of their mental processes to which we have no direct access. That is, we attempt to “mind read” their beliefs, desires, and intentions, and such mind reading or mentalizing is our primary and pervasive way of understanding their behavior. Furthermore, both TT and ST characterize social cognition as a process of explaining or predicting what another person has done or will do. TT claims that we explain another person's behavior by appealing to an either innate or acquired “theory” of how people behave in general; a theory that is framed in terms of mental states (e.g., beliefs and desires) causing or motivating behavior. ST claims that we have no need for a theory like this, because we have a model, namely, our own mind, that we can use to simulate the other person's mental states. We model others' beliefs and desires as if we were in their situation.”

“In most intersubjective situations, that is, in situations of social interaction, we have a direct perceptual understanding of another person's intentions because their intentions are explicitly expressed in their embodied actions and their expressive behaviors. This understanding does not require us to postulate or infer a belief or a desire hidden away in the other person's mind.”(Shaun Gallagher)

“In most intersubjective situations, that is, in situations of social interaction, we have a direct perceptual understanding of another person's intentions because their intentions are explicitly expressed in their embodied actions and their expressive behaviors. This understanding does not require us to postulate or infer a belief or a desire hidden away in the other person's mind — Joshs

So how does this account for lying and manipulation? Or someone putting on a front to appear acceptable? How about all the times we wonder to ourselves what someone is really feeling or whether they're telling us the truth? If beliefs and desires are never hidden away in people's minds, then how come we have no accurate way to always tell when someone is lying or what they're feeling?

The question is whether we should
look at such experiences as imagination
and dreaming as merely a re-arrangement of what was already there, the accessing of inert memories in place of contact with fresh, external novelty. Why not look at such experiences as forms of self-transformation? To do this would be to re-think the meaning of internal vs external. — Joshs

Regardless of how you look at it, you're still experience an environment that is not in the external world and is not publically available to others. You may not wish to call it subjective or internal, but it sure has the same hallmarks of being subjective/internal.

Think of a number, any number. Where does that thought exist if not in the brain? How would anyone know what number you thought of without telling us?

So how does this account for lying and manipulation? Or someone putting on a front to appear acceptable? How about all the times we wonder to ourselves what someone is really feeling or whether they're telling us the truth? If beliefs and desires are never hidden away in people's minds, then how come we have no accurate way to always tell when someone is lying or what they're feeling? — Marchesk

Good questions. I agree that the way the interactionist position is articulated here gives the impression that we simply read off others’ intentions and thoughts from
their observable behavior. My reading of it is that cognitive processes do not consist of internal representations of an external world. Rather than matching inner with outer, the two are blended in each perception. In other words, while i always bring a history of expectations to my interpretation of a perceptual or conceptual events, those expectations interact with something novel in the event, such that the expectations themselves are adjusted to accommodate the object in very act of perceiving. One’s cognitive system is engaged in a holistic way with the world, and changes itself as a whole( including its ‘stored’ memories) with every experience. This is true even in dreaming and imagination. How else could solitary thought lead to legitimately new insight? Certainly not from a recycling or re-combination of stored representations.

When we attempt to understand others , we neither consult an inner ‘canned’ script , nor veridically read off their inner thoughts from their behavior. Instead , our expectations are exposed to what we observe in interaction with others, and as a result we directly perceive ( without simulation) a version of the other’s intentions , which subsequent experience with the other may validate or invalidate.

and as a result we directly perceive ( without simulation) a version of the other’s intentions , which subsequent experience with the other may validate or invalidate. — Joshs

How does this account for autism, or "mind-blindness"? Or how humans tend to anthropomorphize the world around us? How we find cartoon characters, puppets and animals to have beliefs and desires like us? Or the belief that natures if full of spirts and gods?

Regardless of how you look at it, you're still experience an environment that is not in the external world and is not publically available to others. You may not wish to call it subjective or internal, but it sure has the same hallmarks of being subjective/internal. — Marchesk

It is true that whether I watch another dreaming , or listen to them speak , I cannot say that I can accurately anticipate how they will behave next. If I put to the test my expectations concerning what they are dreaming about or their motives and intentions in speaking to me I will sometimes be validated and sometimes not. This tells me that the other person changing in ways to that go beyond my ability to construe in tightly predictive terms. But does this make their functioning private?

If I am attempting to understand an ecosystem are the features of this system that I fail to model well ‘private’?
What makes something private? If we believe that brains make use of stored representations it would seem that we could call such entities private. They are protected from direct expose to an outside world as well as from other representations. But embodied enactivist accounts of cognition see the brain as part of an ecosystem which includes the body and the world. And even when world seems to be minimally involved in cognitive
activity ( deep thought) , we are still dealing with a total system that is in the business of making changes in itself.
That means that even my own thinking isn’t strictly ‘private’ , given that my mind is subtly reinventing itself and its past every moment of its functioning. It is already out in the world every moment , coming back to itself
from an outside.

How does this account for autism, or "mind-blindness"? Or how humans tend to anthropomorphize the world around us? How we find cartoon characters, puppets and animals to have beliefs and desires like us? Or the belief that natures if full of spirts and gods? — Marchesk

A lot of work has been done on autism within the enactivist community.

Take a look at these articles:

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3607806/

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236792668_Understanding_Interpersonal_Problems_in_Autism_Interaction_Theory_as_An_Alternative_to_Theory_of_Mind

ABSTRACT: I argue that theory theory approaches to autism offer a wholly inadequate explanation of au- tistic symptoms because they offer a wholly inade- quate account of the non-autistic understanding of others. As an alternative I outline interaction theory, which incorporates evidence from both developmen- tal and phenomenological studies to show that hu- mans are endowed with important capacities for in- tersubjective understanding from birth or early infancy. As part of a neurophenomenological analysis of au- tism, interaction theory offers an account of interper- sonal problems that is fully consistent with the variety of social and nonsocial symptoms found in autism.

Or how humans tend to anthropomorphize the world around us? How we find cartoon characters, puppets and animals to have beliefs and desires like us? Or the belief that natures if full of spirts and gods? — Marchesk

I’m not at all denying that humans understand the world by reference to a system of constructs , channels
of meaning by which we interpret, organize and anticipate events. What I am arguing against is the idea any element of this system is unchanged by moment to moment events. The whole system is in motion at all times like an interwoven tapestry.

If I am attempting to understand an ecosystem are the features of this system that I fail to model well ‘private’?
What makes something private? If we believe that brains make use of stored representations it would seem that we could call such entities private. They are protected from direct expose to an outside world as well as from other representations. But embodied enactivist accounts of cognition see the brain as part of an ecosystem which includes the body and the world. And even when world seems to be minimally involved in cognitive
activity ( deep thought) , we are still dealing with a total system that is in the business of making changes in itself.
That means that even my own thinking isn’t strictly ‘private’ , given that my mind is subtly reinventing itself and its past every moment of its functioning. It is already out in the world every moment , coming back to itself
from an outside. — Joshs

That's all true and I'm not arguing for radical privacy such that's in principle impossible to figure out what someone is thinking or dreaming. But practically speaking, we can't tell what someone is dreaming unless they tell us. We sometimes know what they're thinking from context, but sometimes we have no clue.

So the subjective/objective split can't be absolute. It's true we're part of the world. But to deny there is a subjective/objective split seems to me to go too far in the other direction. I'm currently listening a Sean Carrol/Mindscape podcast where's he's discussing a book on animal sensation with the author, and there are many examples of how animal senses differ enough from ours such that it's difficult to imagine what sort of experience those animals are having.