A belief has been debunked when the explanation of how we have acquired it gives us no reason whatever to think it true.
That doesn't mean it is false.

If I believe there is a lion in my kitchen and that belief is wholly due to my having taken a hallucinogen earlier, then I have no reason to think that belief is true. That doesn't mean there isn't a lion in my kitchen. There might, by pure coincidence, be one in there.

The evolutionary explanation of our belief in reasons is analogous: the explanation of our belief makes no mention of any actual reasons (just as the explanation of why I believe there's a lion in my kitchen makes no mention of any lion in my kitchen).

Thus, there is no reason whatsoever to think the beliefs are true. And given we do not have to posit any reasons to believe things, we shouldn't. There could still be some and they could even be arranged in the way we believe them to be. But that would be a pure coincidence and not a reasonable belief. Furthermore, just as my hallucinogen induced belief that there is a lion in my kitchen would not qualify as knowledge even if there is a lion in my kitchen, so too we would not know there were any reasons to do or believe things if our belief in them has been induced by evolutionary forces, even if there are reasons to do and believe things arranged exactly as we believe them to be

Thus — Bartricks

Self-referential paradox results. You're offering us a reason why there are no reasons. You just killed yourself!

Even so, most intriguing

If we go back to the OP, he is arguing that it is not reasons, it is intuition that leads us to conclude things. The underming of that argument is ok, for him, because he is saying he does not depend on reasoning for certain (important) beliefs. But, I'm calling him in, just to see if I am getting it.

And I think I agree with him.

I think there is a problem with the claim that our positions were arrived at only via reason. (I don't mean in the sense that that would be bragging, that we are fallible, but rather that they can't be reached by reason (alone).

A common reaction to this is to argue that intuition is fallible or that this is anti-science or all beliefs would then be the same. But that's arguing consequences. I also think the last two are not entailed. Based on intuition and experience, I don't believe them.

Oh. My. God. How many times?
I am arguing that reasons exist.
Are you a goldfish?

Oh. My. God. How many times?
I am arguing that reasons exist.
Are you a goldfish? — Bartricks

Ok, so you are...with a little help from God.

Explain how God $\to$ Reason.

No, I'm not a goldfish! :snicker:

The OP mentions intuition and yet crafts an argument! He/She is committing suicide!

@OP

If you have anything against reason, you're not allowed to use reason. Simple. :snicker:

Summary of the OP's argument.

1. An evolutionary account for the belief that there are reasons (to believe/do x) doesn't require there be actual reasons (to believe/do x).

Ergo,

2. The belief that there are reasons (to believe/do x) is debunked in the sense there needn't be real reasons (to believe/do x).

Ergo,

3. the belief that there are reasons (to believe/do x) needs a different basis/foundation and that basis/foundation is god.

Critique.

True that evolution is all about survival and towards that end everything is/will be sacrificed including but not limited to truth and the belief that there are real reasons (to believe/do something) is one such "truth" If life were given the option survive OR form true beliefs, it would choose the former without batting an eyelid and in a flash.

However what are the justifications for grounding beliefs in god? This question is left unanswered by the OP.

I am not sure why mentioning intuition means one can never use reasoning. I believe the OP is arguing that at a foundational level one is dependent on intuition. Not that one should never reason or that all reasoning is necessarily false. But hopefully bartricks will join in.

If you think that reasoning cannot do everything that is claimed or needs another cognitive process to be complete, of course you can use reason (without contradicting yourself). Further if someone criticizes reason, using reason, those believing that whatever the criticism is is not well argued, THEY still, given their beliefs, need to find the flaws in that criticism if they want to claim the criticism is false. Unless it is merely their intuition that senses it is false.

Unless it is merely their intuition that senses it is false. — Bylaw

Truth is intuition maybe an alternative pathway to truth - it's a feeling rather than a thought - and, guessing hereon, some intuitions of great minds have been vindicated later on by reason. With phenomena like these, we're led to psychological concepts like Freud's unconscious although I prefer to call it subconscious (my intuition :snicker: ).

Given what I said above, intuition isn't exactly non-reason; it's leaving out all the steps in proof and simply presenting the conclusion to someone. The task then is to reconstruct the argument.9

That out of the way, there's the notion of verisimilitude - there are "reasons" other than reasons in the traditional sense (logic) that we can and probably rely on to demonstrate truth e.g. some say that mathematical truths are beautiful and elegant and so are, physicists say, the equations of physical laws. You're aware of course of the so-called argument from beauty (visit Wikipedia for a fairly good exposition of this idea).

Anyway, coming to the OP, I actually like Bartricks' argument because it uses reason to attack/kill reason i.e logical seppuku (I think deep down I'm quite suicidal :snicker: ). Nuff said!

No, I'm not a goldfish! :snicker: — Agent Smith

Yes you are! No matter how many times I tell you that I think reasons exist, 10 minutes later you're telling me I'm arguing that reasons do not exist.

I'm not. I said - many, many times now (and in the OP!!!!) that reasons exist and that only a scoundrel or a fool denies this.

That's as clear as crystal, yes? Yet in 10 minutes time, you'll attribute to me the opposite view.

I am now going to quote me telling you time and time and time again that I am arguing that reasons exist, not that they don't.

Here's the OP:

Any argument - any case - that ends by concluding that we do not have any reason to believe anything is self-undermining. For arguments are just attempts to show us what we have reason to believe.

We can safely dismiss such arguments, then. They are, in effect, arguments against arguments. Only a fool or a scoundrel makes an argument against arguments. — Bartricks

Now here's me explaining it to you for the first time:

Now for the puzzle: when it comes to our faculty of reason the evolutionary explanation seems to be a debunking one, not a vindicatory one. We seem able to explain why we developed a faculty that produces in us the belief that we have reason to believe things without having to suppose that there are actually any reasons to believe things in reality. So we can explain the development of the faculty without having to suppose the reality of what the faculty gives us an apparent awareness of.

Yet that now means that we've undermined our own case, as any case for anything depends on there being actual reasons to believe things (not the mere belief in such things). — Bartricks

See?

Now here's me saying it again

The puzzle arises becasue we can give an evolutionary account of the development of our faculty of reason without having to posit any actual reasons. And thus such an account debunks our impressions and beliefs that we have reasons to do and believe things. Yet we have to presuppose that there really are reasons to believe things. So the atheist who believes they have reason to believe in evolution by natural selection has an incoherent set of beliefs. They believe there is reason to believe in evolution by natural selection, yet if evolution by natural selection alone (unassisted by God, that is) is true, then there are no reasons to believe anything. — Bartricks

And then again, moments later:

1. If the correct explanation of why a person believes x does not involve positing x, then that person's belief in x is debunked.
2. If a purely evolutionary explanation of our development is true, then the correct explanation of why any person believes there are reasons to believe things does not involve positing any reasons to believe things.
3. Therefore, if a purely evolutionary explanation of our development is true, then a person's belief in reasons to believe things is debunked. — Bartricks

Note what the conclusion of that argument is. It isn't what you think it is. It isn't 'there are no reasons to believe things' is it?

And then, a tiny time later I have to do it all over again, here:

OMG. I think there ARE reasons to do things. I could not have been clearer. I said only an idiot or a scoundrel thinks they do not exist.

They exist.

The PROBLEM - for you, not me - is that an evolutionary explanation of how we have acquired our belief in them will discredit them.

So guess what? That means that an exclusive evolutionary explanation is FALSE. It does not mean that evolution by natural selection is false. It means that it can't be the whole story. — Bartricks

And then, about 10 minutes later, I do have to do it AGAIN:

I'm not attacking Reason. I think there are reasons to do things. You can't make a case against them without presupposing them. So if you don't believe in reasons, you're stuck. You can't defend your disbelief, for the instant you do that you'll be appealing to the very things you think do not exist. And so all you can do is assert: all you can do is declare that you disbelieve in things that appear to exist both to you and everyone else who possesses a faculty of reason. — Bartricks

Note, I think reasons to do things exist. I am not arguing that they do not exist. I think they exist. I think a purely evolutionary explanation of us is demonstrably false. Demonstrably, because if true it implies there are no reasons to do things. But there are, so it is false. — Bartricks

And then again:

1. If the correct explanation of a belief that p does not invoke the actual existence of p, then the belief is debunked because we do not have to posit p.

And to that we add this premise:

2. A purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things does not have to invoke the actual existence of any reasons to do things

From which it follows that:

3. If a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things is correct, then our belief that there are reasons to do things is debunked because we do not have to posit any actual reasons to do things.

Note, that conclusion does not assert that there are no reasons to do and believe things or that our belief in such things has actually been debunked. It says 'if'.

This premise is also true:

4. There are reasons to do and believe things and the correct explanation of our belief in reasons to do and believe things does invoke the actual existence of such things.

From which it follows:

5. Therefore, a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things is incorrect. — Bartricks

And AGAIN in a reply about 3 minutes later!!!!:

Er, no. I am saying that there are reasons to do and believe things. — Bartricks

And then AGAIN after you once more attribute to me the view that there are no reasons (I am, you'll note, by this time losing my temper with you):

Oh. My. God. How many times?
I am arguing that reasons exist.
Are you a goldfish? — Bartricks

And that's where we are now.

Do you see how unbelievably patient I am with you?

Now, do you understand that I think reasons do exist? And that this means I think they do exist, not that they don't? Or are you on a sponsored thickathon?

Reasoning is an activity. It is the activity of exercising one's faculty of reason.

If a purely evolutionary story of our development is true, then there are no actual reasons to do anything.

That means that any faculty of reason we have developed is not capable of detecting any actual reasons - for there are none - and will instead be a faculty that generates the hallucination of reasons.

One can still exercise that faculty. But exercising it would simply be to generate hallucinations in oneself, rather than any actual awareness of reasons.

These things should not be conflated (but are, by almost everyone).

Our faculty of reason.

Reasons to do things

The belief or impression that there is a reason to do something.

What an evolutionary account does is explain how we have come to be 'without' having to posit any reasons to do things.

So an evolutionary account will explain how we have acquired a faculty of reason, without having to posit any actual reasons.

And consequently it will explain why we subsequently get the impression of reasons to do things without having to posit any actual reasons (the impressions are generated by the faculty).

Ok, ok.

Let me summmarize, as best as I can, your argument.

Evolutionarily speaking, there doesn't havta be real reasons for believing/doing something even though you believe there are.

What follows?

You claim that the belief that there are real reasons to believe or do something is debunked. It's, to put it bluntly, just convenient/useful/healthy to believe that there are real reasons to believe or do something even though there are none.

If so, any argument you make, which quite naturally requires you to furnish reasons (duh!), is going to fall flat on its face owing to the fact that according to you there are no real reasons. How can you say there are no real reasons to believe anything and with the same breath provide reasons to believe you? You're drinking from the very well you just poisoned! I'll call 911! :snicker:

Evolutionarily speaking, there doesn't havta be real reasons for believing/doing something even though you believe there are.

What follows? — Agent Smith

Nothing follows from that.

Now, I laid out an argument for you, didn't I?

Here it is:

1. If the correct explanation of a belief that p does not invoke the actual existence of p, then the belief is debunked because we do not have to posit p.

And to that we add this premise:

2. A purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things does not have to invoke the actual existence of any reasons to do things

From which it follows that:

3. If a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things is correct, then our belief that there are reasons to do things is debunked because we do not have to posit any actual reasons to do things. — Bartricks

And then you say this AGAIN:

You claim that the belief that there are real reasons to believe or do something is debunked. It's, to put it bluntly, just convenient/useful/healthy to believe that there are real reasons to believe or do something even though there are none. — Agent Smith

No, fishy, I didn't. Again and again and again. I do not claim that. I claim that 'if' a purely evolutionary account of our development is true, THEN the belief is debunked.

This isn't hard. 'If' doesn't mean 'is the case'. "If we were in a victorian school and I was your teacher, you would now have an extremely sore bottom" I have not just said that we are in a victorian school and you have a sore bottom, have I? We've been over this again and again and again and again and again.

If so, any argument you make, which quite naturally requires you to furnish reasons (duh!), is going to fall flat on its face owing to the fact that according to you there are no real reasons. — Agent Smith

Christ. I give up. If we were in a victorian school I would now be in big trouble for having spanked a pupil to death.

:smile:

Ok, ok. You win, but not because you're right but because you're bullheaded!

If a purely evolutionary story of our development is true, then there are no actual reasons to do anything.

That means that any faculty of reason we have developed is not capable of detecting any actual reasons - for there are none - and will instead be a faculty that generates the hallucination of reasons. — Bartricks

When you say reasons, do you mean motivations? (here that is).

Our faculty of reason.

Reasons to do things — Bartricks

OK, right. I don't think I conflate them.

From there in your post to me I am not sure what you are getting at. Could you use motivation or another word of your choice for reasons to do things. That might help me sort out the point you are making here.

No, not motivations. Reasons to do things. Our motivations are often the basis upon which we have a reason to do something, but the reason to do something and the motivation are distinct. For example, if I am motivated to torture John, that is not equivalent to me having reason to torture John. What we are motivated to do we can sometimes have no reason to do, and thus the two are not the same.
Reasons to do things are known as normative reasons (or justifying reasons). They are what shoulds or oughts are made of.
Clearly an evolutionary story of our development does not challenge the idea that we have motivations. Such an account will mention them. What it challenges - because it will not mention them - is the idea that there is anything we should do or should believe.

Our motivations are often the basis upon which we have a reason to do something, but the reason to do something and the motivation are distinct. For example, if I am motivated to torture John, that is not equivalent to me having reason to torture John. What we are motivated to do we can sometimes have no reason to do, and thus the two are not the same. — Bartricks

Can you give me a couple of other examples. If someone is motivated to torture John, it seems to me he has a reason. It may not be what most people call a good reason (when looked at in total) but there would be a reason. He is mad at John and wants John to feel bad. OK, perhaps you grant that but point to the psychopath. He just does it for the hell of it. But then the psychopath gets pleasure from torturing John. John is a human and the psychopath gets pleasure out of torturing humans. That is a reason. We just don't like that reason.

Or maybe I am missing something still, so pardon my slowness. And I almost grasp the OP, at least at times I think so, but then other times, not.

If I am motivated to torture john and have no motivation not to, ought I do so?

Clearly not. So what we ought to do and what we are motivated to do are not equivalent.

"I am motivated to do it, but I wonder if I have reason to do it" is a coherent thought, but would be incoherent if the two were equivalent.

Any confusion here is simply due to the fact the word 'reason' is ambiguous. It can be used as a synonym for motivation and many other things besides.(So I am not saying you are incorrect to say that I have reason to torture john, I am just saying that the word reason does not operate as a synonym for a normative reason in that context).

So, a reason-to-do something is not a motivation, for we can have reason to do that which we are not motivated to do and we can have a motivation to do that which we have no reason to do.

Let's go back to the original dichotomy.

Our faculty of reason.
Reasons to do things — Bartricks

I took this as reasoning, as in reaching conclusions via logic and probably verbal thought. The second seemed to be 'the why we do things.'

But now it seems like the second is really about morals.

Should I do something, should I not.

But a reason-to-do something is not a motivation, for we can have reason to do that which we are not motivated to do and we can have a motivation to do that which we have no reason to do. — Bartricks

We are not motivated enough to do it perhaps. But if we have reasoned that we should do X, but don't do X other motivations are stronger. I mean, if we believe we should do X (either version of should, the moral or the practical) then we have some motivation to do it.

Yes, we can have a reason. IOW it is obvious to others, but we don't seem to notice. But if I have (reached the conclusion that I have) a reason to do something but don't do it, I still have motivation but other things are getting in way, other motivations, laziness, fear,...)

But let me take a break. I literally have a conceptual dyslexia. I suspect that I still have issues with what you are saying here, but it could also be my cognitive, hm, oddity so I don't want to waste out time. I'll read your responses to others.

I took the OP as in part a defense of intuition. That we cannot reason our way to all rational conclusions. There was more I thought was in there of course, but I am reevaluating.

Moral reasons are among the kinds of normative reason that there can be.

So, philosophers call 'reasons to do things' 'normative reasons', so they are not confused with other uses to which the word 'reason'can be put.

There are different sorts of normative reason. They are all reasons to do things, but they have different bases.

For example, we often have reason to do something due to it being in our interests to do it. The fact doing x is in my interests is the basis upon which I have a reason to do it. That kind of normative reason is called an instrumental reason.

Sometimes we have a reason to do something because it is in someone else's interests that we do it, or because it will give someone else what they deserve, or because it would manifest a good character trait, or because it would respect another. When a normative reason has that kind of base it is called a moral reason.

And sometimes we have a normative reason to believe something because the belief is true. When that is the basis of the normative reason it is known as an epistemic reason.

These are all different kinds of normative reason and they can sometimes come into conflict. But morality, note, is partly made of normative reasons. Morality is essentially normative. But the domain of the normative is larger than morality. It includes morality - at least the normative part of it - but includes much else besides. So it is a mistake to think that I am just talking about morality. I am talking about all justifications - all reasons to do things (so, moral reasons, instrumental reasons and epistemic reasons).

I am not talking about anything else that the word 'reason' might be used to denote. So I am not talking about our faculty of reason. Nor am I talking about motivations. Nor am I talking about the causes of things. I am talking about normative reasons.

3. If a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things is correct, then our belief that there are reasons to do things is debunked because we do not have to posit any actual reasons to do things. — Bartricks

That doing certain things is adaptively advantageous is in keeping with an evolutionary account, and provides a practical reason for doing those things. This is also in keeping with the understanding that there cannot be any 'pure' as opposed to practical reason for doing anything. Any reason to do anything is only as good as the purpose it is intended to fulfill.

I don't know what you mean. 3 is a conclusion and so to reject it you need to reject either 1 or 2

I don't know what you mean. 3 is a conclusion and so to reject it you need to reject either 1 or 2 — Bartricks

You're the very soul of clarity! Please, please, don't let me interrupt you. Carry on!

How long were you pulling the push door before someone rescued you? Two days, wasn't it?

How long were you pulling the push door before someone rescued you? Two days, wasn't it? — Bartricks

:lol: I never understood time. Can't answer your question.

3. If a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things is correct, then our belief that there are reasons to do things is debunked because we do not have to posit any actual reasons to do things. — Bartricks

I don't know what you mean. 3 is a conclusion and so to reject it you need to reject either 1 or 2 — Bartricks

Firstly, 3 does not follow from 2. If you think it does then you need to explain how it would. Secondly, 3 itself is not merely a conclusion but an argument: "then our belief that there are reasons to do things is debunked because we do not have to posit any actual reasons to do things": you haven't explained why our reasons to do things is debunked on account of our not having to 'posit actual reasons' or what that even means, when it is obvious that we do posit reasons for doing things (despite your claim that we don't "have to"; {again whatever that could actually mean})and that those reasons motivate us, regardless of their truth value.

3 follows from 1 and 2. If you can't see that we can't continue this

Evolution's prime directive is survival, not (reason-supported) truth, but @Bartricks, (reason-based) truth is what keeps one alive unless...you're circumlocutously arguing for antinatalism. To cut to the chase, evolution requires the belief that there are real reasons (to believe/do things) to be backed up with real reasons (to believe/do things). Otherwise, we would be dead as Dodos! :snicker: