Tripping him up was what you intended to achieve by what you said; it's not the meaning of what you said. — Srap Tasmaner

Yep, but what you just said is not what he said :D.

These are not the only possibilities, of course. It is possible that I did not know what I wanted. It is possible that I wanted to take the discussion into self-reference territory (which is not tripping anyone up). It is possible that I wanted to make a point.

What is for sure after an examination of the possibilities is that context is necessary. Words without contexts (in this case, a thread in a forum) don't have meaning. Sure, intent is also necessary, and since the intent is vague in this case, we are fencing in the dark, but the claim that context plays no role has been falsified.

So, Trump is not merely the person or the card, it is also the idea of tripping someone up -- assuming you interpreted my intent correctly.

Curious.

Words can refer to things that are not in their dictionary definitions ("Trump" just did that), depending on the context. Which means the context (here, a philosophical discussion) has a role. That's all I'm pointing out here. — Mariner

I'm not sure if I'm understanding you here. In every dictionary I've looked at, the word "trump" doesn't have the definition you are ascribing to it. Does this mean that you are using "trump" as an example of your statement that words can refer to things that are not in their dictionary definitions? If this is the case, then again, it is your intent to do so. And the reason I didn't understand your use is because you are using it in a way that we haven't agreed on.

A dictionary is a list of words and their definitions that we all agree on. When you start using rules that we haven't established or agreed on, then even knowing the context isn't going to help me. I'd need to get in your head to see the relationship between some idea and the word your using to refer to that idea that you are intending. Anyone can use any words however they want, but if they intend to communicate, then they would need to use the established rules that everyone has agreed on and learned in grade school.

Yes. I don't disagree with that (not with what Srap Tasmaner said. But it doesn't go far enough when it dismisses any relevance of context.

Perhaps I'm misinterpreting you :D. But you did say that meaning is "not derived at all" from context, and this seems to contradict the experience of any proficient language user.

I'm sure we can reach a formulation that gives the proper weight to the speaker's intent and to context without dismissing one or the other.

After we reach that formulation, we can examine once again whether discarding any word (be it "Trump", a quite ambiguous word, or "artificial", a much less ambiguous one) can be justified on account of it being useless in a given context, even though it is useful in another. — Mariner

It doesn't contradict my experience of using my native language. Before I speak, I have the experience of intending to communicate an idea in my head. I then have the experience of converting those ideas into words that I then write down or use noise to transmit to other minds. There is always the intent to communicate a particular idea.

Answer me this: If I could get into your mind, why would I ever need to know the context in which we are communicating? If I simply understood your intent, then why would I ever need to know the context in which we are communicating? If knowing your intent is enough, then context isn't necessary to communicate.

If knowing your intent is enough, then context isn't necessary to communicate. — Harry Hindu

This means that whenever knowing my intent is not enough, context is necessary to communicate. Which is what I'm claiming.

Our differences seem to be more of emphasis than of content.

In any case, we can [begin to] go back to the theme of the thread. Would you say that the word "artificial" should not be used, whatever the context, and whatever the intent of the speaker? This seemed to be your claim, let me know if it stands as formulated.

This means that whenever knowing my intent is not enough, context is necessary to communicate. Which is what I'm claiming. — Mariner

This doesn't address my answer. Again, if you are using a word in a way that is unfamiliar to me, then even the context isn't going to help me. I did say this in the post you just replied to. Miscommunication occurs as a result of the listener or reader not understanding the speaker or writer's intent, not as a result of them misunderstanding the context. When I misunderstand your words, I'm misunderstanding you, not the context. The speaker or writer's intent precedes even the knowledge of the context. As I said before, even the speaker/writer can get the context wrong, but they still have the intent to communicate a specific idea.

In any case, we can [begin to] go back to the theme of the thread. Would you say that the word "artificial" should not be used, whatever the context, and whatever the intent of the speaker? This seemed to be your claim, let me know if it stands as formulated. — Mariner

Because there are a lot of people that still believe that humans are separate from nature, "artificial" still has it's uses to communicate with those people. If I wanted to steer away from the use of the word because of the outdated idea that it refers to, then I could use the word, "man-made" instead to distinguish between the things man has made and what other animals have made without separating them from nature.

Because there are a lot of people that still believe that humans are separate from nature, "artificial" still has it's uses to communicate with those people. — Harry Hindu

Ok, then the point made way back when, that "natural" would lose its usefulness (in metaphysical discourse) if the word "supernatural" were discarded is still cogent.

This means that whenever knowing my intent is not enough, context is necessary to communicate. Which is what I'm claiming.

Our differences seem to be more of emphasis than of content. — Mariner

I rolled this answer around in my mind a bit more and it seems that we are agreeing for the most part. Because we are cut off from direct contact with each other's minds, we use context as a tool for getting at the intent of the speaker/writer. So we are always still trying to get at the speaker/writer's intent. Context is an indirect means of doing that. This is why we say things like, "I misunderstood you", not "I misunderstood the context" because as every proficient language user knows, deep down, that it is the intent that we are trying to get at, not the context itself.

Ok, then the point made way back when, that "natural" would lose its usefulness (in metaphysical discourse) if the word "supernatural" were discarded is still cogent. — Mariner

I don't remember anyone making that particular point. I made the point that "supernatural" would lose it's meaning in the absence of the natural because the word "supernatural" refers to things (of a manifestation or event) attributed to some force beyond scientific understanding or the laws of nature. So when these other parts are explained scientifically, and the causal relationship between the supernatural and the natural is explained, then "supernatural" won't refer to anything. That is why it will become useless.

If nature is defined as what has been scientifically explained, then once everything is explained, everything would be natural, and then what use would the word, "supernatural" have? Weather is a great example of this. Do we still refer to the weather as a "supernatural" phenomenon?

If nature is defined as what has been scientifically explained, then once everything is explained, what use would the word, "supernatural" have? — Harry Hindu

Let's suppose a dummy universe, with only a few laws (say, 3), which are discoverable by its inhabitants. They discover the first law, and call this the law of nature. And they refer to the events under the influence of the other 2 laws by the word, "supernatural".

In such a universe, once the other two laws are discovered, yes, the word "supernatural" would become obsolete (in talking about physics -- not in talking about history).

Whether or not our universe is analogous to this dummy universe, of course, is a metaphysical (not a scientific) question. Even in the dummy universe, people would never be sure that there weren't new laws waiting to be discovered (the number of laws is not apparent to them). Even if we define supernatural as "whatever has not been explained so far", it seems that there will always be scope for speculating about it.

Worthy of note is that these definitions of natural and supernatural (both referring to explainability) are surely not how the word is used, nor how it was etymologically derived.

Maybe we can pick this up again another time.

I doubt there are any reasons for the assumptions behind physicalist worldviews — The Great Whatever

What are the assumptions behind it? As far as I can tell physicalism is the assumption, there don't seem to be any underlying assumptions supporting it. It does carry quite a few implications for a range of issues but implications aren't assumptions. I'm with you in that I don't think it's a warranted assumption but then I think metaphysical commitments in general are mostly just philosophically gratuitous presumptions.

There are no reasons so far as I know to think that the nature of the mundane world is physical to begin with, in any substantive ontological sense (that is, if by 'physical' you don't just mean something banal, like things that take up empirical space) – this would need to be established prior to the further position that physical sort of stuff is 'all' there is.

It's generally taken for granted that physical things exist and everything else has to prove its existence. But this is a prejudice and so far as I can tell nothing supports it.

It's generally taken for granted that physical things exist and everything else has to prove its existence. — The Great Whatever

Yes, I think that's about right. But I'm not sure what physicalists think non-physical things are, except the set of things that don't exist. I suspect that when the existence of a non-physical thing (like a ghost or a number or a law) is 'proven' (by some standard) it is declared to be physical after all. Which is fine but that just renders physicalism a non-interesting all-encompassing monism.

In the context of philosophy of mind, I think physicalism is emergentism. That consciousness is dependent on complex structure and function, and that non-conscious structure and function exists (ontologically and temporally) prior to consciousness. Emergentism is a better word as it better captures what I think physicalists want to claim.

I'm a philosophical naturalist, but a couple big problems were apparent to me with your argument, in its merits as an argument, with just a quick glance: one, you're arguing in terms of probabilities, which implies the probability that these stances have right what the world is like. But weak naturalism is ultimately an epistemological stance, so it's not a matter of whether it has the world right, but whether it's the most rational stance to take, which means that we shouldn't be talking about probability. And two, even if we were talking strictly about a naturalist ontology versus an ontology that admits supernatural phenomena, and not at all including epistemological issues, there's no plausible way to estimate any probability of correctness for either stance. Of course, I don't buy Bayesian probability in general, and I think that even frequentist probability has ontological justification problems, but still . . .

Let's suppose a dummy universe, with only a few laws (say, 3), which are discoverable by its inhabitants. They discover the first law, and call this the law of nature. And they refer to the events under the influence of the other 2 laws by the word, "supernatural".

In such a universe, once the other two laws are discovered, yes, the word "supernatural" would become obsolete (in talking about physics -- not in talking about history).

Whether or not our universe is analogous to this dummy universe, of course, is a metaphysical (not a scientific) question. Even in the dummy universe, people would never be sure that there weren't new laws waiting to be discovered (the number of laws is not apparent to them). Even if we define supernatural as "whatever has not been explained so far", it seems that there will always be scope for speculating about it.

Worthy of note is that these definitions of natural and supernatural (both referring to explainability) are surely not how the word is used, nor how it was etymologically derived. — Mariner

Sure. People have a tendency to keep asking "Why...?", but this isn't evidence that there is more to be discovered. It is simply evidence that we seek explanations for everything. Either the explanations stop somewhere, or there is infinite causation. What would be the term for explanations that underlie the supernatural explanations? What would be the cause of the supernatural? Would we call those laws, "meta-natural?" and then what about the laws that underlie those meta-natural laws? Where do we stop?

If "supernatural" only carried the meaning of being "unexplained", then I could probably come to some agreement with you. But "supernatural" also carries with it the connotation of "divine", or "holy", and of being the domain of gods. Remember, the ideas that religion are based on are preliminary. Religion was our preliminary explanation of the world and humans' place in it. They were explanations based on our very first assumptions - that humans are the most important aspect of creation, and the reason for creation. Humans have a tendency to focus on themselves - of seeing themselves as the important aspect of creation - of seeing nature as created and designed specifically for them. Religions are anthropomorphic in the sense that it places humans as the central focus of nature. All of these baseless assumptions are where the term, "supernatural", was etymologically derived.

There are no reasons so far as I know to think that the nature of the mundane world is physical to begin with, in any substantive ontological sense (that is, if by 'physical' you don't just mean something banal, like things that take up empirical space) – this would need to be established prior to the further position that physical sort of stuff is 'all' there is.

It's generally taken for granted that physical things exist and everything else has to prove its existence. But this is a prejudice and so far as I can tell nothing supports it. — The Great Whatever

Why does it matter what term we use to label the fundamental substance of reality? It seems to me that it is the term that you don't like, as reality has some kind of substance and things that are made of the same substance can interact, or causally influence each other. Would it matter if called it "mental" instead of "physical"? Wouldn't that be based on a plethora of baseless assumptions as well?

If we can agree that what we call "mental" has a causal influence on the "physical" and vice versa, then why are we arguing over the terms used to refer to the fundamental substance? Why would that even matter? Using different terms to refer to different fundamental substances is what creates the problem in the first place. By referring to them as different substances contradicts our own observations of both "substances" being a causal influence on one another. If it is the terms, "physical" and "mental" that set idealists and materialists off, then dispense with both of these terms altogether and let's all use a new word for the fundamental substance of reality. How about, "information"?

Why does it matter what term we use to label the fundamental substance of reality? — Harry Hindu

It doesn't matter what term you use, but that's not what's being discussed.

There are no reasons so far as I know to think that the nature of the mundane world is physical to begin with, in any substantive ontological sense — The Great Whatever

Maybe if you told us what would count as a "substantive ontological sense," then we could understand what you mean by this:

It's generally taken for granted that physical things exist and everything else has to prove its existence. But this is a prejudice and so far as I can tell nothing supports it. — The Great Whatever

I'd guess a lot of us might grant that it's a "prejudice," but a prejudice that comes from being physical beings, so we're pretty attached to it. (We're not talking about thinking you won't like Indian food.)

Maybe it's easier to differentiate with examples.

Gravity, rubble in the driveway, and many other things we encounter daily, we label physical.
I'm guessing things like telepathy, psychokinesis, and sorcery would be outside of physicalism.

Sorcery, magic, enchantment, witchcraft; the use of supposed supernatural powers by the agency of evil spirits called forth by spells, incantations, &c., on the part of the magician, sorcerer or witch. The word meant originally divination by means of the casting or drawing of lots, and is derived from the O. Fr. sorcerie, sorcier, a sorcerer, Med. Lat. sortiarius, one who practises divination by lots, sortes (see Magic, Divination and Witchcraft). — 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Sorcery

For some reason the mere existence of "physicalities" (as exemplified) is usually not in doubt, but what exactly they are usually is.
When it comes to examples of "non-physicalities", it seems more like we define them first, and then try to figure out if they actually exist (as defined).

There are no reasons so far as I know to think that the nature of the mundane world is physical to begin with — The Great Whatever

The main reason I suspect is that it appears to be physical. It's not much of a stretch to think that it appears that way because it is that way.

No it doesn't. It doesn't appear to be any particular way ontologically.

I don't understand that? The world doesn't seem physical to you?

It doesn't seem like any particular ontological position is true just from looking at the world. In order for it to look a certain way, presumably visual (or whatever) evidence would give reason to believe it is that way. But not only does the way the world 'looks' not give conclusive evidence that some such thesis holds, it seems to give no reason for believing that at all, since all experience in ordinary life is equally compatible with an infinite number of ontological theses.

It has implications on what is being discussed. Everything is interconnected. You can't talk about one thing without it implying other things and ignore those implications as "off topic".

A great example is the idea of "God" or "supernatural". Those ideas have so many implications that most people ignore that they end up having an inconsistent world view, and if your world view is inconsistent, and you don't give a damn that it's inconsistent, then what is the point of discussing anything with you?

A great example is the idea of "God" or "supernatural". Those ideas have so many implications that most people ignore that they end up having an inconsistent world view, and if your world view is inconsistent, and you don't give a damn that it's inconsistent, then what is the point of discussing anything with you? — Harry Hindu

Could you give an example of someone having a belief in something supernatural that leads them to an inconsistency with other beliefs that you think they would probably have?

Hello. I like your position of prima facie. Thus us supernaturalists have the onus of proof that not all phenomena can be explained by natural causes. Have you looked at Aquinas's five ways? He uses them to prove God but it can be modified slightly to prove supernaturalism. Here is a summary of one them:
- Everything in the natural universe has a cause. We have yet to find an exception to this rule, therefore that becomes the prima facie.
- But then the first natural thing must have a cause, which itself either does not have a cause or is not a natural thing, because otherwise that antecedent thing would be the 'first natural thing', and not the other one.
- Therefore supernatural things exist.

For starters, the usage of the terms, "nature", and "supernatural" seem to imply that nature existed first, or is the primary aspect of reality, and the supernatural is on top, above, or beyond the natural - implying that the supernatural is dependent upon the existence of the natural. But the descriptions of these things implies the complete opposite - that the supernatural existed first, or prior to the natural world being created by a "supernatural" entity. Is the supernatural realm the primary realm in which the natural world stems from, or does the supernatural stem from the natural?

If the terms, "natural" vs. "supernatural" are only related to things that are explained vs. things that aren't, then (1) why is the idea of "divinity" associated with "supernatural"? and (2) is any supernatural explanation really an explanation, because by explaining something it becomes natural?

Hello. I like your position of prima facie. Thus us supernaturalists have the onus of proof that not all phenomena can be explained by natural causes. Have you looked at Aquinas's five ways? He uses them to prove God but it can be modified slightly to prove supernaturalism. Here is a summary of one them:
- Everything in the natural universe has a cause. We have yet to find an exception to this rule, therefore that becomes the prima facie. — Samuel Lacrampe

I'm with you and Aquinas here.

- But then the first natural thing must have a cause, which itself either does not have a cause or is not a natural thing, because otherwise that antecedent thing would be the 'first natural thing', and not the other one.
- Therefore supernatural things exist. — Samuel Lacrampe

Whoah... hold your horses. This part seems to be wholly dependent upon an arbitrary, anthropomorphic boundary Aquinas calls, "first". Why must there be a "first" natural thing? Why isn't it natural all the way down?

I really don't know of any other way to make this point, which I have done before in this thread and several times in other threads, If there is a causal relationship with the "supernatural" and "natural" then they must be part of the same reality - the natural one - and any distinction that we make would be arbitrary and anthropomorphic.

If there is a causal relationship with the "supernatural" and "natural" then they must be part of the same reality - the natural one - and any distinction that we make would be arbitrary and anthropomorphic. — Harry Hindu

I was you until you called the one reality "natural". Why would one use that word? Is it not better to employ a different word and keep the natural/supernatural distinction? It is useful to distinguish between gods and things, even if they are part of the same reality.

Learned so much just by reading this thread :D

Why must there be a "first" natural thing? Why isn't it natural all the way down? — Harry Hindu

Because if the universe has a beginning, then there must be a first thing. The only logical alternative is no beginning. But finiteness is a simpler hypothesis than infinity, and so, as per Occam's Razor, it becomes the prima facie until proven otherwise.
- Then this first natural thing is caused by another thing which has no cause (the first cause), for nothing can be the cause of itself.
- And everything in the natural universe has a cause, as we have established earlier.
- Therefore this first cause must be supernatural.

I also agree with here. Maybe we should find clear definitions of 'natural' and 'supernatural', if it is not already done.