So, tell me, Issac, how does one argue for something without appealing to intuition? I'm dying to know....

Aw, is Isaac unable to make an argument?

Don't you worry Bartricks, at some point in the future, having children is going to be a crime punishable by death! Either that or cannibalism. :scream: :groan: Choose, and choose wisely! We still have time, about (say) another 50 years. We need to get our act together and pronto!

Science can help you with all three of those?
— universeness

No. — baker

Did science not eradicate the harm of smallpox to use a simple example.

No, it's precisely because I know I can't be that kind of parent that I don't feel qualified to have children — baker

If you feel you fall short in these aspects yourself does that mean everyone does? If not then do you think it's justified that antinatalists would prevent the birth of people such as Albert Einstein as well as people like Ted Bundy?
Do you associate the antinatalist viewpoint with any measure of human cowardice?

To procreate is to create an innocent person. They haven't done anything yet. So they're innocent. — Bartricks

For you, is innocence/guilt a creation of human conscience or does it have any significance outside of humans or they're like?
If lifeforms such as humans went extinct, do you think evolution/natural selection would simply continue and another lifeform like humans would emerge?
Is antinatalism a pointless viewpoint because the universe has no inherent significance/meaning without the existence of lifeforms such as humans, even antinatalist ones.

I think I understand your approach.

But, as I said, one can make a philosophically justified distinction between a potential person (Newborn) and an actual one (A toddler who can say and intuitively understand I and Thou).

And such a distinction could possibly shake your argument a bit, if not completely invalidate it. That's all I really wanted to say.

so you're just changing the topic — Bartricks

Changing the subject might be relevant because there might be a suspicion that your antinatalist argument made here is based on unmentioned, implicit tacit presuppositions that have to do with your model of God.

Children deserve a good life, free from harms but no-one is under any obligation to give it them so procreation is fine. — Isaac

Ridiculous. Creating that situation he’s talking about. If you create a mess for someone else and say that no one is obligated to get you out of that mess…Don’t create that situation for someone in the first place. Your other bad arguments I’ll get to later.

Ad populum arguments are not fallacious here unless you're arguing for moral absolutism. — Isaac

More tripe. Moral intuitions aren’t equivalent to ad populism. Pro life is now the federal law in the US. Even if that was because 51% of people think it makes sense, it doesn’t (though in this case it’s a minority that wins here). Nothing has changed because an arbitrary majority dictated it. Moral intuitions can be misapplied or wrong. It isn’t bare moral intuitions that morality takes. It is then distilling out the patterns for consistency and not just arbitrary personal preference or cultural indoctrinations. Hence the bridge and difference between meta ethics and normative ethics.

This was not a proposition of mine, it was a corollary of what @Bartricks said about deserts not creating obligations in this context.

If what children deserve doesn't create an obligation to provide it, then procreation is not made immoral by that fact since no one is morally obliged to see to it that those deserts are brought about.

I suspect @Bartricks did in fact mean that an obligation is created by saying that children deserve a good life, but he's just too bilious to admit it.

As to the actual truth of the claim...

If you create a mess for someone else and say that no one is obligated to get you out of that mess…Don’t create that situation for someone in the first place. — schopenhauer1

Still depends entirely on the reason for creating the mess and the extent of the mess. Creating a minor mess, without intent to harm, and for good reason is basically morally fine by most people's standards.

Again, if it's not fine for you, that's up to you, but we shouldn't be surprised that unusual conclusions arise from unusual premises.

It is then distilling out the patterns for consistency — schopenhauer1

The patterns of what?

The patterns of what? — Isaac

Rational analysis of vague intuitions.

vague intuitions. — schopenhauer1

And how do we gather these vague intuitions from other people?

And how do we gather these vague intuitions from other people? — Isaac

Look again at Harrison’s implications. There are patterns in moral intuitions that are consistent but then misapplied for procreation. So it’s interpreting and weighing where things fit and where one’s own preferences (based maybe on current cultural practices) make a blind eye to it.

There are patterns in moral intuitions — schopenhauer1

How do we learn about these patterns?

How do we learn about these patterns — Isaac

Are you trying to get at the idea that what people report is simply what is morality?

Are you trying to get at the idea that what people report is simply what is morality? — schopenhauer1

I'm asking you how we come to learn of these patterns which we are to rationally assess.

I'm asking you how we come to learn of these patterns which we are to rationally assess. — Isaac

Intuition is usually a vague sense that’s all. This feels wrong or right. Sociopaths don’t get to have cart Blanche for example.

Intuition is usually a vague sense that’s all. This feels wrong or right. — schopenhauer1

But that's just in you. You're claiming this about other people. How do we learn of the vague intuitions of other people? Or are you saying that the intuitions of other people are irrelevant. That simply whatever you think is right is right?

Or are you saying that the intuitions of other people are irrelevant. That simply whatever you think is right is right? — Isaac

It’s precisely what Harrison was getting at. If a sociopath has no moral intuition then it doesn’t mean it’s right. That’s what analysis of given situations is about..I have a vague notion harm is wrong..therefore where does that fit. Unless you are indeed a sociopath, in which case they’d have to purely learn morality from analysis and mimicry.

I have a vague notion harm is wrong — schopenhauer1

Well then intuitions are not misapplied. Your intuition is that we shouldn't risk unnecessary harm on others without their consent, and you are not having children as a result.

What possible grounds could you have for assuming other people share your intuitions on the matter?

Well then intuitions are not misapplied. Your intuition is that we shouldn't risk unnecessary harm on others without their consent, and you are not having children as a result.

What possible grounds could you have for assuming other people share your intuitions on the matter? — Isaac

I had a long response here, but I want to get back to the topic at hand.. If you want to start a metaethics thread.. let's debate it there.

Still depends entirely on the reason for creating the mess and the extent of the mess. Creating a minor mess, without intent to harm, and for good reason is basically morally fine by most people's standards.

Again, if it's not fine for you, that's up to you, but we shouldn't be surprised that unusual conclusions arise from unusual premises. — Isaac

Creating a mess, without intent to harm, but with knowledge that it will harm, and for no good reason for the person it is affecting because no one exists yet to need it, is not fine by most standards.. it is misapplied in this case.

Creating a mess, without intent to harm, but with knowledge that it will harm, and for no good reason for the person it is affecting because no one exists yet to need it, is not fine by most standards. — schopenhauer1

It is. We consider it fine in many contexts. Having children being one. Seeing as having children is just about the most consistent human activity ever, it's ridiculous to dismiss it as a relevant context.

As we've discussed before. Intuition don't go around neatly packaged with little labels on them. We can only gather what they might be from our behaviour and feelings. If most people feel morally fine about having a baby that's very good evidence that they have s moral intuition such that it is st least fine, if not actually advised.

If you don't have such an intuition, that's fine, but to argue that others are misapplying the same intuition you have is ludicrous.

There are two possible explanations....

1. Other people have a slightly different intuition to you.

2. Almost every single human of the 10 billion or so that have ever lived have all made some mistake which you (and a couple of others) have finally spotted 400,000 years later.

You're attempting to argue that 2 is the more plausible.

It is. We consider it fine in many contexts. — Isaac

Really? I would never unnecessarily harm someone to any significant degree if I could help it.

. Seeing as having children is just about the most consistent human activity ever, it's ridiculous to dismiss it as a relevant context. — Isaac

This is the arguments vegetarians/vegans make though. We consistently do it but not necessarily because of any scrutiny to if we should. It's a consistent cultural practice and a strong personal preference.. So if we want to make a parallel case of the kind of blind eye of procreation, we can do that here, as I see it as a good candidate for the same kind of arguments.

As we've discussed before. Intuition don't go around neatly packaged with little labels on them. We can only gather what they might be from our behaviour and feelings. If most people feel morally fine about having a baby that's very good evidence that they have s moral intuition such that it is st least fine, if not actually advised. — Isaac

Some cultures think that gods are in the rocks and the trees. Ancient Romans thought that it was cool to subject people to gladiator events and torture for entertainment. It was pretty consistent in their culture. Others thought burning at the stake was good for suspicion or actual having the "wrong beliefs". So?

2. Almost every single human of the 10 billion or so that have ever lived have all made sa mistake which you (and a couple of others# have finally spotted 400,000 years later. — Isaac

Again, a lot of practices are no longer seen as good. Moral intuitions can change over time.. That is where Harrison was right about moral particularism perhaps.

The point doesn't really require a thread. It's much as above. Either your intuitions are always right (God-complex), or everyone's intuitions are always right (relativism), or some generalised sense of human intuitions as a whole are what's right. Dismissing the former two as ridiculous, we're left with the latter.

The latter requires an ad populum argument to arrive at the 'general sense'

I would never unnecessarily harm someone to any significant degree. — schopenhauer1

Neither would I. We're talking about putting people in conditions in which they may come to harm. Not deliberately harming them. I do the former every time I take to the road in my car.

This is the arguments vegetarians/vegans make though. — schopenhauer1

They are no less mistaken for exactly the same reasons.

Some cultures think that gods are in the rocks and the trees. Ancient Romans thought that it was cool to subject people to gladiator events and torture for entertainment. It was pretty consistent in their culture. Others thought burning at the stake was good for suspicion or actual having the "wrong beliefs". So? — schopenhauer1

You keep jumping to the beliefs of cultures. What we're talking about are the moral intuitions which guide those beliefs. I don't think any moral intuition guides the belief that there are Gods in rocks.

You're not presenting any alternative. If we cannot look to people's behaviours to determine their intuitions, then what? Where do we look instead? Unless you answer this question you're just building castles in the air.

a lot of practices are no longer seen as good. Moral intuitions can change over time.. — schopenhauer1

Moral practices change over time. I don't see evidence that moral intuitions do.

Also, none of this addresses

1. Other people have a slightly different intuition to you.

2. Almost every single human of the 10 billion or so that have ever lived have all made some mistake which you (and a couple of others) have finally spotted 400,000 years later.

You're attempting to argue that 2 is the more plausible. — Isaac

All you presented is a way in which 2 might be possible. I fully concede 2 might be possible, but so might 1. You've presented no argument as to why 2 is the more plausible.

Likewise I agree with you entirely about the flaws and pitfalls of deriving moral intuitions from behaviours - we have cultural influences, weakness of will, mistaken methodology... but you've not provided an alternative method which solves these problems.

It's not sufficient to say that because looking to cultural practices for moral intuitions is flawed you can just make up your own and claim them to be universal.

The point doesn't really require a thread. It's much as above. Either your intuitions are always right (God-complex), or everyone's intuitions are always right (relativism), or some generalised sense of human intuitions as a whole are what's right. Dismissing the former two as ridiculous, we're left with the latter.

The latter requires an ad populum argument to arrive at the 'general sense' — Isaac

No, and yes it would require a lot more than this thread is arguing.

Neither would I. We're talking about putting people in conditions in which they may come to harm. Not deliberately harming them. I do the former every time I take to the road in my car. — Isaac

Ugh. No, that is not analogous. If you put a gun to someone's head to drive a car, you're getting closer. But even then, it's not really analogous but at least getting at doing it on behalf of another. Also, when you drive, it is not guaranteed that someone will be harmed. But all of life itself? Harm abounds. Presumably, you don't drive your car knowing that every time, harm will ensue. Now, we can argue how bad people estimate expected harms, and ignore the fact that there are harms no one can even anticipate.. and the (reckless?) Pollyannaish nature of making these decisions on behalf of others, but that is a different thread too.

They are no less mistaken for exactly the same reasons. — Isaac

And I'd of course say this is incorrect.

You keep jumping to the beliefs of cultures. What we're talking about are the moral intuitions which guide those beliefs. I don't think any moral intuition guides the belief that there are Gods in rocks. — Isaac

No the point is that culture can change what intuitions there are. So I guess I am getting even more meta.. Even so, not appropriate for this particular thread.. As Bartricks would say.. stay focused (followed by a provocative insult). I mean Kant gave a whole treatise and I'm supposed to give you a whole metaphysics of ethics in a post? C'mon.. Charitable you are not and so not biting and going off on your long march to 1000 pages on this thread.

You're not presenting any alternative. If we cannot look to people's behaviours to determine their intuitions, then what? Where do we look instead? Unless you answer this question you're just building castles in the air. — Isaac

Huh? I was giving you examples (Ancient Roman torture and gladiators, religious persecution, etc... these are all "behaviors" if you will.. but then you reject them as cultural..but the people who did them presumably thought they were a-ok...)

Moral practices change over time. I don't see evidence that moral intuitions do. — Isaac

So now I give you examples and then you are positive that moral intuitions don't change. Possibly culture changes to "better" moral intuitions, but very slowly.. going forward and backwards but generally moving forward...

(Gladiators are prisoners of war or hated group X.. these people aren't "people".. religious group that has different views.. these aren't "people" in the same way as the former.. turns into.. tolerance, lessening of harm to others or unnecessarily harsh justice, empathy, diverse views without dominance, etc. the general trend is for more empathy, inclusiveness of difference, tolerance, etc...maybe includes animals, may include not causing unnecessary harm to people, period.)

It's not sufficient to say that because looking to cultural practices for moral intuitions is flawed you can just make up your own and claim them to be universal. — Isaac

All we have is analysis based on intuitions. It would seem that in other circumstances, unnecessarily hurting others would be wrong. Here we are unnecessarily hurting others.

This was not a proposition of mine, it was a corollary of what Bartricks said about deserts not creating obligations in this context.

If what children deserve doesn't create an obligation to provide it, then procreation is not made immoral by that fact since no one is morally obliged to see to it that those deserts are brought about. — Isaac

First, I did not say that deserts do not create obligations, I said that they're different concepts - the concept of moral desert is not equivalent to the concept of moral obligation (which is what you had asserted - you'd asserted that to deserve something is equivalent to someone being obliged to give you it; which is nonsense).

The fact a person deserves something will, standardly, give rise to an obligation to provide it. It won't necessarily do so. But it often will. That a person deserves respect is precisely why we standardly are obliged to give it. But that a rapist deserves to be raped does not mean we are obliged to rape them. So, 'sometimes' the fact a person deserves something is the basis of an obligation to provide it; sometimes it is not. 'Sometimes' doesn't mean 'always'.

Second, my argument was that it is immoral - other things being equal - to create a desert of something that cannot be provided (there are exceptions, but whether they apply to the procreation case is something that you'd need to argue). No premise of my argument asserted that if someone deserves something then we ought to give it to them. But you seem incapable of focussing on the actual argument.

I see that now what you're doing is questioning the probative value of intuitions. Good one! All knowledge of anything is based on them. So thanks - my argument is so good all you can do in response to it is question whether we know anything at all. Do you realize how incompetent that is as an argumentative strategy?

For you, is innocence/guilt a creation of human conscience or does it have any significance outside of humans or they're like? — universeness

Innocence is not our creation. It's a status that someone has, not something we bestow by our attitudes. If I believe you're guilty of something, that doesn't mean you are - even if I manage to convince everyone else that you're guilty of it.

Is antinatalism a pointless viewpoint because the universe has no inherent significance/meaning without the existence of lifeforms such as humans, even antinatalist ones. — universeness

No. Antinatalism is the view that it is immoral to procreate (other things being equal).

If, by the 'meaning' of our lives, you mean their purpose, well clearly the purpose of our lives is to do what is right. By procreating then, one goes against the purpose of one's being here. If you disagree, you need to challenge my argument.

If lifeforms such as humans went extinct, do you think evolution/natural selection would simply continue and another lifeform like humans would emerge? — universeness

I don't know. But evolutionary forces do not have moral obligations. We do. And among them is an obligation not to procreate. Note, I have not argued that we have an obligation to stop the production of persons. I have argued that we, as individuals, are obliged not to procreate.

Innocence is not our creation. It's a status that someone has, not something we bestow by our attitudes. If I believe you're guilty of something, that doesn't mean you are - even if I manage to convince everyone else that you're guilty of it — Bartricks

My question was, does innocence/guilt exist outside of the human species or our like?

If, by the 'meaning' of our lives, you mean their purpose, well clearly the purpose of our lives is to do what is right. By procreating then, one goes against the purpose of one's being here. If you disagree, you need to challenge my argument. — Bartricks

I do challenge your argument. I asked you if the purpose of the universe is linked to the existence of humans. If antinatalism were realised it would damage that purpose, would it not?

I don't know. But evolutionary forces do not have moral obligations. We do — Bartricks

Extinction is permanent so if you don't know, perhaps it is unwise to advocate for antinatalism, if it would not achieve your goal as humans would just be eventually replaced by another conscious/sentient species who face the same dilemmas as we do. Morality is a development which occurred as humans worked together more and more and lived in communities. Morality would be an issue for any lifeforms which have a similar level of consciousness to humans.

among them is an obligation not to procreate. Note, I have not argued that we have an obligation to stop the production of persons. I have argued that we, as individuals, are obliged not to procreate. — Bartricks

You make an intriguing distinction here. Are you saying that if human beings can be created by harvesting sperm and eggs and producing humans completely outside of the human body then your antinatalism, would be ok with that?

No, that is not analogous. — schopenhauer1

Of course it is. I'm knowingly risking harm to others. Accelerating a ton of metal at 70mph is inherently a risk to those around me. The analogy required only putting people in a position where they might come to harm, but not deliberately intending that they do.

it is not guaranteed that someone will be harmed. — schopenhauer1

So how likely does it have to be, and why? Is 100% a different moral imperative to 99.99999%?

We could pick others. If I play football (or any other full contact team sport), it's an absolute guarantee that someone else will be harmed at some point in my hobby. If I were a tribesman and I enlist help building the houses for the whole community, it's pretty much guaranteed that someone will come to harm as a result of this activity (it's dangerous work). If I even so much as sharpen a weapon, it's almost guaranteed that someone will one day cut themselves as a result of that sharpening. Examples abound. We live in social groups and see the welfare of the group as greater than that of any individual - or at least the non-sociopathic among us do anyway.

not appropriate for this particular thread.. As Bartricks would say.. stay focused — schopenhauer1

We cannot avoid it. You're invoking your personal moral intuition as a universal moral intuition without any support. Why is your personal feeling on the matter even likely to be shared by everyone else? Your claim (Harrison's) is that there's a misapplied moral intuition - in other words, other people - those who have children - have this same moral intuition you have about harms, but misapply it when it comes to procreation. Your claim absolutely relies on others sharing your moral intuition. But you've failed to provide any argument supporting this.

Without it all you have is "I feel x and so I don't have children" - well bully for you.

When we point to the behaviour of others as a source, you say their behaviour can't be trusted as a guide to their moral intuitions.

When we point to culture as a source, you say cultures change and moral intuitions evolve.

So the question remains - on what grounds do you claim that others share the moral intuition you have, such as to claim it's 'misapplied'?