One way of reading a text is with an eye towards self-consistency or refutation. I'd like to call this the "hard-nosed" approach -- reading it as one who disagreed with the text would read it. And I think that a hard-nosed reading of Derrida makes it easy to pass over him, just on the basis of my own experience with Derrida as that's how it felt when I first encountered him. It seemed kind of flat, as if the stories that the deconstruction was deconstructing would bring more to the text than was there, so it didn't read as very convincing.

Another way, which I'll term "soft", attempts to tease out what an author was getting at. It reads it more like someone who wants to believe, but also cares about what the believes say in a wider context -- so a reader looks for reasons to believe as the author writes.

It was in this way that I think I started to get more out of Derrida, and it was the thought I was having after our last exchange on how play is working in Derrida's thought -- like, he is literally playing with the text, it seems, in order to bring out its instability -- or simply to demonstrate the instability as a possibility.

I'll say the part that I've always had a hard time with is going from manuscript to secondary literature -- I could make sense of the secondary literature, and I can make sense of parts of the Derridean arguments, but oftentimes I'd feel a little lost in the gap between. (actually, one of the reasons for my interest still -- I'm not actively studying him right now, but I'm always collecting references and thoughts, just because I like to think about this stuff)

Two "ways" which philosophers do philosophy can be broadly construed as scientific or literary. — Moliere

Are you suggesting that 'Kant's philosophy' is "scientific"? Which do you mean – pre-modern theoria or modern hypothetico-deduction? "Scientific" in a historical, natural or formal sense? I ask because I am not aware of any precise, unique predictions (via repeatable objective experiments) 'Kant's philosophy' entails. :chin:

"scientific" broadly construed, yes -- in the same way I'd classify Aristotle as a scientific philosopher. It deals with arguments dealing with the nature of things, right? He's making an accounting of knowledge, knowledge is the central organizing concept, his analytic/synthetic distinction rests on interpreting mathematics and physical science; that sort of thing.

But again, I'm putting forward categories here to be able to say how the original article's author could get more out of Derrida if they read it differently. Perhaps these examples aren't good - I'm open to others if the distinction is understood. The examples are just there to make sense of the distinction, between kinds of philosophy, and kinds of reading. And perhaps even the kinds of reading I'm putting forward aren't the best kinds for Derrida - I'm really just suggesting that Timothy could read it differently and get more out of it; and if he did so maybe he'd help us out in obtaining a deeper understanding. But as it is, he's dismissive because he felt dismissed, or so it reads to me.

Or, more circumspectly, he could get more out of it if he wanted to. — Moliere

Yes, he reads Derrida from the position of literary criticism.

Okay "scientific" as you're using the term corresponds to what I call 'pre-modern theoria' (i.e. contemplativa). Still, Moliere, this is literary – not "scientific" in a modern sense – a mode of nonfiction, or reportage, rather than fictive / poetic. I take your point that philosophers ought to be read as they have written but I think you muddle the point by contrasting philosophies as "scientific vs literary" rather than, for example, nonfictive vs fictive (or architectonic vs narrative) where the latter employs expressive ambiguity (e.g. Kierkegaard) and the former strives for reflective clarity (e.g. Kant). But the distinction often isn't so neat, so sharp, since many great philosophers have been hybrid (e.g. Hegel). A pedantic metaphilosophical point, no doubt, but which is germaine to the topic at issue nonetheless.

Oh, yeah, definitely not scientific in the modern sense -- so I take your point about the distinction being unclear or poorly named. I mean much more broadly speaking. And I'm open to other words for the distinction, for sure, rather than scientific/literary -- mostly just trying to draw a distinction here to get the ball rolling here so it's not just us going back and forth with a yes/no type thing :D

And pedantry is fine by me, too. It is philosophy after all!

And naturally the distinction isn't so neat. They rarely are if you try to pin them down -- let's try to treat this as a rough-shod, for-this-conversation type distinction. It's enough for me to admit that there are different styles of reading and writing, because that'd be enough for me to suggest that Derrida could be read differently.

Architectonic is a good contrast word, too. Especially with respect to Derrida! Architecture being one of the common operating metaphors in philosophy.

To what extent is Deconstruction still practiced in philosophy?

To what extent is Deconstruction still practiced in philosophy? — Tom Storm

I don't think it is a live topic anymore.

I wouldn't be the one to ask, cuz I'm not really in institutional philosophy. I just like to read books.

Derrida is still cited with frequency by some it seems.

I do not think Derrida or deconstruction is much a topic in US philosophy departments. I mean, it never really was--mostly in comparative literature departments.

Derrida is still cited with frequency by some it seems. — Tom Storm

Who are these "some?"

Yeah, that's my impression, for the most part. Analytic philosophy is more popular in US phil.

mostly in comparative literature departments. — Jackson

Yes, here in Australia too I suspect and in film theory.

Who are these "some?" — Jackson

Well Joshs says D is a continuing reference point and he's an academic out of Chicago.

Yeah, that's my impression, for the most part. Analytic philosophy is more popular in US phil. — Moliere

I read some Derrida in grad school. There was a Heidegger professor who occasionally gave a Derrida class.

I could never get the hang of deconstruction, I just felt like I could not infer some place to go from what I read: oftentimes I couldn't follow a particular passage of Derrida, or a particular line of thought. It's super dense stuff. But I can give an interpretation of it, just to get at the central question in the title "What Was Deconstruction?"

What I could gather from it though: Heidegger's distinction between the present-at-hand/ready-to-hand is the main distinction that makes sense of Derrida for me. Whereas Heidegger does this phenomenological analysis of language and draws out that the history of metaphysics has, up to him, focused on the present-at-hand at the neglect of the phenomenologically accessible ready-to-hand. -- Derrida instead seems to believe that all philosophy, up to Husserl at least, has been structured by a super-transcendental binary: one that cannot even be named, but which receives many names depending on the philosophy. So you get, in philosophy, these oppositions between presence/absence, material/ideal, good/bad, man/woman, and so forth. (To be fair to Derrida, such oppositions really are quite common)

Deconstruction is supposed to be the method by which we discover this super-transcendental, and perhaps, get to something real and lived, what is between the binary -- the binary is needed, of course, because it makes sense, but upon deconstructing the binary one comes to see what might be "left over". (granted, this is a metaphorical expression of deconstruction -- whether the method works in a particular text is up to the reader/writer, if I'm following correctly)

But also -- the habit, tendency, or solution of the philosophers to make a binary -- that is also in question I believe. However, being the "serious minded" type myself, I think I missed how he did it. Which is why I've talked about play thus far -- it was something that really just occurred to me as I was thinking about these posts.

Deconstruction is supposed to be the method by which we discover this super-transcendental, and perhaps, get to something real and lived, what is between the binary — Moliere

Fair assessment. In the end, I see Derrida as a skeptic.

Probably his most accessible essay is, "Differance."

Heh, I haven't read that one. Maybe I will some day later. I'm always looking for references.

I think skeptic is a good epithet; with respect to scientific knowledge and such I think he really is a skeptic. But, one, I don't see that as a bad thing. And two, I think his skepticism is confined to a tradition. I don't think he's a universal skeptic.

Or, tradition? Naw, that's not right. There are more than one traditions which he is targeting... but a mode of philosophy, maybe.

I think skeptic is a good epithet; with respect to scientific knowledge and such I think he really is a skeptic. But, one, I don't see that as a bad thing. And two, I think his skepticism is confined to a tradition. I don't think he's a universal skeptic. — Moliere

Skeptics posit a totality which cannot be had. Platonism. The real object cannot be conceived.

I am not a skepic.

Skeptics posit a totality which cannot be had — Jackson

Now I have been loosy goosy in my thinking, so please forgive me for this specificity. I only focus on it because this is what I'd agree to, and agree that Derrida is a skeptic in this vein. I'm not sure, though, about "the real object cannot be conceived" only because "the real object" does not seem to be a totality to me, unless "the real object" is understood in a general sense of descriptions for all objects.

I know that's a little dumb sounding, so I'll stop there to see if we're even close to communicating yet :)

"the real object" is understood in a general sense of descriptions for all objects. — Moliere

Derrida is a Kantian.

OK, this gets close to our disagreement on Derrida. But it's a good expression, I think, because what I've said would put him squarely against Kant -- he has a method which goes outside of these considerations, (and if I'm right about play) if one chooses.

I think he's trying to actually move outside of Kant's categories, but knows that in so speaking he would already set up an opposition which would create a Hegelian sort of dialectic...

I think he's trying to actually move outside of Kant's categories, but knows that in so speaking he would already set up an opposition which would create a Hegelian sort of dialectic... — Moliere

The concept of otherness ( "differance") came from Hegel which influenced Levi-Strauss and Saussure. Kojeve's works on Hegel were very influential.

Saussure is the guy I read, at least his course in general linguistics. Just for background.

Would you disagree with Derrida's desire to try to move outside of a Hegelian dialectic? Now that I'm thinking about that expression, maybe it'd be better to say outside of a Kantian antinomy... I do get the sense that Derrida feels trapped, and is trying to escape that trap. Do you think that's unfair?

. Do you think that's unfair? — Moliere

See, Hegel is a concrete thinker. Many do not get that. So I get the idea criticizing dialectic, but in the end, Hegel means nothingness, or an irreducible otherness. I am saying Derrida idealizes otherness.


As the artist Frank Stella said, "All I want anyone to get out of my paintings is the fact that you can see the whole idea without any conclusion . . . What you see is what you see."

Ahhhhh... OK.

I'll admit that this critique is a bit beyond me. I just think your critique is of a higher level than the original article -- the original article felt like the normal sorts of things I hear when people say Derrida is bad. And maybe that works for some, but for me it didn't.

That being said -- if you feel you can say more on the topic, I'm all ears. Or if not, no worries. I'm only stating what I'm interested in, not assigning homework assignments :)

I agree that Hegel is a concrete thinker, tho -- just fyi

I agree that Hegel is a concrete thinker, tho -- just fy — Moliere

Many read the section "Absolute Knowing" in the Phenomenology as saying dialectical history comes to an end. Hegel is criticizing subjectivity and saying we are in the stage of objective knowing. Like you said, a concrete thinker. Thus Hegel is not a skeptic.