Or to put it another way every idea contains the seed of its own negation. — Janus

Which would be more what Hegel means.

Dialectic is the systematic process of affirmation and negation.

But (an/the) antithesis of a thesis X is its complement – whatever completes X (e.g. Y) – not merely Xs "negation" (~X or absence of X), right? Or am I giving Hegel too much credit (re: being / becoming)?

Personally, I don't see anything said here as in conflict with what I said.

Personally, I don't see anything said here as in conflict with what I said. — Moliere

I do not know what you are referring to. It helps to use the quote function if you are referring to something someone said.

But (an/the) antithesis of a thesis X is its complement – whatever completes X (e.g. Y) – not merely Xs "negation" (~X or absence of X), right? Or am I giving Hegel too much credit (re: being / becoming)? — 180 Proof

I think you are right. The usual formulation: thesis—antithesis—synthesis was not explicitly enunciated by Hegel, but scholars generally seem to think it is a good model for what he was doing.
In English we have various words which suggest negation or antithesis, but which may differ more or less in meaning from negation in subtle ways, for example: contrary, complement, contradiction.

As I understand it, Hegel thinks of the dialectical development of thought and spirit in terms of moments in the development of consciousness. The classic as presented in POS is "sense certainty". I understand this as equating to naive realism. But this idea contains the seeds of its negation(s): anti-realism, idealism, indirect realism, which arise by taking what is observed to be the case about the human perceptual organs and their processes as simply true; i.e. that they "filter" or "distort" the "real" objects we encounter so that we "see through a glass darkly".

But then Hegel argues that this is itself a distorted picture, and that the things we encounter are the end process of perception, not its inception; the appearances are the reality and the "ding an sich" is a meaningless phantom, This is the synthesis of the apparent contradiction between the thesis: we see things just as they really are and the antithesis: we see things distorted through the filters of the senses,the synthesis being: we see things just as they are as they and our senses enable us to see them. ( So it is simplistic to say that we inevitably see things "as they really are" or "through a glass darkly")

So, as clumsily as I have hastily put all that, and given my own limited understanding of a difficult philosophy, you are right because in the synthesis the apparent negation is shown to be just that, only apparent. I think this synthesis is referred to as "sublation", but I won't attempt to go further into that, because it is a complex subject that I don't know enough about.

The idea of negation is important though, even though it is superceded, because that is what drives the dialectical development of reason, according to Hegel, as far as I understand it anyway.

:cool:

OK, a stronger statement:

I agree with what I said and with what everyone else said to me.

I think you are right. The usual formulation: thesis—antithesis—synthesis was not explicitly enunciated by Hegel, but scholars generally seem to think it is a good model for what he was doing. — Janus

This is exactly wrong and trivializes Hegel's work. Dialectic is that one idea is in conflict with itself. Not that two ideas are in conflict. This reduces dialectic to legal arbitration.

For example, the concept of faith in religion is based on doubt. There is no synthesis, the very concept is wrong.

I think this synthesis is referred to as "sublation", — Janus

The German is Aufhebung. This means affirmation/negation.

This is exactly wrong and trivializes Hegel's work. Dialectic is that one idea is in conflict with itself. Not that two ideas are in conflict. This reduces dialectic to legal arbitration.

For example, the concept of faith in religion is based on doubt. There is no synthesis, the very concept is wrong. — Jackson

I think you misunderstand if you think that according to Hegel ideas, as such, simpliciter or in the very first instance, are in conflict with themselves. The claim is that an idea may give rise to a conflicting idea, but an idea simpliciter cannot be in conflict with itself. As 180 Proof said, it makes sense to say that ideas contain or depend on their complementaries in that, for example, the idea of goodness makes no sense unless contrasted with badness.

I don't know what you mean by saying that what I said "trivializes" Hegel and I have no idea what you mean with your "faith in religion" example; more explanation is required.

The German is Aufhebung. This means affirmation/negation. — Jackson

Yes, I know the German is Aufhebung. Affirmation/ negation is one definition; but let's not oversimplify:

The meaning of “sublation” as translation of “Aufhebung”

One central term of Hegel, the German word “Aufhebung,” is usually translated as “sublation” into English.

In fact, the word “sublation” appeared in the 19th century English literature , only after Hegel and the Hegel School began using “Aufhebung” and translators needed an equivalent. “Aufhebung,” depending on context, was being used to mean simple negation, affirmation, or a simultaneous affirmation/negation. English translators looked to Latin (many English scientific words have Latin roots) and found the word “sublatus” (to take or carry away or lift up); the Latin “sublatus” then became “sublation” in English.

Why did the translators associate “lifting” or “taking away” with the abstract ideas of negation and affirmation?

The entire flow of meaning from the original German word “Aufhebung” arises from its basic associative picture, which in German involves simply lifting something from a lower place to a higher place, such as from the floor or ground into your hand.

However, thinking about this process can bring to mind certain associations and inferences when the word is used:

A. Something lifted from its ground has been thereby taken away. A legal ban may be “lifted” and thus may in effect be done away with (negated).

B. On the other hand, something lifted up may in fact be preserved (saved) for later use. Physically or even spiritually someone may “lift up” a person who has fallen and save him from impending destruction. Here we have affirmation.

C. The picture of something being raised to a higher level can be abstracted and then applied to intellectual constructs. Someone might say, “Let’s take this thesis to a higher level.” This actually happens. For instance, it is now commonly said among physicists that classical (Newtonian) physics has been “sublated” by or within relativistic (Einsteinian) physics. In other words, it has simultaneously been negated (superseded or supplanted) and affirmed (confirmed to be valid, but only within a wider, relativistic context that was not suspected by Newton).

Thus, an older thesis may be done away with (negated) but preserved in part, namely that part that has been shown to be reasonable. A new or wider understanding has emerged from a critique of the old. The “sublation” of a concept or thesis in its broadest conception has reformed its implicit assumptions (and even its antitheses) by both preserving and negating them in a higher thought that includes the truth of subsidiary or partial aspects.

The aspects A and B are explicit mentioned by Hegel himself, while his pupil and Hegelian Professor of Philosophy J.E. Erdmann was the first one to explicit mention all three aspects in his comment of 1841.

Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed.) states that “sublation” means to “negate … but preserve as a partial element in a synthesis.” This is as close to the philosophical meaning as should be expected from a common dictionary. Dictionaries, after all, merely report what most writers appear to mean when they use a word.

In order to express the three aspects (A,B,C) mentioned above all together, Hegelians prefer to speak of “Aufhebung” instead of “expansion,” “inclusion,” “synthesis,” “sublimation,” “transfiguration,” “transfiguration,” which all more focus on some aspects or else involve unhelpful additional (and unnecessary) connotations.

BTW, Hegel himself never used the term “synthesis” for the concept of “Aufhebung” discussed here.

From here

:cool:

I think you misunderstand — Janus

Back at you. Not engaging with personal attacks.

This is exactly wrong and trivializes Hegel's work. — Jackson

I think you misunderstand — Janus


Back at you. Not engaging with personal attacks. — Jackson

So, you see the latter as personal attack and not the former? If so, could you point out what you see as the difference? (Just so you know, I don't see either as a personal attack, but if pressed I would say the former comes closer).

So, you see the latter as personal attack and not the former? If so, could you point out what you see as the difference? (Just so you know, I don't see either as a personal attack, but if pressed I would say the former comes closer). — Janus

Goodnight.

Goodnight. — Jackson

If every idea is in conflict with itself, perhaps you meant "badnight"? :wink:

Or to put it another way every idea contains the seed of its own negation. — Janus

Yes. Negative knowledge. Interesting how Hegel incorporates it as a necessary part of human experience. Definitely one of the greatest philosophical contributions.

Back at you. Not engaging with personal attacks. — Jackson

That is precisely the correct time to engage your interlocutor.

So, as clumsily as I have hastily put all that, and given my own limited understanding of a difficult philosophy, you are right because in the synthesis the apparent negation is shown to be just that, only apparent. I think this synthesis is referred to as "sublation", but I won't attempt to go further into that, because it is a complex subject that I don't know enough about.

The idea of negation is important though, even though it is superceded, because that is what drives the dialectical development of reason, according to Hegel, as far as I understand it anyway. — Janus

It is exhaustinglay complex. As far as summaries go, you've done a fine job with the final couple paragraphs.

The sublation you refer to is the negation of being. It is superseded in its becoming something "new". For Hegel, this synthesis is the evolution of being, and the basis for a contingent dialectal cycle.

On a side note, I enjoy some of the existentialists that emphasize the importance of becoming for people in pointing out the relevence of the dialectical negative. it is accurate to identify them as the earliest modern psychlogists.

For example, the concept of faith in religion is based on doubt. There is no synthesis, the very concept is wrong. — Jackson

Actually the opposite of doubt is belief. The opposite of faith (especially in a religious sense) is sin or transgression. It is interesting how doubt is nearly as bold a movement as faith. It implies the folly of reason, possibly.

makes sense to say that ideas contain or depend on their complementaries in that, for example, the idea of goodness makes no sense unless contrasted with badness. — Janus

This goes back as far as taoism.

Actually the opposite of doubt is belief. — Merkwurdichliebe

What I said, yes.

Thanks @Janus, for your wonderful summaries. :cool: :sparkle: I wanted to write something similar about the concept of 'aufhebung'. Being Dutch we have the same word, "opheffing" and indeed it has these dual connotations of 'to lift up' and to 'negate' or maybe 'dispel'. I will just refer to your summary though.

@180 Proof :smile: Thanks!
@180 Proof @Jackson@Moliere@Janus and at every other reader interested...
On the notion of ideas being complimentary or in conflict and on there being one idea containing inner tensions, I always read it as follows: I tend to use the term negation over complementarity. The reason is that Hegel uses negation himself. He also approvingly cites Spinoza: "Omnes determinatio est negatio". He also quite some conflict laden language and emphasizes conflict. The idea seems at a higher stage to be able to accommodate this conflict, and is even enriched by it, but nonetheless the conflict is real. I think it is important because when the ideas are applied for instance in Marx, you see the emphasis on conflict as well. I think it is also one of his most insightful contribution and opened the 'avenue of thought' into conflict theory. The idea of a body politic not as a homogenous 'one' (Leviathan) but as a unity within which fault lines criss cross each other has been very fruitful. When he applies his thought himself and makes the turn from consciousness perceiving the world by itself to consciousness dealing with others, he comes to the master / slave dialectic, also a conflict ridden approach.

edit: Maybe in my enthusiasm I gloss over the notion of complimentarity too soon. Clearly, the idea, broken within itself, also needs that break. The master slave ddialectic for instance cannot arise without the notion of master and slave and these notions are not only in conflict. The relationship between master and slave is one of subjugation and conflict but at the same time they are complimentary, because to be master the master needs to slave. This instability in the institution of slavery could only be (temporarily) resolved with the notion of law and contract, transforming (sublating) subjugation in reciprocity (temporarily!).

As far as the movement itself goes, I also shun the idea of thesis antithesis synthesis, as it gives the feeling of there being two ideas, the second idea arising out of nowhere, or just 'called upon' in some sense. I do think Hegel sticks to the image of there being one idea that is internally strained, but that strain only comes to the forefront when the idea is being absolutized and presented as a final answer. For instance being is not opposed by nothingness because of some sort of intervention somewhere, it arises because one considers being. When being is considered, the question arises from this consideration, what about nothing. Hegel in this regard speaks of 'the movement of the concept', not concepts being opposed to each other. So here I would side with Jackson.

I do not know whether Jackson and Janus are far off though, because here Janus gives this great example:

But this idea contains the seeds of its negation(s): anti-realism, idealism, indirect realism, which arise by taking what is observed to be the case about the human perceptual organs and their processes as simply true; i.e. that they "filter" or "distort" the "real" objects we encounter so that we "see through a glass darkly". — Janus

The seeds of the negation can be found in the original naive realism. If naive realism is considered a final answer, questions arise about the distortions our perceptual organs cause, leading to a 'break' or dualism in our view, between thins as they are perceived and things in themselves. The duality then is resolved in some higher idea, but not totally resolved the break is still there, just not efficacious anymore, it does not 'work' anymore. It is no longer 'wirklich' as they say in German. Wirklich has the connotation of being both 'real' (Wirklichkeit means reality) and active, working.

I do not like the word synthesis much either because it gives the impression of a state in which all conflicts and internal breaks are resolved. Rather we get a conceptual framework that is itself inherently unstable, only held up by this continuous movement. The movement from 'negation' to 'negation of the negation' keeps it from breaking down in my view. (This is all my view by the way and I have been criticized for having a too ironic and de-absolutist reading). I think that is why Hegel calls himself a Heracleitian, movement is the only thing remaining. It ends there, that is the absolute insight Hegel offers, but nothing more... It is akin to Wittgenstein's ladder, when you are through with it, you think 'what now'? Well now history is just beginning... it is not the end of history ;)

If every idea is in conflict with itself, perhaps you meant "badnight"? — Janus

Here we see the dialectic in full flow. Wishing someone goodnight is at face value a happy wish. However, it also has the connotation something is over and may therefore revert into its opposite, the meaning of "this is done" reverting 'good night' into an angry slam of the door. :wink:

What I said, yes. — Jackson

Nope. You said:

the concept of faith in religion is based on doubt — Jackson

Faith (religiously speaking) and belief are qualitatively different but commonly confused. Doubt relates to belief, not faith (in the religious sense).

I do not know whether Jackson and Janus are far off though. . . — Tobias

With respect to understanding Marx, I don't think anyone is far off. It's important to understand Marx's relationship to Hegel, and it's important to understand that Hegel is interpreted in a lot of ways (as is Marx, for that matter) -- these are fair and in depth readings of Hegel, and one could attempt a clarification of material dialectic with these readings. For myself I was satisfied with a sentence to bounce off of into the communist manifesto to show the pattern from Hegel to Marx.

I referred back to some books because I think dialectical materialism isn't the sort of idea one just defines, clarifies, and now, having read the words, knows. It's more like a calculus -- it makes sense when you read the basic rules, but you don't know it until you solve the problems. And it's the sort of idea that is only productive to talk about if one reads something and tries to work with the idea themselves a bit. (the way it's not like calculus, of course, is that it's not a deductive logic)

Hi @Moliere I am not an expert on the relationship between Hegel and Marx. I read a bit of Das Kapital. I think Marx is much more 'social' than Hegel. Hegel represents a step in a much more sociological direction as he uses praxis as a critique of Kant, at least in my view. Marx is concerned with the society he is in. His philosophy is also a political critique. I am not that familiar though with Dia-mat as it has been developed since Marx or by Marx as a method. What I do find interesting is that immediately following Hegel a circle of left Hegelians and right Hegelians emerged. The left highlighting the revolutionary conflictuous potential and the right hailing its totalitarian, conservative outlook. His own thinking contains hidden tensions apparently that, when thought through, lead to conflicting interpretations.

Oh, fair. I certainly don't mean to present myself as an expert I should say too -- and I'm sure you're being too modest :D -- you did reference the slave/master dialectic after all! And I'd say that's, like, the key passage from Hegel that is easy to see how he influenced Marx.

Faith (religiously speaking) and belief are qualitatively different but commonly confused. Doubt relates to belief, not faith (in the religious sense). — Merkwurdichliebe

I was referring to Hegel in the Phenomenology.

↪Tobias Oh, fair. I certainly don't mean to present myself as an expert I should say too -- and I'm sure you're being too modest :D -- you did reference the slave/master dialectic after all! And I'd say that's, like, the key passage from Hegel that is easy to see how he influenced Marx. — Moliere

First off,, a noob question, how do you get this ↪ ? I have to use @ if I want to point to someone, but this is far more elegant...

Anyway, yeah the Master slave dialectic is a key passage, also in its own right. I was always struck with the fact that later continental philosophy such as phenomenology or existentialism had so little concern with 'togetherness'. I am sure I will incur the wrath of a host of Hedeggerians, but his 'Dasein' seems very lonely as does 'l'etre' in Sartre. Nietzsche's overman is a lonely figure too. What I like a lot in Hegel is the idea of 'being the same in difference', one remains a true individual but always within a conceptual network of indviduals, genus, society and history. Not 'thrown into it' as Heidegger would have it, but 'growing up' in it, with all the pain, conflict, scepticism and heartache that entails. For me that is something very modern in Hegel actually, so modern that current thinking completely seems to negate it and only focusses on difference. .

What struck me as well is how similar Hegel and Marx seemed to be appreciating the nature of 'work'. In Hegel working and working together are key as well in order to form a society that is wat once guided by law and held together by a certain moral substance.

Hegel's Philosophy of Art gives a good description of what he means by dialectic. He defines tragedy as the conflict of two goods. Christian moralists like to oppose good and evil as the moral conflict. Thus, dialectic is the conflict of two goods.

First off,, a noob question, how do you get this ↪ ? I have to use if I want to point to someone, but this is far more elegant... — Tobias

No worries. At the bottom of people's posts near where the timestamp is you just hover your mouse pointer to the right of the timestamp. A little arrow pointing towards the timestamp appears, and if you hover over that a box appears which labels it as "Reply" -- click on that, and you're good to go.