I believe I understand 'language games' as a concept, — mcdoodle

Cool. So you see language itself as a means of communicating ideas?

But Witt's 'Philosophical Investigations' is also indeed a pawn, or possibly a knight or bishop, in the language game of philosophy. There's a certain social and intellectual milieu where such games are mostly played. — mcdoodle

I respect that this perspective is meaningful to you, but it just isn't particularly to me.

I do believe language is sometimes rule-based and game-like, but I just don't see that becoming a general rule.

In passing, it's interesting that your imagined example is of written language, whereas the Witt notion applies to all forms of language-exchange, and is rooted in talk about 'utterances'. — mcdoodle

That's because no one in my spoken language community ever uses "language game." I'm only familiar with it from seeing it written.

I do believe language is sometimes rule-based and game-like, but I just don't see that becoming a general rule. — Mongrel

We want truth to show up here somewhere, right?

?

We want truth to show up here somewhere, right? — Srap Tasmaner

Truth is one of the rules of some of the games. It's the main rule of "Confession", and an important rule of "Philosophy", "History", and even "Biography". It's not a rule of "Story-telling" or "Poetry". Thus one does not ask if the ring of power was really destroyed in Mt Doom, or in what way my love is like a red red rose.

My understanding is that to talk of different language games is simply to say that we do different things with words, and the rules vary according to what we are doing.

Truth is one of the rules of some of the games. ... It's not a rule of "Story-telling" or "Poetry". Thus one does not ask if the ring of power was really destroyed in Mt Doom, or in what way my love is like a red red rose. — unenlightened

Is not metaphorical truth another rule?

Here, though, there are only words, ordinary words in ordinary language, even to explain to use how we ought to use meta-language. I don't see how that can mitigate any difficulties. I think philosophers on the whole do indeed try to explain the formal meaning they intend their terms to have, but there is a neo-Derrida in my head sometimes who can always find a connotation lurking in the most precise of definitions. — mcdoodle

This is why I appreciate sime's take: philosophy is one area of life in which the flexibility of language can become a pain in the ass. So as to avoid a constant "No, that's not what I meant.." an attempt might be made to nail down certain words to certain meanings.

Another area is technical writing where ambiguity could get someone killed. In these cases, there is nothing game-like about language use. I don't advise in a manual that the power switch be left off and then work through some drama with the reader where the reader comes to understand through social conditioning what I mean. That's ridiculous. When I say "power switch" I mean power switch. There is no inscrutability of reference here. See what I mean?

In these cases, there is nothing game-like about language use. — Mongrel

One might say, "there is nothing game-like about Russian roulette, someone could get killed," but that would be to misunderstand how the term 'game' is being used. Dicing with death is still dicing, and dice is a game. So technical writing is a particular language game where the rule is that everything must be nailed down, and inscrutability is forbidden.

Is not metaphorical truth another rule? — jkop

Sure it is. But what is metaphorical truth? Since we are playing philosophy, one needs a little clarity here and I think a more clear way of expressing the rule I think you are referring to is that metaphors must be 'apt'. rather than 'true'. Language is a bit like a deck of cards, lots of different games with different rules but using the same deck, from fortune telling, to building structures, from magic tricks, to poker, and so on.

You didn't follow my point (you'd have to keep reading.) But you and I are in agreement. Sometimes reference is inscrutable. Sometimes it isn't.

If language games means that language is not a tool for communicating ideas, then it's wrong. If it simply means that there are a variety of social settings where language is used and each of these settings has distinct rules.. yes, of course. That's pretty obvious.

Have you read the Investigations?

Nope. This thread is based on a comment from mcdoodle in another thread.

You should read the Investigations.

Really? Why do you say that?

I think the consensus of the folks I've talked to in this thread is that the concept of language games is not as distinct from propositional meaning as I had thought it was. In fact, I can't really tell the difference. The examples given in this thread to try to point to the meaning of "language games" actually involved all the conceptual apparatus involved in deriving a proposition.

Because some of what you say here is unrecognisable as having anything to do with Wittgenstein.

Not really trying to teach anything about Wittgenstein. I asked a question.

If at some point I failed to point out that I was expressing my limited understanding.. sorry. I've seen you on multiple occasions, specifically in regard to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, talk out of your butt. I assume you were doing the same thing... working through the concepts without having understood the text (if you did read it).

My butt is very learned. This thread is not.

I'm sure you have a learned butt. It does occasionally stink, though.

This thread is on a little nothing website in the middle of Nowhere, Internet. If it ain't impressive, I'm not concerned. I may have learned something about how people take Wittgenstein through this thread, though.

Can't say I learned a damn thing from you, though. :P If you'd like to change that.. tell me if you think "language game" should be considered a pawn in a language game.

No, do the work yourself. Look up the the difference between interpretation and understanding employed by Wittgenstein, look up where he speaks of the distinction between agreements in definitions and agreements in judgements, look up the what it means to agree upon a 'form-of-life'. There's no understanding language games apart from this. Everyone here is speaking of 'context'; yet the important issue is the kind of context at work.

I think the consensus of the folks I've talked to in this thread is that the concept of language games is not as distinct from propositional meaning as I had thought it was. In fact, I can't really tell the difference. The examples given in this thread to try to point to the meaning of "language games" actually involved all the conceptual apparatus involved in deriving a proposition. — Mongrel

One simplistic approach is to take the concept of language-games as the natural successor to Frege's context principle. If that sounds like the sort of thing that would interest you, then you should read the Investigations someday when you've got the time.

Truth is one of the rules of some of the games. It's the main rule of "Confession", and an important rule of "Philosophy", "History", and even "Biography". It's not a rule of "Story-telling" or "Poetry". Thus one does not ask if the ring of power was really destroyed in Mt Doom, or in what way my love is like a red red rose.

My understanding is that to talk of different language games is simply to say that we do different things with words, and the rules vary according to what we are doing. — unenlightened

I don't think it should be quite this easy. Your second paragraph is obviously true, but I don't think it buys us what you say in the first paragraph. Easy to imagine a rule that says you must "tell the truth," but can there even be a rule that what you say must be true? I think you still need an account of truth, or an argument for why you don't need one, and I don't think the bare concept of "language-games" gets you there without more work.

I think the point you're missing is that it's what people think it means that's important. Thus I asked what people think it means. Plus the title of this thread is a double entendre.

The reason I asked why you thought I should read it is that I thought you were saying it's REALLY worth the read. It appears you're just saying I should try harder to look smart.

Fuck that.

That actually does sound interesting. Thanks.

Couldn't care less what people think. There's the consistency of the concept, that's it.

OK.

I think the consensus of the folks I've talked to in this thread is that the concept of language games is not as distinct from propositional meaning as I had thought it was. In fact, I can't really tell the difference. — Mongrel

I do think the Investigations is worth a read. If you're finding 'language games' not that distinct from 'propositional meaning' then something is getting lost. At one point Witt wanted the P I and the Tractatus published together so the relationship between the two would be plainer. I think part of that is that 'The world is everything that is the case' leads to what he saw as the farthest reaches of propositional meaning, and that two to three decades later 'language games', 'form of life' and the looser ideas he later had were understandings that the exchange of propositional meanings is just one 'form of life', appropriate to those doing the exchange in their mutual ambit.

The approach you're taking is one many analytics have held on to, but I confess I find it difficult to understand why they do after Wittgenstein. It seems to say that a certain sort of talk, what Robert Brandom calls (at great length and density) the giving and receiving of reasons, is what all talk is about. It's not how they talk on my local bus, for instance. A philosophy of language has to cope with the talk on my local bus if I'm going to ride with it, as it were.

The stuff Streetlight is mentioning revolves around para 241:

"So you are saying that human agreement decides what is false and what is true?" -- It is what human beings say that is false and true; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. — Witt, P I"

Talking about Wittgenstein in terms of concepts shows a deep misunderstanding.

The approach you're taking is one many analytics have held on to, but I confess I find it difficult to understand why they do after Wittgenstein. It seems to say that a certain sort of talk, what Robert Brandom calls (at great length and density) the giving and receiving of reasons, is what all talk is about. It's not how they talk on my local bus, for instance. A philosophy of language has to cope with the talk on my local bus if I'm going to ride with it, as it were. — mcdoodle

I don't know of any analytic philosophers who would claim that all language is propositional. When I think of things analytical types might be holding to, it's Quine and behaviorism (which excludes any consideration of propositions). Propositions are making a come-back lately. It's definitely not some bulwark of analytical philosophy. The come-back is based on recognizing what we give up when we deny propositional meaning... essentially agreement.

My thoughts about language games were based just purely on the passages of Witt that I have read. It sounded a lot like behaviorism. I realize now I was wrong about that.

Anyways... I appreciate the discussion. :)

Talking about Wittgenstein in terms of concepts shows a deep misunderstanding. — Banno

I think you're going to have to come up with something a little more creative to do with your bishop to win this game. Everybody on this thread disagrees with you. (Except me.. I have no clue.)

"Language game" signifies that speech or writing has meaning in the context of human interaction. — Mongrel

Better:"Language game" shows that speech or writing has meaning in the context of human interaction.
Better still:"Language game" has meaning in the context of human interaction.
Even better:Language games are human interactions.

Removing the notion of reference dissipates the question in the OP.

So we need not expect words and phrases to have unambiguous references. — Mongrel

Reference is not important; or better, all there is to reference is the use of a word or phrase in a speech act.

The question in the OP assumes a referential theory of meaning that the Investigations rejected before language games were intorduced.

Maybe you could help me understand your view.

Witt discarded ostensive definition as a thorough-going explanation for anything because he recognized (in line with what Chomsky would eventually say) that there's just way too much language that a person would already have to understand in order to learn anything ostensively.

If you disagree with Witt and Chomsky on this, could you say how you would address their grievances?