I've generally found that 'cause' is one of those words so beloved of apologists and their cosmological arguments. I rarely see it elsewhere, except when people are talking about wars... — Tom Storm
Oh, yes. A hangover of Aristotelian physics, used with ulterior motives. — Banno
What value is there in loosey-goosey causality. — T Clark
You are hoping to project an intuitive notion of efficient cause onto the physical account - one where, as you say, you can ignore the rest of Aristotle's holistic account. Yet the physics will always let you down. — apokrisis
Efficient cause can't explain anything all on its lonely ownsome. A holism which can provide the context is always going to be the other half of the story that completes the causal picture. — apokrisis
But how could you define your deterministic efficient cause except counter-factually in relation to that which it is not. — apokrisis
The determinism in any causal situation owes everything to the downward acting constraints. And that rather precisely defines the accidents, the randomness, the freedoms, the causal particularity, as the upward acts of individual and constructive action. — apokrisis
...but I want to be able to convincingly argue that the idea of causation is a metaphysical principle that is not of great value in any but the simplest situations. — T Clark
Many, most of the responses so far have seemed to be in that vein, and it surprises me. I thought that the idea of cause was fairly universal. — T Clark
I think the idea of cause has a very strong, intuitive power. People in general think that the fact that events are caused is self-evident. I feel the attraction of that attitude. — T Clark
I think the idea of cause has a very strong, intuitive power. People in general think that the fact that events are caused is self-evident. I feel the attraction of that attitude. — T Clark
We may want to claim something like that if A causes B, then in any case in which A occurs, B must follow; but a moment's consideration will show that not to be the case. It seems from SEP that the present thinking leans to probabilistic accounts rather than modal accounts; that A caused B means B will follow A on most occasions. But I share your concern that such an account seems unduly complex.
We might avoid sophisticated accounts with profound "philosophical explanatory power" if what actually occurs is no more that just "loosey-goosey causality."
So we have the traditional dichotomy. On the one hand we have the empiricist Hume puzzling over how it can be that we call one event the cause of another, when all we have are our observations of those events; and here sits the problem of explaining induction; how we move from a limited number of specific cases to a general law. On the other hand we have Kant supposing that we must already, a priori, have a notion of cause available to us in order that we bet able to attribute cause and effect.
Perhaps the error here is to suppose that there might be a way to firm up our talk of causes to anything more than a colloquial way of speaking, of a habit. — Banno
I'd suggest that the apparent way to cash out the notion that A caused B, where A and B are considered to be two distinct events, is something like that in each and every case in which A occurs, B follows. Implicit in this are modal considerations, the is, necessarily, A causes B if and only if every event A is followed by event B. We thus arrive at counterfactual theories of causation, which, despite having all the apparatus of possible world semantics at hand, fail to produce a coherent account. — Banno
The alternative, for which I have great sympathy, is that the notion of cause cannot be cashed out in any great depth, to follow Hume in concluding that cause is more habit than physics. — Banno
And secondly, it is well worth noting that scientists, especially physicists, rarely if ever make use of the word "cause". — Banno
So what causes a body to cease remaining at rest? A force acting upon it — Philosophim
I mean good luck trying. That would be a counterfactual approach. Deny the obvious, and when that fails, you have no choice but to accept the obvious. — apokrisis
Pfftt. Who has studied metaphysics, physics or philosophy of science?
Causality must be the hardest subject there is. And that is because it is the most abstract and fundamental level of metaphysical analysis. — apokrisis
At issue is whether the notion of cause can stand interrogation. — Banno
The utility of that habit might suit a pragmatists, but does it suit a philosopher? — Banno
We may want to claim something like that if A causes B, then in any case in which A occurs, B must follow; but a moment's consideration will show that not to be the case. It seems from SEP that the present thinking leans to probabilistic accounts rather than modal accounts; that A caused B means B will follow A on most occasions. But I share your concern that such an account seems unduly complex. — Banno
here sits the problem of explaining induction; how we move from a limited number of specific cases to a general law. — Banno
Perhaps the error here is to suppose that there might be a way to firm up our talk of causes to anything more than a colloquial way of speaking, of a habit. — Banno
I agree and it seems clear to me that we are generally socialized to view the world as a vast realm of cause and effect. It's part of our 'commons sense' heritage. — Tom Storm
We know force = mass * acc and it's valid necessarily and therefore never changes. — Shwah
statistical mechanics similarly doesn't imply emergentism except in an epistemological sense and it doesn't preclude regular causation. — Shwah
Wiki gives a very classic definition of causality, and I'm willing to concede that the whole cause-effect relationship is a classical one that doesn't necessarily carry down to more fundamental levels.Here’s what Wikipedia says about philosophical causality — T Clark
Wiki gives a very classic definition of causality, and I'm willing to concede that the whole cause-effect relationship is a classical one that doesn't necessarily carry down to more fundamental levels. — noAxioms
OK, so we keep it to classical since cause is a classical concept, but just keep in mind the earlier comment about making the example so simple (billiard balls) that it hides the deeper analysis, preventing thorough investigation.I think you're right, cause is classical mechanics if it has any meaning at all. I've purposely stayed away from quantum mechanics in this discussion because I think it muddies the metaphysical water. — T Clark
How can the interrogation take place while avoiding the more fundamental level? There seems to be a disconnect between what you say the thread is about and where you're steering it.At issue is whether the notion of cause can stand interrogation.
— Banno
That's what this thread is about for me. — T Clark
How can the interrogation take place while avoiding the more fundamental level? — noAxioms
At first, I was thinking you were agreeing with me that causality is not normally a useful metaphysical idea. Now I'm not sure. — T Clark
And yet induction is logical invalid, since no series of instances is sufficient to imply the general case. It is evident that the problem of induction is at least coextensive with that of causation. The naive response is that our induced scientific laws set out cause and effect - as other posters have posited. But we might agree that account is far from unproblematic.I hadn't thought of the two, causality and induction, as being connected. I've never really understood the whole "problem of induction." Induction seems defensible and useful to me. Actually, it's indispensable. — T Clark
↪Philosophim Of course scientists talk of causes, in just the same way as non-scientists. But "cause" plays little if any part in their explanations. As your own examples show, scientists use force and calculation, not cause. — Banno
...in Newton's law, what causes an object at rest to move? — Philosophim
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.