The question is confused, since it assumes that things being wrong is something extra on top of the rest of the world and what happens in it.

Such an assumption not only begs the question, but profoundly misunderstands morality, which is concerned with things being wrong due to the way they are (in the world, where else). — The Great Whatever

Presumably obligations are not identical to natural properties like causing harm, for example. "One ought not kill babies" doesn't mean the same thing as "killing babies causes harm". So it seems to me that obligations, if anything, are something "extra". So there's no prime facie reason to believe that there couldn't be a world that has the same empirical facts as ours but without these obligations (whatever they are).

The point I'm making is that these supposed obligations have no practical relevance. The physical world would still behave the same in their absence, and unless the existence of obligations has some special causal influence on us, we would still behave the same in their absence. So why does it matter if there are obligations or not? Is it just a matter of principle; that we can (unbeknownst to us) be right in our moral convictions?

So it seems to me that obligations, if anything, are something "extra". — Michael

So you are assuming that obligations are something extra added to the world, and then puzzling over what the difference between a world with obligations and without it is.

The point I'm making is that these supposed obligations have no practical relevance. The physical world would still behave the same in their absence — Michael

Again, it's not as if there's a physical world 'first,' and then obligations get layered on top of it like an invisible blanket. If there are obligations, it's presumably precisely because of the way the world itself is.

So to answer your question, I might say: if killing kids weren't wrong, the world might be such that people were immediately resurrected on dying with no ill effects. Or you can imagine some other such scenario.

And it's pretty ridiculous to say that obligations have no practical relevance – that's precisely the sort of relevance they have.

The question isn't "why ought I to do what I ought to do?". The question is just "why do what I ought to do?" It's a question of motivation. I don't think the existence of some claimed obligation is sufficient. If it could be shown that I was obligated to kill babies, I still wouldn't. — Michael

I can't distinguish between those two questions. How do they differ?

I think you have a very strange understanding of obligations. It's like you think they're some kind of physical fact that has no physical implications. "So if it could be shown that I was obligated to kill babies, I still wouldn't" – it's as if you found some thing under a microscope saying "kill babies!" and you kept your old moral convictions intact, and decided to disobey it. But that second decision as to whether you ought to kill babies isn't something in response to a priori physical "discovery" of an obligation – that is itself simply sorting out one's obligations.

There is still of course the question "Will I do what I ought to?" but that seems like it's not what you're asking. It seems like you're asking "what reason have I to do what I ought to?" which strikes me as a confused question. At least, if someone asked me that in daily life I wouldn't know what they meant.

Your title does not describe your OP, as Pneumenon points out. Why be moral? Because it's the right thing to do. It's that easy, and by definition.

As to the distinction between there being objective truth to any particular rule, there is none so long as there is no way to detect the rule. So it matters only if the nature of what you are is of the sort that can be held accountable in some objective way to said rule, and if the rule is conveyed in some way.

As an example, suppose the universe consists of integer math expressions, and the objective morality is to have an even number result. 1+3 is moral, but 8-5 is not. Is there a distinction that makes a difference to those equations? Well, it matters only if 1+3 has objective existence outside my universe set (I can remove it from the universe and consign it to a good or bad place, and it would care about this), and if the fact of the immorality of an odd result is conveyed to them while still in the expression universe (how would either know?), and if those equations have the free will to alter their result. The physicalist denies all three, and the theist claims all three. 8-5 was conveyed the morality in question, and is given the free will to let 8-5=4 against its physical nature, thus earning its way into the good place after 8-5 is removed from the expression-universe. The distinction is there, but not in this universe.

As for killing babies, the example is skewed by argument from emotion. Pick something less clouded by emotion to look for truth. It is easy to argue for the morality of killing babies if you can get past the emotional implications. There are plenty of species that are fit partly because they do exactly that.

I can't distinguish between those two questions. How do they differ? — The Great Whatever

Because presumably there are non-duty reasons to behave a certain way. It's certainly not the case that every decision I make is made on the grounds that I (believe that I) ought do it. So assuming that I have a duty to behave a certain way, what is my motivation to behave in this way? Perhaps I don't care that it's my duty and decide to do the opposite.

Or would you argue that it's impossible to do something that one believes is wrong?

So you are assuming that obligations are something extra added to the world, and then puzzling over what the difference between a world with obligations and without it is.

...

Again, it's not as if there's a physical world 'first,' and then obligations get layered on top of it like an invisible blanket. If there are obligations, it's presumably precisely because of the way the world itself is.

Well, I certainly don't think that any obligation to behave a certain way is identical to any empirical fact, as if the laws of physics can show us an obligation. That strangling a baby will result in a loss of brain function and so biological death isn't a priori that one ought not strangle a baby.

So to answer your question, I might say: if killing kids weren't wrong, the world might be such that people were immediately resurrected on dying with no ill effects. Or you can imagine some other such scenario.

But what's the connection between killing kids being wrong and kids not immediately being resurrected with no ill effects? They're certainly not identical things. So the wrongness of that act isn't identical to the physical event of the act. Therefore the wrongness must be something else.

And it's pretty ridiculous to say that obligations have no practical relevance – that's precisely the sort of relevance they have.

It's ridiculous if obligations are identical to the actual event, but they're not. The obligation to not kill children is not the same thing as children being killed, so on what grounds is it ridiculous to suggest that there's a world in which children are killed but in which there isn't an obligation to not kill children?

I think you have a very strange understanding of obligations. It's like you think they're some kind of physical fact that has no physical implications.

No, it's exactly because I don't think that obligations are physical facts that I believe that they're of no practical relevance. Whatever an obligation to not kill children is, it's something other than the physical fact of children being killed (and not being resurrected).

"So if it could be shown that I was obligated to kill babies, I still wouldn't" – it's as if you found some thing under a microscope saying "kill babies!" and you kept your old moral convictions intact, and decided to disobey it. But that second decision as to whether you ought to kill babies isn't something in response to a priori physical "discovery" of an obligation – that is itself simply sorting out one's obligations.

It's not a second decision as to whether or not I ought kill babies. It's a decision as to whether or not I will or want to kill babies.

Your title does not describe your OP, as Pneumenon points out. Why be moral? Because it's the right thing to do. It's that easy, and by definition. — noAxioms

As I said above, the question isn't "why ought I be moral". It's just "why be moral?". It's a matter of motivation. That it's the right thing to do isn't (always) sufficient motivation. I might not care about doing the right thing.

Because presumably there are non-duty reasons to behave a certain way. It's certainly not the case that every decision I make is made on the grounds that I (believe that I) ought do it. So assuming that I have a duty to behave a certain, what is my motivation to behave in this way? Perhaps I don't care that it's my duty and decide to do the opposite.

Or would you argue that it's impossible to do something that one believes is wrong? — Michael

I think it's not possible both to do something you think is wrong and not be committed to the claim that you ought not to have done it. And I can't see how you can think you ought not to have done something and think you had reasons for doing it more powerful than not. You might have had motivations, sure – but if you think you oughtn't to have done it, then you're admitting those motivations weren't sufficient reason to do it.

So to ask 'what reason do I have to do what I ought to do / to do what's right?' seems to me grammatically confused in some way, though it's hard to pin down exactly why.

That strangling a baby will result in a loss of brain function and so biological death isn't a priori that one ought not strangle a baby. — Michael

OK, but who said anything about a priori? It may very well be that strangling a baby results in such and such does mean that one oughtn't to do it – in fact this is the ordinary way of thinking about it, that things are bad for reasons. There's no appeal to the a priori.

They're certainly not identical things. So the wrongness of that act isn't identical to the physical event of the act. Therefore the wrongness must be something else. — Michael

That the two are not identical does not mean that they're freely separable. I don't think, for example, that you can have two worlds identical except for the obligations in them. That doesn't make sense – and your question seems to be positioned in a weird limbo, in which you want to insist such a thing is possible, but then notice that this very insistence makes obligations seem like nothing at all.

No, it's exactly because I don't think that obligations are physical facts that I believe that they're of no practical relevance. Whatever an obligation to not kill children is, it's something other than the physical fact of children being killed (and not being resurrected). — Michael

Yes, but notice it doesn't follow from that that whether or not one ought to kill children is something separable from, or not determined by, physical (or whatever sort of other) facts about the world. In other words, you cannot insist that obligations are distinct from the world by fiat and then complain that you can't tell the difference between worlds in which they hold and don't. Your own stipulations are causing the problem.

It's not a second decision as to whether or not I ought kill babies. It's a decision as to whether or not I will or want to kill babies. — Michael

If the question is whether you will kill babies, then that is answered only by seeing whether you actually do – there's no philosophical question there, and no reason to be given, since it's just a fact whether you will or not. The same for whether you want to. That's just a fact about your psychology.

If you are asking something like 'why should(n't) I,' or 'what reason have I...' etc., then again some grammatical error seems to be committed.

I think it's not possible both to do something you think is wrong and not be committed to the claim that you ought not to have done it. And I can't see how you can think you ought not to have done something and think you had reasons for doing it more powerful than not. You might have had motivations, sure – but if you think you oughtn't to have done it, then you're admitting those motivations weren't sufficient reason to do it.

So to ask 'what reason do I have to do what I ought to do / to do what's right?' seems to me grammatically confused in some way, though it's hard to pin down exactly why. — The Great Whatever

Presumably "I believe that I ought not X" does not just mean "I don't want to do X"? So "I believe that I ought not X and I want to do X" isn't a contradiction.

And if it isn't a contradiction then I don't see the problem with my question.

OK, but who said anything about a priori? It may very well be that strangling a baby results in such and such does mean that one oughtn't to do it – in fact this is the ordinary way of thinking about it, that things are bad for reasons. There's no appeal to the a priori.

...

That the two are not identical does not mean that they're freely separable. I don't think, for example, that you can have two worlds identical except for the obligations in them. That doesn't make sense – and your question seems to be positioned in a weird limbo, in which you want to insist such a thing is possible, but then notice that this very insistence makes obligations seem like nothing at all.

I would have thought that if "it is wrong to kill babies" does not follow from the fact that killing babies is possible then to posit a world in which killing babies is possible but in which it isn't wrong to kill babies isn't a contradiction. And if it isn't a contradiction then it's possible.

In other words, you cannot insist that obligations are distinct from the world by fiat and then complain that you can't tell the difference between worlds in which they hold and don't. Your own stipulations are causing the problem.

I'm not saying that obligations are distinct from the world. I'm saying that the obligation to not kill babies is not the same thing as the physical fact that killing babies is possible. So obligations are distinct from physical facts. And if they're distinct from physical facts then there's a possible world which has the same physical facts but doesn't have the associated obligations.

If the question is whether you will kill babies, then that is answered only by seeing whether you actually do – there's no philosophical question there, and no reason to be given, since it's just a fact whether you will or not. The same for whether you want to. That's just a fact about your psychology.

And that's exactly why obligations have no practical relevance. The only thing that is of practical relevance is whether or not we actually will kill babies (which is influenced by whether or not we want to kill babies).

Presumably "I believe that I ought not X" does not just mean "I don't want to do X"? So "I believe that I ought not X and I want to do X" isn't a contradiction.

And if it isn't a contradiction then I don't see the problem with my question. — Michael

Sorry, I think I've lost the thread. No it's not a contradiction, but I don't see how that's related to your question. Is it now about wants? Can you rephrase it in terms of wants?

I'm not saying that obligations are distinct from the world. — Michael

And if they're distinct from physical facts then there's a possible world which has the same physical facts but doesn't have the associated obligations. — Michael

This is contradictory, if physical facts are exhaustive, which I'm not sure if you're assuming. If you assume there are other relevant sorts of facts, then I'm not sure what the problem is. For example, if you think there are moral facts, then you have your answer – in one world the moral fact obtains, in the other it doesn't. If you protest that this is no difference at all, then you've reneged on your thinking that things other than physical facts make a difference – so I'm not sure how to make sense of the position.

The only thing that is of practical relevance is whether or not we actually will kill babies (which is influenced by whether or not we want to kill babies). — Michael

But that's not right. We might decide to kill babies based on deliberating, for example – and in deliberation we can bring concerns to bear other than what we want to do. There's no contradiction in supposing I want to do something, but don't, because I realize I shouldn't. There may be some underlying assumption here that only one's desires can be reasons to do or not do something, or some such, which isn't right.

Sorry, I think I've lost the thread. No it's not a contradiction, but I don't see how that's related to your question. Is it now about wants? Can you rephrase it in terms of wants? — The Great Whatever

I'm asking for a reason to be moral. That it's moral isn't sufficient motivation, as it is possible that one doesn't want to be moral, given that "X is immoral and I want to do X" isn't a contradiction.

This is contradictory, if physical facts are exhaustive, which I'm not sure if you're assuming. If you assume there are other relevant sorts of facts, then I'm not sure what the problem is. For example, if you think there are moral facts, then you have your answer – in one world the moral fact obtains, in the other it doesn't. If you protest that this is no difference at all, then you've reneged on your thinking that things other than physical facts make a difference – so I'm not sure how to make sense of the position.

I'm saying that if moral facts are not the same thing as physical facts then there's no practical difference between a world with moral facts and a world without them. In terms of how we actually live our lives, whether or not there are moral facts is irrelevant, as their (non-)existence has no bearing on how we actually behave.

Unless moral facts are non-physical but nonetheless causally efficacious?

But that's not right. We might decide to kill babies based on deliberating, for example – and in deliberation we can bring concerns to bear other than what we want to do. There's no contradiction in supposing I want to do something, but don't, because I realize I shouldn't. There may be some underlying assumption here that only on'e desires can be reasons to do or not do something, or some such, which isn't right.

Then the influencing factor here is our reasoning and beliefs, not the (non-)existence of some actual obligation.

I'm asking for a reason to be moral. That it's moral isn't sufficient motivation, as it is possible that one doesn't want to be moral, given that "X is immoral and I want to do X" isn't a contradiction. — Michael

I'm not sure I follow what the significance of this is supposed to be. I agree that "X is immoral and I want to do X" isn't a contradiction. Are you worried that something being immoral won't in fact make you not do it? If so, I agree – but I don't agree that it doesn't give sufficient reason not to do it. To ask for additional reason is to ask "Why should one do what's right?" which seems to harbor some grammatical confusion, like "Why ought one to do what one ought?"

I'm saying that if moral facts are not the same thing as physical facts then there's no practical difference between a world with moral facts and a world without them. In terms of how we actually live our lives, whether or not there are moral facts is irrelevant, as their (non-)existence has no bearing on how we actually behave. — Michael

Of course there's a practical difference. For example, in deliberating whether one will do something, we might consider these moral facts, and choose what to do or not based on them.

Then the influencing factor here is our reasoning and beliefs, not the (non-)existence of some actual obligation. — Michael

The two aren't somehow in contradiction. In reasoning, we appeal to obligations – in fact in such a case our reasoning only influences our action because of the obligation. If we had no such obligation, or didn't think we did, then we wouldn't bring it up in reasoning.

Of course there's a practical difference. For example, in deliberating whether one will do something, we might consider these moral facts, and choose what to do or not based on them.

...

The two aren't somehow in contradiction. In reasoning, we appeal to obligations – in fact in such a case our reasoning only influences our action because of the obligation. If we had no such obligation, or didn't think we did, then we wouldn't bring it up in reasoning. — The Great Whatever

We consider what we believe to be moral facts/obligations. Whether or not they are moral facts/obligations has no practical relevance.

I'm not sure I follow what the significance of this is supposed to be. I agree that "X is immoral and I want to do X" isn't a contradiction. Are you worried that something being immoral won't in fact make you not do it? If so, I agree – but I don't agree that it doesn't give sufficient reason not to do it. To ask for additional reason is to ask "Why should one do what's right?" which seems to harbor some grammatical confusion, like "Why ought one to do what one ought?"

Perhaps I should have said that it isn't necessarily a sufficient reason. If I were to somehow know that I have an obligation to kill children, I would need a more convincing reason to carry it out. That I am obligated isn't reason enough for me.

And as a related question, in what practical sense does it matter if someone does the right thing or not? If I'm right in arguing that a world physically identical to ours but without any obligations (or different obligations) is possible then there's no practical difference between a world in which I kill children and killing children is wrong, a world in which I kill children and killing children is right, and a world in which I kill children and there are no moral facts at all.

The only thing of practical relevance is whether or not I kill children. The morality of the act seems practically irrelevant.

And as a related question, in what practical sense does it matter if someone does the right thing or not? If I'm right in arguing that a world physically identical to ours but without any obligations (or different obligations) is possible then there's no practical difference between a world in which I kill children and killing children is wrong, a world in which I kill children and killing children is right, and a world in which I kill children and there are no moral facts at all. — Michael

Ancient cultures pictured morality in different ways. The ancient Hebrew perspective is fairly materialistic, linking morality to a covenant (deal) with God. The Persian view is very abstract, as JK Galbraith said, is probably the origin of the concept of progress. The Roman view associates evil with disease. It's been said that the Greek view is most essentially expressed by the play Agamemnon, in which evil is perpetuated in a chain-like way as the victim, in search of justice, becomes the villain.

We in the western world have inherited all of these diverse views because each one is represented in some way in the Christian view. This diverse inheritance makes Christianity very ideologically dynamic. Morality is a cosmic drama. It's a path tread by every human that starts with a fall from innocence and ends with redemption and transformation.

All of that drama is lacking in a view that reduces morality to a set of obligations. The question becomes: why should I follow the rules of chess? Can't I just throw the knight out the window?

Uh... yes, of course you can.

Ancient cultures pictured morality in different ways. — Mongrel

Sure. Aristotle, for example, went for virtue ethics rather than a law conception of ethics.

Aristotle wasn't an ancient culture. (I'm mocking your style.. ha)

Perhaps I should have said that it isn't necessarily a sufficient reason. If I were to somehow know that I have an obligation to kill children, I would need a more convincing reason to carry it out. That I am obligated isn't reason enough for me. — Michael

I can't make sense of this. How can you claim you're obligated to do it but that there's not sufficient reason to? To claim the latter seems to me just to say that you aren't obligated to do it.

We consider what we believe to be moral facts/obligations. Whether or not they are moral facts/obligations has no practical relevance. — Michael

Of course it does. We aren't motivated because we take things to be believed to be obligations, but because we take them to be obligations. Thus in deliberating, the question 'is X an obligation?' is important, not just the question 'does Y believe X is an obligation?' But if decisions turn on the question of whether something is an obligation, then whether it is an obligation has practical importance.

Now you might say everyone is just deluded and think there are obligations but there really aren't any, and only this delusion of thought has practical implications. But that would be an odd opinion, since you'd commit yourself to thinking you have no obligations, which in practice you don't (and in practice you take those obligations to actually be incumbent upon you).

The only thing of practical relevance is whether or not I kill children. The morality of the act seems practically irrelevant. — Michael

This strikes me as deeply confused, but it's a little hard to tease out why. What I want to say, again, is that you're assuming morality is like an invisible blanket or something that goes on top of the act committed. But the act itself is wrong – it's not that there's the act and then 'wrong sprinkles' on top of it. So to say it's practically relevant whether you kill babies is to say that it's practically relevant whether you do something wrong. And its being wrong will be a force in your deliberations as to whether you do it.

Perhaps I should have said that it isn't necessarily a sufficient reason. If I were to somehow know that I have an obligation to kill children, I would need a more convincing reason to carry it out. That I am obligated isn't reason enough for me. — Michael

I should revise and say, I can make sense of this if I'm obligated according to some law or standard – but then, I would say the reason I don't take that to be sufficient reason is because I don't take the obligation of some law or standard or command to be equivalent to my obligations simpliciter. That is, I can weigh whether some fact about some particular standard requires something of me, and choose to weight other things more heavily. But whether I am required to do something period – I can't make sense of thinking I'm required but don't have sufficient reason to do it.

I can't make sense of this. How can you claim you're obligated to do it but that there's not sufficient reason to? To claim the latter seems to me just to say that you aren't obligated to do it. — The Great Whatever

What I meant is that a believed obligation isn't always a sufficient motivating factor.

Of course it does. We aren't motivated because we take things to be believed to be obligations, but because we take them to be obligations. Thus in deliberating, the question 'is X an obligation?' is important, not just the question 'does Y believe X is an obligation?' But if decisions turn on the question of whether something is an obligation, then whether it is an obligation has practical importance.

What I mean is that if we believe that we have an obligation to not kill then we may very well be motivated to not kill. But our belief may be wrong; perhaps we don't have an obligation to not kill. So whether or not we actually do have an obligation to not kill has no practical relevance.

For example, it's not the fact that there's a monster under the bed that motivates a child to not look under it (because there isn't one); it's the belief that there's a monster under the bed that motivates the child to not look under it.

Now you might say everyone is just deluded and think there are obligations but there really aren't any, and only this delusion of thought has practical implications. But that would be an odd opinion, since you'd commit yourself to thinking you have no obligations, which in practice you don't (and in practice you take those obligations to actually be incumbent upon you).

I might be saying that these beliefs are delusional, and I might very well commit to thinking that I have no obligations. But that's not what I'm saying here. What I'm saying is that there is no practical difference between these beliefs being either accurate or delusional. If we believe that we have an obligation to not kill children then (assuming this is sufficient motivation) we won't kill children, and whether or not this belief is true makes no difference to how things actually play out.

Thinking more about this, I recall that infanticide was common in certain cultures, and not just ancient cultures.

Anthropologist Laila Williamson notes that "Infanticide has been practiced on every continent and by people on every level of cultural complexity, from hunter gatherers to high civilizations, including our own ancestors. Rather than being an exception, then, it has been the rule."

Wikipedia

What is considered Normative Behavior, varies from society to society, but some of the major distinctions between what is considered normatively moral or not, seem to be diminishing worldwide. The horrific gassing of innocent people in Syria was condemned by most of the world. The united outcry against this act, suggest the shared conviction by the majority of the world's societies that it was immoral act. I think this valuation assessment is part of a trend has to do with the way the world's societies have become enmeshed and interact with each other since the end of WWII.

Rational duty is an empty/formal concept, it was part of Kant's attempt to establish objective foundation for morality. Moral duty, I think, only makes sense as a reasonable, and intensively felt cause for action.

Infanticide is big in the animal kingdom in general, but I think that it's always about scarcity. When a population is having trouble supporting the group, they kill the ones everyone is least attached to. A hell of a lot of babies were just still born as well, so it's often hard to tell. Plus the Romans accused a lot of places of heavy infanticide and human sacrifice. They only fight just wars, you see.

The Syrian thing is really probably about not looking to close to Putin, justified by war sanctions against chemical weapons, and fronted as a moral issue. This is a six year civil war, and it would have been fine if they just bombed them all normally, but it's illegal to use gas. 70 people killed, but last time when it was 1000 Trump said that it was no big deal, and not to get involved in it.

They were also sending out strikes from the air base that the US bombed an hour later.

This strikes me as deeply confused, but it's a little hard to tease out why. What I want to say, again, is that you're assuming morality is like an invisible blanket or something that goes on top of the act committed. But the act itself is wrong – it's not that there's the act and then 'wrong sprinkles' on top of it. — The Great Whatever

That the act itself is wrong just is that the act itself is something that one ought not do. My point is that that one ought not do [it] is an extraneous (non-physical) fact about that act, separate to any empirical fact about it. Only the empirical facts about the act have any practical relevance.

What I mean is that if we believe that we have an obligation to not kill then we may very well be motivated to not kill. But our belief may be wrong; perhaps we don't have an obligation to not kill. So whether or not we actually do have an obligation not to kill has no practical relevance.

For example, it's not the fact that there's a monster under the bed that motivates a child to not look under it (because there isn't one); it's the belief that there's a monster under the bed that motivates the child to not look under it. — Michael

So the idea is that thinking you ought to do something has practical relevance, but that you ought to do something doesn't.

But suppose whether you ought to do something influences whether you think you ought to do it. Then, by your own admission, whether you ought to do it has practical relevance.

So you are in effect committed to claiming the following: whether or not you ought to do something cannot influence whether you think you ought to do it. Is that right?

My point is that that one ought not do [it] is an extraneous (non-physical) fact about that act, separate to any empirical fact about it. Only the empirical facts about the act have any practical relevance. — Michael

I don't agree with this. Things are wrong because of what they are (physical or otherwise) – in fact I can't really make sense of the notion that they're not. To be a certain way (physical or otherwise) is to be right or wrong.

But suppose whether you ought to do something influences whether you think you ought to do it. Then, by your own admission, whether you ought to do it has practical relevance.

So you are in effect committed to claiming the following: whether or not you ought to do something cannot influence whether you think you ought to do it. Is that right? — The Great Whatever

Yes. So one would either have to say that obligations are empirical facts or that non-empirical facts can be causally efficacious.

To be a certain way (physical or otherwise) is to be right or wrong. — The Great Whatever

But to be wrong just is that one ought not do it. So you're saying that "this act has these particular physical properties" means the same thing as "one ought not perform this act". That doesn't seem right.

Yes. So one would either have to say that obligations are empirical facts or that non-empirical facts can be causally efficacious. — Michael

So, I think that the fact that 2 + 2 = 4 causes us to believe that 2 + 2 = 4, given that we're creatures that can realize mathematical truths. We don't have to think it, but its truth influences us to think it, because some of our inquiries tend toward truth.

Do you disagree with any of that?

But to be wrong just is that one ought not do it. So you're saying that "this act has these particular physical properties" means the same thing as "one ought not perform this act". That doesn't seem right. — Michael

No, I'm not saying that "one ought not to perform this act" means that it has such-and-such physical properties. But it can be that something is wrong in virtue of (and in virtue of nothing but!) those properties.

No, I'm not saying that "one ought not to perform this act" means that it has such-and-such physical properties.

Well, you did say that "X is wrong" means "one ought not X" and "to be a certain physical way is to be wrong". So you're saying that to be a certain physical way is to be something that one ought not do? The wording seems comparable to say that to be a bachelor is to be an unmarried man, i.e. that "bachelor" means "unmarried man".

But it can be that something is wrong in virtue of (and in virtue of nothing but!) those properties. — The Great Whatever

Which means that that it's wrong and that it has these properties are separate facts.

So, I think that the fact that 2 + 2 = 4 causes us to believe that 2 + 2 = 4, given that we're creatures that can realize mathematical truths. We don't have to think it, but its truth influences us to think it, because some of our inquiries tend toward truth.

Do you disagree with any of that?

I don't think it's the fact that causes us to believe it, any more than the fact that the root of 2 is 1.41421... is what causes us to believe that. Rather it's either the case that we've been told it and we trust the teacher (as is the case for me with root 2) or it's what we've concluded after performing our own calculation, and we believe that the calculation was performed correctly (as is the case for me with 2 + 2).

After all, how can I believe that 2 + 2 = 4 (or, less simply, 9 * 9 = 81) if I've never been told it and never performed the calculation myself? The fact itself doesn't somehow cause my brain to do whatever needs to be done for me to have such a belief.

Well, you did say that "X is wrong" means "one ought not X" and "to be a certain physical way is to be wrong". So you're saying that to be a certain physical way is to be something that one ought not do? The wording seems comparable to say that being a bachelor is to be an unmarried man, i.e. that "bachelor" means "unmarried man". — Michael

I think you're reading 'is' inappropriately, as some sort of modal equivalence. All I mean is that, relative to a world, there may be no other thing that needs to be added to the world over having those sorts of properties for it to be wrong.

I think you're reading 'is' inappropriately, as some sort of modal equivalence. All I mean is that, relative to a world, there may be no other thing that needs to be added to the world over having those sorts of properties for it to be wrong. — The Great Whatever

I don't know what you mean by this. If you accept that "X has these properties" and "X is wrong" mean different things then you accept that X having these properties and X being wrong are different facts.

The question isn't "why ought I to do what I ought to do?". The question is just "why do what I ought to do?" It's a question of motivation. I don't think the existence of some claimed obligation is sufficient. If it could be shown that I was obligated to kill babies, I still wouldn't. — Michael

Are you talking about motivation from an egoistic perspective? As in, what's in it for me? If so,I already said that morality does not require you to want to observe it.

Or are you referring to externalism/internalism schemes of moral motivation?

Anyway, it seems wrong to me to say that last bit about killing babies. Clearly you wouldn't kill babies not just because you don't want to get your hands dirty but because you think it's wrong to kill babies. The methodology of ethics rests largely on appeals to "intuitions" or whatever you want to call them. There isn't going to be some scientific or mathematical proof that killing babies is morally obligatory (nor impermissible). It's going to come from reflection. If you're a realist, then moral facts are exposed through this rational deliberation. If you're an anti-realist, then moral facts are created through this deliberation. At any rate, the discussion (hopefully) leads to a convergence of belief to an equilibrium.

So the fact that you find killing babies wrong is evidence that killing babies is wrong - unless of course you were ignoring good reasons against your view. But I doubt there would ever be a good reason to kill anyone, really.

I don't think it's the fact that causes us to believe it, any more than the fact that the root of 2 is 1.41421... is what causes us to believe that. Rather it's either the case that we've been told it and we trust the teacher (as is the case for me with root 2) or it's what we've concluded after performing our own calculation, and we believe that the calculation was performed correctly (as it the case for me with 2 + 2). — Michael

So the fact that 2 + 2 = 4 has no influence on whether we believe that 2 + 2 = 4? Is it a complete accident that we believe it truly? Or do we sometimes have methods of inquiry that arrive at truth, and so the fact that certain things are true influence us toward believing them?

The latter position seems far more plausible to me, but it's just interesting that you'd be committed to something like the former on your view. I'd say that would be a bad result for your view, since that consequence strikes me as quite bad.

I don't know what you mean by this. If you accept that "X has these properties" and "X is wrong" mean different things then that X has these properties and that X is wrong are different facts. — Michael

Suppose that 'ought p' has a modal semantics – something like, 'in all deontically accessible worlds, p,' where p denotes the proposition that you perform some action. Then it might be that 'ought not p' maps to true for all such p that denote propositions that you perform an action with certain physical (or other) characteristics, and so to have those characteristics would be ipso facto for those actions to be wrong. But still the two would mean different things – one would have a modal semantics, the other would not. Of course, there might be congruence of another kind: either material or maybe even modal. But that's not enough to get synonymy in every relevant sense.

In response to the question, "Why be moral?", I would suggest the question just might be analogous to the question, "just because I can do math well, why should I do math well?"

I'd also like to point out the importance of the questions, "are all opinions about morality equal? Or are some opinions about morality better than others?" (also similar to the questions, "are all opinions about math equal? or are some opinions about math better than others?")

@Michael, I saw you pointed to this thread in A Case for Moral Anti-realism ().

It seems to me that the only difference is that in the second one we would be correct in believing that it is immoral to kill babies. But what difference would being correct make to being incorrect? — Michael

Has your position on this remained the same over the intervening years?