That's why your "criticisms thereof" are not "ingested". They may be food-for-physical-belly, but not nourishment-for-metaphysical-thought. Your error is what Popper called the "Demarcation Problem". Hence, you are shooting at pseudo-science, and hitting thin air. — Gnomon

It's as if you can visualize only one dialectical opponent, whose lance is ever the accusation that what you're doing isn't science. To this rude rider your offer your rote retort.

Philosophy does not speak of physical Reality, but of mental Ideality. — Gnomon

And as Brentano/Husserl points out "mental ideality" is intentional, that is, always about non-mental reality (i.e. consciousness of what transcends consciousness); otherwise, exclusive concern with "mental ideality" lacks substantive (i.e. non-arbitrary) content and spirals into masturbatory solipsism. You're conception of philosophy, sir, is insufficiently rigorous and ahistorical, more akin to "New Age" fantasy (i.e. pseudo-scientific magical thinking) than not. Yeah, philosophy isn't science, but philosophers speculatively interpret scientific findings (as well as pre/non-scientific experiences) about ineliminable realities – selecting & connecting the dots without filling in the blanks with woo – rather than just pleasuring themselves with mere "ideality". :eyes:

Speaking for myself, I've criticized your not attempting to do philosophy here on a site dedicated to making such attempts and dialectically discussing them. Criticism has engendered from you only defensive sophistry and incorrigibly doubling-down on woo. For all of your sincere and speculative exertions, Gnomon, your profound misunderstanding of philosophy is gleefully conspicuous and tediously dogmatic. :yawn:

Primary substance, as defined by Aristotle is the individual, the particular, such as the individual man, or individual horse. Secondary substance is the species such as "man" or "horse". — Metaphysician Undercover

I can't claim to be an Aristotle scholar, but I got my definition from a philosophical dictionary. In the definition below, I don't concern myself with the confusing "qualifications". Instead, I interpret the distinction in a way that makes sense for my Enformationism thesis. The term "substance" today is usually defined as the material from which a thing is constructed : as a sculpture from marble or clay. But, in my thesis, I'm more interested in the mental or metaphysical concept (Platonic Form or Essence) of which the sculpture is an imitation. So I typically use "substance" to mean Real Matter, and "essence" to mean Ideal Mind. See below. :smile:

PS__Likewise, Information has "qualifications" that can be confusing if not carefully defined. In essence it is Ideal & Universal, but in particular, it can become Causal Energy, or Material Object. I didn't just make this up. It's where Information Theory has developed : that shape-shifting Information is the essence of reality : matter, energy & mind.

How does Aristotle define substance? :
Aristotle defines substance as ultimate reality, in that substance does not belong to any other category of being, and in that substance is the category of being on which every other category of being is based. Aristotle also describes substance as an underlying reality, or as the substratum of all existing things.
https://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/firstphilosophy.html

7. Substance and Essence :
One might have thought that this question had already been answered in the Categories. There we were given, as examples of primary substances, an individual man or horse, . . . Ζ.3 begins with a list of four possible candidates for being the substance of something: essence, universal, genus, and subject. . . . Aristotle’s preliminary answer (Ζ.4) to the question “What is substance?” is that substance is essence, but there are important qualifications.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/

Essence :
In philosophy, essence is the attribute (or set of attributes) that makes a thing be what it fundamentally is. It is often called the “nature” of a thing such that it possesses certain necessary, metaphysical characteristics or properties in contrast with merely accidental or contingent ones.
https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Essence

The notion of noble Lincoln is the essence (primary substance) of which the marble is the material (secondary substance) :
THE SHAPE IS NOT THE FORM

"mental ideality" is intentional, that is, always about non-mental reality (i.e. consciousness of what transcends consciousness); otherwise, exclusive concern with "mental ideality" lacks substantive (i.e. non-arbitrary) content and spirals into masturbatory solipsism. — 180 Proof

Yes. Well put. Some want the hole in the donut without the dough.

Ζ.3 begins with a list of four possible candidates for being the substance of something: essence, universal, genus, and subject. . . . Aristotle’s preliminary answer (Ζ.4) to the question “What is substance?” is that substance is essence, but there are important qualifications. — Gnomon

Essence is "substance" in the secondary sense, notice "universal", "genus", "subject". That is how secondary substance is defined. In the primary sense, substance is defined as the individual.

That's why we talk about private-subjective-Mental-concepts in terms of analogies to public-objective-Material-things — Gnomon

Does the dove flap its winks in a vacuum? Is there not already mutter in those public mounds? Is there not always still some mound in our mutter or some mutter in our mounds? A moundless mutterialist like me might suspect that the mound/mutter distinction is no more mound than mutter. What is an analogy? What is a 'map' ? What is 'structure' ? Each master word is explained in terms of still others, yet the blurry go round gets us from eh to be.

Essence is "substance" in the secondary sense, notice "universal", "genus", "subject". That is how secondary substance is defined. In the primary sense, substance is defined as the individual. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is another example of the philosophical problem with our materialistic (matter-based) language. Aristotle defined "substance" from two different perspectives (the "qualifications" I mentioned before). When he was trying to distinguish his pragmatic philosophy from Plato's idealistic ideology, he took matter as the primary. But when he was trying to define his notion of "hylomorphism", he had to distinguish the Actual material (hyle=stuff) from the Potential design (morph=pattern). Hence you have a which-came-first dilemma : the mental idea or the material actualization of the design?

Since I'm an Architect, I tend to think that the mental image (imaginary structure) is prior to the physical building (material structure), hence primary. And morph/form is what I mean by Aristotelian "substance" as the immaterial essence of a thing. I realize Ari's ambiguous reference is potentially confusing. My Enformationism worldview is plagued by many similar dual-meaning words : such as physical "Shape" vs mental "Form". Do you know of another philosopher who found a non-ambiguous term to distinguish between Substance and Essence? :brow:


hylomorphism, (from Greek hylē, “matter”; morphē, “form”), in philosophy, metaphysical view according to which every natural body consists of two intrinsic principles, one potential, namely, primary matter, and one actual, namely, substantial form. It was the central doctrine of Aristotle's philosophy of nature.

Two kinds of Structure :
1. mathematical structure is an imaginary (idealized) pattern of relationships (links) without the nodes.
2. physical structure is the actual nodes arranged into a pattern resembling the mental design.

Hence you have a which-came-first dilemma : the mental idea or the material actualization of the design? — Gnomon

Which came first, the left hand or the right hand ? the East or the West ? the head or the body ?

This is another example of the philosophical problem with our materialistic (matter-based) language. Aristotle defined "substance" from two different perspectives (the "qualifications" I mentioned before). When he was trying to distinguish his pragmatic philosophy from Plato's idealistic ideology, he took matter as the primary. But when he was trying to define his notion of "hylomorphism", he had to distinguish the Actual material (hyle=stuff) from the Potential design (morph=pattern). Hence you have a which-came-first dilemma : the mental idea or the material actualization of the design? — Gnomon

I think you have things a little backward here. Substance in the primary sense, is the most basic, common, and truest sense of the word. This is what Aristotle says at the beginning of "Categories" Ch 5.

"Substance in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance the individual man or horse. But in a secondary sense those things are called substances within which, as species, the primary substances are included; also those which, as genera, include the species. For instance, the individual man is included in the species 'man', and the general to which the species belongs is 'animal'; these therefore --- that is to say, the species 'man', and the genus 'animal' --- are termed secondary substances. — Aristotle Categories 2a 10-15

Now, when we turn to his "Physics" we see that the primary substances. particulars, necessarily consist of both matter and form. The form of the particular (primary substance) is very different from the form of the of the species or genera (secondary substance), the primary "form" includes accidentals which are unique to the individual, and the secondary "form" is an abstraction, a formula or essence.

Under the principles outlined in his physics, the "form" of the particular individual is what accounts for its actual existence, what it actually is, and the matter accounts for the potential for change, the fact that it could be other than it is. Therefore, contrary to what you say the actual existence of a thing is attributed to its form, while potential is assigned to the matter.

Since I'm an Architect, I tend to think that the mental image (imaginary structure) is prior to the physical building (material structure), hence primary. And morph/form is what I mean by Aristotelian "substance" as the immaterial essence of a thing. I realize Ari's ambiguous reference is potentially confusing. My Enformationism worldview is plagued by many similar dual-meaning words : such as physical "Shape" vs mental "Form". Do you know of another philosopher who found a non-ambiguous term to distinguish between Substance and Essence? — Gnomon

This "which came first" dilemma is resolved in Aristotle's "Metaphysics". He poses the problem of why is a thing what it is, rather than something else. Why is it the very unique and particular individual which it is, and not something other than this. He refers to his "law of identity", that a thing is necessarily the same as itself, and it cannot be other than itself. And, since when a thing comes into being (becomes, or is generated), it is necessarily an ordered whole rather than parts randomly scattered without order, it is necessary that the form of the individual is prior in time to the material existence of the individual.

He supports this conclusion that form is prior to matter, in the absolute sense, with his so-called cosmological argument. It is impossible that potential is prior to actual because this would mean a time when there was only potential, and nothing actual. But potential cannot actualize itself, as any potential needs an actuality to actualize it. Therefore if there ever was a time with pure, absolute potential (what some call "prime matter"), there would always be pure absolute potential because it could never actualize itself. What we observe is actuality, therefore pure absolute potential is impossible. And, we must conclude that form, as actual, is prior to matter as potential in the absolute sense.

Notice that this leads to a duality of "form". There is "form" in the sense of secondary substance, formula, which is the species, or genera, and there is also "form" in the sense of primary substance, which is the form of the particular. The two are distinct because the form of secondary substance is an abstraction which is universal, an essence, and this does not include the accidentals. In the primary sense, "form" is a particular and unique individual, including accidentals. This "form", in the sense of primary substance is necessarily prior to the material object to account for the truth of the law of identity. So "form" in the sense of primary substance may exist independently of that substance, but we cannot assign "substance" to that sense of "form", because "substance" requires the duality of matter and form.