So, to be clear, if you order toast and receive a cold, urine soaked piece of mouldy bread, it is reasonable - as far as you are concerned - to conclude that the finest chef in the world received your order and produced what is now in front of you?

Don't evade the question by pointing out that it is 'possible' that the world's best chef produced it. Yes, it is metaphysically possible. But it'd be a very stupid inference to make, would it not?

Now come along, up your game: it isn't reasonable is it? No. And you - all of us - are a bit like that mouldy piece of urine soaked bread, are we not? And God is the finest chef ever. So, on the face of it it's a pretty stupid inference to make - to infer that God created us, is it not? If you think not, explain.

God would not create stupid, ignorant immoral people and create a dangerous world and plonk the stupid ignorant immoral people in it, would he? If you think he would, provide an argument. — Bartricks

Who says people are plonked into this world? I like arguments but false assumptions don't get my thumb up.

I say. And anyone with any powers of observation confirms it. You were plonked into this world. You fell out of your mum, yes?

So, to be clear, if you order toast and receive a cold, urine soaked piece of mouldy bread, it is reasonable - as far as you are concerned - to conclude that the finest chef in the world received your order and produced what is now in front of you? — Bartricks

No. I would conclude the chef is drunk or has a grudge against me. Since I don't know the good man, I'd say he's drunk. So were the gods when they created the world.

Don't evade the question. The finest chef in the world does not cook drunk - they wouldn't be the finest if they did.

Look, this is pointless, you're clearly 14 and not remotely interested in finding out about the world, so just stay in your cage and squawk conventional views at the cat.

say. And anyone with any powers of observation confirms it. You were plonked into this world. You fell out of your mum, yes? — Bartricks

No. I was pulled out. But you were saying gods plonked us in. They didn't. They plonked the universe into existence. PLOINK!

Don't you have homework to do?
Make an argument or go and do your homework.

Don't evade the question. The finest chef in the world does not cook drunk - they wouldn't be the finest if they did. — Bartricks

Even the finest cook has moments. What's your point with urine bread? What you want me to conclude after I receive pissed bread?

Make an argument or go and do your homework. — Bartricks

God can't show his omnipotence. So he's not omnipotent.

What you want me to conclude after I receive pissed bread? — EugeneW

Does they not teach you English good at the learning place?

God can't show his omnipotence. So he's not omnipotent. — EugeneW

Yes, that's right. Who's a good boy!

Well wouldnt God be evil if he denied free will to human beings as well? — DingoJones

Not as evil, I think, as the Abrahamic God must be for giving us a form of "free will" too weak for us to freely – easily – choose in every instance not to make others and ourselves suffer needlessly (i.e. "making us sick but commanding us to be well"). Thus, the argument from poor design.

Do we just chalk this up to the inherently nonsensical nature of omni-god ...

Yeah, of course. I do.

The old trick of people out of rational argument. Show them their failing grammar or spelling.

I just don't understand ... — EugeneW

I know you don't.

WTF is lil D-ker?!? — EugeneW

:smirk:

Then explain me!

Yes, you have defeated me with your brilliant arguments. Or should I say, you are beat me with argument good being done are is. God done good.

Or should I say, you are beat me with argument good being done are is. God done good. — Bartricks

Good done God!

1.If God exists, he would have created the best possible world.
2.There are cases where evil does not lead to the fruition of some greater good (ex: holocaust, starving children, etc.)
3.God could have created a world without these types evil
4.Therefore, God did not create the best possible world [2,3]
5. Therefore, God does not exist. [1,4] — tryhard

The Theodicy (Leibniz) response is basically P1 while rejecting P2. If God exists, he must have made the BPW, so any evils must entail some greater goods in the future. On a different avenue, a theist can employ chaos theory to undermine epistemic warrant for P2.

It seems that the problem of evil is the most powerful argument against the theist argument. — tryhard

Cantorian arguments, modal collapse arguments, and many more do a far better job

Hello @tryhard,

I think that your OP is a notorious dilemma that many have and many will argue about. Unfortunately, it seems as though (for the most partl) the discussion reply posts have derailed quite swiftly into a heated insult match, which isn't very productive nor thought-provoking. Hopefully I can provide a bit of exposition into the problem of evil from my understanding of the issue. Now, I should disclaim that I am not a theist, but this would be my counter arguments to yours.

It seems that the problem of evil is the most powerful argument against the theist argument.

Personally, I don't find the problem of evil as the most powerful argument against theism, but this isn't the main focus of your OP, so I am not going to elaborate too in depth here (unless you would like me to). I think this is a great argument for very specific conceptualizations of a monotheistic God (typically within an abrahamic kind of God), but not all of them.

The support for the first premise is the assumption that God is a perfect being by definition.

I think it would be beneficial for you to specify exactly what you mean by "perfection". But for all intents and purposes, I am going to assume (correct me if I am wrong) that you are referring to a omnibenevolent, omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient God.

God has the ability to remove evil, and the attribute of benevolence attached to his nature seems to compel God to remove evil.

I think this is where the first issue I would have lies: what is evil? and what aspect of omnibenevolence compels God to remove it? Both depend on one's definitions. The problem of evil, as I understand it, boils down to axiology. Likewise, I typically view it as an internal critique and, therefore, "evil" would not be defined by what the opponent (who is providing the argument of the problem of evil to the theist) deems is "evil", but, rather, uses the definition that the particular theist holds for "evil". I think this is important because, although i would agree with you that the examples you give throughout your post are acts of evil (e.g. holocaust), none of your examples are necessarily considered acts of 'evil' by a theist in relation to God. I've never met a theist that thinks that the holocaust wasn't 'evil' in relation to human on human atrocities, but I have met theists that do not hold God to the standard of which He himself commands: in other words, he is not a law giver and obeyer. It is not a contradiction to hold that God's commandments are with respect to humans, not himself. Therefore, it is not a contradiction to hold that God can strike people down where they stand, but a human cannot do such to another human. I think this starts involving what I would presume you meant by:

It seems that the only hope of combatting this objection is for the theists to justify evil's existence.

My complaint would be, although I understand what you are saying, that your statement here is using your definition of evil. If a theist does not hold God to the same standards he proclaims for human-to-human interactions, then it logically doesn't make sense to claim they are "justifying 'evil'" in relation to their own definition because there's no dilemma for them (thereby no justification required in the sense you are using it). An issue only arises if they accept your definition of "evil". Furthermore, their definition (as previously defined) shares your moral rejection of the holocaust (because it was human to human mass genocide, not God to human mass genocide), thusly the issue now refurbishes into a discussion of how/why God could/does allow human-to-human evil. My only emphasis here is that it is no longer about God's direct actions but, rather, his seeming negligence. So it becomes whether or not the theist now needs to justify God allowing evil with respect to humans performing actions on other humans (or, if we wanted to broaden it, animals, etc).

As you are probably already anticipating, if the theist holds that "benevolence" does not directly entail direct interference with human-to-human evil, then there's no dilemma (i.e. if "all-good" is equivocal to "all-loving" then it is a more complex task to discern whether or not a being that truly infinitely loves you would allow you to suffer or not). As you mentioned, if the theist holds a libertarian or compatibilist view of free will, then this may be the part where they start invoking God's allowance of 'evil' as necessary for us to choose to follow him. If "all-good" is "all-loving", a loving being would not force you to follow it: you must choose it (or, at least, that's how the argument goes). My main point here is that loving something is not equivocal (necessarily) to trying to always prevent that something from feeling pain or from suffering--whether that be psychological or physiological. For example, let's say my best friend is a drug addict and is at the point that they take pills simply to prevent unwanted suffering in the form of withdrawal. Now I know that, considering the trajectory, they will die if I don't intervene. To oversimplify it, let's say I have two options: let them overdose on opioids in the most painless (and most absence of suffering) death imaginable or have an intervention and put them in rehab. Considering I love my mate, I will choose the latter option although it will obviously cause tremendous amounts of pain and suffering as they take back their life from addiction in rehab (it's not an easy process getting one's life back together after addiction, let alone detoxification). Now this is obviously an oversimplification, but notice how it is not concrete that we try to always avoid suffering. Likewise, there are people who enjoy pain, but we could easily posit that the "best possible world" is not that which has no pain, but no suffering (where "suffering" is that which someone doesn't enjoy doing--or something to those effects). Therefore, maybe the "best possible world" is where the person who likes to stick themselves with needles can do so and those who don't never have to, etc. But then we inevitably end up with a dilemma of impeding wishes of individuals: in this "best possible world", does one person's enjoyment of raping people overrule the person's hate for getting raped? I think not! To keep this brief, positing linguistically a "best possible world" is a whole lot easier than actually coming up with a viable "best possible world" and, even in the event that you can do it, it would only be a relative "best possible world" (relative, at best, to what humans could best come up with, which can surely not be confidently posited as absolutely the best possible world).

Let me break down your argument's premises:

If God exists, he would have created the best possible world.

I would like to emphasize that, as God is posited typically in a theistic worldview, we would not have any clue what the "best possible world" is in terms of what absolutely is the best possible world. We could both agree on what we think would be best, but not the absolute "best" (which would require the perspective of a omniscient being). Likewise, as previously mentioned, it is not clear that a best possible world would be devoid of pain nor suffering.

There are cases where evil does not lead to the fruition of some greater good (ex: holocaust, starving children, etc.)

Although it was tragic and horrible, humanity did learn something, no matter how small or great, from the atrocities we have committed. Prior to the holocaust, people holistically didn't fully grasp how humans can be psychologically and sociologically manipulated into literally being complacent or, worse, an active participant in mass genocide (although there have been previous genocides to the holocaust, that one is generally the one that hit everyone's radar and is subsequently the most remembered). My main point here is that if a theist is positing an omniscient being, then we legitimately have 0 clue if there's no meaningful, worthy fruition of some greater "good" from the worst atrocities we can both conceive of. It is essentially a comparison of relative knowledge to absolute.

God could have created a world without these types evil

How do you know what God could have done? Maybe it is necessary for an all-loving God to allow evil. Again, theists typically posit a being that is "above our pay grade" in terms of knowledge and wisdom, so why should they concur that He could have done otherwise?

Therefore, God did not create the best possible world [2,3]

Again, what are you constituting as "best possible world"? Absence of pain? Suffering? Both? I would appreciate a little elaboration into what you mean here. Secondly, how do you know what the best possible world is without knowing all possible perspectives, contexts, and knowledge? Or are you merely referring to what would be better than our current world (which is also relative to what we know)?

Can anyone provide an argument that provides justification for the existence of evil while taking into account the unnecessary evils, or gratuitous evils, that we seem to observe throughout our life experiences?

Again, from a theistic perspective that asserts God as outlined previously, how are the 'evils' unnecessary? What logically contradicts the idea that they are necessary (from a theistic perspective)?

Bob

If there be any in this assembly, any dear friend of Caesar's, to him I say, that Brutus' love to Caesar was no less than his. If then that friend demand why Brutus rose against Caesar, this is my answer: —Not that I hated (loved) Caesar (less), but that I loved
Rome more. — Marcus Brutus (Julius Caesar)

There is no evil. Period!

The world you ask for is dead at its heart. What alternative would we have but to believe in God, and then, why would we even bother? So, it is the best of possible worlds. I mean, to take this to the extreme, you're asking, "If there's a God, why aren't people always happy?"

Yes, you've understood the nature of "The problem of evil". The problem of evil reveals to us that we cannot label a God as limited to acting a certain way, when that God is without limits. That's just logically inconsistent, and impossible. If you reduce even one of the omni's to "The most X that is possible", then the problem of evil is solved.

The world you ask for is dead at its heart — theRiddler

:cry:

"If there's a God, why aren't people always happy?" — theRiddler

There was this man who pointed his telescope towards the ground and wondered why he couldn't see any stars? It was after dark.

logically inconsistent, and impossible — Philosophim

You might wanna reconsider that.

logically inconsistent, and impossible
— Philosophim

You might wanna reconsider that. — Agent Smith

I have, and that is what I've concluded. Its your job to show me why my conclusion is wrong. "I don't think so," is not philosophy.

I have, and that is what I've concluded. Its your job to show me why my conclusion is wrong. "I don't think so," is not philosophy. — Philosophim

Well, the law of noncontradiction seems to imply idealism. Are you an idealist?

I have, and that is what I've concluded. Its your job to show me why my conclusion is wrong. "I don't think so," is not philosophy.
— Philosophim

Well, the law of noncontradiction seems to imply idealism. Are you an idealist? — Agent Smith

Could you please show how this references my original statement? Here, I'll reference it again.

The problem of evil reveals to us that we cannot label a God as limited to acting a certain way, when that God is without limits. That's just logically inconsistent, and impossible. — Philosophim

Where am I wrong in these two statements?

:up: Sorry for interrupting your discussion. I'm way in over my head here. Pardon monsieur! Carry on.

My objection rests heavily on the inconsistency of there existing a perfect being in the same reality as an imperfect world. Can anyone provide an argument that provides justification for the existence of evil while taking into account the unnecessary evils, or gratuitous evils, that we seem to observe throughout our life experiences? — tryhard

Yes. I accept Aristotle's logic, which concludes that a First Cause is necessary to explain the contingent existence of our world. That's even more obvious since the evidence for a cosmic beginning was discovered in the notions of evolution and expansion. But although his Prime Mover was self-existent, he didn't insist that it was "perfect", in the sense of moral excellence.

So, my hypothetical model for a self-existent Programmer of our long-running & continually-evolving program is Eternal & Infinite Potential, hence all-encompassing. And that definition includes the potential (or statistical possibility) for both Good & Evil. Therefore, like all executing, but incomplete,digital algorithms, our world computes both positive & negative values (1s & 0s). But the final result (synthesis) remains to be calculated. The up & down dialectic process of evolution swings back & forth between Thesis (e.g. positive, relatively good) & Anti-thesis(e.g. negative ; relatively bad) high & low points. And the ultimate output value remains in the unforeseeable future.

This is a PanEnDeistic (not in same reality) concept of a cosmic creator, which is unlike the typical Theistic model of Goodness & Perfection, that belies the reality of an OK-but-hardly-perfect creation. Since evolution explores both positive & negative possibilities, there's no need for a Heaven or Hell. What you see, is what you get. :smile:


What is Hegelian dialectic of good and evil :
As for good and evil, Hegel was extremely obscure on the issue, and Marx of course dismissed them as metaphysical abstractions detached from reality.
https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/42562/what-is-hegelian-dialectic-of-good-and-evil-and-how-does-it-relate-to-binary-opp