What would a physicalist explanation of mind look like? — Agent Smith

I'll have a stab at it. We have an idea of what the proper functioning of various body parts and organs should be. Disease is, roughly, when there is a malfunction, for whatever reason. Physical intervention can redress the problem. It's the same with the mind. Someone's mind is not functioning properly. Let's hypothesise some physical cause and see whether we can fix it. When the mind is working ok, that is because the physical conditions are in place to allow it to do so. Also, as with the body, self-correction is possible. Just as I can mitigate back ache with physio exercises, so I can relieve mental distress with talking therapy. The effect of talking therapy is (under the physicalist hypothesis) to enable some self-correcting mechanism to start up and get my mind functioning normally again. As with physical disease, I may find interventions that work without knowing why. I don't know if any of the above is true. But I think it at least makes sense or is not wildly and obviously incoherent. But I've no skin in this game. If it turns out that physicalism is false then I can happily live with that.

What would a physicalist explanation of mind look like? — Agent Smith

We physicalists need to introduce a new ingredient with explanatory power. Let's call that ingredient X. Then what is X? Is it matter? No. Is it interaction. No. Is it X? Yes! But X alone won't do. We need an Y too. Then what is Y? Is it matter? No. Is it interaction? No. Is it Y? Yes!
There you go.

Physicalism settled the matter definitively: diseases are caused by microbial invasion of the body. Evidence poured in from all the research labs in the world via microscopes. — Agent Smith

This is an oversimplification. Microscopes were invented in the early 1600s, but the germ theory of disease didn't become prevalent till the middle 1800s.

If I were a medical scientist back before microscopes were invented, I could have, with luck and imagination, hypothesized a purely physical explanation for diseases/illnesses thus: there exists disease/illness-causing agents that are too small for the eyes to see. In other words, before I actually discover the physical nature of sickness, I can construct a hypothesis of their physical nature. IE I have a picture of, I have an idea of, how illnesses could be physical. — Agent Smith

Scientists in ancient Greece and India hypothesized organisms or other factors too small to be seen as the source of diseases.

What would a physicalist explanation of mind look like? — Agent Smith

I think some clarification is needed. When people usually talk about this subject, they are talking about the experience of mind, or mind as experience. If, on the other hand, you are just talking about the mind as a mental process, I think the answer is pretty simple. Mind in that sense is an emergent property that arises from the interaction of the behaviors of neurons and other elements of the nervous system and other bodily systems.

Mind in that sense is an emergent property that arises from the interaction of the behaviors of neurons and other elements of the nervous system and other bodily systems. — T Clark

This assumes that mind resides outside the neurons, like temperature resides outside particles. Emergence is not a fundamental. Interaction is an epiphenomenon. A reasonable position but it overlooks what's going on inside the neurons.

What would a physicalist explanation of mind look like? — Agent Smith

Gosh, won't this become another rehash of the hard problem of consciousness... a trip down the Dan Dennett superhighway?

John Searle says mind is to brain what digestion is to stomach. He's smarter than I am so he must be right... :wink:

Is it worth narrowing down the question further?

John Searle says mind is to brain what digestion is to stomach. He's smarter than I am so he must be right... :wink: — Tom Storm

The stomach digests, the brain...minds??? That isn't right.

Take it up with Searle - he's smarter than you too. I think his point is that the mind is a physical process of an organ (brain). He has a much more detailed account of this in his actual writings.

The Chuchlands are smarter than me too, but that doesn't stop them from being eliminative materialists, which is a bonkers position. Smart people get it wrong a lot, you know.

This assumes that mind resides outside the neurons, like temperature resides outside particles. — EugeneW

Temperature is a property of a large group of particles. A parallel would be if mind is a property of a large group of neurons. I'm not sure what to say about that. Mind is not a property, it's an entity, a phenomenon. Can you expand?

Emergence is not a fundamental. Interaction is an epiphenomenon. — EugeneW

"Epiphenomenon" is not a word I've used. I looked up the definition, it has several related ones. This is the one that seems most relevant to this discussion - "A phenomenon which is secondary to another or others; a phenomenon which is a sort of by-product in no wise affecting other phenomena." Is that different from an emergent phenomenon? I'm not sure.

Smart people get it wrong a lot, you know. — RogueAI

No kidding... when I said smarter than me/you I was being ironic. I thought that was obvious. Sorry. Maybe we need an irony font.

no worries!

:up:

“Mind” is simply another word for the body. It’s about as physicalist as you can get.

This is an extract from the introduction to Searle's "Mind, A Brief Introduction":

"There is an overriding reason for my wanting to write a general introduction to the philosophy of mind. Almost all the works that I have read accept the same set of historically inherited categories for describing mental phenomena, especially consciousness, and with these categories a certain set of assumptions, about how consciousness and other mental phenomena relate to each other and to the rest of the world. It is this set of categories and the assumptions that the categories carry like heavy baggage, that is completely unchallenged and that keeps the discussion going. The different positions then are all taken within a set of mistaken assumptions. [...] I am thinking of dualism, materialism, physicalism, computationalism, functionalism, behaviourism, epiphenomenalism, cognitivism, eliminativism, panpsychism, dual-aspect theory and emergentism, as it is standardly conceived. To make the whole subject even more poignant, many of these theories, especially materialism and dualism, are trying to say something true."

I find the ideas in this book persuasive, and liberating.

We physicalists need to introduce a new ingredient with explanatory power. Let's call that ingredient X. Then what is X? Is it matter? No. Is it interaction. No. Is it X? Yes! But X alone won't do. We need an Y too. Then what is Y? Is it matter? No. Is it interaction? No. Is it Y? Yes! — EugeneW

I understand that's how quantum mechanics work. The theory, that is. If some phenomenon is unexplained, while others are, then they say "this phenomenon is different because it involves a particle (with a new, hitherto unused name, such as "squadrita")".

Then they throw themselves into math, until they "distil" the quantum "squadrita". Once that's done, onto the next.

I find this highly suspect for being prone to fantasy, but hey, if the math works out, you can't argue with quantum mechanics.

What would a physicalist explanation of mind look like? — Agent Smith

Since you referred to "Causation" several times, I'll propose a causal explanation for the Brain Function we know as "Mind" or "Consciousness". According to the definitions below, Causation is not a physical object or substance, but an external force acting on something, whether Matter or Mind. That "influence" is a causal relationship, and in Physics is usually called "Energy". Yet, energy per se is not a material object with physical properties, hence is known only by its effects on matter. So, it can't be distinguished from "Spirit" or "Ghost", except by noting who uses those terms. Spiritualists speak of "spiritual energy", while Materialists avoid any implications of an intentional Cause.

In world events, we observe both Natural and Cultural causes. The former are assumed to be mechanical, while the latter are implicitly mental. For example, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is obviously not a natural phenomenon. So we assume that some human mind imagined that future event, and set-up a series of intermediate causes & effects that were directed toward the result of Ukraine being re-absorbed into a resurrected Soviet Union, or Russian empire (i.e. intended to Make Russia Great Again, MRGA). In other words, the power-of-an-idea, imagining an ideal future state, was the initiating Cause of the invasion.*1

Likewise, Brain & Mind can be construed as Natural & Cultural sources of Causation. The primary distinction between those sources is local direct mechanical transmission of energy versus non-local (end-directed) communication of the power-of-an-idea. So, natural processes are Deontological (obeying natural laws), while cultural developments are Teleological ( obeying political or mental influences). The primary difference between "mechanical transmission" and "mental communication" is that the operator of the "machine" is included in the communication system. In philosophy, we label that initial force as the "First Cause" of a subsequent chain of causation.

Which raises the philosophical question, which is phenomenal (fundamental) and which epi-phenomenal (incidental) : the original Cause or the intermediate Effect? This could be interpreted as a "physical explanation" of the role of mind in the world, in that the mechanical system is completely physical, yet the Cause of the process is external to the machine. So, which more essential, the Teleological Intention, or the Local Mechanism -- the intentional ghost or the perfunctory machine -- the Programmer or the Program? :nerd:


Causality is influence by which one event, process, state, or object contributes to the production of another event, process, state, or object where the cause is partly responsible for the effect, and the effect is partly dependent on the cause. ___Wikipedia
Note -- "Influence" is a graphic metaphor of something fluid flowing-in from outside, instead of internally generated.

Causation : the relationship between cause and effect; causality.
Note : "Relationship" is a mathematical metaphor indicating some invisible connection between two or more points or objects.

Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/
Note -- did the mind of Putin have any effect on his physical tanks & planes?

What is relationship between nature and culture? :
Nature provides the setting in which cultural processes, activities and belief systems develop, all of which feed back to shape biodiversity. There are four key bridges linking Nature with culture: beliefs and worldviews; livelihoods and practices; knowledge bases; and norms and institutions.
https://www.resurgence.org/magazine/article2629-nature-and-culture.html
Note -- Materialist Science studies Nature, while Mentalist Philosophy studies Culture

*1. Some might give a technical label to that invisible energy : "Psychic Power". But on this forum, we'll do well to avoid such baggage-laden nomenclature, as a red-herring.

WHO'S RESPONSIBLE : MIND or MACHINE ?

... the Programmer or the Program? — Gnomon

False dichotomy, G. The uncoerced end-user that executes the, or which does not interrupt an automated, program is responsible.

What would a physicalist explanation of mind look like? — Agent Smith

It would just look like what modern neuroscience tells us it does. Current research suggests, and I mean all of it suggests, that consciousness is produced via the operation of 80 billion neurons across all of the sophisticated structures of the human brain, with a particular emphasis on the operations of the dorsolateral prefrontal, orbitofrontal, and medial prefrontal cortices. This network conducts operations in symphony with the main-brain and emotional processessing networks, which generally have pathways to the rest of the brain, to produce metacognitive functions such as:

"the ability to anticipate the consequencesof behavior, self-awareness, the temporality of behavior (i.e., understanding andusing time concepts), controlling cognition (metacognition), working memory,abstraction, problem solving, and similar complex intellectual processes."

Or, everything you one regards as "the mind." That's what such an argument would look, and there is plenty more research to go with it.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303502619_Is_Self-Consciousness_Equivalent_to_Executive_Function#:~:text=Consciousness%20can%20be%20understood%20as,consequences%20of%20one's%20own%20behavior.

It would just look like what modern neuroscience tells us it does. Current research suggests, and I mean all of it suggests, that consciousness is produced via the operation of 80 billion neurons across all of the sophisticated structures of the human brain, with a particular emphasis on the operations of the dorsolateral prefrontal, orbitofrontal, and medial prefrontal cortices. This network conducts operations in symphony with the main-brain and emotional processessing networks, which generally have pathways to the rest of the brain, to produce metacognitive functions such as:

"the ability to anticipate the consequencesof behavior, self-awareness, the temporality of behavior (i.e., understanding andusing time concepts), controlling cognition (metacognition), working memory,abstraction, problem solving, and similar complex intellectual processes." — Garrett Travers

I don't disagree that the processes you describe, or some like them, are the source of mind. That's different than saying that they are mind. The processes that make up the source of life are chemical, but biology is not chemistry. When I talk about mind, I talk about thoughts, emotions, knowledge, imagination, perception.... Just because I can pinpoint the locations in the brain that light up when I do those things, that doesn't mean they're the same thing.

When I talk about mind, I talk about thoughts, emotions, knowledge, imagination, perception.... Just because I can pinpoint the locations in the brain that light up when I do those things, that doesn't mean they're the same thing. — T Clark

That's precisely what it would indicate. That doesn't mean that thoughts 'aren't' something else, technically speaking. But, what exactly is on offer to describe what we think thoughts 'are,' technically speaking? If we know the brain gives rise to them, and we know executive function includes memory retrieval, pattern-recognition, and conceptual abstractions from recurrent data feedback loops, then it stands to reason that what we 'think' are thoughts, conceptually, are actually just neural computations that are being recognized and stored in memory, patterns, and recurrent analysis. Which would be 100% consistent with all known data on the subject. What's your postulate?

That's precisely what it would indicate. That doesn't mean that thoughts 'aren't' something else, technically speaking. But, what exactly is on offer to describe what we think thoughts 'are,' technically speaking? If we know the brain gives rise to them, and we know executive function includes memory retrieval, pattern-recognition, and conceptual abstractions from recurrent data feedback loops, then it stands to reason that what we 'think' are thoughts, conceptually, are actually just neural computations that are being recognized and stored in memory, patterns, and recurrent analysis. Which would be 100% consistent with all known data on the subject. What's your postulate? — Garrett Travers

By your standard, talking about neurological phenomena as an explanation for mental processes is just as futile than talking about psychological phenomena. To get to the real answer, technically speaking, we should be talking about quantum mechanics and particle physics. Brain function is just as illusory as mental function.

talking about neurological phenomena as an explanation for mental processes is just as futile than talking about psychological phenomena — T Clark

No, if you read my post, you'll notice that my specific assertion was that brain functions are mental functions and psychological phenomena. There's no difference. The brains doing everything. Just like sight and smell.

To get to the real answer, technically speaking, we should be talking about quantum mechanics and particle physics. — T Clark

No, we shouldn't. We should be talking about the systems that produce these phenomena at the macroscopic level where they exist and abide by the laws of classical and relative mechanics. QM doesn't have a single place here in this conversation. And using quanta to derail discussions of science is not an approach that I'll be entertaining.

Brain function is just as illusory as mental function. — T Clark

No, the opposite is the truth, and is what all the evidence suggests.

No, if you read my post, you'll notice that my specific assertion was that brain functions are mental functions and psychological phenomena. There's no difference. — Garrett Travers

As I indicate, I disagree.

No, we shouldn't. We should be talking about the systems that produce these phenomena at the macroscopic level where they exist and abide by the laws of classical and relative mechanics. QM doesn't have a single place here in this conversation. And using quanta to derail discussions of science is not an approach that I'll be entertaining. — Garrett Travers

You've misunderstood my argument. Don't worry about it. I don't think we have anything else to discuss.

As I indicate, I disagree. — T Clark

You disagree based upon what evidence? And what does thie evidence suggest to you? Again, what exactly are you postulating and why?

You've misunderstood my argument. Don't worry about it. I don't think we have anything else to discuss. — T Clark

No, I understood your 'assertion' quite well. I'm still waiting on an argument. As it stands, I've just been told that someone disagrees without any idea of what it is that informs your opinion, or even what that opinion is. You can feel free to convey that information and we'll have a look.

Consciousness is not the zillions of parallel ion peak currents running continuously around on the neuronal network from the early stages of embryonic development changing, growing, evolving in time due to new connectivity and connection strength (memory), and stepping in tandem with the physical world we live in, while mentally shaping that world simultaneously. That's the physical description. It doesn't explain consciousness. It can describe the physical epiphenomena though.

That's the physical description. It doesn't explain consciousness. It can describe the physical epiphenomena though. — EugeneW

Not according to the evidence.

Not according to the evidence — Garrett Travers

The evidence that they don't explain it is that these processes miss a key ingredient.

miss a key ingredient. — EugeneW

No, they're pretty thorough. Anything here in this meta-analysis that they're missing? Appears to me that "consciousness" is merely a term, long in use, to describe the different areas of the brain that control emotion, wakefulness, sight, auditory sensation, and executive functions all working together. What's missing here?: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fncel.2019.00302/full

Appears to me that "consciousness" is merely a term, long in use, to describe — Garrett Travers

Now here you're right. It appears to describe. But it's not consciousness itself residing in the process. So what is missing in the description is consciousness itself. I can give you a materialistic description of what happens when you recognize something, to the neurons level and even deeper but that excludes one thing. The conscious experience itself. So it can't be an explanation. A description of the material epiphenomenon at most.

A description of the material epiphenomenon at most. — EugeneW

If you read the meta-analysis, it covers this. Conscious experience is a matter of wakefulness, meaning "Neurological awareness is primarily anatomically located in the posterior cortical thermal region, including the sensory region, rather than the prefrontal network that is involved in task monitoring and reporting." Go read the paper: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fncel.2019.00302/full