Question for materialists/physicalists: is Dishbrain conscious and what evidence do you have for your answer? — RogueAI

No, great question, but I'd wager to say more retains-certain-functionality than anything even remotely approximating something as complex as consciousness. Consciousness arises as the result the symphony of operations between the neural structures of the brain. Simple neurons aren't going to have that faculty, any more than they have the faculty to induce eye movement when certain structures are damaged. Awesome to see that I'm getting you to explore this though, man. It is the future of philosophy, a huge chunk of at least.

conscious — RogueAI

Define please.

I don't think we can define consciousness, other than we each have a private definition of it, which we assume everyone else has a similar definition (are you a P-zombie, 180???). I think the lack of a rigorous definition of consciousness is a knock on science. Shouldn't we have a working definition of it by now? The fact that we don't suggests that modern science might not be the best tool to tackle the job.

It's the best tool we have; besides, just because the problem isn't solved yet by science in no way entails that science cannot solve the problem (re: hasty generalization fallacy by "mysterians"). Also, there are quite a few "working definitions" depending on which research paradigm cognitive / brain the scientists are using. Anyway, your OP question is incoherent without you defining "conscious" (i.e. it's a scientific problem, after all, and not a philosophical question, IMO).

Interesting story, OP!

This rather disturbing experiment goes to show that neurons are like wires and synapses like logic gates in a circuit board. In other words, the electronic/electrical nature of our brains has been demonstrated (effectively?). That's exactly the opposite of what AI engineers have been trying to do all this time - prove the neural nature of electronic circuitry. I guess it's the same thing.

After reading the article it seems more like the dishbrain was programmed to do do something which was a simulation of playing the game pong.

Anyway, your OP question is incoherent without you defining "conscious" — 180 Proof

He did define it

He did define it — bert1

Where? (Link, please.)

I don't think we can define consciousness, other than we each have a private definition of it, which we assume everyone else has a similar definition (are you a P-zombie, 180???).

That. From this I know exactly what RogueAI is talking about, so for me it's a successful definition. It accurately picks it the bit of the world we want to talk about. But it's not much good for someone who doesn't share this reflexive perception.

I don't read a definition in that quote.

Ok. I do.

You have what is called "ostensive definition", definition by pointing. You might point at a patch of green and say "that is green". You can define consciousness ostensively, that's what RogueAI was implying, I think.

There's surprisingly little detail in that article about the specific set up of the neuron/computer interface. My initial feeling is that the neurons aren't doing anything that a digital computer couldn't do, and that it has nothing to do with consciousness. But I'm going to read more about it.

Lots more detail here: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2021.12.02.471005v2.full

You can define consciousness ostensively, that's what RogueAI was implying, I think. — Daemon

Yes, I agree. Do you understand what RogueAI means? Has this definition worked for you the way it worked for me, as far as you can tell?

Light sensors, for example, "point to green" (or other EM frequencies); the capability "to point" does not itself indicate (define) "consciousness".

You have what is called "ostensive definition", definition by pointing. You might point at a patch of green and say "that is green". You can define consciousness ostensively, that's what RogueAI was implying, I think. — Daemon

That's correct.

Clarify: what's "correct" about @Daemon's statement?

That we can only define consciousness by reference to our own consciousness, which is inaccessible to anyone else. I assume your conscious and subjective experiences are similar to mine (I also assume that you even have them), but I have no way of knowing.

That we can only define consciousness by reference to our own consciousness, which is inaccessible to anyone else. — RogueAI

And therefore that is not a definition in any discursive sense. On the contrary, however, "consciousness" is defined both by philosophy (for example ) and by various sciences in countless ways; what has yet to be achieved, Rogue, is a scientific model which explains "consciousness" (and/or the human brain) in a testable way.

.↪bert1 ↪Daemon Light sensors, for example, "point to green" (or other EM frequencies); the capability "to point" does not itself indicate (define) "consciousness". — 180 Proof

This is informative. It shows you haven't grasped the concept. RogueAI was not saying that the capacity to point indicates consciousness. You haven't performed the reflexive act which would furnish you with the referent of the word.

RogueAI's definition is both philosophical and discursive. It's is clear enough that we are speaking about the same thing, we understand each other as far as I can tell. And it is this definition that is employed by many philosophers, and that is operative in discussions of the hard problem. And rejection of this definition is what puts so many discussions about consciousness at cross purposes.

There is another way you can define it, but that is not very satisfactory. And that is by synonym, and that definition you can find in a dictionary. Usually listed as the very first sense of the word.

It's true that the ostensive definition is private. But that's ok, because the way we go on to talk then indicates if we have both performed the same ostensive definition. We can't be 100% sure, but we can be 99% sure, the more we talk. RogueAI and I, if we continue our discourse, are likely to say similar enough things about consciousness, and use it in the same places, that we will gradually become more sure that we share a concept.

@180 Proof I know you don't share the concept, but do you accept that RigueAI and I do share a concept?

If you don't have the concept, how is it possible for you to say something relevant to our discourse?

I think on a philosophy forum, on this issue particularly, it should be socially acceptable to deny another's experience. In a way that would less acceptable to deny a person's experience of, say, disability discrimination or racial discrimination.

And therefore that is not a definition in any discursive sense. On the contrary, however, "consciousness" is defined both by philosophy (for example ↪180 Proof
) — 180 Proof

'Consciousness is secondary – much more veto than volo – and confabulatory', perhaps selected for as a beneficial social-coordination adaptation which functions as the 'phenomenal complement' to natural language usage. — 180 Proof

awareness of self-awareness = consciousness — 180 Proof

I don't think this is what we are asking about when we ask whether Dishbrain is conscious. I think we are asking if Dishbrain can feel anything. Whether it has experiences.

I don't think this is what we are asking about when we ask whether Dishbrain is conscious. I think we are asking if Dishbrain can feel anything. Whether it has experiences. — Daemon

Indeed. That is definition by synonym (more or less).

If the firing neurons in the dish resemble a part of the neurons involved in the brain when ýou feel pain it might be that pain ho(o)vers around in the dish.

The question is if we can cut the pain out. If we have a drawing of the brain, we can cut the region, involved in feeling pain, out with scissors.

You can remove working structures from a functional brain-body-surrounding, and it will still be functioning. If what you remove will still be functioning, say the neurons responsible for smell, the dish will not possess the smell of rotten eggs. That can only be experienced by the creature experiencing.

I have no idea what RogueAI or you are talking about when you talk about "consciousness" and therefore I've also no way of telling if you are talking about the same (notion of) "consciousness".

Sure, fair enough.

I think we are asking if Dishbrain can feel anything. Whether it has experiences. — Daemon

Yes!

Is dishbrain conscious according to your definition of conscious?