I am a divine command theorist. I arrived at the view after reflecting on the following argument:

1. Moral imperatives are imperatives of reason
2. Imperatives of reason have a single source: Reason
3. Only a mind issues imperatives
4. Therefore, moral imperatives are the imperatives of a single mind
5. The single mind whose imperatives are the imperatives of reason will be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (God).

What mistake have I made?

I think you would have to say that moral imperatives are imperatives of perfect reason in order to get to steps 4 and 5.

The argument is deductively valid, so you need to deny a premise.

I do not see at least at first sight the valid logical jump from 1, 2 and 3 to 4 and 5. Because in 1, 2 and 3 also a mundane reason and a mundane mind could be meant. In 4 and 5, however, suddenly there is talk about a divine reason and a divine mind.

Moreover, an invalid leap could have been made from many human minds to a single divine one.

Francisco Suárez (1548—1617) would argue "that for a law to be genuine law and not just law in name it must be grounded in the legislative act of a superior[.]"

Thus, without Divine Command, there might be no true moral imperatives.

Suárez takes a middle path: "The extreme voluntarist thinks that God is free to command as he wishes, unconstrained by the natures of things. Suárez, on the other hand, thinks that God’s commands and prohibitions are constrained by natural goodness and badness. As befits a perfect being, God prohibits some actions precisely because they are evil. Suárez thinks it absurd to suggest that there are no actions such that they are too evil for God to command or even just to permit." https://iep.utm.edu/suarez/#SH3i

All moral imperatives come from the single source of reason. Only a mind issues imperatives. But it does not follow that there is a single reasoning mind from which all moral imperatives come.

Every chicken comes from a single egg. Only an egg can produce a chicken. But there is no single egg from which every chicken comes.

if all imperatives of morality are imperatives of Reason, and all imperatives of Reason have a single source, then it follows logically that moral imperatives have a single source.
And if only a mind can issue an imperative, then that single source is a mind.
So far so logical. To block that conclusion you must deny a premise.
Then I assert that the mind would have the three divine attributes. I can show that to be the case, but first let's agree that Reason is a mind. Then I can show why that mind will, by virtue of being the source of all reasons, be all powerful, all knowing, and all good.

It does follow. If all chickens had a single source, and it had to be an egg, then all chickens would come from that one egg (the claim that all chickens come from the same egg is, of course, absurd, but that'sbecause the claim that all chickens have a singular source is false). You have changed my premise from all reasons have a single source to each individual reason has a single source. No, all imperatives of Reason have the same, unifying source - Reason - which is why we call them 'imperatives of Reason'.

Okay, now I understand your reasoning.

all imperatives of Reason have a single source — Bartricks

I would deny that. There is a multitude and plurality of sources. These are namely the many individual rational faculties of humans.

but first let's agree that Reason is a mind — Bartricks

Please state your full definition of reason and mind.

So, to be clear, you are claiming the we, as individuals, are the source of the imperatives of reason? So 'Reason' is just another word for Bartricks, at least when I am using the term?
So, if I instruct myself to be cruel, then there is an imperative of reason enjoining me to be cruel? I have reason to be cruel and no reason not to be? And so Hitler had moral reason to do what he did as he was in favour of himself - and others - doing so? Indeed, your view is that immorality is just a form of self conflict, nothing more. Yes?
That view is extremely silly and is rejected by all moral philosophers.

As for my definition of Reason - Reason is the source of all reasons to do and believe things.

And a mind is a thinking thing.

,to be clear, ......Hitler...... — Bartricks

Please, goodness, not him again.

I think @spirit-salamander 's idea is that there are lots of minds, some of which (at least) are capable of using the faculty of reason. So reason's being a single source of some thing does not entail that a single mind is the source of that thing.

Lots of minds. One faculty of reason. Each mind uses the faculty of reason when and only when it is being reasonable.

Nothing that @spirit-salamander wrote entails that every mind uses reason all the time. Some minds are crazy some or all the time.

So, to be clear, you are claiming the we, as individuals, are the source of the imperatives of reason? So 'Reason' is just another word for Bartricks, at least when I am using the term? — Bartricks

You definitely have a faculty of reason, even if sometimes, for example in sleep, you do not use it so that it lies dormant in potentiality, so to speak.

So, if I instruct myself to be cruel, then there is an imperative of reason enjoining me to be cruel? — Bartricks

I would not draw this conclusion and it does not necessarily follow from what I said before.

An imperative of reason must imply a pressure to act, it must be normative. How do you derive normativity? Does reason always imply morality in your theory?

Hitler is an excellent example. According to Salamander's view, Hitler did nothing wrong. That's silly.

Why are you talking about a faculty of reason? We are talking about the imperatives of Reason.
Now, your view entails that Hitler did nothing wrong. Which is stupid. Hitler was a jerk. Your view is false and now you are going to change the topic from imperatives of reason to faculties of reason.

Now, your view entails that Hitler did nothing wrong. — Bartricks

How so? You seem to be hypersensitive when asked specific questions to understand your moral philosophy. So far, I have not made my moral philosophy explicit in the least. Therefore, you cannot draw any conclusions about what I must think about Hitler's actions. You are twisting the discussion here.

Why are you talking about a faculty of reason? — Bartricks

Reason is, after all, a faculty.

Which premise in my argument do you deny? Stop begging the question by making arbitrary pronouncements and stop ignoring the fact your view has the idiotic upshot that Hitler did nothing wrong.

This is a philosophy forum. Learn to argue. Learn to focus on premises. No premise of mine mentions our faculties of reason. And again, your view that we are the source of moral commands means Hitler did nothing wrong. Which is stupid, yes? That's your view. Your view is stupid. Demonstrably stupid.

And now you think your faculty of reason 'is' reason. So Hitler's was Hitler's, yes? So he did nothing wrong. That's your view. It's stupid.

Shall I help you?

If you deny that moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason, then you show only that you are conceptually confused.

If you insist that we are Reason, then Hitler did nothing wrong, which is dumb.

If you insist that something that is not a mind can issue an imperative, then you are bonkers.

Thus, there is no non-dumb sane way to avoid my conclusion. Which is why it is a proof. A proof, that is, that Reason is a person.

2. Imperatives of reason have a single source: Reason — Bartricks

I dispute this premise because it seems to me to be ontologically ambiguous.

Here, the mundane reason of everyone can be meant (every human being is endowed with the faculty to reason) or already the divine reason (there is in principle only one reason, which does not belong to any human being). The former you consider absurd, because otherwise Hitler would have done nothing wrong. If the latter, you already presuppose what you want to prove.

But the former does not imply that Hitler did nothing wrong. It does not follow from it. Indeed, he acted against his moral reason, the principle of which is: to treat every human being at least also as an end in itself.

One can distinguish between purposive calculative reason and moral reason. Hitler only acted right with regard to his (immoral) purpose.

A moral imperative of reason must imply a pressure to act, it must be normative. How do you derive normativity?

Your view is stupid. — Bartricks

You still don't know my whole view. So you can't call it stupid. You still have a lot to learn about how to discuss philosophically in a dialogue.

I dispute this premise because it seems to me to be ontologically ambiguous. — spirit-salamander

Why did you put the word 'ontologically' in there?

Here, the mundane reason of everyone can be meant (every human being is endowed with the faculty to reason) or already the divine reason (there is in principle only one reason, which does not belong to any human being). The former you consider absurd, because otherwise Hitler would have done nothing wrong. If the latter, you already presuppose what you want to prove. — spirit-salamander

Er, what are you on about? The premise is talking about the 'imperatives' of reason. You have just ignored that and decided to start talking about faculties of reason! Stop doing that. Focus on what the premises actually say.

Faculties of reason are not imperatives of Reason! Faculties of reason are faculties of awareness. Big difference.

But the former does not imply that Hitler did nothing wrong. It does not follow from it. Indeed, he acted against his moral reason, the principle of which is: to treat every human being at least also as an end in itself. — spirit-salamander

Er, that's not what Hitler thought. And you think that Hitler himself determines what it is morally right or wrong for Hitler to do. Or do you not understand your own view?

If moral standards are external to Hitler - and they are - then they are not 'his'. He is not their source. Hitler is not the source of the moral imperatives that apply to Hitler and that he flouted. It's wrong to be a racist holocauster, is it not? And it is wrong even if Hitler approves of being one and commands himself to be one, right? And so......your view is wrong. Morality doesn't come from Hitler! Jesus.

Don't tell me you think what Hitler did is wrong and then at the same time express a view about the nature of morality that entails he did nothing wrong.

Moral imperatives apply to us, but do not come from us. And the same goes for all of the imperatives of Reason.

And we call them 'imperatives of Reason' because they come from.....you guessed it, Reason!

And we are 'aware' of these imperatives via our faculties of reason. Which are 'faculties' not commands.

Now, if you think Hitler did something wrong, then you do not think that Hitler was the source of the morality of his actions, yes? Because - breaking news - Hitler approved of what he did.

You still don't know my whole view. So you can't call it stupid. You still have a lot to learn about how to discuss philosophically in a dialogue. — spirit-salamander

I know enough to know that your view is stupid. It entails that Hitler did nothing wrong. That's very silly.

,to be clear, ......Hitler......
— Bartricks

Please, goodness, not him again. — Cuthbert

Why not? Individual and collectivist subjectivists about morality think Hitler did nothing wrong (if they have any coherent thoughts at all). That's outrageous. They should be outed for the idiots they are.

I think spirit-salamander 's idea is that there are lots of minds, some of which (at least) are capable of using the faculty of reason. So reason's being a single source of some thing does not entail that a single mind is the source of that thing. — Cuthbert

He's confused. He didn't read the argument carefully and consequently he has started to blather on about faculties of reason, even though the argument was about imperatives of Reason. Faculties of reason are not imperatives, but faculties - means of awareness.

There are sights and then there is sight. Sights are what you see with sight. Sight is the faculty and sights are what you see with it. Reasons - including imperatives of Reason - are what faculties of reason give us some awareness of. Imperatives of reason, then, are among the rational sights that our reason - our rational sight - gives us some awareness of.

But the likes of Salamander and, I'd wager, 99.9% of everyone else on this site, cannot keep hold of the difference and conflate the means of awareness with the object of awareness. And then they all conclude that morality is something we ourselves make and then have to say that Hitler did nothing wrong.

They reason like this (if they reason at all): "I am aware of moral imperatives by means of my mind, therefore morality is in my mind! I am the source of morality" Or they reason "I have been caused to have my moral beliefs by my mind.....therefore, morality is in my mind!"

It's very silly. But once someone commits these fallacies - and they're known as the subjectivist fallacies - and arrive at their outrageously stupid view that morality is in our gift and is a creation of our own minds, you can't get them out of it. For most people cannot accept that they can be that stupid. It's why they should teach metaethics in schools and not stupid things like French or algebra.

Discussions like ours have been going on forever. I have tried to argue from a naturalistic approach:

The following quotes on the late medieval and early modern Jesuit theologian and philosopher Francisco Suárez (1548—1617) are instructive:

"One position is extreme naturalism or intellectualism, which Suárez attributes to Gregory of Rimini and several others (DL 2.6.3). On this view, no legislative act on God’s part is needed. Rather, natural law simply indicates what should be done or not done on the basis of what is intrinsically good or bad. Loss of life, for example, is bad: murdering King Duncan deprives him of life, and so Macbeth ought not to stab Duncan. On the extreme naturalism espoused by Gregory, Macbeth’s duty not to murder Duncan would obtain even if God had not given the Ten Commandments and even if God had not existed at all.

On the other side is an extreme voluntarism that says that natural law consists entirely in a command or prohibition coming from God’s will, a view that Suárez attributes to William of Ockham (DL 2.6.4). On this view, what one ought or ought not to do is wholly determined by God’s legislative acts and, furthermore, God’s legislative acts are unconstrained. That is, there is no act that is intrinsically bad such that God is compelled to prohibit it or even prevented from commanding it and no act that is intrinsically good such that God is compelled to command it. Had God commanded us to murder and steal, then doing so would have been obligatory and good.

Characteristically, Suárez charts a middle course. He first agrees with the extreme voluntarists that natural law is genuinely preceptive law, and argues that for a law to be genuine law and not just law in name it must be grounded in the legislative act of a superior (DL 2.6.5-10). The obligatory force of natural law comes from God’s will. Contra Gregory of Rimini, that obligation would not be present had God not legislated or not existed at all.

But then comes the crucial qualification that ends Suárez’s agreement with extreme voluntarism: “Second, I say that this will of God—that is, this prohibition or precept—is not the whole reason for the goodness and badness that is found in observing or transgressing the natural law, but that the natural law presupposes in the acts themselves a certain necessary fineness or wickedness and adjoins to these a special obligation of divine law” (DL 2.6.11). The extreme voluntarist thinks that God is free to command as he wishes, unconstrained by the natures of things. Suárez, on the other hand, thinks that God’s commands and prohibitions are constrained by natural goodness and badness. As befits a perfect being, God prohibits some actions precisely because they are evil. Suárez thinks it absurd to suggest that there are no actions such that they are too evil for God to command or even just to permit. To this extent, then, Suárez agrees with the naturalist; the obligations of natural law are rooted in natural goodness and badness." https://iep.utm.edu/suarez/#SH3i

I know enough to know that your view is stupid. — Bartricks

I have outlined my actual view here:

The derivation of a morally binding ought?

My view is expressed in the conclusion of the argument I gave above

1. Moral imperatives are imperatives of reason
2. Imperatives of reason have a single source: Reason
3. Only a mind issues imperatives
4. Therefore, moral imperatives are the imperatives of a single mind
5. The single mind whose imperatives are the imperatives of reason will be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (God). — Bartricks

As that argument is deductively valid it will, if sound, refute all other views about the matter.

You have not refuted it. You have confused imperatives of Reason with our faculties of reason and then proceeded to insist that we ourselves are the sources of moral imperatives, a view that entails Hitler did nothing wrong and is thus absurd in the extreme.

My view is, clearly, a form of divine command theory and, where moral imperatives are concerned, it is equivalent to William of Ockham's. But you cannot refute a view by categorizing it or identifying it with one Ockham defended.

The view that moral imperatives are our imperatives entails Hitler did nothing wrong. It is thus absurd and can be rejected (and there are plenty more reasons to reject it, but that will do).

The view that moral imperatives are somehow being emitted by the mindless natural world (metaethical objectivist naturalism) is downright potty.

The view that moral imperatives are somehow being emitted by Platonic Forms is equally potty.

So, again, to refute my argument you must either deny that moral imperatives are imperatives - which is conceptually confused - or deny that moral imperatives have their source in Reason - which is also conceptually confused - or deny that imperatives need a mind to issue them - which is insane. There's no way out. My argument goes through and establishes both that morality is God's commands and that Reason is God and that God exists.

You've started three discussions but have only made one comment. You've never commented on the discussions you started other than the opening post.

If you're not going to participate fairly, especially in the threads you start yourself, get lost.

As that argument is deductively valid it will, if sound, refute all other views about the matter. — Bartricks

It's the most stupid claim I've read so far in this thread to consider this argument (as it is) deductively valid.

I wouldn't blame @SwampMan for not responding here; Bart's nonsense has hijacked the thread.

Specifically, we cannot claim that God's properties are good, because our only evidence of their goodness is that God has them. — SwampMan

Neat.

It is deductively valid. It'd be stupid not to notice.

You mean a deductively valid argument that responds directly to the op? Go away Banno and regurgitate half understood Stanford pages to others.