Seems we have some agreement. Cool.

:up:

There is a tension, is there not, between your actions being the result of the superior-pattern-processing of your brain, and your actions not being the result of coercion? Aren't you constrained to act as your superior-pattern-processing dictates?

I gather you wish to skip this bit and talk of the coercion of others as what limits freedom.

But if that is so, then you are in agreement with Ardent at least in that freedom happens in the res publica, the public space in which others might coerce you.

Can you indicate what some of these "natural" desires are? Keeping in mind that we're distinguishing between need and desire. I'm asking after having spent a fair amount of time gratifying so-called natural desires, only to finally recognize they weren't really natural in the first place. But who knows, perhaps you're the wiser of us. Examples for the terminally curious: a Zenith El Primero Chronograph, the cost burning my wrist so that I eventually sold it back for what I paid for it. Or exotic steel for a hunting knife, finally learning that a basic 1075 - 1095 carbon steel is best for most people and most applications, and a whole lot less expensive. — tim wood

Anything you, being an organic and natural creature, produce as a desire is itself organic and natural. To argue against such a claim is to assert the existence of an extramundane will beyond that which nature produces in the form of you and your brain and the sum total of thought and action therein contained. In your first example, you purchased a watch that you thought would be stylish, versitile, or otherwise provide utility to you, which is 100% natural and among desires people exhibit on an everday basis. You only changed your mind when the cost was not meeting the desired outcome, 100% natural. Your exotic steel was desired, again, for its utility (hunting), and when discovering that a basic 1075-1095 carbon was more versatile and much less costly, you changed your predisposition on the subject. Meaning your desire for versitile utilities that met and acceptable cost/benefit ratio tipped your scales as far as desire. The exact same process of value determination (desire) in both scenarios. Those desires being very natural and very basic.

Hm. Is this an admission of trying to satisfy unnatural desires? — Banno

Back atcha: are any desires not associated with need entirely natural? Understandable? Sure, but natural?

Following on with Arendt's strategy, is one free to not do as one desires? Or are we subject to the tyranny of desire? A somewhat facetious question, but it indicates that it is not clear what freedom consists in, in the way Garrett Travers supposes, — Banno

Such a proposition is a self-contradiction. If one desires not to do something, they simply will not do it unless forced. In the case of choosing to do something other than that which one desires, it will necessitate an evaluation of conflicting desires and the cost/benefit analysis associated with it, thereby resulting in a replacement desire(s) that will be fulfilled if unimpeded in action. Such a proposition quite literally says nothing whatsoever of freedom from the application of force from fellow humans to overide both your desires and your actions. The two are not even in the same realm of discussion. You are your desires, thoughts, actions, and physical hardware (legs, arms, heart, brain, etc.) Other humans are the exact opposite (not your legs, arms, heart, brain, etc.) And the difference is glaring, if only you'd check it out.

I never had or have any use for a chronograph, having already proved to myself they're useless for their intended nominal purpose as accurate timers. (They're accurate enough, but not the person timing.) And I have never had a use for a hunting knife - I just liked 'em. But let's get basic. A heroin addict wants heroin, really wants it. Is his getting it a demonstration of his freedom?

There is a tension, is there not, between your actions being the result of the superior-pattern-processing of your brain, and your actions not being the result of coercion? Aren't you constrained to act as your superior-pattern-processing dictates? — Banno

No, there is no tention, because as it turns out, the integration of data, ideas, truth, experience, and trauma all change the patterns associated with your desire protocals. A good example would be Tim and his learning that carbon steel was both more versatile and cost effective than an earlier purchase, which resulted in a reorientation in his desire for a new product, predicated upon his values in products. Meaning, your values can be used to prime, inform, and ultimately overhaul your desire protocols to align with one another (values and desires). Which mine do. We are all constrained by the capacities of our brains, that does not describe coercion. This is the definition of coercion : the practice of persuading someone to do something by using force or threats. Does this change the way you're viewing the nature of coercion? You see it is self-contradictory by nature to coerce oneself. It doesn't make sense.

I never had or have any use for a chronograph, having already proved to myself they're useless for their intended nominal purpose as accurate timers. — tim wood

Didn't say you did have use for it. Use is only one dimension along which your desire protocals assess objects, or actions of desire. I said you had a desire for it, predicated on the values that you described in the message you sent, at least. There's no telling why you wanted any of these things, but you purchased them with your labor for nothing other than the desire to have them at bare minimum. If your desires are predicated on irrational standards of value, then irrationally is how your purchases will emerge from you in action.

The basic idea is that the concept of freedom is only meaningful relative to its negation.

This is not contradictory. It's a pretty well worn path in philosophy.

The basic idea is that the concept of freedom is only meaningful relative to its negation. — frank

This basic idea is garbage. Freedom is meaningful beyond that of active negation. I enjoy and value my freedom by simply interacting on this thread, part of a free platform on which to do so. Freedom is valuable when you are performing any action that requires freedom to perform, such as typing on a forum thread. It is negation that renders it of higher meaning and value. But, it is not a necessary precondition. Freedom is a concept that is meaningful when you are not having it negated and when you are. It is intrinsic to your nature, you require freedom to obtain resources to continue and fulfill your life. If negation was the only thing that made freedom meaningful, we would have specialized methods by which to negate freedom as a form of service, much like we have chemo and radiation for cancer. It's exactly the opposite: because freedom is a requirement for life, can be valued independently, and has been shown to result in human flourishing it has innate meaning as a concept, even if threating it only serves to increase its meaning.

However, that actually isn't what the article is about. The article is about what the person being interviewed regards as an impossibility to define: freedom, which is literally absurd as I have very thoroughly argued in this thread.

...are any desires not associated with need entirely natural? Understandable? Sure, but natural? — tim wood

We might ask our friendly stoic, @Ciceronianus...?

Yes, as I said, it depends on how you define 'will'. So, since the idea has no clearly definitive, unambiguous application I agree it is fraught. — Janus

I don't think will is something that seeks a definition that determines it. It seeks a definition that describes it.

Yes, as I said, it depends on how you define 'will'. So, since the idea has no clearly definitive, unambiguous application I agree it is fraught.
— Janus

Which was, among other objectives, the point of Arendt's essay. — Paine

Is it worth using a mental concept of a thing which we can't agree what it is, since it escapes definition and description; I think it's more embarrassing than not.

And if will is not a thing that we know what it is, how can we so assuredly describe its relationship to freedom?

If Arndt was talking about a thing which she herself admits can't be described properly, then how come she makes such clearly delineated claims about it, which would necessarily presuppose what she is talking about? Which even Paine claims is not the case: "(the concept of will is fraught) Which was, among other objectives, the point of Arendt's essay."

Inconvenient observations like this get heavily ignored.

Some philosophers here are not lovers of wisdom, but haters of truth. The refusal to respond to my earlier arguments also serves this opinion.

You both missed the point and evaded the question. I had no "natural" desire for those things. I was in thrall to a desire. That is, wrt those things, I was far from free. And I and no doubt you and almost everyone else have bought things we neither needed nor ultimately wanted, but had been persuaded somehow to want, with the means and opportunity to get. And while all of that can have its pleasant side, I find nothing of freedom of any kind in it.

Is it worth using a mental concept of a thing which we can't agree what it is, since it escapes definition and description; I think it's more embarrassing than not. — god must be atheist

But, it doesn't escape definition and description:

the faculty by which a person decides on and initiates action/ control deliberately exerted to do something or to restrain one's own impulses/ a deliberate or fixed desire or intention/ the thing that one desires or ordains/

So, in other words, the sum total of all human thoughts, actions, desires, or decisions per individual. That's will. It's quite clearly defined, and most people here seem to be laboring under false pretenses of what will is, or definitions given to themselves as a result of casually understanding the concept.

Freedom is defined as:

the power or right to act, speak, or think as one wants without hindrance or restraint/ absence of subjection to foreign domination or despotic government/ the state of not being imprisoned or enslaved.

In other words, the ability of human will to manifest in accordance with each individual's natural inclinations without the threat of force, coercion, impingement, or otherwise uninvited interference.

If Arndt was talking about a thing which she herself admits can't be described properly, then how come she makes such clearly delineated claims about it, which would necessarily presuppose what she is talking about? Which even Paine claims is not the case: "(the concept of will is fraught) Which was, among other objectives, the point of Arendt's essay." — god must be atheist

The only clear thing she can say about it, stated quite clearly mind you, is that nothing can be clearly stated about it, yet the statement was presented as a description of said indescribable thing... Right.. You know what I think, I think it's one of two things: Either she can't describe because she lacks the critical faculty requisite to do so, which seems a bit odd for a philosophy professor. Or, she said as much in the hopes that her reception would be met with the confused neuroticism attendant upon taking statements of the kind seriously without critical review to accompany it.

Some philosophers here are not lovers of wisdom, but haters of truth. The refusal to respond to my earlier arguments also serves this opinion. — god must be atheist

Yeah, the moment you see insults, that's that. The moment someone doesn't address what you said, but instead moves to a new subject, you aren't dealing with a good-faith scenario, that's that. If someone cannot argue outside of an established fallacy(s), that's that. Also, another real, real good one to remember, is when someone attempts to change the definition of a word outside of conventional use, or outside of its adaptive progression; that meaning english is adaptive through time and words change their meaning to suit modern conventional use.

You both missed the point and evaded the question. I had no "natural" desire for those things. I was in thrall to a desire. That is, wrt those things, I was far from free. And I and no doubt you and almost everyone else have bought things we neither needed nor ultimately wanted, but had been persuaded somehow to want, with the means and opportunity to get. And while all of that can have its pleasant side, I find nothing of freedom of any kind in it. — tim wood

No, you weren't in thrall, you were desiring, and thus purchased based on that desire. Ultimately unwanted is different from desiring enough in the moment to purchase. Persuaded, eh? I addressed that. If you are persuaded, that means your brain has done the cost/benefit analysis and overrided a previous desire protocal and replaced with the one YOU ACTED on, which demonstrates your desire for it. Again, if your desires are predicated on irrational values, then your standards of purchase will appear to you as irrational, or in your case as thralldom. You exercised your freedom to purchase something you weren't happy with after you got it home and assessed its quality, you weren't a slave.

I don't think will is something that seeks a definition that determines it. It seeks a definition that describes it. — god must be atheist

A definition that describes it would be a definition that determines it(s nature), would it not?

Much of the confusion here seems to be mistaking "Are you free to act against your own will?" for "Are you free to act against your own desire?". This is ↪Agent Smith's error, along with ↪Metaphysician Undercover and ↪god must be atheist.

Arendt's point here is that "it must appear strange indeed that the faculty of the will whose essential activity consists in dictate and command should be the harborer of freedom." In doing so she shows the tyranny of following one's will, and hence that will is contrary to freedom. The will, therefore, cannot be the source of freedom. — Banno

First off, I fail to see a difference between will and desire.

Second, notice how slavery revolves around compliance to commands; it follows, then, doesn't it?, that freedom is essentially dissent/rebellion, a refusal to comply. Hence I pointed out that free won't (veto not volo) is the essence of our freedom.

Arendt is right. There doesn't seem to be a difference between will & tyrant! It would be silly to think our freedom lies in a despot's hands.

I fail to see a difference between will and desire. — Agent Smith

So one can't wish for something without deciding and moving to obtain it? I desire chips, but I've not the will to get up and go to the shop.

Arendt is right — Agent Smith

SO do you agree that the freedom is not found in the will alone, but requires a public space?

So one can't wish for something without deciding and moving to obtain it? I desire chips, but I've not the will to get up and go to the shop. — Banno

So, desire precedes will. Then shouldn't we be discussing desire for that reason?

Arendt stops making sense on that score, no? Desire comes first, will later. We should trace our actions back to its origins, in this case will desire.

SO do you agree that the freedom is not found in the will alone, but requires a public space? — Banno

I agree with Arendt to the extent that the oppressed can't find their freedom in an oppressor (the will).

I don't think the government hinges so much on the actions and thoughts of its people. Democracy is held together by legal and political institutions, its integrity and the protection of our liberty is placed in their hands. People will naturally, without any special kind of motivation, utilise whatever freedom, security, opportunity provided to them by their government or community.

Also, a person is their will, or do you think you can be robbed of your will but remain yourself. Will, desire, intent... they're all part of our consciousness - us. How can freedom require destroying ourselves? What's left to be free?

Are you suggesting that this is in some way counter to what either I or Arendt has said?

Whatever characterisation one gives will, it is most definitely us and not separate. We always act in accordance with our will because we are our will. Yet, we don't live in a bubble, we are influenced, manipulated, incentivised, blackmailed by our experiences, feelings and interactions with others. We don't need power to enact our will, because there is no "enaction", we need power to ignore, control, resist "outside" influences which compel or restrict us.

The most complete freedom would include absolute power over others and the power to immediately and effortlessly alter any aspect of the circumstances of one's experience.

Is that a counter to you or Arendt? It's a different and perhaps mutually exclusive view than those of yours and Arendt. To me, freedom is control, power and influence, especially over yourself. Sovereignty over oneself. That's why things like rights and protections are essential for freedom.

I will admit that I am not entirely sure what Arendt is arguing against, is there a view of freedom that says a slave is free because they're "internally free" despite every aspect of their life being controlled? Or what exactly is she talking about? I don't understand this divorce of the inner and the outer when there is so much interaction between the two.

Ah, Arendt on freedom is great. She rightly notes that freedom as understood in terms of the 'will' is theological garbage, and she rightly offends the American understanding of freedom, which is just as theological and just as garbage. @Banno, you might be interested in Hito Steryl's essay "Freedom From Everything", which I think is a nice companion piece to Arendt's:

We are accustomed to regarding freedom as primarily positive—the freedom to do or have something; thus there is the freedom of speech, the freedom to pursue happiness and opportunity, or the freedom of worship. But now the situation is shifting. Especially in the current economic and political crisis, the flipside of liberal ideas of freedom - namely, freedom of corporations from any form of regulation, as well as the freedom to relentlessly pursue one’s own interest at the expense of everyone else’s—has become the only form of universal freedom that exists: the freedom from social bonds, freedom from solidarity, freedom from certainty or predictability, freedom from employment or labor, freedom from culture, public transport, education, or anything public at all.

These are the only freedoms that we share around the globe nowadays. They do not apply
equally to everybody, but depend on one’s economic and political situation. They are negative freedoms, and they apply across a carefully constructed and exaggerated cultural alterity that promotes: the freedom from social security, the freedom from the means of making a living, the freedom from accountability and sustainability, the freedom from free education, healthcare, pensions and public culture, the loss of standards of public responsibility, and in many places, the freedom from the rule of law.

As Janis Joplin sang, “Freedom’s just another word for nothing left to lose.” This is the freedom that people in many places share today. Contemporary freedom is not primarily the enjoyment of civil liberties, as the traditional liberal view has it, but rather like the freedom of free fall, experienced by many who are thrown into an uncertain and unpredictable future.

A definition that describes it would be a definition that determines it(s nature), would it not? — Janus

I think there is a difference. You determine the food you are cooking; but you can only describe the food that your neighbour is cooking.

Description, as I used it, has no influence on the topic or thing described. Determination has influence on the nature of the topic or thing.

Description is passive; determination is active.

If you prefer. One thesis of the article is that, as a result of this, freedom has it's being in the shared space in which we live rather than in the privacy of what one wills. — Banno

I doubt it because the existence of others and their goals is what limits our individual freedoms in realizing our own goals. You also have the goals of different groups coming into conflict.

Individualism vs collectivism is that part of ethics that asks questions about what is good for the group vs what is good for the individual. As far as I know that hasn't been resolved yet - just like every ethical dilemma - because ethics is subjective. Obtaining an objective ethical standard is trying to obtain something that doesn't exist.

So one can't wish for something without deciding and moving to obtain it? I desire chips, but I've not the will to get up and go to the shop. — Banno

Or just stop using the vague term, "will" and say that one had the choice to eat chips and the choice to not eat chips. Once the choices were compared to other factors like being too tired or not, one choice wins out over the others. It's really no different than nested IF-THEN-ELSE statements.

IF the experience of craving chips
AND IF not tired
THEN go get chips
ELSE stay at home


It doesn't make sense that they desired chips but then didn't go get chips. Did they really desire it if they didn't go get chips?

SO do you agree that the freedom is not found in the will alone, but requires a public space? — Banno

Bill can go to the wilderness of northern Alaska and enjoy his freedom. His freedom is indeed meaningful relative to the constraints of a community, but he doesn't actually have to be in a community to have his freedom.

If we want to focus on the logical arguments against freedom of the will, great. That's not going to diminish the meaningfulness of "Bill is free in Alaska." It will only make us wonder if anyone can be free in any situation.

Much of the confusion here seems to be mistaking "Are you free to act against your own will?" for "Are you free to act against your own desire?". This is ↪Agent Smith's error, along with ↪Metaphysician Undercover and ↪god must be atheist. — Banno

The problem obviously, is that the author of the article has not provided a cogent definition of "will". It is this faulty description of "will" which produces the appearance of your "strange little paradox". In reality there is no such paradox, just the proposal of an unacceptable definition of "will".

And you continue in your usual habit of attributing to me ideas which are completely inconsistent with what I actually write. In two different posts, I explained that "will" consists of the power to refrain from acting. The capacity of restraint enables deliberation. This is completely distinct from equating "will" with "desire". So you completely ignore what I write, to class me in some category, (those who think "will" is equated with "desire"), through some predisposition to classify people in one way or another, for the purpose of inflicting your prejudiced attack on that person. You insinuate, 'Metaphysician Undercover is one of them', therefore MU thinks like them, without even paying attention to what I actually write.

Arendt's point here is that "it must appear strange indeed that the faculty of the will whose essential activity consists in dictate and command should be the harborer of freedom." In doing so she shows the tyranny of following one's will, and hence that will is contrary to freedom. The will, therefore, cannot be the source of freedom. — Banno

The activity of "dictate and command" is not proper to the will. This activity is proper to the faculty of reason. What is proper to will is action. And the will does not necessarily follow reason. That this is the case was demonstrated long ago by Plato, through reference to the fact that one can do what one knows is wrong. This was the principal argument of Socrates, against sophists who claimed virtue is knowledge, and professed the capacity to teach virtue. In reality, knowing what ought to be done does not necessitate that it will be done. Augustine considered this problem at length. Therefore we have a separation between reason, which dictates and commands what ought to be done, and will, which does not necessarily act according to reason, and is therefore free from the dictatorship of reason.

The implications of this reality are wide ranging. As demonstrated by Aristotle, the capacity to think and reason is a potential of the material organs of the human body. That the will is free from being causally controlled by the habits of this material aspect of the living being, is evidence that the will is truly free from material causation, and united directly to the immaterial aspect of the living being, the soul. Therefore the freedom of the will is what allows us to break free from bad habits of thinking, like what is displayed in your referred article.