Everyone is in the process of dying. — Tzeentch

:up:

Having a thought is a violation of someone else's autonomy? — Tzeentch

No, your decision not to answr is. Not answering is not a thought it is an act. You are intentionally misreading me.

Well, I am interested in your opinion. If I wanted to know Kant's, I'd read Kant. — Tzeentch

Kant's opinion is relevant in a thread about Kant.

Apparently Kant views himself as the all-benevolent person who ought to go about assigning people their moral duties. What do you think of this? I think it is profoundly silly. — Tzeentch

No, you do actually, because you apparently you think that ethics is independent from the expectations of others, dependent on the social good in the case of lying, but independent of the social good in case of violence... apparently there is some Tzeentch who determines the nature of ethics, like I pointed out in the earlier thread.

Kant thought we could rationally understand our duties or at least the grounds from which they sprang. He called that 'the moral law within'. It is not Kant that tells you, it is reason, at least according to Kant.

That last thread was not about lying. It was about violence. We may have discussed Kant's ideas of lying, but only insofar as it was relevant to violence. — Tzeentch

So in case of violence we have a context independent ethical ethical system and in case of lying we do not. Thank you, much more consistent now.

Other people's expectations do not change the nature of things, — Tzeentch

Well, that rather depend on the ' thing' under discussion doesn't it? When you grab someone's hand and start to pump it up and down it is helpful when the other person expects this behavior and understands it as a greeting. That is by no means self evident though, but a product of social expectations.

I don't see how they're all that different for the person who walks past. — Tzeentch

the situation is different because in the situation you have been asked a question you have ignored someone whereas in the situation you have not been asked a question you have not ignored someone. Indeed also ignoring or not ignoring are socially determined behaviors / situations. However I see now that the mere existence of social world has been so far a mystery to you.

Should I go about having expectations and desires towards other people, and then derive all sorts of moral rights to have those things reciprocated? Or is this the moment we need to start appointing people with opinions on "what is reasonable", and we are back in the mud? — Tzeentch

I am not saying the father has a moral right to your answer, you determine whether you answer or not. The only point I am making is that not answering is an act as well and so does not absolve you from the dilemma of whether you have to tell the truth or not. You are just trying to wiggle out of that question by shifting the subject. I am not arguing for any rights on someone whether it is a right not to be ignored or a right to hear the truth.

I don't credit lawmakers with having a particularly solid grasp on the nature of things, and morality by extention. — Tzeentch

Well, this assertion merely proves your utter disregard for decades of learning. Your phrase ' the nature of things' is unintelligible. I can therefore not comment on whether they have a grasp on 'the nature of things' as I fail to understand what that may mean. I do know your phrase displays unjustified contempt.

What's your point? What is the inconsistency or claim you find in Kant that disqualifies him as an ethicist? What mistake has he made? That is, that can be presented in something less than 29 pages of tying complicated knots. He des not tell people what to do; he tells them what they ought to do and why within the limits of his arguments. And how often have I read some citation that claims to undermine or throw over Kant, only to find the writer very likely has not even read his Kant, or not understood him on the points in question, or the one citing has in some way failed. — tim wood

I think we are talking past each other. I am not finding inconsistency in Kant and would never be so bold and so foolish as to disqualify him as an ethicist. I do not think your beef is with me actually. I am not a Kantian, but I greatly admire him and his ethical system and think that the main thrust of it, at least what I consider the main thrust, 'think for yourself, not for others and respect them as autonomous and free agents' is nothing short of brilliant.

Having a thought is a violation of someone else's autonomy? — Tzeentch

No, your decision not to answr is. Not answering is not a thought it is an act. — Tobias

What does that act consist of? A thought surely, an internal process, and nothing else. And that presupposses we can call it an act to begin with - something which I disagree with also.

Apparently Kant views himself as the all-benevolent person who ought to go about assigning people their moral duties. What do you think of this? I think it is profoundly silly. — Tzeentch

No, you do actually, ... — Tobias

I don't assign people moral duties.

... you think that ethics is independent from the expectations of others, ... — Tobias

Yes, and unapologetically so.

dependent on the social good in the case of lying, but independent of the social good in case of violence... — Tobias

Where have I argued that lying is dependent on social good?

I thought that question was part of the dilemma that I thought was being discussed here, which I discussed, but I think you're extrapolating positions from that that I do not hold.

... apparently there is some Tzeentch who determines the nature of ethic, ... — Tobias

I ponder it more like.

Kant thought we could rationally understand our duties or at least the grounds from which they sprang. He called that 'the moral law within'. It is not Kant that tells you, it is reason, at least according to Kant. — Tobias

I can get behind that to a degree, but in that case we should let reason assign the duties and not our fallible selves.

So in case of violence we have a context independent ethical ethical system and in case of lying we do not. Thank you, much more consistent now. — Tobias

I wasn't aware of some rule that in order for one type of unethical behavior to be categorically unethical, all unethical behaviors must be so categorically. But feel free to share some substantion for that rule.

Other people's expectations do not change the nature of things, — Tzeentch

Well, that rather depend on the ' thing' under discussion doesn't it? — Tobias

A handshake is still just a handshake. However, a handshake is also a physical imposition, in which case the desire of the other needs to be taken into account, so I wouldn't call them irrelevant in that regard.

the situation is different because in the situation you have been asked a question you have ignored someone whereas in the situation you have not been asked a question you have not ignored someone. Indeed also ignoring or not ignoring are socially determined behaviors / situations. — Tobias

I have not done anything. I guess that's the issue here - my inaction, where one may have wished for my action.

But one's wishes do not morally oblige me, even if one wishes to morally oblige me.

However I see now that the mere existence of social world has been so far a mystery to you. — Tobias

Bla bla.

The only point I am making is that not answering is an act as well and so does not absolve you from the dilemma of whether you have to tell the truth or not. You are just trying to wiggle out of that question by shifting the subject. — Tobias

I have been very clear. Inaction is not an act, and a perfectly acceptable route out of the dilemma.

Inaction towards problems which are not one's responsibility is acceptable, and by the mere asking of a question one does not become responsible.

Well, this assertion merely proves your utter disregard for decades of learning. — Tobias

There have, even in recent days, been some atrocious laws made. Should those have been accepted on this ground of decades of "learning" that they were supposedly the product of?

I think I'll be a bit more critical of what I call learning.

Your phrase ' the nature of things' is unintelligible. — Tobias

The way things are? Reality? The discussion of which is the purpose of philosophy?

I'll rephrase myself; I don't hold the philosophical ability of lawmakers in a particularly high regard (exceptions not withstanding).

I just thought the debate would interest you, that is the only reason I mentioned you. It is rather pointless to discuss with someone who misconstrues your arguments seemingly on purpose.

As I understand it, Kant himself knew the categorical imperative was circular, and himself did not believe it provided a way to define morality. What he said was that the existence of this imperative divided the motive for morality into perfect or imperfect duty to oneself or others. That is, from it he created a scheme of four motives for action, from which groundwork he could progress analytically.

“.....In our times indeed this might perhaps be necessary; for if we collected votes whether pure rational knowledge separated from everything empirical, that is to say, metaphysic of morals, or whether popular practical philosophy is to be preferred, it is easy to guess which side would preponderate. This descending to popular notions is certainly very commendable, if the ascent to the principles of pure reason has first taken place and been satisfactorily accomplished. This implies that we first found ethics on metaphysics, and then, when it is firmly established, procure a hearing for it by giving it a popular character. But it is quite absurd to try to be popular in the first inquiry, on which the soundness of the principles depends. It is not only that this proceeding can never lay claim to the very rare merit of a true philosophical popularity, since there is no art in being intelligible if one renounces all thoroughness of insight; but also it produces a disgusting medley of compiled observations and half-reasoned principles. Shallow pates enjoy this because it can be used for every-day chat, but the sagacious find in it only confusion, and being unsatisfied and unable to help themselves, they turn away their eyes, while philosophers, who see quite well through this delusion, are little listened to when they call men off for a time from this pretended popularity, in order that they might be rightfully popular after they have attained a definite insight....”