In fairness, though, you have so far not directly answered the question I've posed:

If all awareness in the cosmos were to somehow miraculously vanish [...] what, if anything, would remain of the world as we in any way know it? — javra

I would say everything bar percipients and their perceptions.

Perhaps I'm thick, but I didn't understand what you were trying to convey in your first paragraph.

First were these two.....

This is just another way of saying that to perceive a red flower in a vase entails that there is a red flower in a vase (i.e., the logic of perception).
— Andrew M

We're investigating what we perceive (i.e., can point at), and what we perceive is the object "as it is in itself", so to speak.
— Andrew M

....later was this.....

my position is that of Indirect Realism (...) rather than Direct Realism (our senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world, and the world derived from our sense perception should be taken at face value).
— RussellA

...which confuses me, because in our dialogue it seemed as if your position was just what you claimed it was not. Seems to me as if the first two statements support the direct realist doctrine. — Mww

I'm not sure whether your comment was intended for RussellA or myself. But my position is neither direct (naïve) or indirect realism - I reject the antithesis [*]. See my earlier post here.

I also reject the Kantian appearance/thing-in-itself distinction, which is what my second comment above was meant to convey.

Both are artificial philosophical distinctions, not natural distinctions, such as that between a tree and an image of a tree (e.g., a photograph).

--

[*]

I am not, then - and this is a point to be clear about from the beginning - going to maintain that we ought to be 'realist', to embrace, that is, the doctrine that we do perceive material things (or objects). This doctrine would be no less scholastic and erroneous than its antithesis. The question, do we perceive material things or sense-data, no doubt looks very simple - too simple - but is entirely misleading (cp. 'Thales' similarly vast and over-simple question, what the world is made of). One of the most important points to grasp is that these two terms, 'sense-data' and 'material things', live by taking in each other's washing - what is spurious is not one term of the pair, but the antithesis itself. — Sense and Sensibilia - J.L. Austin

No excuses. Rest assured I shall make the sincerest effort to release my head from its anal captivity.

If all awareness in the cosmos were to somehow miraculously vanish [...] what, if anything, would remain of the world as we in any way know it? — javra

I would say everything bar percipients and their perceptions. — Janus

In other words, everything bar awareness and awareness-contingent givens. What would that be though?

One should minimally add to your reply conceptualizations - including those of the world past, present, or future; or even of possible worlds - for all conceptualizations are themselves contingent on some instantiation(s) of awareness. So it’s known, I find your answer in current form trivially true and hence uninformative. I can try to rephrase the question in this way: What can be posited to exist without any perceptions or conceptualizations (for perceptions and conceptualizations are awareness-contingent and would in no way occur in the absence of all awareness)?

Perhaps I'm thick, but I didn't understand what you were trying to convey in your first paragraph. — Janus

Or perhaps I haven't explained it well enough. If it's of help, to try to illustrate from a different angle; I’ll allude to what I find to be a parallel-enough metaphysics in this regard: Buddhism. It’s a non-physicalist ontology replete with its causal networks that affirms the lack of a creator psyche for the world. I uphold a like position in regard to the generalities just expressed. If this example is not of help, then it appears I'm currently not that capable of properly expressing myself. I'll work on it some for next time.

In other words, everything bar awareness and awareness-contingent givens. What would that be though? — javra

True without percipents there would be no conceptualization. But conceptualization requires perception and perception require percipients and something to perceive.

What can be posited to exist without any perceptions or conceptualizations (for perceptions and conceptualizations are awareness-contingent and would in no way occur in the absence of all awareness)? — javra

I would say that absent percipients only what would be perceived if there were percipients could be posited. So, stars planets, mountains, rivers and so on. A very long list if you include plants.

What can be posited to exist without any perceptions or conceptualizations (for perceptions and conceptualizations are awareness-contingent and would in no way occur in the absence of all awareness)? — javra

I would say that absent percipients only what would be perceived if there were percipients could be posited. So, stars planets, mountains, rivers and so on. A cry long list if you include plants. — Janus

My first thought is, could anyone accomplish this positing without the use of their awareness? Take away awareness in general and the very possibility of this supposition seems to me to existentially vanish. What then?

But I grant that you, as with many others, deem it necessary that givens occur in manners fully independent of awareness in general, this in order to justify givens occurring independently of individual instantiations of awareness - the latter being something we all agree upon. In contrast, I’m thinking more along the lines of C.S. Peirce’s notions of idealism wherein “matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming natural laws”. Here, the physical (being effete mind) is contingent on the occurrence of awareness in general - but is not contingent on any individual instantiation of awareness. The former view - wherein matter is fully independent of mind - would seem to create a dualism between mind and matter if not for the supposition of physicalism. In at least this respect, the latter view does not.

At any rate, though we disagree on this point of ontology, thank you for the answer.

You can't tell a person (science) whose motto is prove me wrong (falsifiability) that she's wrong! That's a compliment and not an insult! :grin:

My first thought is, could anyone accomplish this positing without the use of their awareness? Take away awareness in general and the very possibility of this supposition seems to me to existentially vanish. What then? — javra

You are assuming that the existence of things depends on our positing their existence; I don't make that assumption.

I also don't follow Peirce in assuming that matter is effete mind. But yes, disagreement is fine; I don't hold any position regarding idealism vs materialism, although I think it's fair to say I do lean towards thinking materialism is the more plausible assumption. I also acknowledge that we don't know what materiality is (or anything else for that matter) in any "ultimate" sense.

No excuses. — Mww

No problem. :up: