Where did I say anything about pre-linguistic propositions, that wouldn't make sense. Propositions are by definition linguistic. I was talking about pre-linguistic beliefs. You seem to think all beliefs are propositional, I don't.

So you must have some way to square this with "The world is all that is the case".

How? — Banno

Well, something that I haven't talk much about, is my disagreement with Wittgenstein about what can be talked about in terms of metaphysics.

You need to be more specific, in what way do my statements, conflict with his statement?

You seem to think all beliefs are propositional, — Sam26

That seems to me the best grammar for beliefs. Their structure is a relation between someone and a proposition such that they hold the proposition to be true.

Hence any belief can be put into propositional form. Further if it cannot be put into that form it is not a belief as such, but perhaps an intuition, gut feeling, vague notion or some such.

That seems to me the best grammar for beliefs. Their structure is a relation between someone and a proposition such that they hold the proposition to be true. — Banno

There is no doubt that the grammar of a proposition is the best way for expressing one's belief in statement form. However, that is not the question, the question is, are beliefs only expressed in language (statements/propositions)? My contention is that beliefs can be expressed in two ways, acts that are not linguistic, and acts that are linguistic. This gets to Wittgenstein's idea of showing, viz., the showing of beliefs that are not propositional. For example, a religious person showing their religious belief through prayer, meditation, etc., the very act, shows the belief, apart from any statement or proposition. In fact, the very act of opening a door shows various beliefs about your surroundings. Language expression simply adds to the beliefs that are already there. That one can state the belief after the fact, is no argument against the view that the ontology of a belief, is not restricted to language use.

Hence any belief can be put into propositional form. Further if it cannot be put into that form it is not a belief as such, but perhaps an intuition, gut feeling, vague notion or some such. — Banno

It doesn't follow that because any belief can be put into proposition form, that all beliefs are of this form.

What's interesting is that Wittgenstein believed that some beliefs (religious beliefs, moral beliefs, etc.) could not be expressed as facts in the world. This, it seems, is why Wittgenstein was against arguments about the existence of God, there are no facts of metaphysics ("the world is all that is the case"), no facts that correspond to metaphysical propositions. I believe he was wrong about this.

...facts outside of language... — Sam26

Any fact can be stated. That's what a fact is, and that's what is said in Tractates 1 & 2, and I think these among the views that carried forward into his later work.

If to believe is to hold that some state of affairs is the case, then beliefs range over propositions.

If a belief does not range over some proposition, some state of affairs, what is it a belief in?

I'll add that statements such as "I believe in freedom" or "I believe in Sam26" use a different sense of belief.

I would say that there are pre-linguistic facts or beliefs that give rise to language. — Sam26

What do you mean by this?

Any fact can be stated. That's what a fact is, and that's what is said in Tractates 1 & 2, and I think these among the views that carried forward into his later work. — Banno

Facts are states-of-affairs quite apart from language. We use language to refer to facts, which is what the Tractatus is about, but the world of facts is separate from the world of propositions, which are just claims, that either match with the facts in the world or not. He did carry some of this through to his later work, no doubt.

If to believe is to hold that some state of affairs is the case, then beliefs range over propositions. — Banno

Yes, but that is what I'm disagreeing with, a belief is not just about propositions, but, it can be said that all beliefs have something to do with states-of-affairs (facts). All acts come into contact with states-of-affairs.

I'll add that statements such as "I believe in freedom" or "I believe in Sam26" use a different sense of belief. — Banno

They are still about states-of-affairs.

I would say that there are pre-linguistic facts or beliefs that give rise to language.
— Sam26

What do you mean by this? — Cobra

What I mean, and you have read other posts in here to follow my point, is that there were and are beliefs associated with pre-linguistic man that gave rise to language. Beliefs are not restricted to language. But to have a language, necessarily involves pre-linguistic beliefs, they're foundational to language. It's like the beliefs animals have, only animals weren't able to take it to the next level, language.

What I mean, and you have read other posts in here to follow my point, is that there were and are beliefs associated with pre-linguistic man that gave rise to language. Beliefs are not restricted to language. But to have a language, necessarily involves pre-linguistic beliefs, they're foundational to language. It's like the beliefs animals have. — Sam26

And what are examples of these beliefs? How can you have a belief, or claim to have one without language? I think we have discovered that animals have non-human languages, too.

Maybe you mean that pre-linguistic languages or facts, were not understood until grammar was added to the equation?

And what are examples of these beliefs? How can you have a belief, or claim to have one without language? — Cobra

Just think about your own life. Your beliefs and the beliefs of others are expressed in non-verbal actions all the time, not just expressed in linguistic terms. The very act of turning the key to start you car shows a myriad of beliefs, those beliefs, can be expressed in language, but they're also expressed in your actions apart from statements. You can't have a claim without language, but you can have beliefs without language.

I believe he was wrong about this. — Sam26

Whereas I think there's a misunderstanding here.

Beliefs can be expressed in words. What is expressed in certain acts goes beyond words, and hence beyond belief, into a form of life.

That's what was wrong with Moore's "Here is a hand" - it expressed a mere belief, a mere propositional attitude, that could indeed be subject to discussion, when what was needed was the form of life that shows us as embedded in the world. "Here is a hand" takes place in that form of life, as do all discussions.

A form of life is not a mere set of beliefs.

(Sometime I'll look for support for this view in OC.)

Beliefs can be expressed in words. What is expressed in certain acts goes beyond words, and hence beyond belief, into a form of life. — Banno

Forms of life are just acts, shown in what we do. Wittgenstein is focused on those forms of life that are connected with language use, and by extension, those acts done by a society or culture. I don't know what acts would go beyond words, maybe certain mental phenomena, but I'm not sure. Wittgenstein was wrestling with this very thing at the end of his life, not only in OC, but in other writings during this period.

That's what was wrong with Moore's "Here is a hand" - it expressed a mere belief, a mere propositional attitude, that could indeed be subject to discussion, when what was needed was the form of life that shows us as embedded in the world. "Here is a hand" takes place in that form of life, as do all discussions. — Banno

I'm not sure what you mean by a "mere belief," but if you mean one of W's hinge's or bedrock beliefs, I agree. Ya, his claim amounted to more of a conviction of a belief, an attitude is probably correct too, expressed in tone of voice or a gesticulation (OC 42 seems to suggest this).

A form of life is not a mere set of beliefs. — Banno

I would also agree with this. There are other things going on in a form of life besides belief expressions. A form of life expresses feelings, attitudes, etc, although these things can be phrased as beliefs. For example, "He has a bad attitude."

So, some of this, or most of this I agree with, depending on what you mean by "mere beliefs." I tend to use the phrase "mere beliefs" to refer to opinions, but I suppose you could also use it to refer to basic beliefs, like Moorean beliefs, e.g., "Here is a hand."

Well, time for bed, thanks for the discussion.

Searle points out that hinge propositions set out what something counts as for the purposes of the game. Moving the bishop diagonally counts as a move in chess. It sets up what it is to move the piece in the game. It rules many possible moves - putting the piece back in the box, for example - as not being moves in the game. Of course such moves might be moves in some other game or activity - tidying up.

"God exists" does not have the structure of a constitutive proposition in the requisite sense. Some interpretations might make it so.

I think the problem with taking "God exists" a hinge proposition is that, every reasonable person doesn't take this as a given. Whereas the statement "Here's a hand" is taken as a given by every single person on the planet and doesn't have any epistemic relation. However, religious people ( who are fit for participating in religious games as they live the life form) expect every sane person to take the conceptual scheme of God as a given/bedrock in religion game. So, it's still a hinge proposition.

But it's not simple, I wouldn't argue for a non cognitive religious game. Religious game is very special as it makes statement about reality ( the world ) + value statement + emotive statements as one whole. Religious statements are often multidimensional in their usage. Philosophers should bridge the divide between cognitive and non-cognitive statements here. I find religious language very interesting, and we will discover more about language studying the role/meaning of religious statements.

In another discourse, they are called axioms.

An axiom, postulate, or assumption is a statement that is taken to be true, to serve as a premise or starting point for further reasoning and arguments. The word comes from the Greek ἀξίωμα (axíōma) 'that which is thought worthy or fit' or 'that which commends itself as evident'.[1][2]

The term has subtle differences in definition when used in the context of different fields of study. As defined in classic philosophy, an axiom is a statement that is so evident or well-established, that it is accepted without controversy or question.[3] As used in modern logic, an axiom is a premise or starting point for reasoning

Axioms are self evident true statements we use for a foundation. This is meaningful for mathematics but l am not sure if we call hinge propositions self evident true statements ( true statements have epistemic relations) . A mathematical system is still meaningful if you remove certain axioms, but it's not the same for hinge propositions. Axioms in the true sense should stand on their own, they live in a logical space independent of any mathematical system and we can freely pick them. This isn't the same for a hinge propositions, every hinge proposition comes in a package with a langauge game, separating them is meaningless.

But the use of the word ‘God’ among the religious will
likely include doubt, since God would imply faith , which requires doubt.So I think the hinge proposition God likely includes all of this. Only in a situation where the non-religious had never heard of the concept of God could there be no shared language game.

Doubt in religious game is not the same doubt you have when you are doing a scientific experiment in a lab or when you are guessing. The problem with non-religious people participating in religious game is that, they are using statements in a complete different sense. This isn't a simple confusion that can be removed if both parties sit together and decide the terms. Religious people and non-religious people live in a different world. Any supposed agreement between them will be based on a new misunderstanding.

It seems that just as chess needs the rules, the board, and the pieces, in order for there to be a game of chess, so too, do we need these hinge, bedrock, or foundational beliefs (I think of them as special beliefs, not as propositions) in order to have a language, especially the language of epistemology. This includes the language of doubting. They have a special place between the mind, the world, and our language, and that place is related to our actions in the world.

The problem with using the word "belief" is it implies the bedrock hinge statements are epistemic. It's a matter of being a part of a form of life. People don't doubt hinge propositions, they avoid playing the game by not being a part of a community.

But how does belief fit in a language game, l still need to figure this out ?

What's interesting is that Wittgenstein believed that some beliefs (religious beliefs, moral beliefs, etc.) could not be expressed as facts in the world. This, it seems, is why Wittgenstein was against arguments about the existence of God, there are no facts of metaphysics ("the world is all that is the case"), no facts that correspond to metaphysical propositions. I believe he was wrong about this.

There's actually a big disagreement between Wittgensteinian philosophers here ( esp, whether religious statements are cognitive or non-cognitive). Most religious people use religious statements to make statements about the world, Wittgenstein knew this but he wants us to looking for what's going on with religious statements in addition, and this extra dimension of religious statements could help us see why they are not ordinary statements about the world.

A religious person saying "the tree spoke with the saint", is thinking of the respect nature ought to have for a friend of God and his emotional attachment grows to such an extent, he also makes a statement about the world simultaneously.

I have a big problem with non-cognitive moral statements as they suffer from frege-geach problem. I haven't found a nice solution yet from a philosopher. You may read on Quasi realism to see if you agree with it.

The problem with using the word "belief" is it implies the bedrock hinge statements are epistemic. It's a matter of being a part of a form of life. People don't doubt hinge propositions, they avoid playing the game by not being a part of a community.

But how does belief fit in a language game, l still need to figure this out ? — Eskander

I would disagree that beliefs imply that "hinge-propositions" are epistemic. A belief must have two other components in order for it to be epistemological, viz., justification and truth. A simple claim, or a mere belief, is just that, a claim, it maybe true, or it maybe false. Hinge-propositions, which many interpret to not be propositions at all (and I agree), are a special kind of belief, with a special status, i.e., they stand outside of epistemological language. These beliefs form the backdrop that allow the language-games of knowing and doubting to take root. They function very similar to the rules of chess, the pieces, and the board, which need no justification, i.e., they form the backdrop which allows the game of chess to be played. And, it's that playing of the game that is a form of life.

People do doubt Moorean propositions (hinge-propositions), which is why Moore wrote his papers in the first place. Although, in practical terms, we don't (generally) doubt them in our everyday speech acts.

every reasonable person doesn't take this as a given. — Eskander

That's not a criteria for being a hinge proposition.

Many a novice has been flabbergasted by castling, and nonplussed by en passant.

"Here's a hand" might be might well be disbelieved by a non-english speaker, or by yourself at a magic show.

Forms of life are just acts, shown in what we do. Wittgenstein is focused on those forms of life that are connected with language use, and by extension, those acts done by a society or culture. I don't know what acts would go beyond words, maybe certain mental phenomena, but I'm not sure. Wittgenstein was wrestling with this very thing at the end of his life, not only in OC, but in other writings during this period. — Sam26

Forms of life are not just acts, but acts combined with language. "Block!" goes beyond words in that the block is moved. There is a way of understanding "Block" that goes beyond the rule "When I say 'Block!', you bring me a block", bit which is shown in going along with or against the rule.

Forms of life are not just acts, but acts combined with language. — Banno

No doubt that Wittgenstein concentrated on those forms of life associated with language, but forms of life go beyond language. Any act that people do together with or without language can be construed as a form of life.

My point is that all actions, even the ones you describe, don't go beyond language, i.e., we can further describe the command "Block!" using more sophisticated language forms. There is nothing that happens when someone gets the block that we can't describe using language. You're right, the command "Block!" in itself, doesn't describe all that happens, but my point is that it can be described. Surely you don't want to limit what happens to just that word. Moreover, what would "going along with or against the rule" amount to apart from language? Even if it's just a primitive way of correcting a particular action. It would have to be a language of some kind.

That's not a criteria for being a hinge proposition.

Many a novice has been flabbergasted by castling, and nonplussed by en passant.

"Here's a hand" might be might well be disbelieved by a non-english speaker, or by yourself at a magic show.

By reasonable l mean someone who is mentally sane and for a hinge proposition, there's a mutual understanding between people, a shared practice of taking it as a given to even begin to make sense.

As for your magic show, let's get serious. In a magic show, the language game is different, we expect ourselves to get fooled but the very idea of getting fooled presupposes an ordinary language game where we don't get fooled. Where , here's a hand is taken as a hinge proposition

I have been thinking of a hierarchy of language games, some languages games can be embedded in a more broadly practiced language game. Think of a group of people who have a common form of life and a subtype amongst them have their own "mini" form of life.

I think the non English speaker would say, I don't speak English. He will refuse to play along

Surely you don't want to limit what happens to just that word. — Sam26

No - that is what I thought you might be doing! Yes, the moving of the block can be described; but:

what would "going along with or against the rule" amount to apart from language? — Sam26

Moving the block!

Moving the block! — Banno

Ya, but what's involved in the correcting part. Surely just moving a block is not enough, there has to be the correction of not following the rule (some hand signal, grunt, or words). Some form of communication would have to be involved, which brings us back to the linguistic part.

:broken:

Ok, this thread's about Wittgenstein. I hope I'm right. If I am then,

1. Meaning is use!

Question: Is anything that can be used (e.g. a hammer, a nail, etc.) a word?

Purpose! Meaning of life! (Albert Camus & Sisyphus)

Religious people and non-religious people live in a different world. Any supposed agreement between them will be based on a new misunderstanding. — Eskander

Whether or not they live in different worlds has to be determined by the context of the game. With endless religious denominations living in different worlds from each other , and just as many variants of non-believers whose outlooks oppose each other, there is as much likelihood of misunderstanding among the religious as between self-described religious and non-religious. By the same token , one could gather together adherents of liberal and heretical religious faith with self-described atheists , and find a surprising overlap of thinking on issues of faith. My point was that the words religious, non-religious and God by themselves don’t tell us how individuals and groups will align themselves with respect to each other in a language game.

Religious people and non-religious people live in a different world. Any supposed agreement between them will be based on a new misunderstanding. — Eskander

Axioms are self evident true statements we use for a foundation. — Eskander

To monotheists, "God exists" is an axiom.
To someone who is not a monotheist, it's at most a hinge proposition for the purposes of a particular conversation.

(Not all atheists believe that when they talk on the topic of "god", they are engaging in something that is merely a "language game", do they?)

Do hinge propositions have a special status ? — Eskander

Rather, it's that a conversation on the topic of "God" between a monotheist and someone who is not a monotheist has a type of "special status".

Like you said:

Religious people and non-religious people live in a different world. Any supposed agreement between them will be based on a new misunderstanding. — Eskander

don't think of hinge-propositions as propositions in the normal sense of the word, which is why they're called hinges, basic. or bedrock propositions. They don't fall into the epistemological language we use, at least in terms of JTB. They're not truths, they don't need some kind of justification, at least in the way Moore was referring to them. They're more akin to the rules of chess, as has already been mentioned.

I think Banno has the right of it here. What makes hinge propositions different isn't that they aren't propositional, or cannot be true or factual- its not anything peculiar to their content that marks them out from other sorts of propositions. What makes them hinge propositions is the role they play: the fact that they form the hinge (or bedrock) upon which our other epistemic moves depend.

But by that same token they cannot be subject to evaluation the way other propositions or truths can: they must be held true, in order to play their role. But there presumably still is some fact of the matter regarding whether e.g. here is a hand, or any other hinge proposition or epistemic bedrock or whatever... its just that we cannot simultaneously rely on them as hinge propositions, while also entertaining the possibility that they are false.

I can't make any sense of the idea that there are propositions that are true, but I don't know if their true, it's contradictory. The problem, is the same problem Wittgenstein had with Moore's propositions, viz., that a claim to know (in Moore's cases) involves an objective verification or justification, but what would such a verification look like? Moore's propositions are not the kind of propositions that allow for a justification, which is why I call them beliefs, not propositions in the normal sense. In fact, Wittgenstein refers to them in the same way, "Moore's view really comes down to this: the concept 'know' is analogous to the concepts 'believe', 'surmise,' [etc] (OC 21)." Moreover, what does having knowledge amount to, other than having a true belief based on good reasons or evidence?

If Moore held up his hand, and said, "It's true that I have a hand," it would lack sense for the same reasons that "I know I have a hand," lacks sense. To the latter statement Wittgenstein says to consider it's negation (OC 4), "I don't know that I have hands," this negation tells us something about the queer nature of Moorean propositions. It also tells us something about the proposition "It's true that I have hands," it's just as strange as the Moorean proposition, in fact, it amounts to the same thing. Consider the negation of this proposition, "It's false that I have hands," the exact same problem raises it's ugly head. What in the world would that mean?

Now does it follow that in all cases we can't speak of these kinds of propositions as being knowledge or being true? Of course not, and Wittgenstein gives examples of where we can use the word know when referring to our hands. It also follows that there are cases where we can claim that these kinds of propositions are also true. It depends on the language-game or the context. However, saying a proposition is true, still amounts to having knowledge. Part of the problem is equating what we mean by knowledge and truth, with claims about knowledge and truth.

I can't make any sense of the idea that there are propositions that are true, but I don't know if their true, it's contradictory

I guess I fail to see what is contradictory about an unknown truth. My truck has a certain weight. I don't know what it is, but it has one. So there is some truth, i.e. "my truck weighs X lbs/kg", I just don't know it. Similar examples aren't difficult to multiply: I don't know what the temperature is right now in Paris, but there is a temperature (and so a truth corresponding to that). I don't remember Wittgenstein's birth date, but there is some truth RE when he was born. So I don't see what is difficult about that.

But I do agree with you about justification (and therefore, by extension, knowledge). Given their role as hinge propositions, we cannot evaluate or justify these propositions as we can with other propositions, because any process of evaluation or justification proceeds on the assumption or against the background of these propositions (and so this would involve an obvious circularity). And so they cannot be known, because they cannot be justified. But truth and justification -> knowledge are not the same thing; as above, something can be true, without me knowing whether its true, or without my having rational justification/warrant for believing it.

Otoh, the proposal that hinge propositions could be propositional or beliefs without being truth-apt does strike me as contradictory; given the usual definition of propositions, isn't it necessary that they be truth-apt? And similarly for beliefs, at least, if those beliefs are cognitive and meaningful, mustn't the content of the belief be truth-apt?

So again I suggest that hinge propositions are propositional, are truth-apt, and do not have any special epistemic role because of their content, but rather because of their epistemic function and relation to our other beliefs and propositions and entire method for holding beliefs and evaluating propositions.