I believe Atwell is wrong. Schopenhauer has no claim over the EFFECT of our actions. Schop makes a claim over our actions, and that's where the buck stops.

Atwell is bringing in the "we don't know", which applies directly to the effect of our actions, not to our actions.

Therefore I maintain that Schopenhauer did not commit a logical mistake.

What is the name of logical error committed in the second premise? — jancanc

Not every fallacious reasoning has a name. Whether this one does or not, I don't know. But there may be a chance that it does not have a specific name for its type.

he EFFECT of our actions — god must be atheist

but where do you see Atwell doing that?

but where do you see Atwell doing that? — jancanc

What part of your action don't you know? Gimme one example.

What part of the effect of your action don't you know? Literally inifinite effects, of which you have infinite numbers that you don't know.

He relates to the effect of an action in this phrase:

" We know that we can act directly/unconditionally". that is, Schopenhauer, Atwell thinks, does not show that when we act we cannot know that we act in some other way also. — jancanc

We can imagine a case where we believe we raised our arm: we have the intention, and receive the sensory motor feedback of raising out arm, but in fact, our arm stays at rest. This is enough to establish that the knowledge of our actions is not "unconditional".

The fallacy would simply be invalid premise. The full premise is implied, not explicit: We know that we always act directly/unconditionally. This according to Atwell is incorrect.

Nonmonotonic logic (defeasible arguments)

The term “non-monotonic logic” (in short, NML) covers a family of formal frameworks devised to capture and represent defeasible inference. Reasoners draw conclusions defeasibly when they reserve the right to retract them in the light of further information. Examples are numerous, reaching from inductive generalizations to reasoning to the best explanation to inferences on the basis of expert opinion, etc. We find defeasible inferences in everyday reasoning, in expert reasoning (e.g. medical diagnosis), and in scientific reasoning. — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

What part of your action don't you know? Gimme one example.

What part of the effect of your action don't you know? Literally inifinite effects, of which you have infinite numbers that you don't know. — god must be atheist

Atwell is saying that, for Schopenhauer, the knowledge we have our our actions is unconditional insofar as it is not mediated by the subject-object relation. We have immediate access to our willing which is not conditioned by the PSR. Atwell is stating nothing regarding the effects of our actions, but only speaking of the knowledge we have of them.

The fallacy would simply be invalid premise. The full premise is implied, not explicit: We know that we always act directly/unconditionally. This according to Atwell is incorrect. — hypericin

Atwell changes the second premise to "We can know that we act directly/unconditionally"
This change would then make it an inductive argument right?

As opposed to how he first stated the argument; as a deductive argument--
If anything is an appearance it is known conditionally
We know that we act directly/unconditionally
Therefore action as such cannot be a appearance.

as an inductive argument:
If anything is an appearance it is known conditionally
We know that we can act directly/unconditionally
Therefore action as such cannot be a appearance.

Atwell is saying that, for Schopenhauer, the knowledge we have our our actions is unconditional insofar as it is not mediated by the subject-object relation. We have immediate access to our willing which is not conditioned by the PSR. Atwell is stating nothing regarding the effects of our actions, but only speaking of the knowledge we have of them. — jancanc

I read your argument. To me you are saying that Atwell agrees that our actions are known to us, as long as they are not mediated by subject-object. But when they ARE mediated, then you bring in effect. The very act of considering the object of our action, nullifies the premise, and changes it. Can't you see that?

The very act of considering the object of our action, nullifies the premise, and changes it. Can't you see that? — god must be atheist

No I can't see that.
can you give me an example of considering the object of our action?
It nullifies it and/or changes it?


Atwell is saying that Schopenhauer claims that our actions are known to us unconditionally from the inside, as will, that is, in a non-representational way since they are not subject to the PSR.
(we also know our actions externally, we observe our body and our acts as intuitive representations, as appearance).... but since we have this "inside" unconditional knowledge of our actions, and all appearances are conditioned on the PSR, then actions and appearances (not known in equivalent) are distinct.

No I can't see that. — jancanc

I can see that.

I remember arguing with some people that wars in the old times were over life-supporting resources, and those wars were justified, because it brought the population size down to a manageable volume, something that could be supported by the rare resources. I said the reduction was permanent. They said the reduction may have been useful also if it were temporary. I did not want to accept that, and argued against it. But then I went home, and next morning I realized they were right.

I suggest the same thing to you. I think, and I think without malice or mockery, that you are too much wrapped up in this. Maybe if you sleep on it tonight, tomorrow morning you may begin to see the light.

Just a suggestion.

simply invalid premise, I would say.

Atwell is saying that Schopenhauer claims that our actions are known to us unconditionally from the inside, as will, that is, in a non-representational way since they are not subject to the PSR.
(we also know our actions externally, we observe our body and our acts as intuitive representations, as appearance).... but since we have this "inside" unconditional knowledge of our actions, and all appearances are conditioned on the PSR, then actions and appearances (not known in equivalent) are distinct — jancanc

well stated. However, how could that then lead to Schopenhauer's thing-in-itself? He obviously uses this term--Ding an sich-- in a Kantian sense. Atwell's account? Schopenhauer's account?

Enthymeme.

The first type of enthymeme is a truncated syllogism, or a syllogism with an unstated premise.[2]

Here is an example of an enthymeme derived from a syllogism through truncation (shortening) of the syllogism:

"Socrates is mortal because he's human."The complete formal syllogism would be the classic:All humans are mortal. (major premise – unstated)Socrates is human. (minor premise – stated)Therefore, Socrates is mortal. (conclusion – stated)

While syllogisms lay out all of their premises and conclusion explicitly, these kinds of enthymemes keep at least one of the premises or the conclusion unstated. — Wikipedia

What part of your action don't you know? Gimme one example. — god must be atheist

I knew I stuck a finger up at a bad driver on the way to my new job. I didn't know I'd just insulted my new boss.

I knew I stuck a finger up at a bad driver on the way to my new job. I didn't know I'd just insulted my new boss. — Cuthbert

The getting insulted was the action by your boss. Your action was to insult a driver. It was not your action tha that the driver and your boss was one and the same person.

Your intention in acting, and acting, was just to insult the other driver. Who the other driver was, was not part of YOUR action. Could have been Donalda Trump, could have been Pope Francis, could have been me. Your action... etc.

Not every fallacious reasoning has a name — god must be atheist

That would be too much! Oui? This effect, that law. However, credit must be given where it's due. I actually like remembering named fallacies/effects/syndromes/laws/rules. They serve to explain patterns better than any number of essays I can muster.

They serve to explain patterns — Agent Smith

That true.

We know that we act directly/unconditionally (our actions are know to us in an unconditional way) — jancanc

What part of your action don't you know? Gimme one example — god must be atheist

I knew I stuck a finger up at a bad driver on the way to my new job. I didn't know I'd just insulted my new boss. — Cuthbert

The getting insulted was the action by your boss. Your action was to insult a driver. It was not your action tha that the driver and your boss was one and the same person. — god must be atheist

The example was about the intension (with an 's') of an act, roughly, how we would describe and think of the act given our current state of knowledge. But we can do things without knowing that we are doing them. So our actions are not (always) known to us 'in an unconditional way'. I ate a chicken sandwich. I ate a dose of salmonella. Same action - but part of my action was unknown to me.

Could have been Donalda Trump, could have been Pope Francis, — god must be atheist

True, could have been. And if it had been, I would have unknowingly insulted them. That would have been part of my action that I didn't know.

You rightly pointed out that the effects of an action are not part of the action. They may be unknown to us but they do not made a counter-example to the claim attributed to Schopenhauer in the OP.

I remember that Winifred Atwell was a wonderful piano player... or am I thinking of a different Atwell?

f anything is an appearance it is known conditionally
We know that we act directly/unconditionally (our actions are know to us in an unconditional way)
Therefore action as such cannot be a appearance.

Schop commentator John Atwell states that this argument is not valid.
The reason is that the second premise should state " We know that we can act directly/unconditionally". that is, Schopenhauer, Atwell thinks, does not show that when we act we cannot know that we act in some other way also.

What is the name of logical error committed in the second premise? — jancanc

If Schopenhauer had made an error in his argument, I'd say let's look at the fallacy of amphiboly. But he did not.

At first shot, John Atwell sounds like he's talking about the fallacy of omission against Schopenhauer's argument. I don't think this is the case. Atwell is simply disagreeing with Schopenhauer's assertion that when we act, we have a direct knowledge of this very personal mode of expression, the action. Atwell, then, counters that not all actions are known to us directly. So, no fallacy, just disagreement with assertion.