I guess I can agree with you that Weinberg's arguments aren't any better when construed as scientific arguments than they are when construed as philosophical arguments. His lack of so much as a cursory acquaintance with the relevant literature on reduction and emergence, either in physics, specifically, or in science, generally (e.g. in chemistry, biology, social sciences and cognitive sciences) also puts him at a severe disadvantage compared with his numerous colleagues who both are well acquainted with this literature, and who also (some of them) actively contribute to it. — Pierre-Normand

But at that level you either do borderline science or inconclusive philosophy.

Either there is such a naturalism and people opposed to naturalism in general are all incapable of reasoning or there is none. I am inclined to conclude the former. — Frederick KOH

Just because the option of a non-reductive naturalism isn't a live option in the minds of several intellectuals (scientists and philosophers alike) doesn't mean that they are incapable of reasoning. It may merely means that the general ignorance of such a position is rooted in widespread prejudice. Correct philosophical accounts aren't all popular philosophical accounts.

But at that level you either do borderline science or inconclusive philosophy. — Frederick KOH

Just because a philosopher has a good scientific understanding doesn't necessarily makes her produce "inconclusive philosophy". Also, just because a scientist is well acquainted with philosophy doesn't make her produce "borderline science". Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Hillary Putnam, Susan Hurley, Werner Heisenberg, James Jerome Gibson, Ernst Mayr and George Ellis are cases in point.

Just because a philosopher has a good scientific understanding doesn't necessarily makes her produce "inconclusive philosophy". Also, just because a scientist is well acquainted with philosophy doesn't make her produce "borderline science". Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Hillary Putnam, Werner Heisenberg, James Jerome Gibson, Ernst Mayr and George Ellis are cases in point. — Pierre-Normand

It's borderline and inconclusive irrespective of the people involved.

I guess I can agree with you that Weinberg's arguments aren't any better when construed as scientific arguments than they are when construed as philosophical arguments. His lack of so much as a cursory acquaintance with the relevant literature on reduction and emergence, either in physics, specifically, or in science, generally (e.g. in chemistry, biology, social sciences and cognitive sciences) also puts him at a severe disadvantage compared with his numerous colleagues who both are well acquainted with this literature, and who also (some of them) actively contribute to it. — Pierre-Normand

But you are using the wrong measure in your estimation of him.

Suppose we have an empirically adequate theory at a certain level. Does an "emergentist" have any theory to determine whether that theory is autonomous or admits further reduction?

Suppose we have an empirically adequate theory at a certain level. Does an "emergentist" have any theory to determine whether that theory is autonomous or admits further reduction? — Frederick KOH

That some of the features of the theory that are explanatory fruitful do not admit of further reduction isn't a claim of ignorance. It is a positive claim that can be demonstrated conclusively and without appeal to any sort of magic. What is shown is that this explanatory relevant feature of the system is common to several other systems with heterogeneous material constitutions owing simply to them belonging to an equivalence class: sharing formal/functional features that directly ground those laws. (This is what is being referred to as multiple realizability). That is, it is only from those high level formal/functional features (and also, in many cases, some contingent features of the history of the system and of its normal boundary conditions) that the high/level laws, norms, principles or regularities can be derived and explained.

George Ellis, in his recent books and many articles, provides countless examples of emergent laws in physics, biology, computer science and cognitive science. There also exist an abundant literature pertaining to emergence and top-down causation in chemistry. One paper that I read recently (authored by a professor of chemistry) provides an example of a class of chemical networks where the concentration of a reactant is fixed insensitively to the concentrations of the other reactants in the network provided only that the individual reactions satisfy a specific structural/topological relationship. And that it must be so derives from a mathematical theorem (recently proven) regarding the structure of such networks. I'll dig up the reference if you want.

Suppose we have an empirically adequate theory at a certain level. Does an "emergentist" have any theory to determine whether that theory is autonomous or admits further reduction? — Frederick KOH

It's quite simple:

A theory that explains sets of phenomena in their own terms, without analysing them into their constituent entities such as gluons, quarks or superstrings, is a theory at the appropriate level of emergence whose fundamental objects are autonomous.

It's borderline and inconclusive irrespective of the people involved. — Frederick KOH

They produced insightful philosophical works and made genuine scientific discoveries irrespective of your stubborn denials.

That some of the features of the theory that are explanatory fruitful do not admit of further reduction isn't a claim of ignorance. It is a positive claim that can be demonstrated conclusively and without appeal to any sort of magic. What is shown is that this explanatory relevant feature of the system is common to several other systems with heterogeneous material constitutions owing simply to them belonging to an equivalence class: sharing formal/functional features that directly ground those laws. (This is what is being referred to as multiple realizability). That is, it is only from those high level formal/functional features (and also, in many cases, some contingent features of the history of the system and of its normal boundary conditions) that the high/level laws, norms, principles or regularities can be derived and explained.

George Ellis, in his recent books and many articles, provides countless examples of emergent laws in physics, biology, computer science and cognitive science. There also exist an abundant literature pertaining to emergence and top-down causation in chemistry. One paper that I read recently (authored by a professor of chemistry) provides an example of a class of chemical networks where the concentration of a reactant is fixed insensitively to the concentrations of the other reactants in the network provided only that the individual reactions satisfy a specific structural/topological relationship. And that it must be so derives from a mathematical theorem (recently proven) regarding the structure of such networks. I'll dig up the reference if you want. — Pierre-Normand

So the answer is no. In case you forgot the simple direct question I was asking here it is again:

Suppose we have an empirically adequate theory at a certain level. Does an "emergentist" have any theory todetermine whether that theory is autonomous or admits further reduction? — Frederick KOH

They produced insightful philosophical works and made genuine scientific discoveries irrespective of your stubborn denials. — Pierre-Normand

Philosophy is inconclusive, but some of it is insightful despite that.

They made genuine scientific discoveries. But they also speculate on the borderline of science.

I am not being stubborn. You are being careless.

A theory that explains sets of phenomena in their own terms, without analysing them into their constituent entities such as gluons, quarks or superstrings, is a theory at the appropriate level of emergence whose fundamental objects are autonomous. — tom

Indeed, explanatory autonomy is the key. As I mentioned earlier, the relevant concept of (at least partial) autonomy is neatly explained in Karen Crowther's Decoupling emergence and reduction in physics while discussing "towers of theories" in the framework of effective field theories -- exactly the scientific context where Weinberg would most strongly expect to find "arrows of explanation" that all point towards the levels of higher energy scales in the direction of his uniquely fundamental "final theory"!

That some of the features of the theory that are explanatory fruitful do not admit of further reduction isn't a claim of ignorance. It is a positive claim that can be demonstrated conclusively and without appeal to any sort of magic. — Pierre-Normand

A good example of this is the theory of Computation, specifically the theory of computational universality. Computational Universality cannot be deduced from the laws of physics, it can however be proved that quantum mechanics is compatible with it.

So here we have a fundamental feature of reality which has been discovered in the usual way - by conjecture - that is compatible with, but not deducible from, known physics.

It could be that some future physical theory explains Computational Universality, but I seriously doubt that such a theory could also explain what computationally universal entities do.

Indeed, explanatory autonomy is the key. — Pierre-Normand

Before reduction is attempted, is there a way to tell if the theory was autonomous?

Before reduction is attempted, is there a way to tell if the theory was autonomous? — Frederick KOH

Yes, there is. I just explained it in a long message moments ago. (Well, just two short paragraphs, actually). The autonomy of the theory is demonstrated through deriving it directly from high level structural features (and normal boundary conditions, etc.) of the systems belonging to an equivalence class that abstracts away from most determinate (thought irrelevant to the derivation of the high level laws) features of material constitution. In that case, to attempt a reduction of the high level laws just is pointless. It's akin to seeking your keys under the lamp post, just because there is more light there, and in spite of the fact that you know for a fact that you've lost your keys further down the street in the shadows!

Yes, there is. I just explained it in a long message moments ago. The autonomy is demonstrated through deriving it directly from high level structural features (and normal boundary conditions, etc.) of the systems belonging to an equivalence class that abstracts away from most determinate (thought irrelevant to the derivation of the high level laws) features of material constitution. In that case, to attempt a reduction of the high level laws just is pointless. It's akin to seeking your keys under the lamp post, just because there is more light there, and in spite of the fact that you know for a fact that you've lost your keys further down the street in the shadows! — Pierre-Normand

Using your way to describe autonomy, is it then still possible to also reduce the same explained phenomena into lower level structures?

I wasn't using "charity" in a moral sense, but in a argumentative-methodological sense. As in the "principle of charity." Both Pierre and apo engaged you as though you (1) had a strong point to make and a solid background from which to make that point (2) were starting a thread in good faith, open to potential answers, rather than simply asking a rhetorical question in order to grind a boring, familiar axe.

Apo gave up quickly, realizing you weren't for real. Pierre, with saint-like patience, has continued, which I'm thankful for, because his posts have been enlightening.

As for me, I lack the consitution to deal with the kind of thing you're doing. I'm not sure you're even aware what you're doing. There's a type of person wants to exemplify a certain virtue (in this case no-nonsense rationality) but, since they don't actually have this virtue, merely want it (or want others to see them as having it), they latch on blindly to another figure (in this case weinberg) - this type of person will never be a good defender of the person they latch onto, because they haven't really engaged with their ideas in a meaningful sense. They've merely identified their hero as someone who exemplifies the virtues they want to possess and, on a purely psychological level, aligned themselves with them.

This type of person is quickly revealed - they seem to have a distinct incapacity to argue coupled with a distinct compulsive need to keep the conversation going, by making trivial and confused points about marginal issues.

Pierre's a good dude, I think, but I'm not, really, and I have no patience for the thing you're doing. It hurts to watch. Find a hobby, meet some people, do something else.

In that case, to attempt a reduction of the high level laws just is pointless. — Pierre-Normand

Pointless is not impossible.

Using your way to describe autonomy, is it then still possible to also reduce the same explained phenomena into lower level structures? — Frederick KOH

No, it is not possible. That's because it is proven that the high level features shared by systems that belong to the relevant equivalence class fully explain the existence of the high level laws (since the latter can be causally/deductively derived from the former), on the one hand, and since those higher-level laws are completely insensitive to any other low level features of material constitution that aren't merely deducible from the system's belonging to the relevant equivalence class. Hence, the availability of any bottom-up (and hence reductive) explanation is positively ruled out.

No, it is not possible. That's because it is proven that the high level features shared by systems that belong to the relevant equivalence class fully explained by the existence of the high level laws (since the latter can be causally/deductively derived from the former), on the one hand, and since those higher-level laws are completely insensitive to any other low level features of material constitution that aren't merely deducible from the system's belonging to the relevant equivalence class. Hence, the availability of any bottom-up (and hence reductive) explanation is positively ruled out. — Pierre-Normand

Do the following have these non-reductive features

1) Protein production
2) Plant conversion of sunlight into starches
3) Macroscopic properties of gasses.

Isn't is simpler to ignore my posts and as you say "Find a hobby, meet some people, do something else."

Pointless is not impossible. — Frederick KOH

It is pointless because it is impossible. It is also pointless because, even if, per impossibile, such a reductive explanation were to be achieved, it would be redundant with the formal explanation at the emergent level. You would have a case of causal overdetermination or epiphenomenalism. More plausibly, you would have a case where the reductive "explanation" is an overly complicated pseudo-"explanation" that is entirely parasitic on the high-level explanation, since it would merely amount to claiming that the material constituents were determined by low level laws (and initial conditions) to come to realize an arrangement that happens to constitute the system's falling under the high-level concept that is a causal antecedent for the high-level law such as to thereby necessitate a micro-physical arrangement that (as it happens) realizes the consequent of the law. But that is just another way of stating what the high-level law already was understood to necessitate and fully explain in the much simpler high-level terms while abstracting away from the micro-physical features of the system that contribute nothing to the causal explanation.

I suspect this autonomy is the autonomy that computer designs at the logical level have. It just happens that economics and technology has determined they be implemented using semiconductor technology. But the design does not depend on it.

Is this a correct paraphrase?

It is pointless because it is impossible. It is also pointless because, even if, per impossibile, such a reductive explanation were to be achieved, it would be redundant with the formal explanation at the emergent level. — Pierre-Normand

But there is another error of reductionism, which maybe even deeper: the misconception that our theories form a hierarchy.

I suspect this autonomy is the autonomy that computer designs at the logical level have. It just happens that economics and technology has determined they be implemented using semiconductor technology. But the design does not depend on it.

Is this a correct paraphrase? — Frederick KOH

That would be a relevant example. We may say that the software laws govern how the computers behave, at the relevant functional level that gives meaning to significant input/output structures. The lower levels of hardware implementation enable rather than govern what the software does (as characterized at the relevant symbolic level). In the case where a bug can be traced to a hardware malfunction (e.g. a real winged bug being fried up on a vacuum tube) rather than to a programming error, and only in that case, are reductive explanations of the episode of software failure to meaningfully be sought after. We can also seek to explain how the software is being enabled to run effectively on a specific machine, and such enabling explanations are genuinely reductive. But they are answers to a different question, and not even indirectly relevant to the high-level question concerning the obtaining of the input/output structure that is fully explained by the software specification. (Indeed the hardware design might plausibly have been implemented by the computer builders in order to enable the execution of the software in accordance with its own autonomous laws. So the ensuing operation of the hardware, under the governance of the software instructions, constitutes a clear case of downward causation.)

Sure, but I also have a keen, personal, interest in people who argue in this way, because I've got a bit of that myself. It makes me want to stop and ask: alright, all the bullshit out the way, what are you really asking, what are you looking for? It's clearly not what you say you're looking for, you've demonstrated that, so what are you actually after?

I can't answer that for myself, at least for the part of me that's drawn to provocation for the sake of provocation (which, say what you want, is all this thread really amounts to.) So maybe I want to provoke you into giving an answer that'll help me.

But there is another error of reductionism, which maybe even deeper: the misconception that our theories form a hierarchy. — tom

Yes, I thing that is true also. Causal networks in complex dynamical systems can be very messy and fail to display clear cases of upward and downward causation operating between neatly distinguished levels. (That doesn't prevent such messy systems from displaying stable attractors such as the deterministic surface warming response to the enhanced greenhouse effect.) The same is true of biological systems. Alan C. Love has written a fascinating paper in which he criticizes the narrow focus of theoreticians on neat hierarchies: Hierarchy, causation and explanation: ubiquity, locality and pluralism. The abstract may be worth quoting in full:

"The ubiquity of top-down causal explanations within and across the sciences is prima facie evidence for the existence of top-down causation. Much debate has been focused on whether top-down causation is coherent or in conflict with reductionism. Less attention has been given to the question of whether these representations of hierarchical relations pick out a single, common hierarchy. A negative answer to this question undermines a commonplace view that the world is divided into stratified ‘levels’ of organization and suggests that attributions of causal responsibility in different hierarchical representations may not have a meaningful basis for comparison. Representations used in top-down and bottom-up explanations are primarily ‘local’ and tied to distinct domains of science, illustrated here by protein structure and folding. This locality suggests that no single metaphysical account of hierarchy for causal relations to obtain within emerges from the epistemology of scientific explanation. Instead, a pluralist perspective is recommended—many different kinds of top-down causation (explanation) can exist alongside many different kinds of bottom-up causation (explanation). Pluralism makes plausible why different senses of top-down causation can be coherent and not in conflict with reductionism, thereby illustrating a productive interface between philosophical analysis and scientific inquiry."

Do the following have these non-reductive features

1) Protein production
2) Plant conversion of sunlight into starches
3) Macroscopic properties of gasses. — Frederick KOH

Which one of those requires superstrings as part of the explanation? Quarks?

As for me, I lack the consitution to deal with the kind of thing you're doing. I'm not sure you're even aware what you're doing. — csalisbury

Good old Socrates wannabe trolling.

This locality suggests that no single metaphysical account of hierarchy for causal relations to obtain within emerges from the epistemology of scientific explanation. Instead, a pluralist perspective is recommended—many different kinds of top-down causation (explanation) can exist alongside many different kinds of bottom-up causation (explanation). — Pierre-Normand

But this confuses epistemology and ontology.

Of course our causal accounts of nature might well be varied and poorly connected due to accidents of history and differences in interests. But the naturalist perspective would expect - for rational reasons, accounted for in hierarchy theory itself - a deep unity of nature, and so the potential for some actual nested hierarchy of theories.

So sure, pluralism could be the epistemic case if we had no particular desire to get the whole story of nature right. But on the other hand, it is very reasonable to expect that nature does have its one unified story to tell - even if it is also agreed that a lot of the actual story involves historical accidents along the way that add random elements of a degree of "living" spontaneity.

A theory of birds is contingent on there being birds. Yet still that evolutionary accident fits into a greater hierarchical story of an intersection between ecological constraints and organismic possibilties. Something like a bird would have had to fill that niche.

So a totalising discourse would be ontically pluralist in that strict sense - the history of the Cosmos has its accidents too. But that still leaves as our main target the formal backbone of all that counts as its integrative necessity - the hierarchy that is simplicity building into complexity via the semiosis of level-creating symmetry breakings.

As an aside, biology is going through what could be its "standard model" style causal revolution. There is an argument that life can only exist because of the chemo-structural possibility of a respiratory chain. And that involves a symmetry breaking depending on which way protons are pushed across a membrane (in to out, or out to in). Nature of course had no choice but to do both - giving us bacteria and archaea. Then have dichotomised respiration, again it was inevitable that the two modes would become mixed in the one organism to produce the large complex cells of the eukaryota.

If this is true - and we are talking about work only a decade old - then almost all the old evolutionary contingency when it comes to the evolution of life is removed at source. There is in the whole universe only this single way that the potential of chemistry could take the next step to be organised as living dissipative structure.

And this is just like particle physics with its tale of gauge symmetry breaking. The destiny of Universe - once its bath of radiation had cooled and expanded sufficiently - was completely locked in by Platonic-strength constraints on particle production.

Even human social, economic and political structures are likely to have very little that are truly contingent about them - http://pontotriplo.org/quickpicks/constructal_theory_of_social_dynamics.html

So I would say we are learning that nature is far more unified by some general organisational principles - mainly to do with closure for causality (symmetries) and least action principles (symmetry breakings) - than we ever really expected. Simplicity and complexity are being united under the one set of metaphysical rules.

That would be a relevant example. We may say that the software laws govern how the computers behave, at the relevant functional level that gives meaning to significant input/output structures. The lower levels of hardware implementation enable rather than govern what the software does (as characterized at the relevant symbolic level). — Pierre-Normand

In that case, that's quite an anti-climax. Engineers create structures like this all the time. Engineers who make parts and components at one level are also at the same time creating abstractions for engineers at the next level.

The part of your difference with Weinberg where he does not consider
this autonomy to be fundamental - well I am on his side on this,

It is not a difference in the understanding of the facts. It is one of perspective.
I am sure you can debate perspective, but I would rather debate something else.