Instead of a reply why not reformulate your response to Weinberg's chicken soup and the king's touch based on what has been exchanged so far. — Frederick KOH

I did it twice already. Why not produce your own paraphrase of what you take to be a valid argument that runs from chicken soup to Weinberg's style arrows-of-explanation-reductionism?

I did it twice already. — Pierre-Normand

How did it resolve the difference between

this:
It is the lack of confidence that there might be a naturalistic (i.e. non-supernatural) explanation of the healing power the King's Trough that undermines our faith in the genuineness of the phenomenon. In the case of the chicken soup, it is easier to imagine a naturalistic explanation. Such an explanation no doubt will make reference to some systemic effect of some ingredient in the soup on human physiology (or bacterial physiology).


and this:
The belief in the power of the King's touch would be one the the things this culture is wrong about. It may even be the case that the widespread wrong belief it is false by that's cultures own lights. (A majority of people flouting a norm doesn't make it not a norm).

Would you agree that they are different enough for a synthesis to be helpful? — Frederick KOH

They are different claims because they are making different points. Producing explanations and syntheses of Weinberg's arguments, and of my replies to them, it is all I do. Taking random pot shots and asking non-committal rhetorical questions seems to be all you do. I am sorry to say but your posts would resemble Trump's tweets rather more if they were just a bit longer and better articulated.

I am sorry to say but your posts would resemble Trump's tweets rather more if they were just a bit longer and better articulated. — Pierre-Normand

:-O

Laying bare your presuppositions is all I did O:)

So it could turn out that the culture that does not recognize the naturalistic/non-naturalistic distinction might end up convincing you of its point of view. What happens to your original response to the soup and touch then? — Frederick KOH

Basically, all you are suggesting here is that if my epistemic powers are fallible then that entails that anything that I now believe to be true could be shown to me to be false. The response to this argument is either to acknowledge it as such and endorse a form of radical skepticism or, maybe, counter it with something like McDowell's epistemological disjunctivism. I would favor the latter, but it could be the topic of another thread on epistemology. I don't see the relevance of this to our discussion of Weinberg's reductionism.

Basically, all you are suggesting here is that if my epistemic powers are fallible then that entails that anything that I now believe to be true could be shown to me to be false. The response to this argument is either to acknowledge it as such and endorse a form of radical skepticism or, maybe, counter it with something like McDowell's epistemological disjunctivism. I would favor the latter, but it could be the topic of another thread on epistemology. I don't see the relevance of this to our discussion of Weinberg's reductionism. — Pierre-Normand

What if I was using naturalism as a way to probe what counts as a valid defence in your eyes and do the same for Weinberg's reductionism?

Laying bare your presuppositions is all I did — Frederick KOH

You are seemingly trying to saddle with beliefs in radical relativism, magical thinking, or some such. However, just like your post-modern hero Rorty, I don't endorse relativism and I explicitly argue against it. Furthermore, unlike him, I don't recuse scientific discourse's claim to objectivity (though I don't restrict this right to scientific discourse alone, let alone to reductive modes of scientific explanation).

You are seemingly trying to saddle with beliefs in radical relativism, magical thinking, or some such. — Pierre-Normand

Showing that something is a presupposition doesn't make the opposite true. It only makes the burden of consistency heavier.

What if I was using naturalism as a way to probe what counts as a valid defence in your eyes and do the same for Weinberg's reductionism? — Frederick KOH

Do it, then. Discussion would be much easier if you would lay your card down on the table, as I do.

Do it, then. Discussions would be much easier if you would lay your card down on the table, as I do. — Pierre-Normand

I don't know what your defences are. They changed enough that I felt a need to ask for a synthesis.

I don't know what your defences are. They changed enough that I felt a need to ask for a synthesis. — Frederick KOH

This suggests one. It doesn't need a defence for the same reason that naturalism doesn't.

I don't know what your defences are. They changed enough that I felt a need to ask for a synthesis. — Frederick KOH

No. I've carefully read three book chapters and attempted enough explanations of what Weinberg's main argument is, and why I think it is unsound. My views didn't change (well, obviously they changed since I was a huge Weinberg fan 20 years ago) in spite of the fact that I tried to meet you mid-way though following your numerous side tracks. Now it's your turn to explain what you take Weinberg's main argument to be and why you take this argument not to be invalidated by my challenges.

No. I've carefully read three book chapters and attempted enough explanations of what Weinberg's main argument is, and why I think it is unsound. My views didn't change in spite of the fact that I tried to meet you mid-way though following your numerous side tracks. Now it's your turn to explain what you take Weinberg's main argument to be and why you take this argument not to be invalidated by my challenges. — Pierre-Normand

Is naturalism any better defended?

What if I was using naturalism as a way to probe what counts as a valid defence in your eyes and do the same for Weinberg's reductionism? — Frederick KOH

BTW, I think this is what Weinberg was trying to do with the soup and touch story.

BTW, I think this is what Weinberg was trying to do with the soup and touch story. — Frederick KOH

Yes, because he believes naturalism (construed as the rejection of magical thinking cum super-naturalism) to entail 'reductionism' (as conceived by him) and hence, by contraposition, the rejection of 'reductionism' to entail super-naturalism. So, we agree on the form his specific argument. Now you can address my objections to it.

Yes, because he believes naturalism (construed as the rejection of magical thinking cum super-naturalism) to entail 'reductionism' — Pierre-Normand

Wrong. Not entailment. Structural similarity. Naturalism suffers from the same structural defects as reductionism.

Wrong. Not entailment. Structural similarity. Naturalism suffers from the same structural defects as reductionism. — Frederick KOH

It didn't seem to me that Weinberg believes his own brand of 'convergence-of-explanatory-arrows' reductionism to suffer from structural defects. Did you see him express self-doubts that I may have missed somewhere in those two book chapters?

It didn't seem to me that Weinberg believes his own brand of 'convergence-of-explanatory-arrows' reductionism to suffer from structural defects. Did you see him express self-doubts that I may have missed somewhere in those two book chapters? — Pierre-Normand

If the defects are the same as those of naturalism, he would not consider them defects. There is no conclusive argument against solipsism but we feel free to ignore it.

If the defects are the same as those of naturalism, he would not consider them defects. There is no conclusive argument against solipsism but we feel free to ignore it. — Frederick KOH

If Weinberg doesn't recognize them to be defects, then what relevance does this have to your assessment of his argument? Are *you* now acknowledging that Weinberg's reductionism is defective?

If Weinberg doesn't recognize them to be defects, then what relevant does this have to your assessment of his argument? Are *you* now acknowledging that Weinberg's reductionism is defective? — Pierre-Normand

Naturalism is also defective. But you are still going to choose the soup. He is pleading at a court that doesn't have philosophers in the jury. The same jury that would laugh at solipsism.

If Weinberg doesn't recognize them to be defects, then what relevance does this have to your assessment of his argument? — Pierre-Normand

The similarity of his arguments to ones that would be used to defend naturalism.

Naturalism is also defective. But you are still going to choose the soup. He is pleading at a court that doesn't have philosophers in the jury. The same jury that would laugh at solipsism. — Frederick KOH

OK, so your view is that he's just pretending to advance rational arguments in favor of reductionism but he's merely bulshiting. He actually believes that his being a distinguished theoretical physicist entitles him to dismiss without argument the challenges put forward by both philosophers of science and fellow scientists such as Ernst Mayr, Michel Bitbol and George Ellis. And yet, in spite of this philistine attitude of his, he merely pretends to be rationally arguing against people who hold contrary views and whom he consider to be good friends and colleagues.

OK, so your view is that he's just pretending to advance rational arguments in favor of reductionism but he's merely bulshiting. — Pierre-Normand

You can offer rational arguments, but in many areas of life they are never airtight. People at the caliber of Weinberg know this. The gaps that can be attacked I just call them defects. You call them bullshit.

The similarity of his arguments to ones that would be used to defend naturalism. — Frederick KOH

That's rather unclear. You seem to be claiming that your construal of his argument may be defective (or intended for a jury of people who don't care about arguments at all -- owing to their having an unshakable faith in reductionism) but that it must be deemed to be relevant to Weinberg's argument because it is (in some unspecified respect) similar to arguments that "would be used" by others, though not by Weinberg himself, to reach the same conclusion?

You can offer rational arguments, but in many areas of life they are never airtight. People at the caliber of Weinberg know this. The gaps that can be attacked I just call them defects. You call them bullshit. — Frederick KOH

I call them bulshiting because you are characterizing them as being devised to gather approval from a jury who doesn't care one bit about their soundness and validity, because they purport to support preconceived notions uncritically accepted by this jury.

I call them bulshiting because you are characterizing them as being devised to gather approval from a jury who doesn't care one bit about their soundness and validity, because they purport to support preconceived notions uncritically accepted by this jury. — Pierre-Normand

Nice try. Laughing at solipsism does no imply one is doesn't care one bit about their soundness and validity.

intended for a jury of people who don't care about arguments at all — Pierre-Normand

Twice. You need new tricks. Laughing at solipsism does no imply one is doesn't care one bit about arguments.

The gaps that can be attacked I just call them defects. — Frederick KOH

Also, you seem to see the gaps that I have highlighted in Weinberg's pro-reductionism arguments to be minor defects akin to unfulfilled promissory notes. This could be said of the sort of "in principle" 'ontological reductionism' that often is claimed to be consistent with the falsity of merely 'epistemic reductionism'. Weinberg's true "final theory", for instance, could be claimed to lay, possibly, forever beyond the reach of human knowledge due merely to contingent limitations of human cognitive and/or computational powers. This all very well be true of the "final theory" of particle physics. But those contingent explanatory "gaps" have nothing to do with the flaws I have highlighted in Weinberg's conception of reductionism. Those flaws rather have to do with his overly narrow conception of causal explanation, which leads him to ignore many real and well understood non-reductive causal determinations of emergent phenomena. Weinberg's explanatory gaps are actually wider than the argumentatively filled up space between then. They consist in Weinberg passing over, or downgrading (e.g. as mere reflection on historical accidents) large areas of fruitful and uncontentious scientific practice and understanding.

Also, you seem to see the gaps that I have highlighted in Weinberg's pro-reductionism arguments to be minor defects akin to unfulfilled promissory notes. This could be said of the sort of "in principle" 'ontological reductionism' that often is claimed to be consistent with the falsity of merely 'epistemic reductionism'. Weinberg's true "final theory", for instance, could be claimed to lay, possibly, forever beyond the reach of human knowledge due merely to contingent limitations of human cognitive and/or computational powers. But those contingent explanatory "gaps" have nothing to do with the flaws I have highlighted in Weinberg's conception of reductionism. Those flaws rather have to do with his overly narrow conception of causal explanation, which leads him to ignore non-reductive causal determinations of emergent phenomena. Those gaps are actually wider than the argumentatively filled up space between then. They consist in Weinberg passing over, or downgrading (e.g. as mere reflection on historical accidents) large areas of fruitful and uncontentious scientific practice and understanding. — Pierre-Normand

If you say a similar argument can be made against naturalism, I am happy to concede.

Laughing at solipsism does no imply one is doesn't care one bit about arguments. — Frederick KOH

Laugh and ironise all you want; it is your own refusal to engage in arguments that may lead one to conclude that you don't care about them. Although Weinberg's pro-redutionism arguments seem to me to be defective, I can not fault him with merely substituting laughter for them. He clearly acknowledges the need to be arguing soundly for the truth of his conclusions, in spite of his numerous potshots at philosophers.