Is it the case that there is no 'good' reason to believe what I believe? — clemogo

I want to open a door, and I have the idea "I must turn the door handle in order to open the door".

My idea is partly based on my innate a priori intuition of causation - an effect needs a cause - and partly based on my empirical a posteriori observations - turning a door handle causes the effect of the door opening.

Innate a priori intuitions in sentient life are not arbitrary. They have evolved over hundreds of millions of years in order to ensure the survival of sentient life. Ideas based on empirical a posteriori observation are also not arbitrary, as based on the laws of nature.

IE, as ideas are founded partly on innate a priori intuition and partly on empirical a posteriori observation, ideas are not arbitrary.

Restricting myself to philosophy, I'd say for every thesis there's an antithesis; necessarily so since philosophy deals with unanswered questions (issues lacking definitive proof/evidence that could settle the debate). I'm not so sure of what practical significance this is (philosophers in their ivory towers) but if one does make a choice between opposing schools of thoughts, it simply can't be because of correctness/truth/veracity. Personal preferences are/have to be the deciding factor.

I'm a novice but I'm certain that if you take philosophy seriously (enough), one can construct a coherent weltanschauung, a model, that should serve you well 99% of the time. That's not bad, right? All that's needed for you to do this is explore the various branches of philosophy and the different ideas present therein and solve the jigssw puzzle that the ideaverse is. Warning! While some pieces may fit perfectly, others may not. The options: either tweak ideas so that all the pieces mesh perfectly and you get a clear picture of reality OR leave the puzzle unfinished!

What? Me? I haven't even bought the puzzle, forget about solving it.

What you're noting is that most people are rationalizing, and not rational creatures. Philosophy attempts to address that rational beyond the rationalizing. And if practiced well, I believe it does its job well. Will many people reject rationality in favor of their own personal feelings and biases? Of course. You can't make a person change their mind, and many are much happier in their own bubble of belief then actively challenging and thinking about what they believe.

If philosophy is about finding plausible ideas, but what we find plausible is based on our arbitrary intuitions, then isn't philosophy futile? — clemogo

Given that ideas are not based on arbitrary intuitions (previous post), it follows that what we find plausible is also not based on arbitrary intuitions.

A scientist would ask "how do I open this door ?". A philosopher would ask those questions that a scientist doesn't need the answer to, such as "does this door exist in my mind or as a fact in the world?"

Knowledge for its own sake cannot be futile. As Einstein said “The pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, an almost fanatical love of justice and the desire for personal independence -- these are the features of the Jewish tradition which make me thank my stars that I belong to it.”

I want to open a door, and I have the idea "I must turn the door handle in order to open the door".

My idea is partly based on my innate a priori intuition of causation - an effect needs a cause - and partly based on my empirical a posteriori observations - turning a door handle causes the effect of the door opening. — RussellA

Is that really what happens when you want to open a door? When I want to open one, I just do it with no thought at all. The wanting goes directly into the action without the step we call "intention." There's no idea "I want to open the door." There's just the wanting and then the opening.

An individual subscribes to an idea or philosophy due to their personal biases and intuitions. If the idea conforms to their biases and intuitions, they are more likely to accept it as being true. Also, it seems to me that biases and intuitions are virtually impossible to overcome completely, especially because they are probably mostly unconscious.

Moreover, an individuals biases and intuitions are ultimately arbitrary, since they are the result of the individual's genes, upbringing, education, environment, etc. (which are things that are essentially outside their control and are due to chance). — clemogo

Alas, someone dissing intuition again. Intuition is not arbitrary. It's a reflection of everything we've learned since we were babies. Generally, our knowledge is not made up of facts. We knew that things fall long before we knew about gravity. We don't say "things fall." We say "Sh*t, I broke another f**king glass."

Beyond that, of course our thoughts, ideas are based on who we are. That's why there are so many different ways of seeing things. That doesn't necessarily represent bias. It makes more sense to me to call it perspective. In my experience, reason only comes in at the end when we use it to weed out the baloney. My ideas reflect my experience. The fact that I am subject to the faults of a limited perspective, bias if you will, means that a lot of my ideas are incomplete or wrong. Reason is one of the facilities I use to deal with that.

An individual subscribes to an idea or philosophy due to their personal biases and intuitions — clemogo

Strange that you are reducing one's reality of the world to biases and intuitions. Bias implies inclination to prejudice. Intuition implies instinctive understanding. Both of them exclude conscious reasoning, observation, perception, cognition, ... Do you maybe reject the existence of consciousness?

There's no idea "I want to open the door." There's just the wanting and then the opening. — T Clark

There is the conscious thought "I want to open the door".

Isn't the subconscious "wanting" not also a thought ?

An individual subscribes to an idea or philosophy due to their personal biases and intuitions. — clemogo

I think there are far more compelling reasons than mere confirmation bias etc. Our reasons for believing are very complex and varied.

Your proposition asserts that all points of views are arbitrary by default. Then you ask if anyone could come to a different conclusion after accepting those premises.

A more philosophical approach would move toward the premise as the matter of interest.

A more philosophical approach would move toward the premise as the matter of interest. — Paine

This is the premise, isn’t it?:

An individual subscribes to an idea or philosophy due to their personal biases and intuitions. — clemogo

This is my experience too—for the most part: most ppl read what they want to hear. But I am also aware that there are a small group of ppl who come to philosophy and ideas because they are dissatisfied both with what they already accept, and with what they see and hear in the world around them...

...they sense that there is something more and better, and if their desire is strong enough, and their wit sharp enough, it invariably leads them to search outside their own time and place for something better...

...This other place and time can only be found in the old books; for we cannot read the future ones, and those good thinkers who lived and died in the past persist in their writings, or in the accounts of their speeches and deeds by contemporaneous or later good writers...

...Is it not more plausible that the millennia of writings that are—mirabile dictu—still available to us from the past, contain the thoughts of men who are superior to us; we who are confined to this tiny little moment of time? We object, and submit our advanced knowledge in opposition to their rudimentary knowledge; and, yes: I agree that, down through the centuries, man has learned a lot that is superior to, say, Democritus or Aristotle or Kepler, etc...but what about knowledge of the human things?...

...regarding those, have our modern state-of-the-art social sciences shed more light on the human soul than did Moses or Solomon, or Homer or Plato? Why, the very notion of “mind” or “soul” have gone the way of the old authors, who till only yesterday accepted them as a priori concepts. Every day a new disease or “syndrome” is recognized and given an acronym and diagnosis and therapy. The latest I heard of (NYT) is called “Prolonged Grief Disorder”, or PGD...

...which was very well known to the ancients. The classic example is the widow of the sailor who never returned from the sea: every day to the end of her life she goes out to the end of the dock and gazes out to sea to see if her long-lost lover will return that day. My grandmother wrote—every day—a letter to my grandfather, her husband, after he died of a heart-attack...every day, till she herself expired...

...today that is considered to be pathological and in need of therapy; to the ancients, it was considered the ultimate example of marital piety. Who was correct?...

...The answer to such questions as these is what can animate any future philosophy.

I love the old books. I am better versed in them than more recent ones. I own the biases of my preferences.

I don't agree that the old writers all accepted what has been discarded today. They fought each other tooth and nail. I think you are romanticizing the past. I realize that the 'present' has much to be questioned and struggled against. That is what Socrates said about his situation.

There is the conscious thought "I want to open the door". — RussellA

For me, at least, this is often not true. I just took a sip of water. My throat felt dry, so I reached over, picked up my glass, and took a drink. There were no thoughts like "I'm thirsty" or "I want a drink." I just was and I just did. I think most people don't really pay attention. Looking back, you can lay out a chain of thoughts and intentions, but that's often a rationalization of what they think they must have done.

Isn't the subconscious "wanting" not also a thought ? — RussellA

Good question. It's not what I usually think of as a thought. It's certainly not in words. Do thoughts have to be words? Even if they're thoughts, that doesn't necessarily mean they are ideas.

What are the implications of this for philosophy? If philosophy is about finding plausible ideas, but what we find plausible is based on our arbitrary intuitions, then isn't philosophy futile? — clemogo

Well, it may still be the case that some people's arbitrary intuitions are correct and so their philosophy might well be sound, despite the pathway taken. Also, people frequently change their minds and not always for arbitrary reasons - people do grow and they learn new things, are exposed to better ideas, etc.

I've often thought that people tend to choose the beliefs that sit best with them emotionally. So it is less about matching external ideas with specific biases and more about feelings. This also explains why so many people's beliefs are inconsistent.

I just took a sip of water. My throat felt dry, so I reached over, picked up my glass, and took a drink. There were no thoughts like "I'm thirsty" — T Clark

I am in front of a glass of water. My throat feels dry. I can either pick up the glass of water or not pick up the glass of water. My brain "knows" there is a glass of water in front of me, and my brain "knows" my body is thirsty.

The question is, what process is underway whereby the brain moves the arm to pick up the glass of water rather than not move the arm at all. If the brain uses cognition, then the brain uses thoughts, either subconscious or conscious. If the brain is part of a deterministic system, then free will is precluded, and the raising of the arm has been completely determined by the previous existing cause of the body being thirsty, meaning that the brain has not needed either subconscious or conscious thoughts.

IE, one's beliefs in thoughts depends on one's position as regards free will and determinism.

Do thoughts have to be words? — T Clark

The Neanderthals, living in Eurasia about 40,000 years ago, may not have had a brain with the level of complexity required for modern speech, even if they had the physical apparatus for speech, but even without any words to describe their feelings, the sight of a woolly mammoth bearing down on them must certainly have given them cause for thought.

IE, thoughts don't have to be in words.

Even if they're thoughts, that doesn't necessarily mean they are ideas. — T Clark

As I understand it, a thought is fleeting, whilst an idea is something you expel into the world around you. As Pythagoras said “Thought is an Idea in transit, which when once released, never can be lured back, nor the spoken word recalled. Nor ever can the overt act be erased.”

IE, a thought remains in one's internal world, whilst an idea may become part of one's external world.

Is it the case that there is no 'good' reason to believe what I believe? — clemogo

If there was no good reason to believe anything, then we wouldn't believe anything. When you say that a person's ideas "are the result of the individual's genes, upbringing, education, environment, etc.", you are essentially saying, "here, these are the reason's we believe things".

You've essentially articulated relativism, or the importance of subjectivity, to which the classic critique stands, "if nothing is true, then neither is the statement "nothing is true" or in respect to your wording, "If we should not subscribe to any ideas, then we should not subscribe to the idea known as "you should not subscribe to any ideas".

You do raise an important, often forgotten point that our ideas come from perhaps a humbler origin than by divine ordination of truth, and I think we would do well to have a certain degree of open mindedness in response to the implications of this. But I would not go around saying that our ideas mean nothing, just because they are the result of factors (largely) outside of our control. If anything, this puts our ideas on par with any other occurrence in the universe, something to be studied and respected as an element of time and space, and if we allow ourselves to indulge a little in the emotions and sense of dignity that we also (often) come equipped with, maybe we should even allow ourselves to care a little, about the things we've come to care about.

One doesn't after all say, "plants should not have leaves because the leaves are a result of arbitrary happenstances."

I think what's happening is that we once thought our ideas were divine, and now that we have reason to believe that they aren't, we sometimes jump to thinking that our ideas are worthless. Can't there be some wiggle room between "divine" and "worthless"? How about "kind of interesting"?

The question is, what process is underway whereby the brain moves the arm to pick up the glass of water rather than not move the arm at all. If the brain uses cognition, then the brain uses thoughts, either subconscious or conscious. — RussellA

IE, thoughts don't have to be in words. — RussellA

IE, a thought remains in one's internal world, whilst an idea may become part of one's external world. — RussellA

As is common in discussions here on the forum, you and I are working from different definitions of a particular word. "Thought" means something different to you than it does to me. Here are some definitions, although I don't think this will resolve our differences.

• The process of thinking; cogitation.
• A product of thinking or other mental activity: synonym: idea.
• The faculty of thinking or reasoning.

Here are some definitions of "cogitation."

• Thoughtful consideration; meditation.
• A serious thought; a carefully considered reflection.
• The act of meditation or contemplation.
• The faculty of thinking.

As I said, I'm sure this won't resolve the issue. Perhaps I should start a thread - What is a thought? Perhaps not.

As is common in discussions here on the forum, you and I are working from different definitions of a particular word. — T Clark

:up:

If beliefs were arbitrary we might believe things that were probably false, like the world is made out of cheese. But they’re not arbitrary; we believe things for certain reasons.

If philosophy is about finding plausible ideas, but what we find plausible is based on our arbitrary intuitions, then isn't philosophy futile? — clemogo

Wittgenstein's beetle in a box argument against the idea that philosophy is futile

It may well be that a person's inherent beliefs are arbitrary, based on genes, upbringing, education, environment, etc. From this it would follow that an individual philosophizing in an empty room will only end up confirming their own beliefs, undertaking an empty philosophy.

However, Wittgenstein may provide a solution to this problem.

Descartes said that the only thing he was sure of were his thoughts. Wittgenstein argued against this, arguing that the notion of a private language is incoherent, in that thoughts require words, and words require other people. The consequence is that meaning can only be found in language as a social event between language users.

Wittgenstein explained his reasoning in Philosophical Investigations para 293. Suppose everyone had a box with something in it, which we call a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, but they can look into their own box. This means that everyone's idea of what a "beetle" is only comes from knowing what is inside their own box. Then what purpose does the word "beetle" have in the social language game if no one knows what anyone else means by the word beetle. Wittgenstein concludes that words used within social language game cannot refer to any particular object, with the consequence that "the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant".

Therefore, even if an individual's belief, an individual's private beetle in a box, have been based on arbitrary factors such as genes, etc, in the context of a social language, the language game, these beetles, these objects which only exist in the mind of the individual, drop out.

Therefore, the argument that the language game of philosophy is futile because the beliefs of an individual user of the language game have been based on arbitrary factors such as genes, etc is negated if the beetles, the object-references, within the language game vanish.

IE, the consequence of Wittgenstein's beetle in a box argument is that philosophy within a social language game is independent of any arbitrary beliefs of any particular user.