Read The Ego Tunnel (or if you've got the balls – most don't – Being No One).

On the contrary, it is what is so. — Banno

If that's as compelling an argument for it we're going to get, so much for that.

This is not the case. We can refer to the flower, and alternately, we can refer to the experience of the flower. — Banno

This has already been addressed twice.

That said, I have to correct myself. Just as I might refer to "the red flower" as a shorthand for "my experience of a red flower", I'm also apt to refer to the object itself as "the red flower" as a shorthand for "the (hypothesed) object that causes my experience of the red flower". Then, of course, all references to objects are really just references to mental models, to hypotheses about an us-independent reality that with overwhelming likelihood exists, but that we have no direct knowledge of. — Kenosha Kid

But this isn't the issue at hand. You were not critiquing me, I was critiquing Dennett by way of you:

Qualia add nothing helpful to the conversation:

What is gained by talk of the-qual-of-the-flower that is not found in talk of the red flower? — Banno

It is helpful to have a more precise language with which to distinguish objects from our experiences of them. My contention was that "qual" is a good, if putative, term that, until more facts are forthcoming, allow us to unambiguously discuss the latter without being confused for the former. I'm not seeing anything like support for the above here, just a lot of distraction. Perhaps we're misunderstanding one another, but iirc my reading of the above is consistent with your posts on this from years ago.

This has already been addressed twice. — Kenosha Kid

indeed, with no clarification.

That said, I have to correct myself. Just as I might refer to "the red flower" as a shorthand for "my experience of a red flower", I'm also apt to refer to the object itself as "the red flower" as a shorthand for "the (hypothesed) object that causes my experience of the red flower". Then, of course, all references to objects are really just references to mental models, to hypotheses about an us-independent reality that with overwhelming likelihood exists, but that we have no direct knowledge of. — Kenosha Kid

See the bolding? Isn't what you are saying here that when we attempt to refer to the flower directly we only succeed in again referring to our awareness of the flower?

Which is only to repeat the same error. Repeating yourself is not presenting an argument.

Again, when you pick the flower, you break the stem of the flower, not of anything else. A mental model does not have a stem.

Again, you are assuming a cartesian theatre. Again, you are talking as if you were a homunculus. Again, you deny that we can talk about the things in the world, while pretending to do just that.

You seem to pretend to realism while failing to commit.

On Dennett. He is important precisely because so many dislike his ideas, especially those of his arguments that hit home.

Keep in mind that his criticism of qualia is distinct from, although related to, is theory of conciseness.

Quining Qualia presents solid arguments against the usefulness of qualia. These stand regardless of Dennett's other musings on consciousness.

One of philosophy's greatest mysteries, even more mysterious than the hard problem, is the mystery of how Daniel Dennett ascended to prominence in anglo-american philosophy. — sime

No mysteries. Dennett got himself taken very seriously by two generations of neuroscientists with his philosophical contributions of elucidating vague (folk) concepts which they were using. And the "hard pseudo-problem" was dis-solved by Dennett et al nearly a quarter century ago. (NB: It's only "hard" for philosophers because the explanatory gap is a scientific problem (re: phenomena) and not a philosophical one.) Chalmers' woo-of-the-gaps hustle only dupes incorrigible panpsychists, Cartesians, subjective idealists, latter-day Platonists and some neo-Kantians.

An existence of which we can say nothing doesn't count. — Banno

And pretending like the cup is indistinct from the perception of the cup is just pretending to speak of the cup.

See the bolding? Isn't what you are saying here that when we attempt to refer to the flower directly we only succeed in again referring to our awareness of the flower?

Which is only to repeat the same error. Repeating yourself is not presenting an argument. — Banno

The emboldened bit is a straw man. Substituting in your own "clarifications" to critique is unnecessary. And "attempting" has nothing to do with it. Subjectivity isn't a failure to be sufficiently objective. It's the framework within which everything we experience occurs.

Again, when you pick the flower, you break the stem on the flower, not on anything else.

Again, you are assuming a cartesian theatre. Again, you are talking as if you were a homunculus. Again, you deny that we can talk about the things in the world, while pretending to do just that. — Banno

And again these objections have been addressed. I'm not going to repeat myself as your argument hasn't moved on. This is, like I said, just a lot of distraction and straw-man construction, especially the leap to a Cartesian theatre.

And pretending like the cup is indistinct from the perception of the cup is just pretending to speak of the cup. — Hanover

Yep. Is there someone here who does that?

It's only "hard" for philosophers because the explanatory gap is a scientific problem — 180 Proof

That's
precisely
Chalmers'
point.

Jesus.

Whatever. I'll leave you to your confusion, unable to talk about the stuff that constitutes your world.

If you say so ... but then, by implication, you're also saying that Chalmers refutes himself in admitting his formulation amounts to a category mistake (i.e. comparing scientific apples and philosophical oranges). Okay, sure, frank. :smirk:

And I'll leave you unable to distinguish between a thing and a representation of a thing, screaming with terror at a photo of a great white :smirk:

If you say so — 180 Proof

So you basically have absolutely no idea what's meant by "the Hard Problem."

:up:

I'll leave you unable to distinguish between a thing and a representation of a thing, — Kenosha Kid

I make that distinction, explicitly*. Indeed, you do not seem to have grasped the simple point that we can talk about both our experiences and the things experienced.

...all references to objects are really just references to mental models, to hypotheses about an us-independent reality that with overwhelming likelihood exists, but that we have no direct knowledge of. — Kenosha Kid

Supposing that the world is only likely is, shall we say, somewhat fraught. It takes a philosophy to make such mistakes. And better philosophy to point out the error.

Doubt is only possible within a context of certainty. Doubting the existence of the flowers, trees, chairs and people that make up your world is not clever, indeed it verges on the mad.

* indeed, since you claim, even in your clarification, that "all references to objects are really just references to mental models", it is you who is not able to refer to flowers.

It's only "hard" for philosophers because the explanatory gap is a scientific problem
— 180 Proof

That's
precisely
Chalmers'
point. — frank

So you basically have absolutely no idea what's meant by "the Hard Problem." — frank

Not according to frank, frank. :lol:

I make that distinction, explicitly. Indeed, you do not seem to have grasped the simple point that we can talk about both our experiences and the things experienced. — Banno

It keeps coming back to this, doesn't it? It's like the thing itself vanishes if we are able to have an experience of it.

Yep. Is there someone here who does that? — Banno

You're a Chalmers fan unawares.

:grin:

Stove's gem parodies this: we can only see with our eyes, therefore we cannot see.

Demonstrating again that you address the argument you want to hear, not the argument I am making.

I know I said

I'm not going to repeat myself as your argument hasn't moved on. — Kenosha Kid

but I guess there's a twisted pleasure in saying it four times:

Just as I might refer to "the red flower" as a shorthand for "my experience of a red flower", I'm also apt to refer to the object itself as "the red flower" as a shorthand for "the (hypothesed) object that causes my experience of the red flower". — Kenosha Kid

If you're gathering:

Indeed, you do not seem to have grasped the simple point that we can talk about both our experiences and the things experienced. — Banno

irrespective of what I write, I wonder what you're basing that on. Oh yeah. Straw man building.

Supposing that the world is only likely is, shall we say, somewhat fraught. It takes a philosophy to make such mistakes. And better philosophy to point out the error. — Banno

I'll look forward to that when it arrives, but in the meantime you're mistaking knowledge about experience of a red flower with experience of a red flower itself. Learning that we have no direct perception of the external world doesn't retrospectively change the nature of the experiences we've had. If we do have direct perception of the world, we do so whether we know it or not. And if our experience is instead of a model unconsciously constructed from brain activity triggered by photons, phonons, etc. mediating partial data about objects in the external world, it is whether we know it or not. Knowing is great, but it's not as transformative as you're making it out. I still see a flower in the same way.

all references to objects are really just references to mental models", it is you who is not able to refer to flowers. — Banno

Absolute nonsense. I can refer to wormholes in the same way as I can refer to flowers. I'm much more confident about the existence of the latter. I don't need proof of the external world to have confidence in my models about it.

The pragmatist's failure to commit. Not only that, but you seem to have me confused with Mww, quoting your reply to him instead of to me.

But I take it that you now renege on your claim that "all references to objects are really just references to mental models". So there's that.

Doubt is only possible within a context of certainty. Doubting the existence of the flowers, trees, chairs and people that make up your world is not clever, indeed it verges on the mad. — Banno

Demonstrating again that you address the argument you want to hear, not the argument I am making. — Banno

Not only that, but you seem to have me confused with Mww, quoting your reply to him instead of to me. — Banno

Rubbish, I've quoted it at you three times in response to your "you can't refer to objects" comments.

But I take it that you now renege on your claim that "all references to objects are really just references to mental models". So there's that. — Banno

Not at all. If the external world is a hypothesis, however compelling, however confident in it we are, then statements about it are statements about our beliefs in it. You seem to imagine a contradiction between this and

I'm also apt to refer to the object itself as "the red flower" as a shorthand for "the (hypothesed) object that causes my experience of the red flower". — Kenosha Kid

but they're the same.

If the external world is a hypothesis... — Kenosha Kid

Thee's the cartesian theatre.

Doubt is only possible within a context of certainty. Doubting the existence of the flowers, trees, chairs and people that make up your world is not clever... — Banno

We'd have much more fun discussing Rorty's mirror.

Thee's the cartesian theatre. — Banno

Do you seriously observe no difference between recognising that we don't have direct perception of objects and a full-on subscription to dualism? I get the comparison you're making, but unfortunately it's regarding uncontroversial statements about the brain. There's plenty of examples of the brain doing processing that we're not conscious of that feeds into stuff we are conscious of. I'm certainly not conscious of how photons get converted into an image of 'red flower', and anyone who pretends they are is full of it. Calling it a Cartesian theatre or humunculus is just misleading.

We'd have much more fun discussing Rorty's mirror. — Banno

Funnily enough, your responses reminded me of the threads on postmodernism I started a while back. Coming from a scientific background, I'm comfortable with the fact that our models of reality will likely always be deficient and only ever be that: ever-improvong but never perfect models. So yeah I have sympathy with the descriptive parts of Rorty (and pomo generally, and a lot of the prescriptive stuff). Probably no surprise there. :rofl:

Hard problem as opposed to the simple problem of why it's so sensible for dead matter to coalesce and go around identifying itself as people?

I'm confused?

Near as I can tell, it's complete nonsense. What exactly is a "property of experience"? Or a "qualitative aspect" of an emotion? — tim wood

I agree. I understand the concept, but as it is something that would be entirely different for everyone under every circumstance, outside of a concept, it seems fairly useless. Ie: When I read discussions on this topic I am rapidly drawn back into one of the more ridiculous classes in which we, the students, were to explore our feelings. We were asked how we felt about something, and then asked how we felt about that, and about that, etc. I think the point of the exercise was to demonstrate that there are multiple levels at play in each moment, however, the result was a classroom filled with confused looking students while our starry eyed instructor looked on waiting for our epiphany. It was most entertaining.

"Think about a duck. How do you feel about that duck? how do you feel about feeling that way? How do you feel about the way you feel about how you feel about the duck? How does that feeling make you feel now? and now? how about now?" Endless possibilities really.

...direct perception... — Kenosha Kid

What's that? There's plenty of room in that notion for a range of views.

I'm comfortable with the fact that our models of reality will likely always be deficient — Kenosha Kid

Me, too. It's just that the model used in explanations of perceptions is very different from the model used in our scientific theories.

I think the hard problem is that people have a surface level/qualia, too, that can't be explained through dissection.

We are not brains and a spine; we are whole bodies and whole personas. Nothing will ever be more definitive of us than our whole lives, and something remains to be said for the surface level of things that expresses itself more than is possible to measure.

Obviously, you're not going to find a person inside their brain.