I saw a studied that suggested that dumber people were more dishonest. They gave them a die, and asked them to go in a private box that actually was and for true private to roll the die, and paid out more for a higher roll. The dumber group overwhelming beat the odds, rolling a hell of a lot of sixes. The smarter group beat the odds too, but not as amazingly.

I think that philosophers are more honest, and I think that honesty is the true mark of intelligence. They don't have to be right all the time, or about everything, but no ones doing any better. Everyone is pretty much just saying the same stuff as the Greeks too, with small novel divergences and or just simple inversions on various points.

It's still the highest ends of what's going on in human thought. How it relates to some non-human reality is always secondary to me.

Novices are generally not good at any activity; so this wouldn't seem to support the idea that practiced philosophers are bad at philosophy. In fact if they were not good at it they would not be able to recognize how bad undergraduates are. There is no absolute good and bad; expertise is relative only to the range of expertise within any field.

This means that our experience of the world is ineluctably conceptually shaped. That is what it would mean to say that Kant thinks we cannot 'get outside our conceptual schemas', although I doubt he ever expressed it exactly like that. — John

Did Kant mean it in the broadest sense that we can't get outside of some form of conceptualizing the world, or that we can't get outside of specific fundamental concepts?

Beyond Kant, the anti-realist argument would be that we can't get outside our thinking about the world to see what the world is actually like, and adjust our concepts accordingly. But that flies in the face of history and most fields of knowledge, were humans do revise their concepts based on new knowledge and experiences.

What we moderns think about the world is different in many ways than what various ancient groups though, because our knowledge and experiences of the world has grown quite a bit.

It's still the highest ends of what's going on in human thought. How it relates to some non-human reality is always secondary to me. — Wosret

Yes, and the question is what non-human scale of values could it possibly be related to, in any case?

Novices are generally not good at any activity; so this wouldn't seem to support the idea that practiced philosophers are bad at philosophy. In fact if they were not good at it they would not be able to recognize how bad undergraduates are. There is no absolute good and bad; expertise is relative only to the range of expertise within any field. — John

I changed my post, because that would need to be expounded on to say that if professional philosophers made the same fundamental mistakes as students, unlike with other professions, then there would be reason to think humanity is just bad at philosophizing.

No, Kant isn't saying that we can't get outside the categories of thought, he's attempting to secure their objectivity in the face of Hume's critique that they aren't to be found in experience. He actually does think that there is a domain of experience that isn't subject to categorization, so we both can get outside of them, and he isn't trying to justify some cultural prejudices, but secure the objectivity and universality of thought itself. Without that it's only human, it's only us complexly ooting at each other about homo sapien stuff, and that's it.

Without that it's only human, it's only us complexly ooting at each other about homo sapien stuff, and that's it. — Wosret

So Humeans are howler monkeys, and Kant is the monolith from 2001? j/k

so we both can get outside of them, and he isn't trying to justify some cultural prejudices, but secure the objectivity and universality of thought itself. — Wosret

What does it mean for thought to be objective and universal? Does that just mean for all humanity? Or any thinking being? I take it Kant wasn't endorsing Platonism.

Did Kant mean it in the broadest sense that we can't get outside of some form of conceptualizing the world, or that we can't get outside of specific fundamental concepts? — Marchesk

Some concepts do seem to be fundamental; space, time, causality, materiality, form, function, quantity, quality, relation, modality. I just thought of those off the top of my head; I'm sure there are more. Do you think we can do without any of those?

Beyond Kant, the anti-realist argument would be that we can't get outside or thinking about the world to see what the world is actually like, and adjust our concepts accordingly. But that flies in the face of history and most fields of knowledge, were humans do revise their concepts based on new knowledge and experiences.

What we moderns think about the world is different in many ways than what various ancient groups though, because our knowledge and experiences of the world has grown quite a bit. — Marchesk

Our thinking about the world is produced by the world, so as the world changes our thinking changes without our ever having to "get outside of our thinking".

It's basically Platonism, only we can't actually know the categories, but they still exist.

What it means is that we can think the same thing, and it isn't dependent on the material that instantiates it, but on principles of form, which are universal, so that I and you, can construct the same idea, or thought, or meaningful thing out of any material whatever, and as long as the form is right, then we can obtain the same meaning, or idea.

Necessarily then, none of that form or meaning can be dependent on the material that is used in forming it. It can't be found in it, but in order for it to be meaningful, to be "rational" it has to be universal and the same precisely in all instantiations. This is just how reason works, and no material that instantiates anything does.

Some concepts do seem to be fundamental; space, time, causality, materiality, form, function, quantity, quality, relation, modality. I just thought of those off the top of my head; I'm sure there are more. Do you think we can do without any of those? — John

Perhaps not. But we can revise our thinking on them. And we can propose concepts without one or more of those categories you listed.

The idea that time and space arise from something more fundamental, or that the cosmos is massively contingent and without any prescriptive laws of nature. Or that time doesn't really flow, and the future already exists. Stuff like that.

Did Kant think those things couldn't exist in the world? Was carving nature at its joints incoherent to him?

Is there someone/something other than humans doing philosophy?

Do we need something other as a comparison to notice whether we're poor at an activity?

Here's the suggested evidence that humans perform poorly at philosophy:

1. Errors in reasoning affecting even professional philosophers.

2. Failure to resolve issues explored by the ancient Greeks.

3. Failure to reach consensus on almost anything.

4. That professional philosophers generally agree with the assessment that their colleagues are poor at doing philosophy.

The evidence can be contested, but if it is correct, then we'd have reason for thinking humans aren't that great at philosophizing.

Actually, I'd argue that the study proved dumb people are luckier than smarter people, thus the saying "dumb luck." It is most likely that the Heavenly Creator bestows luck upon idiots as a divine apology.

I think the problem is that philosophy is defined as the field of unanswerable questions, and so if a firm answer were given to a question, it would no longer be considered philosophical. What is beyond the realm of science is within the speculative realm of philosophy, but should science advance, philosophy will contract, except to the extent the new scientific discovery arouses new philosophical questions.

That is a thing, I've heard of that... from now on whenever things don't work out I'll take it as a compliment from the universe.

I saw a study that suggested that dumber people were more dishonest. — Wosret

That's odd. I saw a study that suggested just the opposite: Smart people tended to be more crooked.

I think that philosophers are more honest, and I think that honesty is the true mark of intelligence. — Wosret

Your study, my study, and your statement that philosophers are more honest (than horses, say) and that honesty is the true mark of intelligence are all groundless. It may be the case that stupid people are crooks, or that smart people are, but I'm pretty sure this hasn't been proved to the satisfaction of even a C+ GPA undergraduate psychology major.

What principles of behavior would link intelligence (a lot of it or only a little) to honesty? What is it about honesty and intelligence that connects them? Is it not more likely that a very smart person would think of successful ways to lie, cheat, and steal? Stupid people would trip themselves up and be discovered--dumb and dishonest, wouldn't they?

You may be right that philosophers are more honest (than horses, say) but why? Are they honest because they have nothing to lose? Maybe they know they are too unimaginative to lie and get away with it? Could it be that they took their ethics class seriously? Maybe they are merely afraid of getting caught in a lie -- which is different than valuing the truth highly.

Together we have reinforced the idea that people are not very good at philosophy, and that we may not be very good at psychology either. What the hell are we good at? Homo mediocriter. I'm poor at math, gardening, housekeeping, astronomy, Sanskrit, and bicycle maintenance, just for starters. I am also slightly dishonest.

What the hell are we good at? — Bitter Crank

Telling stories. Maybe we should put philosophy into literary form. Or just have undergrads watch The Matrix and Fight Club.

I said "I think" rather than that's a fact. I think it for various reasons, but mostly because philosophy is supposed to be about the true and the good. I also think that it deals with the most problematic areas of life. Call me biased, or bad at psychology.

I don't think that we can consistently tell whether people are lying, no one can demonstrate an ability to consistently greater than chance, and seven year olds can pull it off. It takes trust, not intelligence to fool people. They have to be willing to trust you, and there are various reasons why they would or wouldn't, mostly based on your known and reputable trustworthiness, and agreeableness. I maintain that it doesn't takes intelligence to deceive, it takes trust, and the consequences of deception are the same risks to the idiot as the genius.

Are humans bad at music?

You might believe the best was achieved by Spinoza, but won't it always be possible that I could disagree with you, just as I might disagree with you that Mozart's music is greater than Bach's or Beethoven's, or Miles Davis'. — John

Better is not the word to use for things like philosophy and art. Mozart's music was created and appreciated by a civilization that had never heard of Miles Davis. Jazz was created and sustained by a civilization that appreciated Mozart.

Quine and Davidson are philosophers who inherited the legacy of Kant (and everything that Kant inherited), modern science and the logic of Frege. Kant did not live to see post-Newtonian physics or modern logic.

It is not exactly the same thing for science. As remarked by Bouveresse, there are Aristotelian philosophers today, but no Aristotelian physicists.

Dolphins are better at it.

Perhaps not. But we can revise our thinking on them. And we can propose concepts without one or more of those categories you listed.

The idea that time and space arise from something more fundamental, or that the cosmos is massively contingent and without any prescriptive laws of nature. Or that time doesn't really flow, and the future already exists. Stuff like that.

Did Kant think those things couldn't exist in the world? Was carving nature at its joints incoherent to him? — Marchesk

Can you give an example of any concept "without one or more of those categories"?

Spinoza, for example proposed that time and space arise form substance, which is infinite and eternal. So he has given us a concept "without one or more of those categories", except that the subject of the concept is said to give rise to all of them. I think this is quote similar to Kant's idea that the noumenal gives rise to the phenomenal. Spinoza actually says that God is the "efficient cause" of both the existence and the eternal essence of things. But this kind of metaphysical stuff is beyond the purview of science.

If the cosmos were "massively contingent" it would be unintelligible, so we can put that one to rest, I think. Does time flow or do things move (change) in time? The idea that the future "already exists" seems unintelligible. But from the point of view of eternity, all that is past, present and future is eternally present. "Already exists" suggests a before and after though, and yet there is before and after only in time, not in eternity. None of this stuff is decidable by science, though; it is all metaphysics.

So, Kant would be right, I would say, if he thought such things couldn't exist in the world. I believe he thought we do "carve nature at the joints", though.

...that's just deism. It is direct conflict with Spinoza philosophy.

Substance isn't a casual state. God does not exist and act to create states of the existence and the form. Rather God is a logical expression, the infinite which existence never without, expressed all the time. When Spinoza says "God causes," he's talking more like a manner of "final cause," of necessary logical expression, of the infinite which nothing is ever without, only he recognises it as a necessary truth rather than an action of the world which creates meaning where there was none.

If the cosmos were "massively contingent" it would be unintelligible, so we can put that one to rest, I think. Does time flow or do things move (change) in time? The idea that the future "already exists" seems unintelligible. But from the point of view of eternity, all that is past, present and future is eternally present. "Already exists" suggests a before and after though, and yet there is before and after only in time, not in eternity. None of this stuff is decidable by science, though; it is all metaphysics — John

Spinoza's philosophy is dedicated to showing the opposite, to how the necessity of eternity isn't at all opposed to the contingent and the possible. The future might always "already exist," but is still need to be made. To get there events still have to occur and people have to make choices. Without those entirely contingent moments, the future which "already exists " would never arrive.

In terms of states of the world, is all decided by "science." All the events that occur are a function of the existing states themselves and their relationships. The possible outcomes which are actual are defined by states of the world, by their causal relationships, by the states of the world and how they interact.

Everything you say here presents nothing more than the assertions of TWOD, it does not represent the philosophy of Spinoza.

Ethics Part I

PROPOSITION 16,
Corollary I: Hence it follows that God is the efficient cause of all things that can come within the scope of the infinite intellect.

PROPOSITION 2 5
God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things but also of their essence.

Proof: If this is denied, then God is not the cause of the essence of things, and
so (Ax. 4) the essence of things can be conceived without God. But this is absurd
(Pr. 1 5). Therefore, God is also the cause of the essence of things.
Scholium This proposition follows more clearly from Pro 1 6; for from that
proposition it follows that from the given divine nature both the essence and the
existence of things must be inferred. In a word, in the same sense that God is said
to be self-caused he must also be said to be the cause of all things. This will be
even clearer from the following Corollary.
Corollary Particular things are nothing but affections of the attributes of God,
that is, modes wherein the attributes of God find expression in a definite and determinate
way. The proof is obvious from Pr. 1 5 and Def. 5.

All I can say is that if you have read Spinoza, you have obviously not understood him.

Corollary I: Hence it follows that God is the efficient cause of all things that can come within the scope of the infinite intellect. — Ethics

You are missing this key definition. Spinoza is talking about the infinite intellect here, not finite states of the world (i.e. "efficient causality" as is commonly used).

It's made clear a couple of propositions down:

PROP. XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things.

Proof.—All things which are, are in God, and must be conceived through God (by Prop. xv.), therefore (by Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.) God is the cause of those things which are in him. This is our first point. Further, besides God there can be no substance (by Prop. xiv.), that is nothing in itself external to God. This is our second point. God, therefore, is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things. Q.E.D. — Ethics (Gutenberg)

You have not understood Spinoza, John. You're cherrypicking his thought to confirm what you think he should be saying.

The misunderstanding and the "cherrypicking" is pretty obviously yours, as I see it.

Firstly. Spinoza would say that both the existence and the essence of all things would "come within the scope of an infinite intellect.

Secondly, by differentiating between transient cause and indwelling cause, I think Spinoza should be understood to be pointing out that since God is the efficient cause of all things, that efficient causation is not a transitive matter, as it is usually thought to be.

Everything proceeds from the utter necessity of God's nature; and the notion of contingency and, correlatively, contingent causation is only coherent and applicable insofar as we are unaware of the totality of the causal determination of things and events.

Thirdly, you are conveniently ignoring PROPOSITION 25:

God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things but also of their essence.

and its exact agreement with what I had said that you based your disagreement upon:

Spinoza actually says that God is the "efficient cause" of both the existence and the eternal essence of things. — John

Now, I am not arguing that Spinoza is right about this, that is a separate question; but it is very clear to me that it is what he thought. If you can provide some clear textual evidence to the contrary, either from Spinoza or from an expert interpreter, or even a decent argument explicating a plausible alternative interpretation, then I will be prepared to listen, but mere assertions will not do.

Do we need something other as a comparison to notice whether we're poor at an activity? — Marchesk

Yes. To say that humans are poor at philosophy assumes some ideal way of doing philosophy that humans are not attaining. It's like saying that all humans are poor at basketball, despite players such as Michael Jordan. It presupposes some ideal philosopher (or basketball player) that no human can match.

Here's the suggested evidence that humans perform poorly at philosophy:

1. Errors in reasoning affecting even professional philosophers. — Marchesk

To err is human. Again, who else does philosophy?

2. Failure to resolve issues explored by the ancient Greeks. — Marchesk

All of them or some of them? Perhaps some are unresolvable.

3. Failure to reach consensus on almost anything. — Marchesk

Really? The subject of philosophy has evolved over the millenia and many of its questions have been subsumed by science, which has provided much consensus on many of its branches. Philosophy will continue to evolve, of course, and there is no reason to expect that all of the various issues that it has raised or will continue to raise should have been resolved by now.

That professional philosophers generally agree with the assessment that their colleagues are poor at doing philosophy. — Marchesk

Perhaps most philosophers are just inherently pessimistic and/or hypercritical (compared to other humans, that is).

Yes, I was going to ask too: Are humans bad at philosophy compared to who or what? By what yardstick do we measure the skilful or unskilful carrying out of philosophy except the humans that do and have done it? It's like saying humans are bad at reasoning. No, we're very bloody good at it actually compared to every other life form we know of.

Edit: (Maybe it's a trivial point as the OP does address the more sensible question as to why we make the mistakes we do when philosophizing. Still, it irks me slightly.)

It's like saying humans are bad at reasoning. No, we're very bloody good at it actually compared to every other life form we know of. — Baden

Some cognitive scientists have stated that we are bad at reasoning. That we're better than other animals is like saying I'm better at playing the violin than a dog.

But if no humans mastered playing the violin, despite putting in the effort, then we would conclude that humans are bad at playing the violin. What would be the comparison? Other instruments.

But it's easy enough to find things we are uncontroversially bad at. Crunching big numbers, memory accuracy, repetitive perfection - stuff that computers are very good at. Now you might argue that there's the comparison, but computers were made because we're bad at those things. Computers used to be human calculators. It wasn't impossible with lots of people to do heavy duty calculations, it's just inefficient and error prone.

I'm better at playing the violin than a dog. — Marchesk

I'm not, unfortunately.