You can't simply define a term in such a way that your opponent's claim is false by definition. — Michael

You can't simply dismiss my definition without providing another one. Oh, wait you just have, damn. Then I have to admit I don't know what you're talking about.

You can't simply dismiss my definition without providing another one. — unenlightened

I'm not dismissing your definition. I'm saying that you can't simply refute the free will defence by choosing to define "evil" in such a way that their claim is wrong by definition. You have to actually show that the things that the free will theodicist is referring to when he talks about evil (e.g. murder) actually are unjustifiable, and so actually are evil (and so that we have real examples of evil in the world). You've already admitted that you aren't willing to do this, and so you don't have a reasoned argument against the free will defence.

You have to actually show that the things that the free will theodicist is referring to when he talks about evil (e.g. murder) actually are unjustifiable, and so actually are evil. — Michael

I don't think any freewill theodicist thinks murder is justifiable, or not evil. Perhaps you could cite one?

I don't think any freewill theodicist thinks murder is justifiable, or not evil. Perhaps you could cite one? — unenlightened

That the theist thinks that murder is evil and that you define "evil" as being unjustifiable is not that the theist thinks that murder is unjustifiable. This is where you equivocate. You have to ask what the theist means by "evil", and then replace the term "evil" in their claim "murder is evil" with their definition to actually understand what they're saying.

As for thinking murder justifiable or not, this is ambiguous. A better phrasing would be "the existence of murder is justifiable". And that's exactly what the free will defence claims; the existence of murder is justified (on the grounds that free will is a good).

If you want to draw a distinction between the existence of murder being justifiable and murder being justifiable then your original claim "nothing justifies evil [e.g. murder]" doesn't actually address the free will defence at all.

As for thinking murder justifiable or not, this is ambiguous. A better phrasing would be "the existence of murder is justifiable". And that's exactly what the free will defence claims; that the existence of murder is justified (on the grounds that free will is a good). — Michael

That's what you claim the freewill defence claims; I claim that this is either a misunderstanding, or the defence fails, because it relies on exactly the equivocation, nay contradiction, of saying that murder is unjustified, but its existence is justified. What I think it actually claims is that the possibility of murder is justified, but the existence of murder is not. But I already said that way back, so I'll stop here unless you actually have an alternative meaning for the term 'evil'.

It's really suspicious that the argument ends up with God's mysterious ways. — Marchesk

The need to assume God, in the first place, is based in the fact that the universe is filled with "mysterious" things. So it should not be at all surprising to you, nor suspicious, that the question of why God does what God does, ends up with "God's mysterious ways". The whole belief in the existence of God is based in the assumption that the universe behaves in "mysterious ways". Nor should it appear as a cop out, because until human beings are omniscient, there will always be "mysterious" things out there.

The whole belief in the existence of God is based in the assumption that the universe behaves in "mysterious ways". Nor should it appear as a cop out, because until human beings are omniscient, there will always be "mysterious" things out there. — Metaphysician Undercover

The problem isn't assuming that God would do things we don't understand. The problem is when you combine an omni-good god with the existence of an imperfect creation, specifically evil.

It's a cop out to say that such a God must have a reason for allowing evil, but we can't state what it is. The reasonable conclusion is that such a being doesn't exist, and if there is a God, humans have incorrectly ascribed ridiculous attributes to such a being.

I don't think so. It doesn't make sense to say possibility is justified because it is not a truth which means anything in ethics. Anything is always possible. Even in the world where no evil is ever committed, it's still possible. At any point, someone could have chosen to behave in an evil way, only in this world they didn't. Possibility isn't created by action, so it's beyond question of whether it was just to make.

It's how free will is consistent with causality. Even if you a God who chooses to create everything as it is, you aren't responsible for defining the actions of your creations. Since they are not you, are not God's thoughts, demands or actions, they have freedom. In the world being something other than yourself, there is freedom and possibility. You did not create it and you do not have the power, even in your omnipotence or power as the act who creates the universe, to override it. No matter what you cause and know, possibility and free will are present.

Most of the time, arguments about the evil God and the responding free will defence do not actually respect free will at all. The former mistakenly think God must be able to, with his omnipotence, for a world which is necessarily perfect, as if God had the power to remove not just evil but also the possibility of evil. On the other hand, the latter just use free will as an apology for allowing evil to exist, as if knowingly creating someone who causes evil is morally pure simply because they made their own choices.

Both these arguments make errors, but it's actually the argument God is evil that gets closer to the truth in terms of ethics. Imagine you are the government and the wealthy, with excess resources and the power to direct them to create more resources and social well-being, yet when they question coms about what you should do you say: "Ehhhh, I'm just going to nothing. That riff raft just keeps making bad decisions. If only they would make the right choice, direct themselves properly, to pull themselves up by their bootstraps, they could be prosperous like me." It's utter libertarian bullshit. Just because people have free choice and could harm themselves by making a bad choice, it doesn't somehow make it moral to allow suffering to occur, if you have means and ability to prevent it.

Free will is God's indictment. With possibility and free will, God's causality does not necessitate our actions. God can knowingly create whatever God wants without violating freedom. In Gods omnipotence and omniscience, God could cause whatever world God wanted, including word in which people only use free will to choose good. Or a world in which there are only people who freely choose to follow God. Or a world in which resources are more common, regenerate easily, limiting the destructive impact of competition on the life which uses them. Or a world in which people are not damned for choosing to follow God. None of these would violate possibly or free will, yet God knowing chose not to do them and calls it good. Evil.

Imagine you are the government and the wealthy, with excess resources and the power to direct them to create more resources and social well-being, yet when they question coms about what you should do you say: "Ehhhh, I'm just going to nothing. That riff raft just keeps making bad decisions. If only they would make the right choice, direct themselves properly, to pull themselves up by their bootstraps, they could be prosperous like me." It's utter libertarian bullshit. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Dude. Slow down a bit, use the quote facility, and write in English. I really have no idea what you're saying, let alone what of what I'm saying you disagree with.

The problem isn't assuming that God would do things we don't understand. The problem is when you combine an omni-good god with the existence of an imperfect creation, specifically evil.

It's a cop out to say that such a God must have a reason for allowing evil, but we can't state what it is. The reasonable conclusion is that such a being doesn't exist, and if there is a God, humans have incorrectly ascribed ridiculous attributes to such a being. — Marchesk

There's no cop out, it's just that most human beings really don't understand "evil". Do you understand evil? If something doesn't go your way, is there evil involve?. The dog shits on the floor, is it evil? You leave your keys in the car when you run into the store and someone steals it, is that person evil? In general, what qualifies as "evil" to the average human being is probably not even similar to what qualifies as "evil" to God. That is because the average human being has no relationship with God, and therefore hasn't got a clue as to what qualifies as "evil" to God. So if you have no relationship with God, then what makes you think that the things which you call 'evil", God would call "evil"? And if God doesn't see them as evil, why should he prevent them?

And if God doesn't see them as evil, why should he prevent them? — Metaphysician Undercover

All that's fine and dandy, but then why would the theist call God, "good", since being good is based on our conception of good and not God's.

You can't have your cake and eat it too. Either God is perfectly good in a meaningful sense to us, or we shouldn't use "good" as a description of God. So the price of using this line of argument for the FWD is God's goodness, so far as we understand the word.

All that's fine and dandy, but then why would the theist call God, "good", since being good is based on our conception of good and not God's. — Marchesk

The theologian has the very difficult task of determining our relationship with God, and "good" in relation to this. The importance of that task should not be underestimated. To simply reject the existence of God, in an atheist way, is not the solution, because to many theists, rejecting God is itself the greatest evil. Therefore to the person who has this type of relationship with God, atheism fulfills the definition of evil, hence the attitude of kill the infidels. The ethicist has no resolution to this problem, except to recognize "God" as a real motivating factor in human beings. If an ethicist must recognize God as real, then an atheist cannot be an ethicist.

You can't have your cake and eat it too. Either God is perfectly good in a meaningful sense to us, or we shouldn't use "good" as a description of God. So the price of using this line of argument for the FWD is God's goodness, so far as we understand the word. — Marchesk

My argument is that God is perfectly good in a meaningful sense to us, but it takes a highly skilled, and well-educated theologian to determine this meaning. Human beings do not naturally know what "good" is, therefore what "good" means has to be determined through much study, an this is the study of theology, the human being's relationship with God.

You can understand the word "good" in any way you please, that is the nature of free will. And you can insist that it is impossible that God is perfectly good, because that's the way that you understand the word "good". But ethics is not about stipulating what "good" means, and dictating that, it's about producing agreement on such terms. "Good", in ethics, generally refer to what motivates us to act, we seek the good. Therefore "good" refers to something different in each human act. Good is a particular, which is specific to each act, we can identify the good of the act, and therefore find the intention.

All that's fine and dandy, but then why would the theist call God, "good", since being good is based on our conception of good and not God's. — Marchesk

The theist calls God "good" because whatever God is, that is what is good. We do not define "good" and then ascertain whether God satisfies that definition, we ascertain what God is like and then define "good" accordingly. The assumption is thus that our human conception of good is imperfect, but ultimately grounded in God's very nature, which is the basis upon which we seek to correct it as we come to know Him better.

Yet the God of monotheistic religions is said to permit this sort of behavior from us because of free will. Slavery, genocide, war, child soldiers, rape, etc. is allowed to take place, even though God is good and able to prevent them.

Maybe the problem is not with these religious notions about God, but rather involves our how our conception of what's good is possible. The term 'good' losses its meaning without the concept/experience of 'evil', they co-implicate each other. Imagine that you were in a world where only good could possibly happen, if so then what's good would be the way things are, it would have no differential

.

We do not define "good" and then ascertain whether God satisfies that definition, we ascertain what God is like and then define "good" accordingly.

Sounds to me like:

"Is the pious (τὸ ὅσιον) loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?

The theist calls God "good" because whatever God is, that is what is good. We do not define "good" and then ascertain whether God satisfies that definition, we ascertain what God is like and then define "good" accordingly. — aletheist

So what is God? Well, for one he's omnipotent. Therefore we define "good" as "omnipotent"? Obviously that doesn't work.

Sounds to me like: "Is the pious (τὸ ὅσιον) loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" — Cavacava

The Euthyphro dilemma poses a false dichotomy by assuming that either (a) good is defined apart from God as an independent standard to which He conforms, or (b) good is defined as whatever God arbitrarily does. Instead, good is properly defined as whatever is consistent with God's eternal and immutable nature.

So what is God? Well, for one he's omnipotent. Therefore we define "good" as "omnipotent"? Obviously that doesn't work. — Michael

No, we characterize God's omnipotence as good. By analogy, our own abilities are also good - including free will, even though (unlike God) we exercise it in ways that are not good.

No, we characterize God's omnipotence as good. By analogy, our own abilities are also good - including free will, even though (unlike God) we exercise it in ways that are not good. — aletheist

But you said that we define "good" according to the nature of God. If it's God's nature to be omnipotent then we define "good" as "omnipotent". So what's wrong here?

The term 'good' losses its meaning without the concept/experience of 'evil', they co-implicate each other. Imagine that you were in a world where only good could possibly happen, if so then what's good would be the way things are, it would have no differential — Cavacava

Not being able to name the good seems like a small price to pay for not having to suffer.

But you said that we define "good" according to the nature of God. If it's God's nature to be omnipotent then we define "good" as "omnipotent". So what's wrong here? — Michael

Perhaps formulating my previous response as a syllogism will help you see your mistake.

• Whatever is consistent with God's nature is good.
• God's omnipotence is consistent with God's nature.
• Therefore, God's omnipotence is good.

There's no cop out, it's just that most human beings really don't understand "evil". Do you understand evil? — Metaphysician Undercover

Evil is behaving selfishly, harming others, manipulating them, exploiting them, discriminating against them, causing them to suffer, etc.

Are you really suggesting that human beings can't tell good from bad, in general? Do we not grow up being told the difference, and enforcing the difference amongst ourselves, and teaching our kids likewise?

Perhaps formulating my previous response as a syllogism will help you see your mistake.

Whatever is consistent with God's nature is good.
God's omnipotence is consistent with God's nature.
Therefore, God's omnipotence is good. — aletheist

So you're not talking about the meaning/definition of "good"? Just about what things are good?

In which case I haven't made a mistake; the mistake was yours when you said "we ascertain what God is like and then define 'good' accordingly".

But let's revise the argument a bit. Say that for God, the good is pleasure, and evil is suffering. God is a hedonist. So then we can ask whether an omni-hedonist God is compatible with a world full of suffering.

If the response is that suffering is necessary for pleasure, then Benatar's critique of existence surely applies. Why create a world where you have to suffer in order to feel good?

Not being able to name the good seems like a small price to pay for not having to suffer.

The conception of such world, a utopia, is dependent on our conception of our world as we experience it. It is an idealization we base on our experiences of good and evil in this world, along with love & hate, pleasure & suffering, life & death. A world where only good actions are possible is impossible in principle because if it were so, we would no longer be capable of making a mistake, we would no longer be human. Instead of free agency, we would be fully determined to act in a certain manner.

So you're not talking about the meaning/definition of "good"? — Michael

As should be clear by now, the meaning/definition of "good" is "whatever is consistent with God's nature," which accords with saying that "we ascertain what God is like and then define 'good' accordingly."

Because no one has ever postulated that, maybe, humans are not free in the traditional libertarian sense of freedom, or that this type of freedom is actually irrelevant to us.

we ascertain what God is like — aletheist

How?

A world where only good actions are possible is impossible in principle because if it were so, we would no longer be capable of making a mistake, we would no longer be human. Instead of free agency, we would be fully determined to act in a certain manner. — Cavacava

And what's wrong with that? Isn't that what it's like for God? A perfectly good God has no free will to do evil.

I don't see the inherent value in being able to choose evil actions.

we ascertain what God is like — aletheist

How? — unenlightened

That would be theology, rather than philosophy.

And what's wrong with that? Isn't that what it's like for God? A perfectly good God has no free will to do evil. — Marchesk

That is an odd conception of free will you have going there. I have coffee every morning because I like coffee in the morning, but I could have tea; I have the freedom to change, but I do not. If God is good then he chooses not to do evil, but that doesn't make him unfree.

That would be theology — aletheist

You mean we make it up.