No, but I don’t see “it” as separate from change either. I don’t really see it as anything. Yet there are all kinds of things in the world— obviously. Beings all over the place. When asking about the beingness of beings, I think all we can say is that there have been many interpretations, and perhaps ask about the human beings doing the interpreting. — Xtrix

It seems that beingness should be though of as a noun. I can't remember if Heidegger uses that term or simply 'being'. The being (verb?) of a being (noun?) would seem to be its existing. ( Interestingly 'existence' is, like 'beingness', a noun while 'existing' is a verb). The logic seems to be that just as being is not a being, that it doesn't exist in other words, so it is with existence, which does not exist either.

The thing is language is pretty loose and sloppy. So while we seemingly cannot be precise about these kinds of things, we can kind of think around them intuitively feeling the logic of how we use terms.

I would invoke an analogy to perception at this point, but perhaps that’s not helpful in this context. — Xtrix

Not sure what you mean, but I'm intrigued...

Cheers, that's interesting.

"What is being" is one question among several of philosophical concern. Add "what is knowledge?", "What is beauty?", "What am I?"... and a few others. Each has at one time or another been claimed to be the prime, defining question in philosophy. — Banno

Those other questions have, at their heart, the question as to what kind of thing (being) they are. The "is" in the questions guarantees that.

"What is being" is one question among several of philosophical concern. Add "what is knowledge?", "What is beauty?", "What am I?"... and a few others. Each has at one time or another been claimed to be the prime, defining question in philosophy. My favourite amongst these is "What ought I do?". — Banno

I think metaphysics/ontology has always been seen as the most general and the most basic. There are many important questions worth asking— but when we do so we’re asking about beings. I can’t see how it could be otherwise. Even in the questions you posed, there’s the “is”.

But the question of being is the first in rank — as the broadest, deepest, and most originary. Here I agree with Heidegger. That’s not to say it is the only question, or that it’s the first one we ask in philosophy or in life.

Few philosophers restrict themselves to one of these questions, after all. — Banno

Sure— nor should anyone. But yet there’s an understanding of being in every inquiry, whether explicitly stated or not. If we inquire about nature, about language, about life, or about stamps, we’re inquiring about beings. Perhaps we say they’re objects of thought or physical objects— doesn’t matter.

But the question of being is the first in rank — as the broadest, deepest, and most originary. Here I agree with Heidegger. That’s not to say it is the only question, or that it’s the first one we ask in philosophy or in life. — Xtrix

I am assuming you are thinking with 'language' here? Can you think without 'language'? As in this worded stuff I'm using here? If your answer is no you probably won't be able to understand that the answer isn't no for everyone.

It seems that beingness should be though of as a noun. — Janus

I don’t think so. Remember that nouns and verbs, as the two main groups of words, has a history as well. It dates back to the Greeks, in fact. But the Greeks, when analyzing Greek language, were still doing so from a certain understanding of being — being as phusis. What later became noun and verb was initially a unity.



When you say meaning being prior to the word, I think of perception. There are so kinds of beings around us — pre-linguistic humans (babies) and non-human primates can sense and perceive just as human adults. Most of us are still pre-linguistic in out activity, in fact. Our habits and various skills are testament enough that we don’t even have to be fully conscious, let alone “thinking” in the sense of words and concepts, most of the time.

Can you think without 'language'? As in this worded stuff I'm using here? — I like sushi

These are open questions, but my opinion is that we can indeed think without language. You can visualize a scene without a verbal commentary, for example. Or rotate an imaginary object in your head— which doesn’t involve words but which nevertheless happens internally.

There’s also the issue of awareness. When I’m imagining something or talking to myself, projecting into the future or remembering an experience from my past, I consider it thought. Yet who’s noticing that— and how? What is it that recognizes thought as thought?

It seems the answer is Awareness, or perhaps our consciousness. (I use the terms interchangeably.) Awareness, then, seems “bigger” than thought — in the sense that we can “hold” thought in awareness.

Yet who’s noticing that— and how? What is it that recognizes thought as thought? — Xtrix

I assume your answer is 'being'. This is just a trick of language (that is Heidegger's concern not Husserl's).

Even so, if this is your view then what exactly do you mean by 'being'? Many people state 'being' as if they know what it is because it is a common colloquial term of reference. In hermeneutical sense there is an investigation, but in terms of consciousness it is an overlay.

When, in whatever language used, the term 'being' is uttered they is an automatic assumption that meaning is possessed in the term, and that the term is directed towards something (Intentionality). The 'being' is not Intentional, the 'being' is an example of Intentionality.

I'm with Banno in regards to words. If Heidegger cannot make clear what 'dasein' means then the reader should have serious concerns about everything that follows.

Note: I'm fairly charitable when it comes to using terms loosely and for multiple purposes, but when such a term is used so often and ubiquitously the author should take better care. It is also clear that Heidegger wasn't exactly shy of stating he obvious with verbosity yet he shied away from doing the same for 'dasein'. Alarm bells should ring there for anyone looking critically at his work.

Even in the questions you posed, there’s the “is”. — Xtrix

Meh. Only because I followed your posts, which made use of it.

Earlier I returned the discussion to the OP: The OP asks the question "why is there something?"

Does the theory of being you are presenting answer this question?

Asking for a friend.

@Joshs?

It seems that beingness should be though of as a noun.
— @Janus

I don’t think so. R — Xtrix

How can this be contended? '-ness' forms a noun from an adjective, expressing a state or condition.

It's this very move that is contended: treating existence as a state. As if there were things that do not exist, waiting to change their condition into one of existence. That is, treating existence as a first order predicate.

It's this very move that is contended: treating existence as a state. As if there were things that do not exist, waiting to change their condition into one of existence. That is, treating existence as a first order predicate. — Banno

This is where I find Kant to be very useful in how he frames Noumenon. When we speak of Noumenon we are necessarily talking about phenomenon, yet the idea of Noumenon - which is not anything - is 'existing' only as a negation NOT as an item of experience or potential experience. Phenomenon, and any other term, creates a mental space into which humans tend to shoehorn some antithesis.

The argument against treating existence as a property is, so far as I am aware, first found in Kant's rejection of the ontological argument.

Edit: Thinking on that, it seems a rookie mistake for Heidegger to have made. I guess his attention was elsewhere.

Try this: one might argue that being, "is" and so on are of some import, but the whole purpose of philosophy is to answer the great question of what a man is to do with his life (sic.). Hence, such weeny whiny arguments are not for real men, but an indication of nerdish cowardice.

I'm not wanting to present such an argument, but simply to point out that such arguments as this, and yours for "being" being at hte centre of philosophy, have a common, and erroneous, structure, in that they place one thing at the centre of philosophical discourse before the discourse begins.

Better to look at what philosophy is in terms of it's method - critical analysis that seeks clarification - than in terms of this or that content.

How can this be contended? '-ness' forms a noun from an adjective, expressing a state or condition. — Banno

Except 'being' is not an adjective, but a verb. 'kind', 'calm', 'cold', 'fierce'. 'wild' are all adjectives. What about 'wilder'?

Perhaps 'beinghood' would have been clearer. Think of parent and neighbour, both nouns to which hood may be added to indicate a state or condition. Interestingly, 'parent' may be a verb too (not sure about 'neighbour').

I wonder if I've I've clarified anything. Although I agree with @Xtrix that looking at language use, and critical analysis in general are not enough to constitute the whole of philosophy, I also don't think they can hurt. Clarity is not always the aim; sometimes we can expand our more or less fuzzy 'feels' or intuitions, which themselves can constitute kinds of understanding; understandings which may be expressed more aptly in metaphor than in proposition.

Except 'being' is not an adjective, but a verb. — Janus

Indeed.

Can't see that this helps, if the point is to defend a misuse of language. What would be needed is a new language game in which the use is clear... which I suppose @Xtrix and co. say they have.

Clarity is not always the aim; sometimes we can expand our more or less fuzzy 'feels' or intuitions, which themselves can constitute kinds of understanding; understandings which may be expressed more aptly in metaphor than in proposition. — Janus

But when the entire work of Heidegger hinges on the term then it is a problem. That was my point and has remained my point about Being and Time.

No one can really point out where Heidegger articulates what he means with any real precision. the fact that he goes to such ends to explain some more obvious points tells me he merely covered up his ignorance with the pretense of some deeper understanding. He is a hack, but not a useless hack ;)

they place one thing at the centre of philosophical discourse before the discourse begins — Banno

Except that’s exactly what Heidegger did not do. He comes to phenomenological ontology as his rethinking of Husserl’s phenomenology, and the argument he makes in the beginning of Being and Time is that this is the only methodology which can support a properly scientific philosophy.

Better to look at what philosophy is in terms of it's method - critical analysis that seeks clarification - than in terms of this or that content. — Banno

Which is exactly what Heidegger did, but without the parenthetical claim that we already know the right method for doing philosophy.

Not for nothing, but Timothy Williamson, in his role as defender of the project of philosophy as a theoretical science, has relentlessly attacked your claim that philosophy is just conceptual clarification.

My favourite amongst these is "What ought I do?". — Banno

Furthermore, in each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another. Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine. That entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue, comports itself towards its Being as it ownmost possibility. In each case, Dasein is its possibility, and it ‘has’ this possibility, but not just as a property that something present-at-hand would. And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, choose itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or it can only ‘seem’ to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic — that, something of its own — can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. — H 42-43, M&R

It’s not like it’s an accident that Being and Time birthed existentialism.

One more note on philosophy as clarification.

We do not know what Being means. But even if we ask, ‘What is “Being”?’, we keep within an understanding of the ‘is’, though we are unable to fix conceptually what that ‘is’ signifies. We do not even know the horizon in terms of which that meaning is to be grasped and fixed. But this vague understanding of the meaning of Being is still a fact.

However much this understanding of Being (an understanding which is already available to us) may fluctuate and grow dim, and border on mere acquaintance with a word, its very indefiniteness is a positive phenomenon which needs to be clarified. An investigation of the meaning of Being cannot be expected to give this clarification at the outset. If we are to obtain the clue we need for Interpreting this average understanding of Being, we must first develop the concept of Being. — H 5-6, M&R

So Heidegger’s your guy on both counts.

we can at least try to put parts of this conversation into a first-order predicate format, — Banno

Hurrah. Russell and Quine. What the thread needs, I do agree.

But not by saying something like "There is something that is an apple and is imaginary", surely. — Srap Tasmaner

:100:

One would presumably take care to remain inside the intensional scope, sure; — Banno

Like this, though?

If on the other hand we are talking about Mordor and surrounds, — Banno

Pretending to talk about? Agreeing to pretend there is something that is named Mordor? Agreeing to pretend that "Frodo" does indeed refer? It doesn't seem that you care at all to remain inside the scope of such clarifications.

If on the other hand we are talking about Mordor and surrounds, then "Frodo" does indeed refer, — Banno

Reassurance welcome, of course.

Yet who’s noticing that— and how? What is it that recognizes thought as thought?
— Xtrix

I assume your answer is 'being'. — I like sushi

No, I would say awareness— wouldn’t you?

Even so, if this is your view then what exactly do you mean by 'being'? — I like sushi

This is the question of the OP. But I don’t give any definition or interpretation myself. Again, it would be a little like asking “What is God?” I could add to a long list of interpretations, but I’d rather delve into the question itself, who’s asking it, and its history / development.

I'm with Banno in regards to words. If Heidegger cannot make clear what 'dasein' means then the reader should have serious concerns about everything that follows. — I like sushi

I agree. He should be clear about it. This is why he dedicates 100s of pages to expand upon it. In the end, dasein (literally “being there”) is interpreted as temporality.

Alarm bells should ring there for anyone looking critically at his work. — I like sushi

Well what are you getting at here? Are you of the opinion that Heidegger is a charlatan, or simply misguided? Perhaps you agree with what Russell said was “language running amok” (paraphrasing) or when Chomsky says its “empty verbiage.”

I respect these men and I sympathize with this view, yet I also feel I’ve learned a great deal from Heidegger — so the onus is on me to explain what’s so interesting. Apparently I’ve failed to do so up to this point. But I can only keep trying, against the charge of charlatanism and obscurantism.

Earlier I returned the discussion to the OP: The OP asks the question "why is there something?"

Does the theory of being you are presenting answer this question? — Banno

This will sound evasive, but no. Nor would I say I'm presenting a theory of being, since I've not defined what being is. Perhaps it's best to look at a positive claim, one made by Heidegger and one which I agree: the traditional interpretation of beings, starting with the Greeks (especially Plato and Aristotle) and stretching throughout the history of the West, is the that of constant presence. If we agree on this, we can proceed with the more general question.

How can this be contended? '-ness' forms a noun from an adjective, expressing a state or condition. — Banno

@Janus

If I may preface this by something relevant here:

It simply no longer occurs to us that everything that we have all known for so long, and all too well, could be otherwise-- that these grammatical forms have not dissected and regulated language as such since eternity like an absolute, that instead, they grew out of a very definite interpretation of the Greek and Latin languages.

We also find the same relations in our word "Being" (das Sein). This substantive derives from the infinitive "to be" (sein), which belongs with the forms "you are," "he is," "we were," you have been." "Being" as a substantive came from the verb. We thus call the word "Being" a "verbal substantive." Once we have cited this grammatical form, the linguistic characterization of the word "Being" is complete. We are talking here at length about well-known and self-evident things. But let us speak better and more carefully: these linguistic, grammatical distinctions are worn out and common· place; they are by no means "self-evident." So we must turn an eye to the grammatical forms in question (verb, substantive, substantivization of the verb, infinitive, participle).

This is important to keep in mind.

Lastly:

Above all we must consider the fact that the definitive differentiation the fundamental forms of words (noun and verb) in Greek form of onoma and rhema was worked out and first established in the most immediate and intimate connection with the conception and interpretation of Being that has been definitive for the entire West. This inner bond between these two happenings is accessible to us unimpaired and is carried out in full clarity in Plato's Sophist. The terms onoma and rhema were already known before Plato, of course. But at that time, and still in Plato, they were understood as terms denoting the use of words as a whole. Onoma means the linguistic name as distinguished from the named person or thing, and it also means the speaking of a word, which was conceived grammatically as rhema. And rhema in tum means the spoken word, speech; the rhetor is the speaker, the orator, who uses not only verbs but also onomata in the narrower meaning of substantive.

[...]

Thus the two terms onoma and rhema, which at first indicated all speaking, narrowed their meaning and became terms for the two main classes of words.

(All from Intro to Metaphysics, "The Grammar and Etymology of Being.")

So appealing to grammar doesn't help much. We can categorize the word itself, but that's not really the point. If being isn't a "thing," then it's not a noun. "Is" isn't a noun either.

But remember, the question isn't "What kind of word is 'being'"? The question is what is "it"? What is the meaning of being?

It's this very move that is contended: treating existence as a state. As if there were things that do not exist, waiting to change their condition into one of existence. That is, treating existence as a first order predicate. — Banno

Well then here we agree. Being (or existence, whatever we like) isn't a "state." It's not as if being emerges from a void of nothingness and "comes into being." That's certainly not the claim I want to be making.

it seems a rookie mistake for Heidegger to have made. I guess his attention was elsewhere. — Banno

Heidegger is well aware of Kant -- in fact he had several lectures on him.

Descartes not only evades the ontological question of substantiality altogether; he also emphasizes explicitly that substance as such-that is to say, its substantiality-is in and for itself inaccessible from the outset. 'Being' itself does not 'affect' us, and therefore cannot be perceived. 'Being is not a Real predicate,' says Kant, who is merely repeating Descartes' principle. Thus the possibility of a pure problematic of Being gets renounced in principle, and a way is sought for arriving at those definite characteristics of substance which we have designated above.

B&T p. 94

He goes on, of course, but I won't bother quoting the entirety of it. Needless to say he's certainly aware of the mistake you claim he's making.

An interesting passage:

The 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again. Such expectations, aims, and demands arise from an ontologically inadequate way of starting with something of such a character that independently of it and 'outside' of it a 'world' is to be proved as present-at-hand. It is not that the proofs are inadequate, but that the kind of Being of the entity which does the proving and makes requests for proofs has not been made definite enough. This is why a demonstration that two things which are present-at-hand are necessarily present-at-hand together, can give rise to the illusion that something has been proved, or even can be proved, about Dasein as Being-in-the-world. If Dasein is understood correctly, it defies such proofs, because, in its Being, it already is what subsequent proofs deem necessary to demonstrate for it.

(p. 205)

I think many on this forum are largely operating within this purview as well -- which is to say, one oriented towards subjects representing objects, and a picture of the human being as an evolved animal with reason, or a mind. Zoon echon logon holds true to this day.

Try this: one might argue that being, "is" and so on are of some import, but the whole purpose of philosophy is to answer the great question of what a man is to do with his life (sic.). Hence, such weeny whiny arguments are not for real men, but an indication of nerdish cowardice. — Banno

But here I think you fail to notice that these questions of ethics and morality, which I'd agree are ultimately what we're after, are rooted in our beliefs, values, and attitudes towards the world. They're rooted largely on the question "What am I?" "What is a human being?" etc. Aristotle is a well known example, of course. Politics and governance are grounded on answers to these questions, even if held tacitly as unquestioned presuppositions. If it is assumed that we're created by God, for example, the answer to "What should I do with my life?" is answered in a very definite light indeed.

So most niche intellectual pursuits I would agree are ways of avoiding the "real" questions of action, of living in the real world, etc., and questions about being could be added to this list. But from my view, I keep the question you raised in the background at all times -- and this is in fact what motivates me to even care about the question at all. On the surface it seems the most hifalutin, abstract bullshit you could imagine.

Better to look at what philosophy is in terms of it's method - critical analysis that seeks clarification - than in terms of this or that content. — Banno

Critical analysis presupposes thought and awareness and, in fact, human being, does it not? When we analyze, question, interrogate, investigate, dissect, clarify, etc., we're engaging in a very human activity. We can call it "philosophy" or "thinking" or anything we like, but my claim is about the question of being as first in rank -- as the broadest of questions and deepest. I don't think this should be controversial, really. If you ask about being, you're asking about everything. Hard to get broader than that. It may not be the "central" concern, or the most interesting, or the most relevant to our lives, or the most studied, or the most popular, etc.

I would say the "method" of philosophy is really phenomenology, by the way. But replacing this word with "critical analysis" doesn't matter that much to me. The point above stands either way, as both assume the human being.

This is a very interesting thread. I've been mulling over just this idea for a short story I'm writing, set on China during the Cultural Revolution. I figured it's a good backdrop for this question because it is a time period of extreme dogmatism in favor of materialism, which of course, tends to entail a specific type of definition about what it means for something to truly "exist."




I think the invisible dragon can be said to exist in a number of cases, even if we assume it has zero possible interaction with our world.

A. If exists in its own parallel world, and there it interacts with shadow physical objects, and could be observed by shadow people there.

B. It has one way interaction with our world. We cannot ever see the dragon, but it can see us.

However, if you turn the dragon into a non-observer, a sort of fundemental particle that interacts with nothing, not even other particles of its own type, what can be said of its potential existence then?

The way I see it, the problem for some contemporary forms of materialism, for example eliminative materialism, is that they base their claims to knowledge in empiricism, and correspondence definitions of truth. However, the limits of empirical verification are necissarily the limits of observation, and so the role on an observer becomes inextricably tied up in definitions of existence.

Leaving aside tautologies, Kant's analytic knowledge, Hume's relations of ideas, etc. (these are quite limited and I'm of the opinion that Quine dealt them a serious blow) - to verify a factual statement e.g. "Socrates is standing," requires an observation to assess if the factual statement corresponds to reality. Saying it is true something exists, requires an observer. But obviously this is different from saying existence requires an observer. Pluto existed before anyone observed it, but there was always the ability for it to be observed.

So, the limits of what can be, appear to become the limits of observation. Otherwise, if you posit that things can exist that cannot be observed (i.e. they cannot interact with anything observable), it seems like existence as a whole becomes non-sensical as a term. Things that exist can be indistinguishable from things that don't exist. Existence is reduced to a brute fact, but a brute fact that relates to nothing and can't be verified

On the other hand, if you allow that the potential for observation is an essential component of defining existence, doesn't the existence of an observer become an essential element of what it means for something to exist?

Generally materialist models get around this by positing a sort of hypothetical God's eye view through which the world can be viewed, detached from the messiness of finite observers. Limitless observation means that the limit of observability doesn't need to define what it means to exist. The problem here, is that you now have God in your definition. However, these systems generally want to define existence outside the role of an observer, and they definitely don't want to have to resort to God, even as a hypothetical, to define reality.

I don't see how you get around this, aside from moving towards a sort of pragmatist definition of truth, which feels more like a punt.

Not for nothing, but Timothy Williamson, in his role as defender of the project of philosophy as a theoretical science, has relentlessly attacked your claim that philosophy is just conceptual clarification. — Srap Tasmaner

Then let's have the discussion. Give me a paper to read.

There's folk who quote their sacred texts and then explain what they are supposed to mean.

Then their's folks who quote their sacred texts and then say "See!"

I would say the "method" of philosophy is really phenomenology — Xtrix

One thing I really like is Heidegger's hermeneutic approach: you start from the asking of whatever question, and you don't skip right over how the question is asked, and why, and by whom, and what they think they're up to, but start there, with that vague understanding. And it's fascinating to see how he treats this not just as methodology but as part of the essential structure of the world: we ask vague questions about things we kinda already understand because some of what we understand or could understand is hidden, and that's part of what we investigate too.

Wittgenstein never quite seems to manage that unifying of method and subject matter, so to speak. The explanation of why, say, we're misled by language never really comes, and is never really brought into focus. Here we're misled or tempted or whatever, he'll say, and that's it. But his talk of reminding us of what we already understand could obviously support the hermeneutic approach.

No, not following.

Frodo walked into Mordor. "Frodo walked into Mordor" is true.

But Expecting to find the flag of Mordor outside the UN - that'd be an error of scope.

He's aware of Kant's criticism - so go on and explain why he appears to nevertheless use existence as a first order predicate: Beingness.

go on and explain why he appears to nevertheless use existence as a first order predicate: Beingness. — Banno

He does t say beingness or existence are predicates. Or subjects. They mark the original relation between self and world before we idealize this binary into a for-itself
subject encountering an in-itself object.