Not sure what you are asking. It's not an either/or choice; the notion of intent found in Phenomenology comes into theories of naming, for example.

I am suggesting that an examination of the language of being looks more productive than musings about time.

Yes, being is a happening.
— Joshs

I don't agree with this. — Xtrix

I’m getting this from Heidegger. He uses lots of similies for Being. Happening, occurrence, the in-between , the ontological difference, the ‘as’ structure are some of them.

“Understanding as the Dasein’s self-projection is the Dasein’s fundamental mode of happening. As we
may also say, it is the authentic meaning of action. It is by understanding that the Dasein’s happening is characterized—its historicality. Understanding is not a mode of cognition but the basic determination of existing. We also call it existentiell understanding because in it existence, as the Dasein’s happening in its history, temporalizes itself. The Dasein becomes what it is in and through this understanding; and it is always only that which it has chosen itself to be, that which it understands itself to be in the projection of its own most peculiar ability-to-be.”(Basic Problems of Phenomenology)

It is very much like nothing. We interpret this "nothing," but that's all we can say about it. — Xtrix

As you know , Heidegger has lots to say about the nothing, authentic angst , the uncanny, absence. These are not the totality of what he has to say about being, but one aspect of it. Heidegger closely links projection , temporality , the ‘as' structure, the ontological difference and ‘Dasein as absent’. There is no Being without beings and vice versa. They are inseparable as the ontological difference between Being and beings , otherwise referred to as the in-between , occurrence, happening , the ‘as’ structure and projection.

Husserl seems to be saying that there is a primordial act of consciousness wherein something is first seen as something. Would you say this is still working within a metaphysics of presence, whereas Heidegger would say that the seeing as is derived from the pre-conscious pragmatic awareness of the ready-to-handedness of things? — Janus

It sounds like that from the quote , but for Husserl there isn’t a primordial beginning of consciousness in terms of a particular content that all higher acts of constitution are built on. The primordial beginning for him is the formal
structure of associative synthesis that he call internal time consciousness, the structure of retention-presence-protection that associatively connects one moment to the next as a unified synthetic flow.

The difference I see with Heidegger is that Heidegger takes pragmatic awareness as a totality of relevance that unifies our total past as background ‘framing’ of every disclosure of a ready to hand thing. Husserl begins instead with the perceptual object that only indirectly links back to a larger totality of our past experience.

I am suggesting that an examination of the language of being looks more productive than musings about time. — Banno

Except that if you examine the language of being primarily via predicate logic you’ll have Wittgenstein rolling over in his grave. Witt didn’t write about time but I think it’s an important element implicit in his concept of use as radically situational and contextual.

Sure, but intentionality or "aboutness" is not restricted to linguistic practices or contexts; to make it all about language would be, in phenomenological terms, to be working from a metaphysics of presence; of the already-named.

The world as always already interpreted should not be conflated with the world as already named in my view. Meaning is not an artifact or "after-fact" of language; meaning is also pre-linguistic and is what makes language possible in the first place.



Thanks Josh, the way you encapsulated the distinction between Husserl's and Heidegger's approaches makes it clear. I haven't read much of Husserl, but I'll have to make it a priority

Witt didn’t write about time but I think it’s an important element implicit in his concept of use as radically situational and contextual. — Joshs

By all means, fill that in. I suspect time only enters in a secondary sense, since use occurs over time. But it also occurs over place.

Meaning is not an artifact or "after-fact" of language; meaning is also pre-linguistic and is what makes language possible in the first place. — Janus

Sure, but think in terms of what we are doing rather than of meaning, and see that language is a part of what we are doing. It's what we do that is sometimes non-linguistc.

Interpreting is pretty much making use of.

Harry Potter is a thing. Harry Potter is a being. — Xtrix

Is he? It’s a phrase that occurs in some books and movies, and we understand how fiction works so we understand that we are to pretend it’s a story about a person called “Harry Potter”. He’s definitely not a person. I could see an argument for “Harry Potter” naming an aspect of those books and movies, an abstraction (and this is what we would mean by saying he’s a character in a book). But I’m iffy on whether abstractions are things, or just ways of seeing things.

But does Harry Potter "exist" -- if by "exist" we mean is a being? Yeah, of course. So do unicorns and Santa Claus. — Xtrix

But you have to say a lot more than, for instance, “Santa Claus exists — as an idea,” or something like that. An idea of what? Not of a person. Not only does there not happen to be the person stories call “Santa Claus”, there cannot be. Ditto for unicorns.

Do you have a criterion besides “__ is a noun phrase”?

Every discussion of existence turns into a discussion of Santa Claus and I think that’s just a mistake. I don’t see any point in talking about Santa Claus without a much better understanding of pretending than I have.

Seeming is what we do to things, isn' it? — Banno

Is it? How do we do that?

Say I see a fallen tree with a bit over a foot of a broken limb sticking straight up. If the branch had broken just so, and the light were just so, I might (as my ex-wife did) think I was seeing an owl perched on a fallen tree. Is that a seeming I impose? You could say that. But on what do I impose it? Is there not a primary phenomenon there of a fallen tree? This, I think Heidegger says, is what is manifest, what has been brought to light, what shows itself in itself.

Will you say that I have imposed ‘tree’ on a selection of my visual field? Or that I have ‘constructed’ the tree? If you want to say it is ‘already interpreted’ for me as a tree, I’m not really inclined to deny that, but I’d want to know a lot more about what ‘interpreted’ means here. There has to be the back and forth between what is given — not to my consciousness, but to me as a person — and how I understand it, its meaning for me. So whatever ‘interpretation’ means here, it’s not going to be something I impose on the world I find.

It's not a hammer until one uses it to hit a nail. Use is pivotal. — Banno

And there’s a similar story here. Is an affordance imposed or discovered? It’s not simply one or the other, right?

I suspect time only enters in a secondary sense, since use occurs over time. But it also occurs over place — Banno

I’d have to think about how Wittgenstein would distinguish place from time , but my sense is it would be secondary and derivative from context, which is temporal.

Is an affordance imposed or discovered? — Srap Tasmaner

One sees (is shown) the cat on the mat as "the cat is on the mat". So, both. Or the question is senseless...

I’d have to think about how Wittgenstein would distinguish place from time , but my sense is it would be secondary and derivative from context, which is temporal. — Joshs

Sorry, you lost me. "It" is the mooted distinction made by Witti between place and time...? I doubt there is much to be found on this. Irrelevant, rather than derivative.

Not for nothing, but I’m reminded now that there’s a similar issue (similar to what I’m trying to understand about phenomena and appearances) raised by Sellars in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Sellars ends up arguing that we have to understand what it means for a tie to be blue in order to say that a tie looks blue.

It’s the same pattern: yes, the world is ‘already interpreted’ (one of the points Sellars is making) but it’s also a denial that we can say such interpretation is ‘mere appearances’, or the likes of ‘it looks blue to me’, all the way down. The tie, in all its being-blue, is given, but its givenness is not the mythical sort that is Sellars’s target.

But on what do I impose it? Is there not a primary phenomenon there of a fallen tree? ...
Will you say that I have imposed ‘tree’ on a selection of my visual field? — Srap Tasmaner

I'd indeed say the "interpretation" or recognition as a tree comes after the "that thing there". It happens all the time that one can not exactly identify what he is seeing. It's an undetermined "Dasein"(being-there) which becomes "Etwas"(a determined something) - lending from Hegel.
When it comes to the determination I'd indeed say, this is imposed, but also happens without reflection to some degree. After seeing a tree for the first time, it is likely following trees of the same kind will be recognized as similar to the first. More detailed classifications likely require reflection of the concept and a more thorough investigation.

One answer would be that abstraction is what we resort to under uncertainty or dispute, but I don’t think that’s an argument that we don’t generally start from the terribly abstract and whittle down the possibilities until, for whatever reason, we settle at a somewhat lower level of abstraction.

I’m not sure what the argument against that would be, except that I can’t think of any reason for us to do that. It’s tidy in an analytic sense, but

• it’s slow and expensive
• it does not track how children learn language (at mid-level abstraction via exemplars) and natural languages are usable from the first steps of acquisition
• it fails to connect things to each other as we find them connected
• it misses our, possibly urgent, interest in what’s around us

All of that is about us, as creatures that find what we expect and want to find, what suits us, and adjust as we are surprised. We can give no meaning to ‘that thing’ and have no use for it, so it’s unlikely to be our first choice if we can guess ‘tree’ instead and change it ‘telephone pole’ later if we have to. But insofar as it’s ‘all about us’, that’s only because we are just the sort of creatures that can be sustained by the sorts of environment we find ourselves in, so we’re, in turn, all about where we live.

Interpreting is pretty much making us of. — Banno

Did you mean "making use of"?

Fixed.

We can give no meaning to ‘that thing’ and have no use for it, so it’s unlikely to be our first choice if we can guess ‘tree’ instead and change it ‘telephone pole’ later if we have to. — Srap Tasmaner

But in this sense it is not about use, it is about what gains identity and so just "is" without spending any further thought. It is purely phenomenological. With further determinations we get into socially mediated concepts. I do not know many kinds of trees, so which "level of abstraction" would be low enough? And which woods are suitable for telephone poles? That would require some inquiry. And is that tree even a tree or is there some biological distinction, for example, is it a small tree or a giant mushroom? While thinking about those questions and considering what remains the same is "the thing there". In fact this seems to be the quickest, most immediate notion that one can possibly have. Maybe the "thing" is exaggerated and in fact it is just a "there"

Meaning is not an artifact or "after-fact" of language; meaning is also pre-linguistic and is what makes language possible in the first place. — Janus

For what it’s worth, Grice says something like this too with his thing about “natural meaning” and “non-natural meaning”. He claims a kind of continuity between “clouds mean rain” and “‘clouds’ means clouds”. (Heidegger slips ‘signs’ and ‘symbols’ into that torturous discussion of phenomena and appearance, so we’re not far off.)

Interpreting is pretty much making us of.
— Banno

Did you mean "making use of"? — Janus

Fixed. — Banno

Might have been better the other way. I was all set to write a series of long (possibly tedious) posts about how we make ‘us’ of things through interpretation. ’Twas but a dream.

But in this sense it is not about use, it is about what gains identity and so just "is" without spending any further thought. It is purely phenomenological. With further determinations we get into socially mediated concepts. — Heiko

But it sounds pretty empty. Does it make sense for me to be oriented toward something as something that ‘just is’? People aren’t cameras. I could see arguing for logical but not temporal priority here, and that perhaps this is what phenomenology uncovers. Something like, only by (‘first’ in the logical sense) being oriented toward something as a thing that is, can we be oriented toward it as anything. That looks more than a little like the Fregean conception of predication — if that’s a flower, it’s an existing thing that is a flower, and its existing is purely presupposed.

My impression, though, is that Heidegger thinks logical relations are themselves in need of grounding, rather than grounding what we might have to say about the being of things. I suppose that passes over your point about identity, but here identity seems to be a sort of raw demonstrative ‘that’.

Does it make sense for me to be oriented toward something as something that ‘just is’? — Srap Tasmaner

I think it does. You do not need to know what is flying towards you to react. You do not need to know if it is a telephone-pole or a streetlight that you nearly walked into.
That said I agree that recognition of known things does not necessarily seem to require additional thought - one is usually too relaxed when in a known environemt to be continuously asking if the "thing there" might be dangerous.

PS: On the other hand all unexpected "movement" raises suspicion.

↪ucarr
An existing thing, whether material or conceptual, is a road map to somewhere else.
— ucarr

How about, a thing is a dimensional construction which we create in order to organize and anticipate future events? — Joshs

Your language foregrounds ratiocination to a derived conclusion, whereas my language foregrounds an involuntary response, something like a chemical reaction.

From your language I see a thing that is a complex cognitive construction that encompasses a mental journey via intention. From my language I see an autonomic journey as thing that participates in an ever-branching serial.

Your statement is more at intentional exercise of reason. My statement is more at stream of consciousness, the foundation on top of which reason operates.

As soon as we posit intentional creation of a thing, we're inhabiting the mind-space. Some argue this is epiphenomenal, thus lacking the causal power of existence.

I see now that I want to simplify my proposition; Material things are road maps to somewhere else.

I don't see being as separate from becoming; the only difference I could imagine would be to see it as becoming abstractly considered by putting the idea or sense of change aside. Do you understand being as changeless? — Janus

No, but I don’t see “it” as separate from change either. I don’t really see it as anything. Yet there are all kinds of things in the world— obviously. Beings all over the place. When asking about the beingness of beings, I think all we can say is that there have been many interpretations, and perhaps ask about the human beings doing the interpreting.

notice that the account of being given in the tradition of Frege, Russell, Quine and so on does not depend on time. — Banno

This is like saying it doesn’t depend on human being. But Frege and Russell were indeed human beings.

I’m getting this from Heidegger. He uses lots of similies for Being. Happening, occurrence, the in-between , the ontological difference, the ‘as’ structure are some of them. — Joshs

Where does Heidegger say being is a “happening”? Or that being is anything at all?

Occurrence, so far as I’ve read, is another term for the present at hand. That’d be like saying Heidegger agrees with the western tradition.

The ontological difference is the distinction between being and beings— it is not a description or claim about being itself.

Again, I don’t see Heidegger ever offering another interpretation of being. What he’s trying to do is analyze the human being asking this question/ interpreting being. The basis for the various western interpretations, for example, is presence — which indicates time. So he sets off to “explicate” dasein in terms of a new conception of time (i.e, temporality) brought to light by a phenomenological analysis of everydayness.

As you know , Heidegger has lots to say about the nothing, authentic angst , the uncanny, absence. — Joshs

Indeed. Would be worth getting into.

My impression, though, is that Heidegger thinks logical relations are themselves in need of grounding, rather than grounding what we might have to say about the being of things. I suppose that passes over your point about identity, but here identity seems to be a sort of raw demonstrative ‘that’. — Srap Tasmaner

On the other hand, coming back to the use-character, Heidegger points out that such stuff really "isn't" in some sense. I guess this has to do with the intention the things were created with. Again, going back to Hegel it is totally unclear what was meant with "Dasein", which cannot be said of a hammer or some other "human" invention.

The world as always already interpreted should not be conflated with the world as already named in my view. Meaning is not an artifact or "after-fact" of language; meaning is also pre-linguistic and is what makes language possible in the first place. — Janus

Well said. :clap:

I would invoke an analogy to perception at this point, but perhaps that’s not helpful in this context.

But I’m iffy on whether abstractions are things — Srap Tasmaner

What else would they be? Are they nothing? If they’re not nothing, then they’re “in” being along with everything else— clouds, feelings, sound, force, Bach’s fugues and strawberry candles.

But you have to say a lot more than, for instance, “Santa Claus exists — as an idea,” or something like that. An idea of what? Not of a person. — Srap Tasmaner

Well yes— Santa is usually thought of as a person. But regardless, as I said before in normal usage it’s perfectly fine you say Santa doesn’t exist. But ontologically, yes the concept of Santa claus is a being— it’s something; it “is.”

There's niche band of philosophers - John Haugeland, Joseph Ruse, Rebecca Kukla - who take exactly this track of blending Heidegger and Sellars and it's probably one of the more exciting contemporary developments out there.

This is like saying it doesn’t depend on human being. But Frege and Russell were indeed human beings. — Xtrix

This is like saying it doesn't depend on German, but both Husserl and Heidegger arranged their arguments in German.

An inapt argument?

Jesus, as if they weren’t hard enough on their own. On the other hand, something like this is becoming vaguely mainstream in post-analytic Anglo-American philosophy, isn’t it? Rorty and McDowell come to mind — but honestly I don’t know much really contemporary stuff.

What else would they be? Are they nothing? If they’re not nothing, then they’re “in” being along with everything else— clouds, feelings, sound, force, Bach’s fugues and strawberry candles. — Xtrix

I don’t have a dogmatic position on abstractions. My gut feeling is that we’re not talking about new objects, which are abstract, but new ways of relating to given concrete objects. Abstraction is when I count the forks in the drawer as all the same sort of thing regardless of their size, material, or handle design. ‘Fork’ is an abstraction over those concrete objects. I’m not motivated by some sort of ontological purity — but if abstraction is a way of relating to a concrete object, then my taking an object as a fork tells me something about how I relate to it.

An example I used to think about is doing trigonometry: you draw a ‘generic’ triangle on the blackboard by drawing an actual, non-generic triangle, but then interacting with it in a particular way, not relying on the actual, measurable length of its sides or interior angles — in some sense pretending that you could not just measure. (And maybe abstraction is always like this — we’ll say ‘ignoring’ all except the features you’ve chosen, but maybe ‘ignoring’ means ‘pretending not to notice’.) Here it’s almost as if the burden of abstraction is carried by a methodology, by careful control over what you may do with the picture and what you may not. That’s interesting.

There is nothing on earth that answers to “Erin Hunter”. She doesn’t exist. — Srap Tasmaner

Yet you invoked Erin Hunter in your example. If I had invoked Eric Hunter as the author you would have had good reason to correct me: ''No, it's Erin, not Eric." You could accuse me of a failure of reference. Erin Hunter is not of flesh and blood and as you say not to be found walking on the earth. That's not quite enough to establish non-existence, however.

But you didn't spot that I contradicted myself. First I wrote that Potter doesn't exist and that Rowling does. Then, after your challenge, I wrote that they both exist, only in different ways. So, in my role as the naive non-philosopher, how do I get out of that one? I would mumble something like - "Yeah, but Potter doesn't really exist." I would invent a whole new ontological category - Real Existence vs a lowly mere Existence - and I would be in a bit of a mess.

The line I'm taking is to see how far naivety gets us and when it breaks down. It gets us somewhere and we can brave out some initial challenges but only at the cost of raising new problems.

And maybe abstraction is always like this — we’ll say ‘ignoring’ all except the features you’ve chosen, but maybe ‘ignoring’ means ‘pretending not to notice’. — Srap Tasmaner

A triangle can be little, large, flat or pointy. To me, it is not clear at all which same- or alike-ness would make up for the essential properties of an arbitrary determination.

People think they walk with their legs and carry things with their arms. Yet we carry ourselves with our legs and the world holds us.

He really doesn't. — Banno

Because he is a hack. Anyone who using a contradiction to explain their way out of a corner then leaves other instances of contradictions unattended is playing at the worst kind of sophistry. ‘Dasein’ doesn’t mean anything and no matter how many times he repeatedly reframes the ‘meaning’ of the term ‘Dasien,’ in this or that context, it didn’t fool me for a second that such explicit contradictions didn’t make an ounce of sense.

I also find it tiresome when I’m told he makes more sense when you’ve read his earlier work. If so why can’t anyone explain what he meant? And given that he wrote pages of waffle explaining the most basic points why didn’t take any care whatsoever to explicate the use of the term ‘dasein’ … because there isn’t one is the answer. He simply hid everything behind this obscure term and elsewhere openly uses contradictory terms and frames them as ‘not contrary’ as if that is a good enough explanation. He requires the reader to literally reconstruct their language (I’m not against that) yet offers no guiding principles and simply moves on quickly by re-presenting ‘dasein’ over and over as if it will hypnotise the reader into believing it (which happened to work on some sadly).