Living in the now is beyond both logic and morality. Logic and morality are distractions; leisure time activities. They get to sit around before and after facts, ruminating on how living in the now is logical and/or moral (or not).

If that analysis is correct (and I think it is), then living in the now is amoral and a-logical. It's not immoral, or illogical, or moral, or logical. Living in the now does not concern itself with such things. It's too busy living and dying. That's my read on it.

Logic and morality are distractions; leisure time activities — James Riley

What a remarkable statement. Morality seems more pain/suffering-oriented (negative utilitarianism) and everyone who's been through high school knows enough about how pain operates - at a subconscious level (the unthinking nature of pain :point: Relfex Action)

Moral theories then are mental reflexes - they're not arrived at by a process of step by step logical deduction (reactions, not responses). Obviously, right? Where's the time to think when someone's skinning you alive?

Morality is a biological response to context, a person in isolation would have no need of morality. As a social construct, it is best seen as the self-interest of a common biology. Self-interest is something that even a person in isolation understands, the fear of death underlines this fact. What seems to us as natures indifference to our continued survival, is the stimulus to form community. Compassion arises with the identification of other, as just another self, or an expanded concept of self. In essence it is concern for the well being and continued survival of our common biology.

Since animals are not moral agents, I never understood efforts made to explain morality through animal behavior.

Further, it makes no sense to view morality from a groupwide (or 'herd' or 'species') perspective. A group consists of individuals who are each moral agents, but the concept of that group is just a generalization and itself not a moral agent.

The group sooner becomes a patsy, a tool to avoid personal accountability for one's actions, rather than a tool of understanding.

Screw logic! I wanna live! — TheMadFool

As Freddy might say, logic-usage is an expression of life. They're not mutually exclusive.

Since animals are not moral agents ... — Tzeentch

The work of many primatologists, for instance, suggest otherwise.

Studies in primates, cetaceans, elephants and other eusocial mammal species have also shown similar degrees of empathy as well. Consider ...

https://yoursay.plos.org/2012/03/27/should-chimpanzees-have-moral-standing-an-interview-with-frans-de-waal/ — 180 Proof

I view that as cherry-picking, though.

That animals may seem to show signs of empathy at times, does not change the fact that they kill, rape and dominate. Just like some humans, yes. Maybe some human behaviors can then be understood through that lens.

Is that then also moral behavior? If not, we're back at square one with the question what is moral and what is not.

That animals may seem to show signs of empathy at times, does not change the fact that they kill, rape and dominate. Just like some humans, yes. — Tzeentch

For these eusocial mammals, like humans, empathic behaviors are not accidental or exceptional. A focus on anti-social behaviors is "cherry-picking" that deflects from the predominant eusociality (i.e. what we humans articulate as "morality"), and even the anti-social exceptions which prove the eusociality rule.

Let's cut this matter up into two questions:

Are animals moral agents?

The lack of self-awareness, reflection, reason and capability for deeper than surface level understanding I have seen in all my interactions with animals would imply they are not. Animals seem to be a slave to whatever input is given to them, and unable to analyse that input in the way that (some?) humans can.


Is animal behavior a measure for the morality of human behavior?

The fact that animals seem to act almost exclusively on base necessities and selfpreservation, and shun virtually no actions to meet those ends, attests to little more than a 'rule of the jungle', ergo 'might makes right' concept underlying their behavior. Hardly a guide for moral human conduct.


Further, I would make the point that social or empathic behavior is not the same as being moral. The real question is how that behavior holds up when self-preservation (or self-aggrandisement) is no longer the driving force behind it, or when social or empathic behavior would be at odds with self-preservation. In both humans and animals we see 'morals' go out of the window as soon as they are no longer useful, thus such morals were a meaningless facade and not a matter of principle.

Screw logic! I wanna live!
— TheMadFool
As Freddy might say, logic-usage is an expression of life. They're not mutually exclusive. — 180 Proof

They're not the same thing either (false positives & false negatives are errors).

I might as well ask, do you suppose so-called cognitive biases give us an edge over the competition, evolutionarily speaking that is? In other words, irrationality is/could be an advantage when it comes to survival. Socrates, for example, felt the full force of reasoning well viz. death by Hemlock! Socrates probably set the precedent for the wise (rational) to be tried by a kangaroo court and quickly sent to the gallows. At this rate, by 3000 AD expect foolery to go global. It's a paradox I tell you! Glad to have lived at a time when 180 Proof was around!

Now, I know the answer to where is everybody? (Fermi Paradox)? All intelligence has been replaced by idiocy!

Are animals moral agents? — Tzeentch

Yes. Human primates, non-human primates, cetaceans, elephants ... groom feed protect & even adopt each other's young; cooperately gather / provide & share "goods"; discourage / punish free-riders; form friendship bonds (outside of kinship & mating); and mourn their dead.

Is animal behavior a measure for the morality of human behavior?

Humans are animals so the behaviors are, at minimum, strongly correlated.

Further, I would make the point that social or empathic behavior is not the same as being moral.

Please do. Explain (or cite some empirical studies).

:roll: C'mon, Fool.

Yes. Human primates, non-human primates, cetaceans, elephants ... groom feed protect & even adopt each other's young; cooperately gather / provide & share "goods"; discourage / punish free-riders; form friendship bonds (outside of kinship & mating); and mourn their dead. — 180 Proof

I don't see any of these behaviors as essentially moral.

Humans are animals so the behaviors are, at minimum, strongly correlated. — 180 Proof

I disagree. The faculties I described previously (self-awareness, reflection, reason, capability for deeper than surface-level understanding, etc.) signify a fundamental difference between human beings and animals. Every individual that possesses these faculties has the choice whether to act as an animal or cultivate that which makes them human. In practice that means that some individuals act like animals, that much I can get behind.

Further, I would make the point that social or empathic behavior is not the same as being moral.

Social behavior comes in many shapes, from behaviors out of selfless compassion and love, to self-preserving, self-aggrandizing or downright manipulative. As such, not all socially cooperative behavior is moral.

Empathy is an emotion, and emotions aren't moral or immoral; they just are. Empathy can lead to moral action, but the emotion of empathy itself does not make a person moral.

Moral actions consist of three elements, all of which are required for an action to be considered moral (will elaborate if needed):

1. The individual acts with a just intention.
2. The individual possesses the power to make their intention reality.
3. The intended outcome (essentially a confirmation of 2.)

Behavior that stems from empathy can, but does not necessarily tick these boxes.

What a remarkable statement. Morality seems more pain/suffering-oriented (negative utilitarianism) and everyone who's been through high school knows enough about how pain operates - at a subconscious level (the unthinking nature of pain :point: Relfex Action)

Moral theories then are mental reflexes - they're not arrived at by a process of step by step logical deduction (reactions, not responses). Obviously, right? — TheMadFool

I've never viewed morality as pain/suffering. It might be considering pain suffering, before or after pain/suffering. But pain/suffering are themselves, morality notwithstanding. For me, morality is the consideration of it, not it.

Moral theories then, are theories. Whether a theory is a mental reflex or not is yet another conisderation that has nothing to do with the event (pain/suffering). It's you and I sitting around talking about it, thinking about it; not living it.

Where's the time to think when someone's skinning you alive? — TheMadFool

:100: :up: :death:

:up: :strong:

This human/animal, moral/amoral discussion has me wondering: What is stronger evidence of being a moral agent: Being able to sit around and talk about morality, or being moral?

We've got nothing on animals when it comes to being moral.

My premises are not so specieist and anthropocentric. Again, "moral" is an articulation – generalization – of eusocial group behavior which exercises-reinforces empathic responses in group members. Volition ("free will") is enabled-constrained in a web of normative behaviors (i.e. adaptive habits) for maintaining, or optimizing, individual flourishing and collective sustainability, and therefore, at least in compatibilist terms, "free will" is neither an independent nor determinative variable. Both sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, for instance, provide ample evidence corroborating compatibilism (i.e. deflation of how free "free will" is) with respect to mammalian group behaviors, which includes (though I agree does not exhaust) what we generalize with the concept of "morality". Your libertarian(?) view, Tzeentch, seems to elevate Human primates "above" nature – "transcendence" typical of idealists and/or ""free will" theodicists – as if we're somehow "mysteriously more than" evolved mammals (i.e. with "souls" à la homunculi), which means we're talking about wholly incommensurate conceptions of morality and, in effect, past each other.

therefore, at least in compatibilist terms, "free will" is neither an independent nor determinative variable. Both sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, for instance, provide ample evidence corroborating compatibilism (i.e. deflation of how free "free will" is) with respect to mammalian group behaviors, — 180 Proof

Awesome!

then living in the now is amoral and a-logical. It's not immoral, or illogical, or moral, or logical. Living in the now does not concern itself with such things. It's too busy living and dying. — James Riley

And this perhaps the ground for "necessity knows no law." But is exculpatory only on the basis of after-the-fact judgment whether by self or others. It seems to me, then, that while indeed there may be moments when morality suspends, it is not clear to me that it suspends entirely, or that in that moment we are free of it. And perhaps the loci of being bound lies equally in both fact and act of consideration and choosing.

And this perhaps the ground for "necessity knows no law." But is exculpatory only on the basis of after-the-fact judgment whether by self or others. It seems to me, then, that while indeed there may be moments when morality suspends, it is not clear to me that it suspends entirely, or that in that moment we are free of it. And perhaps the loci of being bound lies equally in both fact and act of consideration and choosing. — tim wood

:up:

I think consideration and choice themselves may be a leisure time activity.

The law often makes room for "heat of the moment" because it knows that, while an agent may have had an opportunity to avoid a situation in the first place, that is all Monday Morning Quarterbacking once the shit hits the fan. He can be punished for placing himself in the situation, but excused for acting like a human (animal) in the heat of the moment. In other words, the law is smart enough to know it's limits.

Punishment is usually then designed to dissuade the agent, or others, from making choices that may result in what we consider (in after-the-fact ruminations) to be immoral. Take this Kyle Rittenhouse for example. I think they should burn him down. I might have shot when he shot, but I would not have placed myself in that situation in the first place. And I would not have placed myself there because I am a moral agent; not because some law threatened me with punishment for being stupid. But stupid people exist, and punishment should be designed to dissuade them and other stupid people from acting stupid.

If the law fails to dissuade, it can expect repeat performances. Indeed, it may very well incite. I say burn him down like a murderer to avoid stupidity. Momma needs some schooling too.

But here we are, talking about morality. I don't think that can be equated to acting morally.

I learn from your comments.

I learn from your comments. — tim wood

:blush: :sweat: I hope that is a good thing. Thanks.

C'mon, Fool. — 180 Proof

:grin: Sometimes I go too far but then some of us don't go to where a path actually leads, preferring to find a comfortable spot and make it their home! I'm a nomad!

A question: Why can't the world of ideas be lived in, experienced as a wanderer? Why do people expect you to, well, settle down in a manner of speaking?

I've never viewed morality as pain/suffering. — James Riley

Moral theories then, are theories. Whether a theory is a mental reflex or not is yet another conisderation that has nothing to do with the event (pain/suffering). It's you and I sitting around talking about it, thinking about it; not living it. — James Riley

Empathy, does it exist?

David Chalmer's hard problem of consciousness and, more generally, theory vs praxis (Mary's room argument). Why does a discussion on morality end up becoming one on consciousness? Is this some kind of a package deal?

Compassion arises with the identification of other, as just another self, or an expanded concept of self. — boagie

Expansion from a certain vantage point but contraction from another. When I feel more for others, I feel less for myself.

Since animals are not moral agents, I never understood efforts made to explain morality through animal behavior. — Tzeentch

A very good point.

Modal logic:

1. □P $\rightarrow$ ◇P

It's like looking for water in the desert or something like that.

I'll leave it at that.

Again, "moral" is an articulation – generalization – of eusocial group behavior which exercises-reinforces empathic responses in group members. — 180 Proof

In my view, morality is not tied to group behavior; acknowledging the absence of ultimate answers, to live a moral life is to strive to live in accordance with truth. Whether the truth gives rise to empathy in the individual is not relevant to it, nor is the question of whether living in accordance with truth is beneficial to whatever group one arbitrarily is thought to be a part of.

Groups are by their very definition a generalization and thus an inaccurate representation of truth and not useful in determining what is true and moral and what is not.

Volition ("free will") is enabled-constrained in a web of normative behaviors (i.e. adaptive habits) for maintaining, or optimizing, individual flourishing and collective sustainability, and therefore, at least in compatibilist terms, "free will" is neither an independent nor determinative variable. — 180 Proof

Yet, I could use my free will to act contrary to my individual flourishing or collective sustainability if I so desired. So I don't think such a constraint is present, except there where it is self-imposed, out of free will. Though, the sense of free will seems to not be present in all individuals to the same degree.

Perhaps then free will must first be attained, through a process of self-mastery.

It seems that through observation of the self one can gain insight into the biological drives behind one's behavior, and override these behaviors - something animals are not capable of. Moving sub- or unconscious processes to the level of the conscious, thus allowing adjustment to take place.

This is why creatures, whether they be human or animal, that lack the faculties described previously, cannot be thought of as moral agents. They are essentially automatons.

To be a moral agent then is perhaps a great priviledge to begin with.

Your libertarian(?) view, Tzeentch, seems to elevate Human primates "above" nature – "transcendence" typical of idealists and/or ""free will" theodicists – as if we're somehow "mysteriously more than" evolved mammals (i.e. with "souls" à la homunculi), ... — 180 Proof

Hardly all humans manage to elevate themselves above nature, in fact most don't. So I would not make such a generalization about humanity as a whole. I believe every individual has at its essence at least the potential to become something greater than a simple animal - to master the self and become free, thus to become a moral agent, be able to strive towards truth and Good, and to live a life wrought with meaning.

..., we're talking about wholly incommensurate conceptions of morality and, in effect, past each other. — 180 Proof

Undoubtedly, but I don't mind.

Why can't the world of ideas be lived in, experienced as a wanderer? — TheMadFool

Who says one can't? (e.g. Socrates, Montaigne, Nietzsche, Cioran, S. Weil, I. Murdoch ...)

Why do people expect you to, well, settle down in a manner of speaking?

Insomniacs tend to disturb sleepwalkers.

In my view, morality is not tied to group behavior ... — Tzeentch

Idealism (i.e. disembodied cognition / volition). :roll:

They [animals] are essentially automatons.

Descartes' error. (vide A. Damasio)

So I would not make such a generalization about humanity as a whole.

Neither would I. It's strongly implied nonetheless by the (seemingly) 'anthropocentric idealist' position you take on 'morality'.

Perhaps morality needs a combination of logic and emotion in order for it to be balanced. Logic or rationality is needed to assess the best course of action, juggling possible effects. However, there may also be need for emotional aspects as a motivating factor to aid an approach which involves empathy or compassion too.

Who says one can't? (e.g. Socrates, Montaigne, Nietzsche, Cioran, S. Weil, I. Murdoch ...) — 180 Proof

Yeah, ideas/philosophies/theories are like ports to a ship - some are friendly, relaxing, exhilirating places, others are hostile, disturbing, dull as ditchwater - but there really is no reason why a ship must remain at any particular one. As you said, homo viator or, our friend @Wayfarer.